//! The read agreement: which credentials a principal's own token may fetch.
//!
//! The mirror of [`crate::matrix`] and [`crate::queue`]. Those modules say
//! where a credential lives; this one says who is allowed to read it, and the
//! two have to agree on the same path or a delivery fails with a 403 that names
//! nothing.
//!
//! The hive document ([`render_shared_hives`]) has one stanza per kind a hive
//! reads, and they are not all scoped alike — which is the point rather than
//! an inconsistency:
//!
//! ⚠️ The **agent** stanza grants read on *every* agent's credentials rather
//! than on the ones that hive hosts. That is a decision, not an oversight: an
//! agent's path does not name its hive, so a per-hive grant has to be
//! enumerated and re-emitted, and an enumeration that can silently drift
//! advertises a boundary it does not hold. A wide grant that says so beats a
//! narrow one that only looks narrow. The narrower shapes, and what they would
//! cost, are in `docs/trust-boundary/security.md`.
//!
//! The **hive** stanza has no such problem and is therefore narrow: that path
//! names its principal, so scoping it to the reader's own name costs nothing
//! and drifts nowhere. Do not widen it to match the agent stanza — the
//! asymmetry is the point, and only holds if a one-per-hive credential is
//! stored under [`Kind::Hive`] — see docs/trust-boundary/security.md.
//!
//! A hive reads nothing under `swarm/services/` or `swarm/controller/`. A swarm
//! service's OIDC client secret is read under a certificate that is not a
//! hive's: `swarm-bao.nix`'s per-service readers, and its granter for the UI's.
//!
//! Rendering stays separate from writing so the text can be asserted with no store to talk to.

use crate::{
    Error, backend_env,
    path::{Kind, MOUNT, ROOT, checked_segment},
};

/// Namespace for a hive's cert-auth role and the policies the controller writes.
///
/// The controller's own grant is scoped to `hive-*` for both, so this prefix is
/// the difference between a hive the controller may provision and a policy it
/// must not be able to rewrite — including its own.
pub const HIVE_PREFIX: &str = "hive-";

/// The cert-auth role name for `hive`.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `hive` holds anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`.
pub fn hive_object_name(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
    checked_segment("hive", hive)?;
    Ok(format!("{HIVE_PREFIX}{hive}"))
}

/// Namespace for an agent's cert-auth role and certificate common name.
///
/// Deliberately *inside* [`HIVE_PREFIX`] rather than beside it.
/// `sys/policies/acl/hive-*` and `auth/cert/certs/hive-*` are the whole of what
/// the controller's grant lets it create (`swarm-bao.nix`'s
/// `controllerPolicyText`), and the controller is the only principal that
/// learns an agent exists — a name outside that prefix is one nothing can
/// write. It costs no authority: the controller already holds `create`/`update`
/// on `secret/data/swarm/agents/*`, so it can already replace every credential
/// the shared policies grant read on.
///
/// It still cannot collide with a hive's. [`hive_object_name`] renders
/// `hive-<hive>`, so a collision needs a hive named `agent-<agent>` — and
/// `nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix` forbids the substring `agent` in any hive
/// name (and `hive` too), applied to every entry of the swarm directory in
/// `swarm.nix`. The fragment list is what to read before renaming either.
///
/// Host principals' **common names** are operator-set options
/// (`deploy.bao.controllerCommonName`, `secretPublisherCommonName`, …) that
/// may spell this prefix, and that is harmless: an agent's cert-auth role pins
/// the store's agent CA (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which signs no host
/// leaf, and every host role pins `deploy.bao.clientCaFile`, which signs no
/// agent leaf. A CN match alone logs nobody in.
pub const AGENT_PREFIX: &str = "hive-agent-";

/// The cert-auth role name for `agent`, and the common name of the certificate
/// that authenticates it. One string, two objects: the role matches the subject
/// by spelling both the same.
///
/// Injective in `agent` — the prefix is fixed and [`checked_segment`] has
/// already refused anything that could re-punctuate the suffix. Agent names
/// are one swarm-wide namespace (an agent's path is `swarm/agents/<agent>`,
/// with no hive segment), so two agents sharing a name would share every
/// object this names. swarm-controller's `create_agent`, the one place an
/// agent is created, refuses a name the swarm has already placed on another
/// hive. An agent no hive's wanted state declares is invisible to that check.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `agent` holds anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`.
pub fn agent_object_name(agent: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
    checked_segment("agent", agent)?;
    Ok(format!("{AGENT_PREFIX}{agent}"))
}

/// The agents among `names`, a listing of cert-auth roles: the inverse of
/// [`agent_object_name`], for a caller that needs the set of agents holding a
/// store identity.
///
/// A name that carries the prefix but whose suffix is not a legal segment is
/// dropped rather than returned: [`agent_object_name`] could not have produced
/// it, so it is not an agent this crate minted.
#[must_use]
pub fn agents_from_role_names(names: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
    names
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|name| name.strip_prefix(AGENT_PREFIX))
        .filter(|agent| checked_segment("agent", agent).is_ok())
        .map(str::to_owned)
        .collect()
}

/// One read stanza. With [`list_stanza`] and [`create_stanza`], the only shapes
/// this module emits, so what an agent may write is a property of the renderers
/// rather than of each call site.
fn read_stanza(path: &str) -> String {
    format!("path \"{path}\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}}\n")
}

/// One list stanza: the key names under a `metadata/` path. Neither a value
/// nor the metadata itself, which take `read` on `data/` and on `metadata/`.
fn list_stanza(path: &str) -> String {
    format!("path \"{path}\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}}\n")
}

/// One create stanza: `create` and `read`, never `update`. A leaf that holds
/// nothing takes a first write and the holder cannot replace it afterwards,
/// which is what a `-cas=0` write needs and all it gets.
fn create_stanza(path: &str) -> String {
    format!("path \"{path}\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}}\n")
}

/// The one policy every hive's cert-auth role attaches.
///
/// Inside [`HIVE_PREFIX`] so that the controller may write it. It is the object
/// name of a hive called `hives`, and `nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix` forbids
/// the substring `hive` in every hive name, so no hive spells it.
pub const SHARED_HIVE_POLICY: &str = "hive-hives";

/// Render the policy [`SHARED_HIVE_POLICY`] holds: read on every agent's
/// credentials and on this hive's own, with the hive's name taken from the alias
/// of its certificate login on the cert auth mount `mount_accessor`.
///
/// A hive's certificate carries its bare name as the common name, and that is
/// the alias name, so the own-path stanza reads `swarm/hives/<hive>/` for
/// whichever hive presents the token. A login whose alias is not a hive's name
/// reads a path where nothing is stored. The `agents/` and `hives/` segments
/// are fixed text, never taken from the identity.
///
/// The controller kind and the `swarm/services/` tree are deliberately absent:
/// a hive has no business reading the credentials of the thing that provisions
/// it, and a swarm service's OIDC client secret is read under a certificate that
/// is not a hive's. Adding either is a boundary decision, not a consequence of
/// the namespace growing.
///
/// The hive's *own* kind is granted, and only that one: a hive holds the queue
/// credential its own agents authenticate with, so it reads the one principal
/// named after itself, which is why the path takes the name from the alias
/// instead of widening to the whole kind.
///
/// Read-only: the controller mints these and never reads one back.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `mount_accessor` holds anything but
/// `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`: it is interpolated into the policy text, where it could
/// close the stanza.
pub fn render_shared_hives(mount_accessor: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
    checked_segment("mount accessor", mount_accessor)?;
    let own = format!("{{{{identity.entity.aliases.{mount_accessor}.name}}}}");
    let agents = read_stanza(&format!(
        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{}/*",
        <&str>::from(Kind::Agent)
    ));
    let own = read_stanza(&format!(
        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{}/{own}/*",
        <&str>::from(Kind::Hive)
    ));
    Ok(format!("{agents}{own}"))
}

/// The one policy every agent's cert-auth role attaches.
///
/// Inside [`HIVE_PREFIX`] so that the controller may write it, and without an
/// agent's suffix so that it is never an agent's object name:
/// [`agents_from_role_names`] needs `hive-agent-` with a segment after it. The
/// hive name that would spell it is `agent`, which `nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix`
/// forbids.
pub const SHARED_AGENT_POLICY: &str = "hive-agent";

/// The template that stands for the agent's name in [`render_shared_agent`]:
/// the name of the login's identity entity, which swarm-controller sets to the
/// agent's name.
const ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE: &str = "{{identity.entity.name}}";

/// Render the policy [`SHARED_AGENT_POLICY`] holds: read on one agent's
/// credentials and list on their names (how `hive-matrix-daemon` finds its
/// linked accounts), with the agent's name taken from the identity entity of
/// whoever presents the token.
///
/// The text is the same for every agent, so a change to the rule is one write.
/// An entity whose name is not an agent's grants nothing: the controller names
/// each agent's entity after the agent, and a login that no entity of that
/// name owns reads `swarm/agents/<generated name>/`, where nothing is stored.
///
/// The one write is `create` on the agent's own [`backend_env`] leaf, without
/// `update`: the agent seeds it from the file it has today, once, and cannot
/// replace it. The stanza cannot constrain the content, and the agent's own
/// process holds the identity, so while the leaf is empty it can also create it
/// with any text, and the store's value then wins over the file. That is no
/// wider than the harness-dir file the agent already owns:
/// the container activation's `heal_own_dir` (`nix/agent-modules/user.nix`)
/// re-owns that dir to the agent recursively at every boot, so the agent
/// already controls the legacy file. Any other write would let an agent hand
/// itself an identity it was never issued. An agent has no business with
/// another agent's credentials, a hive's, a service's, or the controller's, so
/// none of [`render_shared_hives`]'s breadth applies. A hive still reads this
/// agent's secrets, and closing that is its own decision.
#[must_use]
pub fn render_shared_agent() -> String {
    let kind = <&str>::from(Kind::Agent);
    let read = read_stanza(&format!(
        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/*"
    ));
    let list = list_stanza(&format!(
        "{MOUNT}/metadata/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/*"
    ));
    let seed = create_stanza(&format!(
        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{kind}/{ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE}/{}",
        backend_env::LEAF
    ));
    format!("{read}{list}{seed}")
}

/// What an agent's token grants under [`SHARED_AGENT_POLICY`]: the document
/// with the store's template filled in for `agent`. The oracle tests use to ask
/// whether the policy covers a path.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn effective_agent(agent: &str) -> String {
    checked_segment("agent", agent).expect("a legal agent name");
    render_shared_agent().replace(ENTITY_NAME_TEMPLATE, agent)
}

/// What a hive's token grants under [`SHARED_HIVE_POLICY`]: the document with
/// the store's template filled in for `hive`.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn effective_hive(hive: &str) -> String {
    checked_segment("hive", hive).expect("a legal hive name");
    render_shared_hives("auth_cert_test")
        .expect("a legal accessor")
        .replace("{{identity.entity.aliases.auth_cert_test.name}}", hive)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_agent_document_reads_the_entity_name_where_the_agent_goes() {
        assert_eq!(
            render_shared_agent(),
            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
             path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
             path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/{{identity.entity.name}}/backend-env\" {\n  capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_document_names_no_agent_and_grants_no_wider_than_one() {
        let shared = render_shared_agent();
        assert!(!shared.contains("atlas"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("agents/*"), "{shared}");
        assert!(!shared.contains("update"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("delete"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_policy_name_is_writable_and_no_agents_or_hives() {
        assert!(SHARED_AGENT_POLICY.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
        assert!(
            agents_from_role_names(&[SHARED_AGENT_POLICY.to_owned()]).is_empty(),
            "it must not be read back as an agent"
        );
        // The only hive name that would render it carries `agent`.
        assert_eq!(
            hive_object_name("agent").expect("legal as a segment"),
            SHARED_AGENT_POLICY
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_document_grants_every_agent_and_this_hive_alone() {
        assert_eq!(
            effective_hive("pr1ma"),
            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
             path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/pr1ma/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_hive_document_takes_the_hive_from_the_alias_name() {
        let shared = render_shared_hives("auth_cert_1a2b3c4d").expect("legal accessor");
        assert_eq!(
            shared,
            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
             path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/{{identity.entity.aliases.auth_cert_1a2b3c4d.name}}/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n"
        );
        // The template fills in for hives that differ in length, case and
        // punctuation, and each then reads exactly its own path.
        for hive in ["pr1ma", "a", "Mixed_Case-1", "x".repeat(63).as_str()] {
            let own = effective_hive(hive);
            assert!(own.contains(&format!("swarm/hives/{hive}/*")), "{own}");
            assert!(!own.contains("{{"), "{own}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_hive_document_names_no_hive_and_grants_no_wider_than_one() {
        let shared = render_shared_hives("auth_cert_1a2b3c4d").expect("legal accessor");
        assert!(!shared.contains("pr1ma"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("hives/*"), "{shared}");
        assert!(!shared.contains("create"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("update"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("delete"));
        assert!(!shared.contains("list"));
        // The control: the walk finds the stanzas that are there.
        assert_eq!(stanza_paths(&shared).len(), 2, "{shared}");
        assert!(
            stanza_paths(&shared)
                .iter()
                .any(|g| g.starts_with("swarm/hives/{{"))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_accessor_that_could_close_the_stanza_is_refused() {
        for bad in ["", "a.b", "a}}b", "a\"b", "a/b", "a b"] {
            assert!(
                matches!(render_shared_hives(bad), Err(Error::PathSegment { .. })),
                "{bad:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_shared_hive_policy_name_is_writable_and_no_agents() {
        assert!(SHARED_HIVE_POLICY.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
        assert!(
            agents_from_role_names(&[SHARED_HIVE_POLICY.to_owned()]).is_empty(),
            "it must not be read back as an agent"
        );
        assert_ne!(SHARED_HIVE_POLICY, SHARED_AGENT_POLICY);
        // The only hive name that would render it carries `hive`.
        assert_eq!(
            hive_object_name("hives").expect("legal as a segment"),
            SHARED_HIVE_POLICY
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_hive_reaches_no_swarm_services_secret() {
        // A swarm service's OIDC client secret is read under a certificate that
        // is not a hive's. Checked by walking the stanzas, so a wider grant
        // that happened to cover the tree (`swarm/*`, say) fails too.
        let p = effective_hive("pr1ma");
        assert!(!p.contains("swarm/services"), "{p}");
        let service = "swarm/services/swarm-grafana/oidc/client";
        assert!(
            !stanza_paths(&p).iter().any(|g| covers(g, service)),
            "a hive's document reaches {service}:\n{p}"
        );
        // The control: the walk does find a path the document grants.
        assert!(
            stanza_paths(&p)
                .iter()
                .any(|g| covers(g, "swarm/hives/pr1ma/oidc/client"))
        );
    }

    /// 🩸 The per-hive matrix sender-token scoping, asserted on the rendered
    /// document rather than on the path function alone: it is the policy text
    /// that decides what a hive may fetch, so "the path is per-hive" only
    /// means something if the stanza that reaches it is too.
    #[test]
    fn a_hive_reaches_its_own_matrix_sender_token_and_no_other_hives() {
        let alpha = effective_hive("alpha");
        let own = crate::matrix::sender_token_path("alpha").expect("legal");
        let other = crate::matrix::sender_token_path("beta").expect("legal");

        // Reachable: the hive's own stanza is the prefix of its own path.
        assert!(
            alpha.contains("path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/alpha/*\""),
            "{alpha}"
        );
        assert!(own.starts_with("swarm/hives/alpha/"), "{own}");

        // Unreachable: no stanza in alpha's document is a prefix of beta's
        // path. Checked by walking the stanzas rather than by asserting the
        // absence of the string "beta", so a future stanza that happened to
        // cover it — `swarm/hives/*`, say — would fail this too.
        assert!(
            !stanza_paths(&alpha)
                .iter()
                .any(|granted| covers(granted, &other)),
            "alpha's document reaches {other}:\n{alpha}"
        );
    }

    /// Every `path "…"` a rendered document grants, with the `secret/data/`
    /// ACL prefix stripped so it compares against a store path.
    fn stanza_paths(document: &str) -> Vec<String> {
        document
            .lines()
            .filter_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("path \""))
            .filter_map(|rest| rest.split('"').next())
            .filter_map(|p| p.strip_prefix("secret/data/"))
            .map(str::to_owned)
            .collect()
    }

    /// Does a granted policy path cover `path`? Only the trailing-`*` form
    /// this module renders, which is the only form it has to understand.
    fn covers(granted: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
        match granted.strip_suffix('*') {
            Some(prefix) => path.starts_with(prefix),
            None => granted == path,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_grant_is_read_only() {
        // A hive reads credentials; a hive that could write one could hand
        // itself an agent's identity.
        let p = effective_hive("pr1ma");
        assert!(!p.contains("create"));
        assert!(!p.contains("update"));
        assert!(!p.contains("delete"));
        assert!(!p.contains("list"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn one_hives_document_does_not_reach_another_hives_path() {
        let a = effective_hive("alpha");
        assert!(a.contains("swarm/hives/alpha/*"));
        assert!(!a.contains("beta"));
        assert!(!a.contains("swarm/hives/*"), "the hive stanza stays narrow");
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_name_that_could_close_the_stanza_is_refused() {
        // The name reaches a role name and a certificate subject, so a name that
        // could re-punctuate either is refused.
        assert!(
            hive_object_name("atlas/*\" { capabilities = [\"root\"] }").is_err(),
            "the object NAME is a place a name can do damage too"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
        // The control for the case above: if every name were refused, that
        // assertion would pass while proving nothing.
        assert!(hive_object_name("a-b_C9").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_object_name_sits_inside_the_namespace_the_controller_may_write() {
        // `hive-` is what the controller's own policy scopes both
        // `sys/policies/acl/` and `auth/cert/certs/` to, so a name outside it
        // is one the controller cannot create at all.
        let n = hive_object_name("pr1ma").expect("legal");
        assert_eq!(n, "hive-pr1ma");
        assert!(n.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
    }

    /// What `effective_agent("atlas")` must be, byte for byte.
    const ATLAS_DOCUMENT: &str = "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
         path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"list\"]\n}\n\
         path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/backend-env\" {\n  capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]\n}\n";

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_document_is_its_stanzas_naming_that_agent() {
        assert_eq!(effective_agent("atlas"), ATLAS_DOCUMENT);
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_document_does_not_grant_the_whole_agent_prefix() {
        // `render`'s agent stanza is `agents/*` on purpose, and inheriting one
        // character of that here would give every agent every other agent's
        // credentials while the document still read as per-agent.
        let p = effective_agent("atlas");
        assert!(
            !p.contains("swarm/agents/*"),
            "the agent stanza must not widen to the kind: {p}"
        );
        assert!(p.contains("secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*"));
        assert!(p.contains("secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/*"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_document_reaches_nothing_but_that_agent() {
        // Stated as an exhaustive check over the kinds rather than as a list of
        // paths, so a kind added to `path::Kind` cannot be granted here by a
        // renderer nobody re-read.
        let p = effective_agent("atlas");
        for kind in Kind::ALL {
            let segment = <&str>::from(kind);
            let expected = kind == Kind::Agent;
            assert_eq!(
                p.contains(&format!("swarm/{segment}/")),
                expected,
                "kind {kind:?} in an agent's document: {p}"
            );
        }
        assert!(!p.contains("argus"), "no other principal is named");
        assert_eq!(
            p.matches("path \"").count(),
            3,
            "three stanzas, or the document grants something unaccounted for: {p}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_document_is_exactly_its_own_stanzas() {
        // Pinned byte for byte: an added stanza (a hive's queue credential, a
        // second agent) is exactly what a presence check misses.
        assert_eq!(effective_agent("atlas"), ATLAS_DOCUMENT);
        // The control: the pin discriminates between agents.
        assert!(!effective_agent("other").contains("agents/atlas/"));
    }

    /// The paths of the stanzas in `document` that grant `capability`.
    fn paths_granting(document: &str, capability: &str) -> Vec<String> {
        let mut paths = Vec::new();
        let mut current = "";
        for line in document.lines() {
            if let Some(rest) = line.strip_prefix("path \"") {
                current = rest.split_once('"').map_or("", |(path, _)| path);
            } else if line.contains(&format!("\"{capability}\"")) {
                paths.push(current.to_owned());
            }
        }
        paths
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_only_write_is_creating_its_own_backend_env() {
        // An agent that could write its own credentials could hand itself an
        // identity it was never issued. The one leaf it may create is the one
        // it seeds from its backend environment file, and `update` on it would
        // let the agent replace a value the operator set.
        let p = effective_agent("atlas");
        let leaf = format!(
            "secret/data/{}",
            crate::backend_env::env_path("atlas").expect("legal")
        );
        // The control: the walk finds the stanzas that are there.
        assert_eq!(
            paths_granting(&p, "read"),
            ["secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/*", leaf.as_str()]
        );
        assert_eq!(paths_granting(&p, "create"), [leaf.as_str()]);
        for capability in ["update", "delete", "sudo", "patch"] {
            assert!(
                !p.contains(capability),
                "an agent's document must not grant {capability}: {p}"
            );
        }
        // The exact stanza overrides the glob for its path, so it carries
        // `read` itself.
        assert!(
            p.contains("backend-env\" {\n  capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\"]"),
            "{p}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agent_reads_values_and_lists_names_and_nothing_crosswise() {
        // `read` on `data/` is the values; `list` on `metadata/` is the key
        // names. `read` on `metadata/` (version history, deletion times) is not
        // granted, nor is `list` anywhere but `metadata/`.
        let p = effective_agent("atlas");
        let stanzas: Vec<&str> = p.split_inclusive("}\n").collect();
        assert_eq!(stanzas.len(), 3, "{p}");
        // The third is the create stanza, pinned by the test above.
        for stanza in &stanzas[..2] {
            let on_data = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/data/");
            let on_metadata = stanza.starts_with("path \"secret/metadata/");
            assert!(on_data != on_metadata, "{stanza}");
            assert_eq!(
                stanza.contains("capabilities = [\"read\"]"),
                on_data,
                "{stanza}"
            );
            assert_eq!(
                stanza.contains("capabilities = [\"list\"]"),
                on_metadata,
                "{stanza}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn one_agents_document_does_not_reach_another_agents_path() {
        let a = effective_agent("atlas");
        assert!(a.contains("swarm/agents/atlas/*"));
        assert!(!a.contains("argus"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agent_name_that_could_close_the_stanza_is_refused() {
        // The name reaches a role name and a certificate subject, so a name that
        // could re-punctuate either is refused.
        assert!(agent_object_name("atlas/*\" { capabilities = [\"root\"] }").is_err());
        assert!(agent_object_name("").is_err());
        // The control: if everything were refused the arms above would pass for
        // the wrong reason.
        assert!(agent_object_name("a-b_C9").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_object_name_sits_where_the_controller_can_write_it() {
        // `hive-*` is the whole of what `controllerPolicyText` lets the
        // controller create under `sys/policies/acl/` and `auth/cert/certs/`,
        // and the controller is the only principal that learns an agent exists.
        let n = agent_object_name("atlas").expect("legal");
        assert_eq!(n, "hive-agent-atlas");
        assert!(n.starts_with(HIVE_PREFIX));
        assert!(n.starts_with(AGENT_PREFIX));
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_object_name_cannot_be_spelled_by_a_legal_hive_name() {
        // The collision argument, as an assertion rather than as prose: the
        // only hive name that renders an agent's object name is one carrying
        // the substring `agent`, which `nix/reserved-hive-fragments.nix`
        // forbids — so the guard this leans on is named in a test that fails if
        // the prefix is ever changed to something that guard does not cover.
        let agent = agent_object_name("atlas").expect("legal");
        let colliding_hive = agent
            .strip_prefix(HIVE_PREFIX)
            .expect("an agent's name is inside the hive namespace");
        assert_eq!(colliding_hive, "agent-atlas");
        assert_eq!(
            hive_object_name(colliding_hive).expect("legal as a path segment"),
            agent,
            "this is the hive name a collision would need"
        );
        assert!(
            colliding_hive.contains("agent"),
            "and it is unrepresentable only because a hive name may not contain `agent`"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_agents_document_is_not_the_hives() {
        // A later edit that made one shared document delegate to the other
        // would hand an agent the hive's `agents/*` stanza.
        let agent = effective_agent("atlas");
        let hive = effective_hive("atlas");
        assert_ne!(agent, hive);
        assert!(!agent.contains("swarm/services/"));
        assert!(!agent.contains("swarm/hives/"));
        // The control: the hive's document does carry that stanza.
        assert!(hive.contains("path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\""));
    }

    #[test]
    fn only_agent_roles_come_back_and_without_their_prefix() {
        let roles: Vec<String> = [
            "hive-agent-atlas",
            "hive-pr1ma",
            "swarm-controller",
            "hive-agent-argus",
        ]
        .map(str::to_owned)
        .to_vec();
        assert_eq!(agents_from_role_names(&roles), ["atlas", "argus"]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_role_agent_object_name_could_not_have_produced_is_dropped() {
        // An empty suffix and one carrying a dot are both names the prefix
        // matches and no agent can have.
        let roles: Vec<String> = ["hive-agent-", "hive-agent-a.b", "hive-agent-ok"]
            .map(str::to_owned)
            .to_vec();
        assert_eq!(agents_from_role_names(&roles), ["ok"]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_listing_inverts_agent_object_name() {
        let name = agent_object_name("atlas").expect("legal");
        assert_eq!(agents_from_role_names(&[name]), ["atlas"]);
    }
}