| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
07852cabc1
The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container. `nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the `containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts, its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`, `networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv` path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines. The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge — so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not afford in the first place. Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix diff: - The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which it refuses to load at all. - The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the containment. - The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing. - `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter. Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer; it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit), `service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as "ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`. Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't. Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710 tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts emptied. |
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| .. | ||
| src | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
hive-host-sock
Wire types for the host admin socket (/run/hyperhive/host.sock) — the
host-control protocol spoken between the hivectl operator CLI and the
hive-c0re daemon.
Why it's its own crate
Re-homed out of hive-sh4re so a standalone hivectl depends on just this
protocol crate instead of the whole daemon-shared crate. hivectl drives the
full hive (spawn / kill / destroy / rebuild / deploy) over this socket without
linking hive-c0re; keeping the request/response shapes here is what makes that
thin dependency possible.
Shape
Serde-derived request/response enums for the host admin protocol. The larger
shared payload types some variants reference (Approval, AgentStatusRow)
stay in hive-sh4re — this crate is only the protocol envelope, no server or
client implementation.
Its own jobs module is the exception: the job-queue vocabulary hivectl
needs (Source, State, PermPayload, NodeId) is protocol-local. The typed
DagView/NodeView projection that used to live there is gone — the queue is
served as a generic graph (hive-jobq-wire), not as a second hand-written
view.
See docs/boundary.md (host admin socket access) for the trust model around who
may connect to the socket, and hive-priv-sock for the sibling split on the
privileged-helper socket.