# Glue: the matrix registration token comes from the secret store.
#
# The store's first reader, and deliberately a small one. It fetches an opaque
# 32-byte value and writes it where ./hive-matrix.nix already looks — the
# homeserver never learns the store exists, and its config is unchanged.
#
# ⚠️ Why this credential first. It has no second file and no format: authelia's
# OIDC secret needs a `.secret` *and* a matching `.digest`, so shipping that
# one first would debug "can a reader authenticate and get bytes back" and
# "did we write authelia's file format right" at the same time, with an SSO
# outage as the failure mode. Here the failure is narrow — new agent accounts
# cannot be provisioned, existing ones are untouched, nothing crash-loops.
#
# ⚠️ The fallback is today's behaviour, not a new one. `hive-matrix.nix`'s
# activation script still mints a token when the file is absent; this unit
# overwrites it with the swarm's copy when the store has one. A store that is
# empty or unreachable leaves a working hive with a local token.
#
# 📌 This runs wherever a client identity is configured, NOT only where the
# store is. `deploy.bao.enable` would have been the co-location assumption
# itself; the reader needs a certificate, not a neighbour. On the store's own
# host ./glue-bao-tls.nix supplies one as a `mkDefault` and nothing changes;
# elsewhere an operator places the leaf and names it, and the same unit works.
{
  pkgs,
  lib,
  config,
  ...
}:
let
  hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
  deployCfg = hyperhiveCfg.deploy;
  baoCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao;

  baoDeploy = deployCfg.bao;

  # What decides whether this unit exists at all. A reader is defined by holding
  # a certificate the store accepts, and that is true on the store's own host
  # and on a hive three networks away for exactly the same reason.
  haveClientIdentity = baoDeploy.clientCertFile != null && baoDeploy.clientKeyFile != null;

  # Where the token lives in the store. A path, not a convention to guess at:
  # whoever writes it and whoever reads it must agree, and the agreement
  # belongs in one visible place.
  tokenPath = "secret/swarm/matrix/registration-token";

  # A literal, not an option — ./hive-matrix.nix names its container
  # `containers.hive-matrix` directly and declares no `machine` to derive it
  # from, which the trust-bundle call in that file already says out loud.
  # ⚠️ A `swarm.matrix.machine` read parses fine and fails at module-system
  # resolution, so this is the kind of mistake only reading the target module
  # catches.
  matrixMachine = "hive-matrix";
in
{
  config = lib.mkIf (hyperhiveCfg.enable && haveClientIdentity && deployCfg.matrix.enable) {
    # Same rule as the unit's own gate: this reader exists on a host that has a
    # client identity and a homeserver, which is not every host that runs the
    # store, so the store's module cannot name it.
    services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [ "swarm-bao-matrix-token" ];

    systemd.services.swarm-bao-matrix-token = {
      description = "fetch the matrix registration token from the swarm secret store";
      # Every one of these names a unit that exists only where the store runs.
      # `Requires=` on an absent unit fails the job outright, so the ordering is
      # conditional even though the read is not: off-host there is nothing local
      # to wait for, and the timeout below is what bounds the attempt instead.
      after = lib.optionals baoDeploy.enable [
        "swarm-bao-pki.service"
        "container@${baoCfg.machine}.service"
      ];
      wants = lib.optionals baoDeploy.enable [ "container@${baoCfg.machine}.service" ];
      requires = lib.optionals baoDeploy.enable [ "swarm-bao-pki.service" ];
      before = [ "container@${matrixMachine}.service" ];
      wantedBy = [ "container@${matrixMachine}.service" ];
      path = [
        deployCfg.bao.package
        pkgs.coreutils
      ];
      # Sized for the race this loses, not for an unseal. `swarm-bao` comes up
      # seconds before this unit asks, and the cert-auth role it logs in
      # against is written seconds after — so a few short attempts cover it.
      # ⚠️ `swarm-bao-controller-policy`'s 2880 × 30s is NOT the model to copy.
      # That unit blocks nothing; this one is `Before=` the homeserver's
      # container, and whether that ordering waits across an auto-restart is
      # unverified — so an hours-long window would be a bet on an unknown,
      # where a minute is not. A store still sealed after it keeps the degrade
      # below, as today.
      #
      # `StartLimit*` are `[Unit]` settings, so they go here and not in
      # `serviceConfig` — systemd ignores them under `[Service]`. The window
      # has to exceed `RestartSec × burst`.
      startLimitBurst = 4;
      startLimitIntervalSec = 300;
      serviceConfig = {
        Type = "oneshot";
        RemainAfterExit = true;
        # What actually bounds the read below. Stated here rather than
        # left to systemd's default, so the number a boot waits on is in
        # the file that waits.
        TimeoutStartSec = 30;
        Restart = "on-failure";
        RestartSec = 15;
      };
      environment = {
        BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
        BAO_CLIENT_CERT = baoDeploy.clientCertFile;
        BAO_CLIENT_KEY = baoDeploy.clientKeyFile;
      }
      # Absent means the system trust store, which is what a deployment with a
      # real CA wants and what a self-signed one must not be left with.
      // lib.optionalAttrs (baoDeploy.serverCaFile != null) {
        BAO_CACERT = baoDeploy.serverCaFile;
      };
      script = ''
        set -euo pipefail

        # A sealed or uninitialised store answers on the port and never
        # answers the read, so "the store is up" is not the same as "the
        # store can answer". `TimeoutStartSec` above is the bound; the
        # homeserver only `Wants=` this unit, so hitting it degrades to
        # keeping the local token rather than holding up the container.
        # `bao`'s own message is the only thing separating a missing value
        # from a refused identity from an unreachable host. This unit's
        # degraded mode is correct for all three, so it reports which one
        # rather than asserting all three in a sentence of ours — a reader
        # that cannot say why it read nothing is indistinguishable from a
        # broken one.
        err="$(mktemp)"
        trap 'rm -f "$err"' EXIT

        # Cert auth is a login, not a transport setting. The `BAO_CLIENT_*`
        # variables above only decide which certificate the TLS handshake
        # presents; without a token `bao` asks its token helper instead, and
        # that is a `sh` this unit's `path` does not carry. `-token-only`
        # answers on stdout and skips the helper on both sides.
        #
        # Fails LOUDLY, unlike the read below: the three states a login failure
        # covers — store not up, sealed, role not written yet — are all things
        # a retry fixes, and `Restart=on-failure` above is what retries. Exiting
        # 0 here spends the whole boot on a condition that was seconds old.
        if ! BAO_TOKEN="$(bao login -method=cert -token-only 2>"$err")"; then
          echo "could not log in to swarm-bao with this host's certificate; keeping the token hive-matrix already has." >&2
          if [ -s "$err" ]; then
            cat "$err" >&2
          else
            echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
          fi
          exit 1
        fi
        export BAO_TOKEN

        if ! token="$(bao kv get -field=value ${lib.escapeShellArg tokenPath} 2>"$err")"; then
          echo "swarm-bao did not return ${tokenPath}; keeping the token hive-matrix already has." >&2
          if [ -s "$err" ]; then
            cat "$err" >&2
          else
            echo "bao failed without writing a diagnostic." >&2
          fi
          exit 0
        fi

        if [ -z "$token" ]; then
          echo "swarm-bao returned an empty ${tokenPath}; keeping the local token." >&2
          exit 0
        fi

        umask 077
        printf '%s\n' "$token" > ${lib.escapeShellArg (toString deployCfg.matrix.registrationTokenFile)}
        chmod 0600 ${lib.escapeShellArg (toString deployCfg.matrix.registrationTokenFile)}
      '';
    };
  };
}