//! Per-agent Forgejo user + access-token provisioning, account
//! policy (email alignment, repo-creation lockdown), avatar uploads,
//! and the bootstrap `core` admin user + token lifecycle. The typed
//! API-client constructor + `forgejo admin` helpers live in the
//! module root (`super`).

use std::path::Path;

use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use base64::Engine;
use forgejo_api::structs::{EditUserOption, UpdateUserAvatarOption};
use forgejo_api::{ApiErrorKind, ForgejoError};
use reqwest::StatusCode;

use super::{CONFIG_ORG, api, forge_admin, is_present};

const TOKEN_NAME_PREFIX: &str = "hyperhive";
/// Where the host-side `core` admin token lives. Used by hive-c0re
/// itself to push the meta repo + drive admin API calls (org
/// creation, future webhook setup, etc.). Root-only.
const CORE_TOKEN_PATH: &str = "/var/lib/hyperhive/forge-core-token";
// Forge provisioning markers (`forge/core-avatar-set`,
// `forge/agent-configs-avatar-set`, `forge/email-aligned-<name>`) live
// in `crate::paths` — one-shot guards: the upload/align runs once, the
// marker is written, subsequent startups skip. Delete one to force its
// step to re-run.
// Avatar PNGs are loaded at runtime from
// `$HIVE_ASSETS_DIR/branding/{hyperhive,agent-configs}.png` via the
// helpers in `hive_sh4re::assets`. The `agent-configs.png` is
// rendered from its SVG during the `hyperhive-assets` derivation's
// build.
/// Per-agent token scopes (broad-but-not-admin). See
/// `docs/forge.md::Token scopes` for the per-scope rationale.
const TOKEN_SCOPES: &str = "read:user,write:user,read:notification,write:notification,write:repository,write:issue,write:organization,write:misc";

/// Bootstrap `core` token scopes — adds `read:admin,write:admin` on
/// top of `TOKEN_SCOPES` so the host daemon can drive
/// `/api/v1/admin/*`. Site-admin membership alone isn't enough: the
/// token's own scope gate runs before the user-permission check.
/// See `docs/forge.md::Token scopes`.
const CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES: &str = "read:admin,write:admin,read:user,write:user,read:notification,write:notification,write:repository,write:issue,write:organization,write:misc";

/// Pull the access token out of forgejo's success message. Format
/// has shifted across versions (table form vs. "Access token was
/// successfully created: <hex>"), so just hunt the output for the
/// first long hex-looking word.
fn extract_token(output: &str) -> Option<String> {
    output
        .split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == ',' || c == ':')
        .find(|w| w.len() >= 32 && w.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()))
        .map(str::to_owned)
}

/// Canonical email address for a hive agent's Forgejo account.
/// Must match the `user.email` set by `meta::render_flake` so commits
/// by the agent link back to their Forgejo profile page.
fn agent_email(name: &str) -> String {
    format!("{name}@hyperhive.local")
}

/// `EditUserOption` with every field unset except the ones Forgejo's
/// validator effectively requires: `login_name` and `source_id = 0`
/// (local auth, the default for users hive-c0re creates). Omitting
/// `login_name` made Forgejo reset `use_custom_avatar` on every admin
/// edit — the same reason the old raw JSON bodies always carried both
/// fields. Callers set only the field(s) they mean to change on top.
fn sparse_edit_user_option(name: &str) -> EditUserOption {
    EditUserOption {
        active: None,
        admin: None,
        allow_create_organization: None,
        allow_git_hook: None,
        allow_import_local: None,
        description: None,
        email: None,
        full_name: None,
        hide_email: None,
        location: None,
        login_name: Some(name.to_owned()),
        max_repo_creation: None,
        must_change_password: None,
        password: None,
        prohibit_login: None,
        pronouns: None,
        restricted: None,
        source_id: Some(0),
        visibility: None,
        website: None,
    }
}

/// Whether a Forgejo API error is a definitive 403. The typed client
/// maps a 403 response to `ApiErrorKind::Forbidden` when the endpoint
/// spec lists it, or to `UnexpectedStatusCode(403)` otherwise — check
/// both defensively.
fn is_forbidden(e: &ForgejoError) -> bool {
    match e {
        ForgejoError::ApiError(api) => matches!(api.error_kind(), ApiErrorKind::Forbidden),
        ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s) => *s == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
        _ => false,
    }
}

/// Ensure a forgejo user named `name` exists. Idempotent: forgejo
/// returns a "user already exists" error which we treat as success.
/// `admin` adds `--admin` (site admin) — used for the bootstrap
/// `core` user that drives the API. `password` picks the initial
/// account password: `None` uses `--random-password` (the existing
/// agent provisioning shape — the password is never read, agents auth
/// by token); `Some(pw)` uses `--password <pw>` so the operator path
/// in `hivectl` can set a real password for matrix-style web-UI login.
async fn ensure_user_exists(name: &str, admin: bool, password: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
    let email = agent_email(name);
    let mut args = vec!["user", "create", "--username", name, "--email", &email];
    match password {
        Some(pw) => args.extend(["--password", pw, "--must-change-password=false"]),
        None => args.extend(["--random-password", "--must-change-password=false"]),
    }
    if admin {
        args.push("--admin");
    }
    let result = forge_admin(&args).await;
    match result {
        Ok(_) => {
            tracing::info!(%name, "forge: created user");
            Ok(())
        }
        Err(e) => {
            // Forgejo's "already exists" error wording varies; just
            // try the next step and let token issuance surface a
            // real failure if the user truly isn't there.
            let msg = format!("{e:#}");
            if msg.contains("already exists") || msg.contains("user already") {
                tracing::debug!(%name, "forge: user already exists");
                Ok(())
            } else {
                tracing::warn!(%name, error = %msg, "forge: user create unclear; trying token anyway");
                Ok(())
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Set the forgejo password for an existing user. Used by the operator
/// path in `hivectl forge create-user --password` so re-running on an
/// already-created account still updates the password (covers the
/// "I forgot the password I set last week" case + the "argus retried
/// the verb to verify the fix" case — `forgejo admin user create`
/// silently skips a password change once the account exists). Idempotent
/// from the operator's point of view: same password input → same final
/// account state.
async fn change_user_password(name: &str, password: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let args = [
        "user",
        "change-password",
        "--username",
        name,
        "--password",
        password,
    ];
    forge_admin(&args)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("forgejo admin user change-password {name}"))?;
    tracing::info!(%name, "forge: changed user password");
    Ok(())
}

/// Idempotently align the Forgejo account email to `agent_email(name)`.
/// Existing agents were created with `{name}@hive.local`; this corrects
/// that so git commits (which use `{name}@hyperhive`) link to profiles.
/// Best-effort: failures are warned, not propagated.
///
/// Marker-guarded: writes `EMAIL_ALIGNED_MARKER_PREFIX{name}` on first
/// success and skips the PATCH on all subsequent calls. This prevents
/// Forgejo's admin-user-edit endpoint from resetting `use_custom_avatar`
/// on every `sync_agent` tick. Delete the marker to force re-alignment.
///
/// Uses the admin REST API (`admin_edit_user`, i.e. `PATCH
/// /api/v1/admin/users/{name}`) rather than `forgejo admin user edit`
/// because the CLI dropped the `edit` subcommand somewhere between
/// forgejo 8 and current. The edit body carries `login_name` +
/// `source_id = 0` via [`sparse_edit_user_option`].
pub(super) async fn ensure_user_email(name: &str) {
    let marker = crate::paths::forge_email_aligned_marker(name);
    if marker.exists() {
        return;
    }
    let Some(token) = core_token() else {
        tracing::debug!(%name, "forge: skipping ensure_user_email — no core token yet");
        return;
    };
    let email = agent_email(name);
    let mut edit = sparse_edit_user_option(name);
    edit.email = Some(email.clone());
    let client = match api(&token) {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH user email: client build failed");
            return;
        }
    };
    match client.admin_edit_user(name, edit).await {
        Ok(_) => {
            if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
                std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
            }
            std::fs::write(&marker, "").ok();
            tracing::info!(%name, %email, "forge: user email aligned");
        }
        Err(e) if is_forbidden(&e) => {
            // Core token missing admin scope — see
            // `docs/forge.md::Token scopes` migration note.
            tracing::warn!(
                %name, %email, error = %e,
                "forge: PATCH user email forbidden — core token likely missing admin scope. \
                 Delete {CORE_TOKEN_PATH} and restart hive-c0re to re-mint with the new scopes."
            );
        }
        Err(e) => tracing::warn!(%name, %email, error = %e, "forge: PATCH user email failed"),
    }
}

/// Disable direct repo creation for agent `name` by setting
/// `max_repo_creation = 0` on its Forgejo account. Agents must
/// create repos *through hive-c0re* (which owns the perms), never with
/// their own token — a write-scoped token can otherwise create + own
/// repos and self-merge, bypassing the operator-only-merge policy.
///
/// `max_repo_creation = 0` means `CanCreateRepo()` is false for any
/// count (Forgejo: `MaxRepoCreation >= 0 && NumRepos >= MaxRepoCreation`),
/// so creation is refused while push / PR / clone stay intact. **Existing
/// repos are untouched** — this only blocks *new* direct creation.
///
/// Marker-guarded like [`ensure_user_email`]: the edit runs once per
/// agent (delete the marker to re-apply). The edit body carries
/// `login_name` + `source_id` for the same reason `ensure_user_email`
/// does — omitting `login_name` makes Forgejo's `EditUserOption`
/// validator reset `use_custom_avatar`. Best-effort: failures warn,
/// don't propagate.
pub(super) async fn ensure_repo_creation_disabled(name: &str) {
    let marker = crate::paths::forge_repo_creation_disabled_marker(name);
    if marker.exists() {
        return;
    }
    let Some(token) = core_token() else {
        tracing::debug!(%name, "forge: skipping ensure_repo_creation_disabled — no core token yet");
        return;
    };
    let mut edit = sparse_edit_user_option(name);
    edit.max_repo_creation = Some(0);
    let client = match api(&token) {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH max_repo_creation: client build failed");
            return;
        }
    };
    match client.admin_edit_user(name, edit).await {
        Ok(_) => {
            if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
                std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
            }
            std::fs::write(&marker, "").ok();
            tracing::info!(%name, "forge: disabled direct repo creation (max_repo_creation=0)");
        }
        Err(e) if is_forbidden(&e) => {
            tracing::warn!(
                %name, error = %e,
                "forge: PATCH max_repo_creation forbidden — core token likely missing admin scope. \
                 Delete {CORE_TOKEN_PATH} and restart hive-c0re to re-mint with the new scopes."
            );
        }
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(%name, error = %e, "forge: PATCH max_repo_creation failed");
        }
    }
}

/// Mint a fresh access token for `name`. Token name is suffixed with
/// a monotonic clock so re-issuing doesn't collide with an existing
/// token of the same name in the DB. `scopes` is the scope string
/// passed to `forgejo admin user generate-access-token --scopes`;
/// use `TOKEN_SCOPES` for agents, `CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES` for the
/// bootstrap `core` user.
async fn mint_token(name: &str, scopes: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let token_name = format!(
        "{TOKEN_NAME_PREFIX}-{}",
        std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map_or(0, |d| d.as_secs())
    );
    let stdout = forge_admin(&[
        "user",
        "generate-access-token",
        "--username",
        name,
        "--token-name",
        &token_name,
        "--scopes",
        scopes,
    ])
    .await?;
    let token = extract_token(&stdout)
        .with_context(|| format!("parse token from forgejo output: {stdout:?}"))?;
    tracing::debug!(%name, %token_name, "forge: minted access token");
    Ok(token)
}

/// Mint a fresh Forgejo access token for an agent and write it to the
/// agent's state dir via hive-priv. hive-c0re runs unprivileged and
/// cannot write to agent-owned (0755) state directories directly.
async fn mint_and_persist_agent_token(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let token = mint_token(name, TOKEN_SCOPES).await?;
    crate::priv_client::write_agent_forge_token(name, &token)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("write forge-token for {name} via hive-priv"))
}

/// Mint a fresh Forgejo access token for the `core` admin user and
/// write it directly to `path`. Unlike agent tokens this path is owned
/// by hive-c0re itself (under `/var/lib/hyperhive/`), so a direct
/// write is both correct and necessary (no priv round-trip).
async fn mint_and_persist_core_token(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    let token = mint_token("core", CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES).await?;
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(path, format!("{token}\n"))
        .with_context(|| format!("write core token to {}", path.display()))?;
    let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
    tracing::info!(path = %path.display(), "forge: persisted core access token");
    Ok(())
}

/// Ensure `name` has a forgejo user + token file. Always re-mints the
/// token so the on-disk file always reflects the current `TOKEN_SCOPES`.
/// Safe to call on every spawn and on every hive-c0re startup.
pub async fn ensure_user_for(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
    if !is_present().await {
        return Ok(());
    }
    ensure_user_exists(name, false, None).await?;
    ensure_user_email(name).await;
    mint_and_persist_agent_token(name).await
}

/// Provision a forgejo user for `name` and return the freshly-minted
/// token. Unlike [`ensure_user_for`], the token is **not** persisted to
/// disk — the caller is responsible for storing it. Used by `hivectl
/// forge create-user` for human (non-agent) accounts so we don't create
/// stray `/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/<name>/` directories for users that
/// aren't agents.
///
/// `password` picks the account password. `None` keeps the existing
/// random-throwaway shape (caller doesn't need web UI access — token
/// alone is enough). `Some(pw)` sets `pw` as the password, including
/// running `forgejo admin user change-password` if the account already
/// exists, so the operator can log into the forge web UI afterwards.
/// Idempotent: re-running with the same `Some(pw)` lands on the same
/// final state.
pub async fn provision_user_token(name: &str, password: Option<&str>) -> Result<String> {
    if !is_present().await {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "hive-forge container not running — wait for hive-c0re to start it before provisioning forge users"
        );
    }
    ensure_user_exists(name, false, password).await?;
    if let Some(pw) = password {
        // `user create` silently no-ops on an existing account, so
        // we run change-password unconditionally when the caller
        // asked for a specific password — keeps the verb idempotent
        // for "set or reset" use.
        change_user_password(name, pw).await?;
    }
    ensure_user_email(name).await;
    mint_token(name, TOKEN_SCOPES).await
}

/// Set `core`'s Forgejo avatar to the hyperhive logo once, then
/// remember it so subsequent startups don't re-upload. Best-effort
/// — any non-2xx is logged at the caller; the project runs fine
/// with the default hash identicon.
pub(super) async fn ensure_core_avatar(token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let marker = crate::paths::forge_core_avatar_marker();
    if marker.exists() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    let png_path = hive_sh4re::assets::core_avatar_png();
    let png_bytes = tokio::fs::read(&png_path)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("read core avatar PNG from {}", png_path.display()))?;
    // The raw-HTTP predecessor POSTed the admin endpoint
    // `/admin/users/core/avatar`, which forgejo-api has no method for.
    // `token` IS the core user's own token though, so updating "the
    // current user's avatar" (`POST /user/avatar`) is behaviorally
    // identical.
    api(token)?
        .user_update_avatar(UpdateUserAvatarOption {
            image: Some(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&png_bytes)),
        })
        .await
        .context("set core avatar")?;
    if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(marker, "").ok();
    tracing::info!("forge: set core user avatar to hyperhive logo");
    Ok(())
}

/// Set the `agent-configs` org's Forgejo avatar to the
/// configs-stack glyph once. Sibling to `ensure_core_avatar`:
/// one-shot, marker-guarded, best-effort. Uses `org_update_avatar`
/// (`POST /api/v1/orgs/{org}/avatar`, base64-PNG payload).
pub(super) async fn ensure_config_org_avatar(token: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let marker = crate::paths::forge_config_org_avatar_marker();
    if marker.exists() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    let png_path = hive_sh4re::assets::config_org_avatar_png();
    let png_bytes = tokio::fs::read(&png_path)
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("read {CONFIG_ORG} avatar PNG from {}", png_path.display()))?;
    api(token)?
        .org_update_avatar(
            CONFIG_ORG,
            UpdateUserAvatarOption {
                image: Some(base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&png_bytes)),
            },
        )
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("set {CONFIG_ORG} avatar"))?;
    if let Some(parent) = marker.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).ok();
    }
    std::fs::write(marker, "").ok();
    tracing::info!(
        org = CONFIG_ORG,
        "forge: set org avatar to configs-stack logo"
    );
    Ok(())
}

/// Outcome of probing whether the persisted core token still works
/// against the *current* forge. Existence on disk is not validity: a
/// token minted before a forge rebuild / re-provision is unknown to the
/// new forge's DB and 401s on every call — which silently breaks the
/// hive-ci runner-registration prefetch (it reads this same token to
/// fetch a runner registration token).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum CoreTokenCheck {
    /// Token authenticated successfully — keep using it.
    Valid,
    /// Forge explicitly rejected the token (401/403) — re-mint.
    Invalid,
    /// Couldn't determine (forge unreachable / 5xx). Don't re-mint on a
    /// transient: keep the existing token and let a later ensure pass
    /// re-check once the forge is responsive. Re-minting here would both
    /// fail (mint needs the forge too) and churn tokens needlessly.
    Indeterminate,
}

/// Map a failed token-probe call to a [`CoreTokenCheck`]. Only a
/// definitive auth rejection (401/403 — surfaced by the typed client
/// as `Unauthorized`/`Forbidden` API errors, or defensively as bare
/// `UnexpectedStatusCode`s) is `Invalid`; anything else (transport,
/// 5xx, unexpected shapes) is `Indeterminate`. Pure so the decision
/// logic is unit-testable without a live forge.
fn classify_core_token_error(e: &ForgejoError) -> CoreTokenCheck {
    match e {
        ForgejoError::ApiError(api) => match api.error_kind() {
            ApiErrorKind::Unauthorized | ApiErrorKind::Forbidden => CoreTokenCheck::Invalid,
            _ => CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate,
        },
        ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s)
            if *s == StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED || *s == StatusCode::FORBIDDEN =>
        {
            CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
        }
        _ => CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate,
    }
}

/// Probe whether `token` is still accepted by the current forge with a
/// cheap authenticated `user_get_current` (`GET /api/v1/user`, covered
/// by the core token's `read:user` scope). See [`CoreTokenCheck`] for
/// how the outcome is interpreted.
async fn check_core_token(token: &str) -> CoreTokenCheck {
    let Ok(client) = api(token) else {
        return CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate;
    };
    match client.user_get_current().await {
        Ok(_) => CoreTokenCheck::Valid,
        Err(e) => {
            let outcome = classify_core_token_error(&e);
            if outcome == CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate {
                tracing::debug!(
                    error = %e,
                    "forge: core-token probe inconclusive (unreachable / unexpected response); \
                     treating as indeterminate"
                );
            }
            outcome
        }
    }
}

/// Ensure the bootstrap `core` admin user + a token at
/// `CORE_TOKEN_PATH`. The token is what hive-c0re uses for forgejo
/// API calls (org creation, meta-repo push, and the hive-ci
/// runner-registration prefetch). Returns the token.
///
/// Idempotent, but validity-aware: when a token file is already present
/// it is **probed against the current forge** before being trusted. A
/// token persisted before a forge rebuild / re-provision is stale (the
/// new forge DB doesn't know it) and would 401 every caller — so on a
/// definitive rejection the token is re-minted. A merely-unreachable
/// forge leaves the existing token in place (a later ensure pass
/// re-checks) rather than churning tokens on a transient.
pub(super) async fn ensure_core_user_and_token() -> Result<String> {
    let path = std::path::Path::new(CORE_TOKEN_PATH);
    if let Ok(existing) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
        let trimmed = existing.trim().to_owned();
        if !trimmed.is_empty() {
            match check_core_token(&trimmed).await {
                CoreTokenCheck::Valid | CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate => return Ok(trimmed),
                CoreTokenCheck::Invalid => {
                    tracing::warn!(
                        path = %path.display(),
                        "forge: persisted core token rejected by forge (stale after rebuild?); \
                         re-minting"
                    );
                }
            }
        }
    }
    ensure_user_exists("core", true, None).await?;
    mint_and_persist_core_token(path).await?;
    let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
        .with_context(|| format!("read {CORE_TOKEN_PATH} after mint"))?;
    Ok(raw.trim().to_owned())
}

/// Read the persisted core token, or None when the forge isn't
/// seeded yet. Cheap — just a file read.
pub fn core_token() -> Option<String> {
    std::fs::read_to_string(CORE_TOKEN_PATH)
        .ok()
        .map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::{CoreTokenCheck, classify_core_token_error};
    use forgejo_api::{ApiError, ApiErrorKind, ForgejoError};
    use reqwest::StatusCode;

    fn api_err(kind: ApiErrorKind) -> ForgejoError {
        ForgejoError::ApiError(ApiError {
            message: None,
            kind,
        })
    }

    #[test]
    fn auth_rejection_errors_are_invalid() {
        // The whole point: a stale token (forge rebuilt out from under it)
        // 401s, and 401/403 are the only outcomes that trigger a re-mint.
        assert_eq!(
            classify_core_token_error(&api_err(ApiErrorKind::Unauthorized)),
            CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
        );
        assert_eq!(
            classify_core_token_error(&api_err(ApiErrorKind::Forbidden)),
            CoreTokenCheck::Invalid
        );
        // Defensive: the same statuses arriving as bare status codes
        // (endpoint spec didn't list them) must classify identically.
        for s in [StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN] {
            assert_eq!(
                classify_core_token_error(&ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s)),
                CoreTokenCheck::Invalid,
                "status {s} should be invalid"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn transient_and_unexpected_errors_are_indeterminate() {
        // Never re-mint on a transient — minting needs the forge too, and
        // churning tokens on a blip is worse than keeping the existing one.
        for s in [
            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
            StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
            StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT,
            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                classify_core_token_error(&ForgejoError::UnexpectedStatusCode(s)),
                CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate,
                "status {s} should be indeterminate"
            );
        }
        assert_eq!(
            classify_core_token_error(&api_err(ApiErrorKind::NotFound { errors: None })),
            CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate
        );
        assert_eq!(
            classify_core_token_error(&api_err(ApiErrorKind::Generic)),
            CoreTokenCheck::Indeterminate
        );
    }
}