//! The read agreement: which credentials a hive's own token may fetch.
//!
//! The mirror of [`crate::matrix`]. That module says where a credential lives;
//! this one says who is allowed to read it, and the two have to agree on the
//! same path or a delivery fails with a 403 that names nothing.
//!
//! ⚠️ Every hive gets the same document, and it grants read on **every**
//! agent's credentials rather than on the ones that hive hosts. That is a
//! decision, not an oversight: an agent's path does not name its hive, so a
//! per-hive grant has to be enumerated and re-emitted, and an enumeration that
//! can silently drift advertises a boundary it does not hold. A wide grant that
//! says so beats a narrow one that only looks narrow. The narrower shapes, and
//! what they would cost, are in `docs/trust-boundary/security.md`.
//!
//! Rendering stays separate from writing so the text can be asserted with no
//! store to talk to.

use crate::{
    Error,
    path::{AGENT_PREFIX, MOUNT, checked_segment},
};

/// Namespace for a hive's own policy and cert-auth role.
///
/// The controller's own grant is scoped to `hive-*` for both, so this prefix is
/// the difference between a hive the controller may provision and a policy it
/// must not be able to rewrite — including its own.
pub const HIVE_PREFIX: &str = "hive-";

/// The policy and cert-auth role name for `hive`. One name, both objects: the
/// role attaches the policy by spelling it identically.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `hive` holds anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`.
pub fn hive_object_name(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
    checked_segment("hive", hive)?;
    Ok(format!("{HIVE_PREFIX}{hive}"))
}

/// Render the document every hive's policy holds: read on every agent's
/// credentials.
///
/// Takes no arguments because it depends on nothing — same text for every
/// hive, unchanged by which agents exist. That is what makes it a deploy-time
/// object rather than derived state with a re-emission to get wrong.
///
/// Read-only: the controller mints these and never reads one back.
#[must_use]
pub fn render() -> String {
    format!("path \"{MOUNT}/data/{AGENT_PREFIX}/*\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}}\n")
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn the_document_grants_read_over_the_whole_agent_prefix() {
        assert_eq!(
            render(),
            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_grant_is_read_only() {
        // The half of the old policy that survives the widening: a hive reads
        // credentials, and a hive that could write one could hand itself an
        // agent's identity.
        let p = render();
        assert!(!p.contains("create"));
        assert!(!p.contains("update"));
        assert!(!p.contains("delete"));
        assert!(!p.contains("list"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn no_name_reaches_the_document_at_all() {
        // Why the injection cases that used to live here are gone rather than
        // relaxed: nothing interpolates into the text any more, so there is no
        // stanza for a name to close. `hive_object_name` still validates,
        // because a name does reach the policy's *identifier*.
        let p = render();
        assert!(!p.contains("pr1ma"));
        assert_eq!(p.matches("path \"").count(), 1, "one stanza, no per-agent");
        assert!(
            hive_object_name("atlas/*\" { capabilities = [\"root\"] }").is_err(),
            "the object NAME is still a place a name can do damage"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
        // The control for the case above: if every name were refused, that
        // assertion would pass while proving nothing.
        assert!(hive_object_name("a-b_C9").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn every_hive_gets_a_byte_identical_document() {
        // The property the deploy-time write depends on: nothing about a hive
        // or its agents changes the text, so there is nothing to re-emit.
        assert_eq!(render(), render());
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_object_name_sits_inside_the_namespace_the_controller_may_write() {
        // `hive-` is what the controller's own policy scopes both
        // `sys/policies/acl/` and `auth/cert/certs/` to, so a name outside it
        // is one the controller cannot create at all.
        let n = hive_object_name("pr1ma").expect("legal");
        assert_eq!(n, "hive-pr1ma");
        assert!(n.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
    }
}