# `checks.module-eval-grafana` — see ./lib.nix for the shared # rationale (why this suite exists, naming convention, "evaluates # not executes"). { pkgs, lib, self, nixosSystem, }: let inherit (import ./lib.nix { inherit pkgs lib self nixosSystem ; }) hive runGroup ; grafanaOldPath = hive { deploy.grafana.enable = true; swarm.grafana.socketDir = "/run/test-grafana-sock"; swarm.grafana.datasourceUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:19999"; swarm.grafana.logsDatasourceUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:19998"; swarm.grafana.plugins = [ ]; swarm.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory; }; # The metrics UI beside the IdP. It reads its secret out of the store like # every other Grafana host, so it needs a store identity like every other # Grafana host — the cert pair here is not scenery, it is the arm that would # have caught the deleted co-located copy unit coming back. grafanaWithAuthelia = hive { deploy.grafana.enable = true; deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ]; deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory; deploy.authelia.enable = true; deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem"; deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem"; }; # The same UI with the IdP on ANOTHER host and a store leaf placed by hand. # Knowing an IdP is not running one: `swarm.authelia.url` is what says this # swarm has SSO, and nothing about this host does. Identical to the fixture # above in everything the delivery path reads, which is the point. grafanaRemoteAuthelia = hive { deploy.grafana.enable = true; deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ]; deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory; swarm.authelia.url = "https://auth.example.invalid"; deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem"; deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem"; }; # A Grafana host holding no store identity. This used to be the shape the # module went QUIET on — no OIDC block, a warning, and a container whose # login form is off regardless, so no way in and nothing failed. It is kept # rather than deleted because the shape is still reachable by an operator; # what changed is the deliverable, from a warning nothing reads back to a # refusal naming the two options to set. Only the identity is missing, so an # arm below can name which refusal fired. grafanaNoIdentity = hive { deploy.grafana.enable = true; deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ]; deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory; swarm.authelia.url = "https://auth.example.invalid"; }; # The mirror image: the identity is placed, and the swarm names no IdP. The # other half of "SSO must always be configured", and isolated the same way — # exactly one thing wrong, so the arm reads one refusal. grafanaNoSso = hive { deploy.grafana.enable = true; deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ]; deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory; deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem"; deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem"; }; # Did ./host-modules/swarm-grafana.nix refuse this host, and for which of its # two reasons. An assertion is a config VALUE until something forces it — # `.config` never throws — so a fixture in a state the module refuses is # evaluable and the refusal is readable as data. That is what lets a case # check that a misconfiguration is REPORTED, rather than only that it is not # silently accepted. # # Matched on the option name the message names, not on its prose, so the # wording stays rewordable: the option name is the part an operator has to # act on, and a message that stopped naming it would be the actual defect. grafanaRefusedFor = m: option: lib.any ( a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.grafana.enable requires" a.message && lib.hasInfix option a.message ) m.assertions; cases = [ { # This fixture enables grafana and NOT authelia, which is the shape the # login form used to stay enabled in: the toggle read "both services are # on this host" rather than "grafana requires SSO". Grafana ships an # `admin`/`admin` account and its vhost is on the public gateway, so a # password box there is a way in whatever the topology. name = "grafana disables its local login form even where authelia is not on this host"; ok = grafanaOldPath.containers.swarm-grafana.config.services.grafana.settings.auth.disable_login_form; } { # The absence class this whole file is for, and the reported defect in one # arm: the OIDC block hung off "authelia is on this host", so the split # deployment got a Grafana with no SSO settings and no login form — no way # in at all. The block is emitted in every deployment now, so the negative # arm is not "no block elsewhere" but "the two do not name the same IdP": # each host's block has to point at the URL the SWARM names, and a block # built from `deploy.authelia` rather than `swarm.authelia.url` would pass # a presence check on both fixtures while sending one of them nowhere. name = "grafana's OIDC block names the swarm's IdP, wherever that IdP runs"; ok = let oauth = m: m.containers.swarm-grafana.config.services.grafana.settings."auth.generic_oauth"; remote = oauth grafanaRemoteAuthelia; local = oauth grafanaWithAuthelia; in remote.enabled && lib.hasInfix "https://auth.example.invalid/api/oidc/token" remote.token_url && local.enabled && lib.hasInfix "https://auth.t.local/api/oidc/token" local.token_url && !(lib.hasInfix "auth.example.invalid" local.token_url); } { # 🩸 The arm that guards the ruling this slice landed under. There is ONE # delivery route: the store reader, on every host that runs Grafana. The # negative names the deleted unit rather than a generic absence, because # the way this regresses is someone re-adding the co-located copy as an # optimisation — a second writer of one path, and a second shape of "the # secret is wrong" to debug. name = "grafana's OIDC secret has exactly one delivery unit, the store reader, in both topologies"; ok = let local = grafanaWithAuthelia.systemd.services; remote = grafanaRemoteAuthelia.systemd.services; in local ? swarm-bao-grafana-oidc && remote ? swarm-bao-grafana-oidc && !(local ? swarm-grafana-oidc-secret) && !(remote ? swarm-grafana-oidc-secret); } { # What the deleted warning became. The shape is unchanged — a Grafana host # holding no store leaf — but silence there is a container nobody can log # into for a reason no log names, and a warning is read back by nothing. # The second arm is what makes this a refusal about the IDENTITY: this # fixture names an IdP, so a message about `swarm.authelia.url` here would # mean the two assertions had been collapsed into one conjunction. name = "a grafana host with no store identity is refused, naming the options to set"; ok = grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "deploy.bao.clientCertFile" && grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "deploy.bao.clientKeyFile" && !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "swarm.authelia.url"); } { # "SSO must always be configured", as an eval-time refusal rather than a # gate. A null URL used to drop the OIDC block silently, and # `disable_login_form` is unconditional a hundred lines below it, so that # combination produced a Grafana with no SSO and no password box — an # outage whose cause is a boolean that evaluated to false at build time # and left no trace. Same isolation as the arm above, mirrored. name = "a grafana host in a swarm with no IdP is refused, naming swarm.authelia.url"; ok = grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoSso "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url" && !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoSso "deploy.bao.clientCertFile"); } { # Without this the two arms above prove nothing: a refusal that fires on # every host is not a check, and both of these are hosts a swarm is # expected to have. Read through the same helper, so a message that # stopped naming its option would fail the arms above rather than pass # this one by accident. name = "neither grafana refusal fires on a correctly configured host, co-located or not"; ok = !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaWithAuthelia "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url") && !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaWithAuthelia "deploy.bao.clientCertFile") && !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaRemoteAuthelia "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url") && !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaRemoteAuthelia "deploy.bao.clientCertFile"); } { # Same 403-not-a-miss reason as the matrix and queue arms below: the # reader's grant covers the `services` prefix, so a path outside it is # refused rather than empty, however correct it reads. The negative arm is # the rename this is exposed to — a secret filed under the hive that runs # the service instead of under the service itself. name = "grafana's OIDC secret is read from the prefix the publisher writes"; ok = let s = grafanaRemoteAuthelia.systemd.services.swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.script; in lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/services/swarm-grafana/oidc/client" s && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/hives/" s); } { # Both halves of the co-location assumption, which was one host's # `deploy.*` answering a question about the whole swarm: the identities # were minted only where the queue happened to run, and the token # endpoint was known only where the IdP happened to run. name = "hive identities and the token endpoint do not depend on which host runs what"; ok = let autheliaNoQueue = hive { deploy.authelia.enable = true; }; in lib.elem "hive-h1" (map (c: c.id) autheliaNoQueue.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.oidc.clients) && grafanaRemoteAuthelia.services.hyperhive.swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint == "https://auth.example.invalid/api/oidc/token"; } ]; in runGroup "grafana" cases