//! Per-agent authorization: the one [`Permission`] set an agent holds.
//!
//! The set lives in the swarm's `agent-permissions` record
//! (`swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions`), one list per agent. Each member
//! is enforced where it applies: the MCP-tool and built-in-tool members by
//! the processes that spawn `claude` (the agent harness and the subagent
//! daemon), [`Permission::ManageRootAgent`] by hive-c0re's bind mounts. An
//! agent the swarm sets nothing for holds [`Permission::default_for`].
//!
//! It also resolves the *built-in* claude tool list ([`builtin_tools_for`]):
//! that set is permission-gated too (`web_tools`), so it belongs here rather
//! than in any one consumer. Both processes that spawn a `claude` call the
//! same function, so a subagent can never be handed a built-in its parent
//! does not have — with one deliberate exception:
//! [`subagent_builtin_tools_for`] additionally grants a **subagent** Claude's
//! own `Bash` when the parent holds [`Permission::Execution`]. The parent
//! never gets built-in `Bash` itself (it has the out-of-process `bash` MCP
//! server instead); the permission transfers to a subagent, not the
//! mechanism.

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// Built-in claude tools present in every session regardless of permissions.
/// Anything not in this list (and not added by a permission's
/// [`Permission::builtin_tools`]) literally doesn't exist in the session —
/// this is the `--tools` list, which holds even under
/// `--dangerously-skip-permissions`.
///
/// Web egress (`WebFetch`/`WebSearch`) is permission-gated (`web_tools`) and so
/// lives there, off by default. Nested agents (`Task`/`Agent`) are
/// intentionally omitted. `Bash` is disallowed — shell execution goes
/// through `mcp__bash__run` (background tasks with structured output via
/// `hive-bash-mcp`) instead of a raw interactive shell. `TodoWrite` is
/// omitted because the todo list lives in claude's in-process session state
/// and silently evaporates on /compact or session reset — agents should
/// plan in /state notes instead. `Skill` is included so installed plugin
/// skills (`base@hyperhive` and friends) are actually invokable — without
/// it here, every `SKILL.md`'s `description` frontmatter is inert: the
/// model never sees the tool that triggers a skill, no matter how well it
/// matches the task at hand.
pub const ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS: &[&str] = &["Edit", "Glob", "Grep", "Read", "Skill", "Write"];

/// The built-in claude tools `perms` resolve to: [`ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS`]
/// plus each permission's own built-ins, de-duplicated, base set first.
///
/// ⚠️ The result is a claude `--tools` value once joined, and must **never be
/// empty** — not because of what an empty value does, but because we don't
/// know. Our own measurement and the installed `claude --help` disagree about
/// whether `--tools ""` means "no tools" or parses as the flag being unset,
/// and the answer is a property of whichever claude release is installed.
/// [`ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS`] is non-empty, which keeps the case from arising.
///
/// ⚠️ This governs built-ins only. `mcp__*` tools are not filtered by
/// `--tools` at all; they are governed by `--strict-mcp-config` plus
/// whatever the caller renders into `--mcp-config`.
#[must_use]
pub fn builtin_tools_for(perms: &[Permission]) -> Vec<&'static str> {
    let mut tools: Vec<&'static str> = ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS.to_vec();
    for perm in perms {
        for tool in perm.builtin_tools() {
            if !tools.contains(tool) {
                tools.push(tool);
            }
        }
    }
    tools
}

/// [`builtin_tools_for`] plus Claude's built-in `Bash`, granted iff `perms`
/// contains [`Permission::Execution`] — the **subagent**-only `--tools`
/// resolution.
///
/// `Execution` already grants shell execution to the parent agent, via the
/// out-of-process `bash` MCP server (`mcp__bash__run`/`status`/`kill` —
/// see the variant's own doc comment). A subagent has no MCP server at all
/// by default (`docs/tools/subagent.md`), so there is no `mcp__bash__*` for
/// it to inherit that permission through; it gets Claude's own `Bash`
/// instead.
///
/// 🩸 Deliberately **not** folded into [`builtin_tools_for`]/[`Permission::builtin_tools`]:
/// those are shared with the harness's own `--tools`, and the main agent must
/// never gain built-in `Bash` no matter which permissions it holds — only a
/// *subagent* spawned by an `Execution`-holding parent does.
#[must_use]
pub fn subagent_builtin_tools_for(perms: &[Permission]) -> Vec<&'static str> {
    let mut tools = builtin_tools_for(perms);
    if perms.contains(&Permission::Execution) {
        tools.push("Bash");
    }
    tools
}

/// One thing an agent may be permitted. Stored by its `snake_case` name.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, strum::IntoStaticStr)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum Permission {
    /// `send`, `recv`, `ack_until`
    Messaging,
    /// `get_agent_meta` (`set_status` is always-on — see `ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS`)
    Meta,
    /// `get_loose_ends`, `cancel_loose_end`, `remind`
    Inbox,
    /// Gates whether the `bash` MCP server (`mcp__bash__run`/`status`/
    /// `kill`) is rendered into the agent's config at all — see
    /// `extra_server_required_permission` in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`.
    /// `tools()` returns `&[]`: this isn't a `mcp__hyperhive__*`
    /// allowlist entry, the gate lives at config-render time instead.
    Execution,
    /// Claude built-in web egress tools: `WebFetch` (retrieve a URL) and
    /// `WebSearch` (search the web). Both are omitted from `--tools`
    /// without it; holding it enables them in the session and in
    /// `--allowedTools` so they run without a confirmation prompt.
    WebTools,
    /// Agent may manage *any* agent in the hive. Concretely, hive-c0re
    /// bind-mounts every agent's state dir (RW) and config dir (RO) into the
    /// holder's container, plus `/applied` and `/meta` read-only, so the
    /// holder can recover an agent that is down. See
    /// `lifecycle::host_config::set_nspawn_flags`.
    ///
    /// The name is historical, from when "the root agent" was the widest
    /// thing to manage. Kept under that spelling because every stored grant
    /// carries it.
    ManageRootAgent,
}

impl Permission {
    /// Every permission in a stable order.
    pub const ALL: &'static [Self] = &[
        Self::Messaging,
        Self::Meta,
        Self::Inbox,
        Self::Execution,
        Self::WebTools,
        Self::ManageRootAgent,
    ];

    /// What an agent the swarm sets nothing for holds.
    pub const DEFAULT: &'static [Self] =
        &[Self::Messaging, Self::Meta, Self::Inbox, Self::Execution];

    /// What `agent` holds when the swarm sets nothing for it: [`Self::DEFAULT`],
    /// plus [`Self::ManageRootAgent`] for the root agent
    /// ([`crate::manager::MANAGER_AGENT`]), which recovers the others.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn default_for(agent: &str) -> Vec<Self> {
        let mut perms = Self::DEFAULT.to_vec();
        if agent == crate::manager::MANAGER_AGENT {
            perms.push(Self::ManageRootAgent);
        }
        perms
    }

    /// The MCP tool names (without the `mcp__hyperhive__` prefix) this
    /// permission grants. Empty for the permissions that grant something
    /// else; see each variant's doc comment.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
        match self {
            Self::Messaging => &["send", "recv", "ack_until"],
            Self::Meta => &["get_agent_meta"],
            Self::Inbox => &["get_loose_ends", "cancel_loose_end", "remind"],
            // `Execution` grants the out-of-process `bash` MCP server,
            // gated at config-render time in `hive-agent/src/mcp_config.rs`
            // — an out-of-process server has no later enforcement point, so
            // that gate is the actual security boundary. `WebTools` grants
            // Claude built-ins (`builtin_tools()`); `ManageRootAgent` grants
            // bind mounts.
            Self::Execution | Self::WebTools | Self::ManageRootAgent => &[],
        }
    }

    /// MCP tools that are always exposed regardless of which permissions an
    /// agent holds. `set_status` lives here because the operator
    /// dashboard depends on every agent being able to report its status
    /// chip — gating it would let a misconfigured agent go dark on the
    /// dashboard. The server-side `SetStatus` handler has no permission
    /// check either (only length validation), so listing it here keeps the
    /// `--allowedTools` list honest with that reality.
    ///
    /// `compact` lives here too: it's pure self-management (no cross-agent
    /// effect, no privilege), gated server-side on context usage, and every
    /// agent should be able to reach for it — same reasoning as `set_status`.
    ///
    /// `mark_todos_done` too: todos are pushed to an agent whether or not it
    /// holds `Inbox` (which only gates `get_loose_ends`/`cancel_loose_end`/
    /// `remind`), so an agent without `Inbox` must still be able to clear
    /// them.
    pub const ALWAYS_ON_TOOLS: &'static [&'static str] =
        &["set_status", "compact", "mark_todos_done"];

    /// The Claude built-in tool names this permission enables. Only
    /// `WebTools` returns a non-empty slice.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn builtin_tools(self) -> &'static [&'static str] {
        match self {
            Self::WebTools => &["WebFetch", "WebSearch"],
            _ => &[],
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// The stored names are the `snake_case` spellings the old tool-group
    /// and capability files used, so an imported grant decodes.
    #[test]
    fn stored_names_are_snake_case() {
        let names: Vec<&str> = Permission::ALL.iter().map(|p| <&str>::from(*p)).collect();
        assert_eq!(
            names,
            [
                "messaging",
                "meta",
                "inbox",
                "execution",
                "web_tools",
                "manage_root_agent"
            ]
        );
        for perm in Permission::ALL {
            let json = serde_json::to_string(perm).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(json, format!("\"{}\"", <&str>::from(*perm)));
        }
        assert!(serde_json::from_str::<Permission>("\"lifecycle\"").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn only_the_root_agent_defaults_to_managing_the_others() {
        assert_eq!(
            Permission::default_for("atlas"),
            Permission::DEFAULT.to_vec()
        );
        let ruth = Permission::default_for(crate::manager::MANAGER_AGENT);
        assert!(ruth.contains(&Permission::ManageRootAgent));
        assert_eq!(&ruth[..Permission::DEFAULT.len()], Permission::DEFAULT);
    }

    /// Adding permissions only ever adds built-ins — the base set is in every
    /// resolution, and no permission can remove one. Both `--tools` callers (the
    /// harness and the subagent daemon) rely on this to reason about "the
    /// parent's set" without re-deriving it.
    #[test]
    fn builtin_tools_are_the_base_set_plus_whatever_the_permissions_add() {
        assert_eq!(
            builtin_tools_for(&[]),
            ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS.to_vec(),
            "no permissions resolves to exactly the base set"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            builtin_tools_for(Permission::DEFAULT),
            ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS.to_vec(),
            "the default permissions add no built-ins"
        );
        for perm in Permission::ALL {
            let resolved = builtin_tools_for(&[*perm]);
            for base in ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS {
                assert!(resolved.contains(base), "{perm:?} dropped {base}");
            }
        }
    }

    /// `web_tools` is the one permission that widens the built-in set, and it is
    /// opt-in. A subagent inherits this resolution rather than a list of its
    /// own precisely so it cannot get web egress from a parent without the
    /// permission.
    #[test]
    fn web_egress_is_present_only_with_the_web_tools_permission() {
        let with = builtin_tools_for(&[Permission::WebTools]);
        assert!(with.contains(&"WebFetch") && with.contains(&"WebSearch"));
        let without = builtin_tools_for(Permission::DEFAULT);
        assert!(!without.contains(&"WebFetch") && !without.contains(&"WebSearch"));
    }

    /// No resolution may produce an empty `--tools` value. What an empty one
    /// means is disputed and release-dependent (see [`builtin_tools_for`]),
    /// so this pins the rule that makes the question moot rather than any
    /// answer to it.
    #[test]
    fn no_permission_combination_resolves_to_an_empty_tools_arg() {
        assert!(!ALLOWED_BUILTIN_TOOLS.is_empty());
        assert!(!builtin_tools_for(&[]).is_empty());
        assert!(!builtin_tools_for(Permission::ALL).is_empty());
    }

    /// Built-ins are not MCP tools and the two lists must not be mixed: a
    /// `mcp__*` name in `--tools` would be silently inert, since `--tools`
    /// does not filter the MCP surface at all.
    #[test]
    fn the_builtin_list_names_no_mcp_tools() {
        for tool in builtin_tools_for(Permission::ALL) {
            assert!(!tool.contains("__"), "{tool} looks like an MCP tool name");
        }
    }

    /// A subagent whose parent holds `Execution` gets Claude's own `Bash` —
    /// the parent already has shell execution (via the out-of-process
    /// `bash` MCP server), and a subagent has no MCP server of its own to
    /// inherit that through, so it gets Claude's built-in tool instead.
    #[test]
    fn subagent_gets_bash_when_parent_has_execution() {
        let tools = subagent_builtin_tools_for(&[Permission::Execution]);
        assert!(tools.contains(&"Bash"));
    }

    /// 🎯 The negative case that matters: without `Execution`, a subagent
    /// must not get `Bash` either. Without this, a later refactor that
    /// grants it unconditionally would go unnoticed.
    #[test]
    fn subagent_gets_no_bash_without_execution() {
        for permissions in [&[][..], &[Permission::Messaging, Permission::WebTools][..]] {
            let tools = subagent_builtin_tools_for(permissions);
            assert!(
                !tools.contains(&"Bash"),
                "{permissions:?} must not grant Bash"
            );
        }
    }

    /// The parent (harness) resolver is untouched: `builtin_tools_for` —
    /// what `hive-agent`'s own `--tools` and
    /// `--allowedTools` are built from — never produce `Bash`, with or
    /// without `Execution`. Only the subagent-specific resolver above adds
    /// it; the operator's ruling was explicit that the main agent does not.
    #[test]
    fn parent_resolver_never_gains_bash() {
        for permissions in [&[][..], &[Permission::Execution][..], Permission::ALL] {
            let tools = builtin_tools_for(permissions);
            assert!(
                !tools.contains(&"Bash"),
                "{permissions:?} must not grant Bash to the parent"
            );
        }
    }
}