# The swarm root CA: the anchor a whole swarm shares, and the issuer of # each hive's own CA (which is where it gets used — see ./hive-tls.nix). # # One root rather than per-peer pinning, because cross-hive trust is then # O(1): trust the root once and every present *and future* peer validates, # instead of every hive having to name every other one. # # Two provisioning modes share ONE structure — what differs is who puts # the artifacts on disk, never what the artifacts are. Which mode does # what, and what moving between them costs: # `docs/swarm/ca.md::Two provisioning modes, one structure`. # # ⚠️ Root key AND root cert are runtime files, never nix options. The key # for the obvious reason; the cert as a consequence, and that one costs # something real — nothing whose trust store is built at build time can # name it: `docs/swarm/ca.md::Distributing the root`. # # ⚠️ This root no longer issues the swarm's SERVICE certificates, and the # `swarm-services-ca` sub-CA that used to sit under it is gone rather than # moved. Those come out of the secret store's own `pki` mount now, anchored # on a root generated inside it (./swarm-bao.nix), and ./hive-tls.nix asks # for them over the network instead of signing them here. What is left here # is one job: the anchor each hive's own CA is issued under. { lib, config, pkgs, ... }: let cfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.ca; hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive; # The subject CN is a label for a human reading a chain, not an # identity anything authenticates against. Fall through swarm name → # hive domain → a constant so a hive that has set neither still # evaluates; a missing `domain` is reported by its own assertion in # hive-network.nix, and shouldn't also surface here as a null. swarmLabel = if hyperhiveCfg.swarm.name != null then hyperhiveCfg.swarm.name else if hyperhiveCfg.domain != null then hyperhiveCfg.domain else "hyperhive"; in { options.services.hyperhive.swarm.ca = { autoConfigure = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.bool; default = false; example = true; description = '' Run the whole swarm CA on this one host: generate the swarm root when it is missing, and issue this hive's CA under it. `services.hyperhive.deploy.singleHostSwarm` turns this on as part of the all-on-one-box mode. Set it here directly to run the CA on a host that is not otherwise all-local. **Off by default, deliberately.** A swarm's services and its hives can live on different hosts, and this host has no way to tell whether it is the one holding the root — so the swarm CA is something an operator sets up, not something a host decides it is. Turn this on for an all-on-one-host deployment (dev boxes, single-hive swarms) and get the hierarchy for free. With it off, both artifacts are operator-provided: the root under `stateDir`, and this hive's CA under `services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.tls.stateDir`. A hive given neither keeps the self-signed CA it has always had — it simply isn't part of a swarm's trust hierarchy, which is the correct outcome for a hive nobody has federated yet. ''; }; stateDir = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.str; default = "/var/lib/swarm-ca"; description = '' Host directory holding the swarm root CA: `root.pem` (the anchor, safe to distribute — copy it to this same path on every other host in the swarm) and `root-key.pem` (0600, the one file that must never reach the nix store or another host). The directory itself is 0700: nothing reads out of it but the hive CA issuance in `hive-tls.nix`. Moving the swarm CA to its own host is a matter of moving this directory and setting `autoConfigure = false` here. ''; }; validityDays = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.int; default = 10950; description = '' Validity window of the swarm root CA in days (default ~30y). Deliberately longer than `services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.tls.caValidityDays`: the root must outlive the hive CAs it issues, or those chains expire out from under hives that are still perfectly happy with their own intermediate. Rotating a root is the one operation in this system with no partial-failure mode — it invalidates every peer at once, paced by the slowest peer's rebuild — so it is never automatic and this window is meant to be uneventful. ''; }; }; config = lib.mkIf (hyperhiveCfg.enable && cfg.autoConfigure) { # A CA that fails to issue is invisible until something makes a TLS call # hours later, so this oneshot is worth more than most services. services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [ "swarm-ca" ]; systemd.services.swarm-ca = { description = "Generate the swarm root CA when absent"; wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ]; path = [ pkgs.openssl ]; serviceConfig = { Type = "oneshot"; RemainAfterExit = true; UMask = "0077"; # Pin the journal identity (else it's the `script` store-path wrapper). SyslogIdentifier = "swarm-ca"; }; script = '' set -euo pipefail d=${lib.escapeShellArg cfg.stateDir} install -d -m 0700 "$d" root="$d/root.pem" rootk="$d/root-key.pem" # Note the asymmetry with the hive CA in hive-tls.nix, which # regenerates itself once expired: a root is never replaced # automatically, not even an expired one. Consumers hold this # cert, so replacing it is a swarm-wide flag day that wants an # operator running it deliberately, with both roots trusted # across the overlap. if [ -s "$root" ] && [ -s "$rootk" ]; then echo "swarm root CA already present at $root — leaving it alone" exit 0 fi # Half a root is not a root. Generating a fresh key beside an # already-distributed cert (or the reverse) leaves every # consumer trusting an anchor that no longer signs anything — # and it would look like it worked. if [ -e "$root" ] || [ -e "$rootk" ]; then echo "swarm root CA half-provisioned ($root / $rootk) — refusing to generate over it" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "generating swarm root CA at $root" # pathlen:1 — the root signs hive CAs, which sign leaves. One # intermediate below the root and no deeper. openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -sha256 \ -days ${toString cfg.validityDays} \ -keyout "$rootk" -out "$root" \ -subj "/CN=swarm-ca ${swarmLabel}" \ -addext "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1" \ -addext "keyUsage=critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign" chmod 0600 "$rootk" chmod 0644 "$root" ''; }; }; }