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hyperhive/swarm-authelia-bridge
Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
atlas bed4358e19 swarm options: no swarm.* value depends on a deploy option or this host's hive
- swarm.serviceDomains lists every swarm service name on every host. The
  store's issuing role is built from it, so the store now admits a leaf
  for grafana, metrics, otel, logs, the bao UI and the apex whichever host
  runs the store. Each gateway's own leaf stays narrowed by
  localServiceDomains.
- swarm.matrix.apiUrl defaults to http://<swarm.matrix.gatewayHost>
  (null when gatewayHost is null) instead of loopback on the matrix host.
- The authelia vhost proxies /bridge/ to swarm-authelia-bridge with the
  prefix stripped, and deploy.swarm-controller.authBridgeUrl defaults to
  ${swarm.authelia.url}/bridge on every host. swarm.authelia.bridgeUrl is
  removed.
- swarm-authelia-bridge admits only swarm-controller's OIDC client on
  every request (403 for any other active token), configured by
  SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CONTROLLER_CLIENT_ID (renamed from
  ..._OPERATOR_READER_CLIENT_ID, which gated ListOperators alone).
- swarm.peerHives is removed; swarm-wireguard.nix filters this host's own
  hive out of swarm.hives itself.

Closes #4933
2026-10-04 18:13:47 +02:00
..
src swarm options: no swarm.* value depends on a deploy option or this host's hive 2026-10-04 18:13:47 +02:00
Cargo.toml fix(#3344): type the roster entry's name as Ident, per review 2026-08-20 00:15:48 +02:00
README.md swarm options: no swarm.* value depends on a deploy option or this host's hive 2026-10-04 18:13:47 +02:00

swarm-authelia-bridge

The only thing allowed to write swarm-authelia's users database.

Why this exists

swarm-controller's CreateIdentity job needs to add an agent as an authelia subject, but swarm-controller runs unprivileged and does not own users.yml — a different uid does (authelia-swarm, the user services.authelia.instances.swarm runs as). Root/CAP_CHOWN/a shared group were all examined and rejected during this crate's design thread — see swarmctl/README.md's identical analysis of this same file, written before this crate existed.

The fix: run this process as User = "authelia-swarm"; instead — inside the swarm-authelia container, alongside authelia itself — so it simply owns the file it writes. No elevated privilege anywhere.

Shape

  • One endpoint, POST /requests, body = swarm-authelia-bridge-sock's BridgeRequest verbatim — EnsureAgentIdentity (idempotently ensure an agent exists as an authelia subject), ListAgentIdentities (the roster: the subjects carrying the agent marker group, names only) and ListOperators (the operator group's usernames).
  • Bearer-authenticated via authelia's own OIDC token introspection (RFC 7662), against swarm-controller's existing machine-client identity (already minted for the queue connection) — no new credential. ⚠️ Every request admits only the client named by SWARM_AUTHELIA_BRIDGE_CONTROLLER_CLIENT_ID (swarm-controller's) and answers every other active token 403: authelia issues machine tokens to every hive and its agents too.
  • No restart of authelia after a write — relies on authentication_backend.file.watch, confirmed working against the pinned 4.39.20 build during this design work.
  • Listens on loopback. The authelia vhost proxies /bridge/ to it with the prefix stripped, so swarm-controller on any host calls https://<swarm.authelia.domain>/bridge/requests.

One store, two writers

This bridge and swarmctl both read and write authelia's users.yml directly. That is the whole arrangement — neither keeps a private copy it considers canonical.

It used to be otherwise, and the seam was real: each side had its own users.json treated as authoritative, rendering the same physical users.yml. A writer whose own JSON was missing could not tell "nothing here yet" from "someone else's users", so it refused to write at all — which is exactly what a hive with existing users hit.

What still has to hold, since two processes share the file:

  • Read before write. Both do, so neither can drop a user the other added between operations.
  • Unknown keys survive. Both carry unmodelled top-level and per-user fields through a round-trip, or whichever writes second would silently delete what the first added.
  • Every user gets an email. A relying party asking for the claim fails rather than degrades, so both write paths fill in a synthetic address when none was supplied.

Neither restarts authelia: it watches the file. swarmctl could (it is root); this bridge deliberately cannot, and a reload that depends on which process wrote is not a reload.