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Author SHA1 Message Date
atlas
edad6f863c feat(#1886): trust a peer hive's root CA hive-wide for self-signed federation
Add swarm.peers.<domain>.caCert (path to a peer hive's root CA PEM),
trusted everywhere the hive's own internal CA is — so a self-signed
peer hive can federate (matrix) and any in-hive consumer validates its
certs.

Mechanism (reuses the existing hive-CA embedding): the meta-flake
renderer embeds a LIST of CA files next to each agent's flake —
hive-ca.pem (the hive's own self-signed CA, when active) plus each peer
caCert as peer-ca-<N>.pem — and emits them all in
security.pki.certificateFiles, so every agent trusts them at build
time. The matrix container trusts the same peer CAs for federation TLS.
Nothing is installed in the host trust store; the certs live in the nix
store (no mutable host file).

- meta.rs: embedded_ca_files() = hive CA + peer CAs (from new
  HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS env); ca_embed_state() tracks the list (content +
  add/remove); sync_agents materialises + stages the list; render emits
  the multi-entry certificateFiles. Tests cover hive-only / hive+peers
  / peers-only / none.
- hive-c0re.nix: HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS service env (colon-joined caCerts);
  caCert / certFingerprint option docs updated to the hive-wide scope.
- hive-matrix.nix + docs/swarm.md: scope + comment updates.

certFingerprint stays the c0re-only leaf-pin path.
2026-06-22 16:54:44 +02:00
damocles
eb09ec4e28 forge_notify: record dedupe cursor inside the ok arm for clarity 2026-06-22 16:45:24 +02:00
damocles
f5ac6d79e3 forge_notify: leave delivered threads unread, dedupe wakes in-memory 2026-06-22 16:23:04 +02:00
iris
4342a50895 docs(web-ui): refresh matrix-accounts page for heartbeat + age-dimming + problem+json
The M4TR1X ACC0UNTS section described the pre-heartbeat state: a
snapshot 'written at startup / rewritten each daemon (re)start' with an
'ambiguous' as_of, and the live-status dot as a 'dashboard-side
follow-up'. All three shipped since:

- the daemon now force-rewrites the snapshot every ~30s (heartbeat), so
  as_of advances while alive and a stalled value is an honest dead-daemon
  signal — documented, with the full dot state table (green / dim-green
  'no heartbeat' age case / amber container-down + offline / grey);
- the login endpoint moved to /api/matrix-account-login and its failure
  body is RFC 9457 application/problem+json (message in detail), not the
  old 4xx { error } — corrected, with the 400/500 status scheme.
2026-06-22 16:07:54 +02:00
damocles
65ad994c85 dashboard: return problem details directly from client-error handlers 2026-06-22 16:04:22 +02:00
damocles
2b0c51badf inline problem_details builder at call sites; drop the one-caller wrapper 2026-06-22 16:04:22 +02:00
damocles
cdf1bfe7db use the problem_details crate for problem+json responses 2026-06-22 16:04:22 +02:00
damocles
5dc1b3933a return accurate http status codes for dashboard client errors 2026-06-22 16:04:22 +02:00
atlas
dc4c5460d5 feat(#1877): restructure hive-forge into pr/issue sub-verbs
Group issue/PR operations under `pr` and `issue` parent commands
(`hive-forge pr close 42`, `issue create …`, `pr status --pr 42`) per the
operator decision — kind-namespaced verbs replace the flat surface.

- new `verbs::pr_cmd` / `verbs::issue_cmd` parent commands wrap the existing
  per-verb modules (reuse their Args + run fns) under `#[command(subcommand)]`.
- kind-validation (the win over the old generic verbs): the generics that work
  on both (view/comment/comments/close/labels/assign/timeline) call
  `assert_kind` first, so `pr close <issue>` / `issue close <pr>` are rejected
  with a 'use the other command' message. PR-only / issue-only verbs are
  kind-correct by construction. `number` exposed `pub(crate)` on the shared
  verbs so the wrappers can probe it.
- every flat kind verb (`close`, `pr-create`, `pr-status`, `issue-edit`, …)
  kept as a `#[command(hide = true)]` back-compat alias — still parses, dropped
  from --help; removed in a later sweep once usage migrates. (`pr`/`issue`
  bare-show become `pr show` / `issue show` — the names are now parents.)
- docs/tools/forge.md documents the new surface + the deprecated aliases.

cargo build/clippy/fmt clean, 54 tests pass; --help surface + alias parsing
smoke-tested.
2026-06-22 16:01:13 +02:00
29 changed files with 879 additions and 221 deletions

24
Cargo.lock generated
View file

@ -1367,6 +1367,7 @@ dependencies = [
"hive-sh4re",
"libc",
"listenfd",
"problem_details",
"reqwest",
"rusqlite",
"serde",
@ -1508,6 +1509,16 @@ version = "0.4.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9171a2ea8a68358193d15dd5d70c1c10a2afc3e7e4c5bc92bc9f025cebd7359c"
[[package]]
name = "http-serde"
version = "2.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0f056c8559e3757392c8d091e796416e4649d8e49e88b8d76df6c002f05027fd"
dependencies = [
"http",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "httparse"
version = "1.10.1"
@ -2627,6 +2638,19 @@ dependencies = [
"syn",
]
[[package]]
name = "problem_details"
version = "0.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d50e8b46a2f32e61ae82888734e24627ea0f8c9bc7c5fc8d0c3e0eb7ed0ff5ab"
dependencies = [
"axum",
"http",
"http-serde",
"serde",
"serde_json",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro-crate"
version = "3.5.0"

View file

@ -70,9 +70,46 @@ Background task spawned once per harness boot. Polls
`GET /api/v1/notifications?all=false` every 30 seconds (Forgejo's
unread-only filter), formats each notification as a broker
`Wake { from: "forge" }` message, and delivers it to the agent's own
inbox so claude's normal turn loop picks it up. Mark-read happens
after successful delivery so a failed-delivery notification
resurfaces on the next tick.
inbox so claude's normal turn loop picks it up.
### Mark-read on read, not on delivery
Delivered conversation threads are deliberately left **unread** in
forge. The hive-forge read-before-comment guard keys off forge's own
notification read-state (`GET /notifications?all=false`) to refuse a
comment when a thread has unread activity by others — so the agent
reading the thread via the CLI (`hive-forge comments` / `view`,
which `PATCH`es `/notifications/threads/{id}`) is the single
mark-read point. If `forge_notify` marked threads read on delivery,
that unread signal would be consumed before the agent acts and the
guard could never fire.
Because a delivered thread stays unread, it reappears in every
`?all=false` poll. An in-memory **delivery-dedupe cursor** (thread
id → last-delivered `updated_at`, held in the poll loop) stops the
same version from re-firing a wake; a new comment bumps `updated_at`
so genuinely new activity re-delivers. The cursor is pure anti-spam,
not a correctness oracle: lost on harness restart it just
re-delivers currently-unread threads once (harmless — `recv`
tolerates redelivery), so it carries none of the persisted-mirror
fragility that ruled out an on-disk seen-cursor. Each poll prunes
the cursor to the threads still in the unread set. A failed wake
delivery is left unread **and** out of the cursor, so it resurfaces
next tick.
Two paths still mark-read directly (no read-before-comment value):
self-echo notifications (the agent's own writes, see below) and
`HIVE_FORGE_NOTIFY_SKIP_REASONS` drop-listed reasons.
> Note: the unread list grows for threads the agent never reads via
> the CLI, since nothing else trims it. This does not affect guard
> correctness (the guard does a per-thread, repo-scoped query) nor
> wake delivery (Forgejo orders unread newest-first, so new activity
> always lands in the polled window). Bounding the unread list via a
> reason-independent firehose-reduction is a separate follow-up — the
> existing auto-unsubscribe below is gated on a `reason` field that
> this Forgejo's notification API does not actually emit, so it never
> fires today.
### Activation gates (graceful no-ops)

View file

@ -40,25 +40,35 @@ and `qualify()` / `qualified_label()` semantics.
```nix
services.hyperhive.swarm.peers = {
"lab.example.com" = { }; # CA-trusted (Let's Encrypt etc.)
"edge.corp" = { certFingerprint = "sha256:…"; }; # self-signed TLS
"edge.corp" = { certFingerprint = "sha256:…"; }; # self-signed TLS, c0re peer checks only
"mesh.internal" = { caCert = ./mesh-ca.pem; }; # self-signed, trusted for matrix federation
};
```
The attrset key is the peer's DNS domain. `certFingerprint` is
optional:
The attrset key is the peer's DNS domain. Two independent, optional
trust knobs — pick by what you need to trust:
- **Omitted / null** — the system CA bundle validates the peer's TLS
cert. Correct for peers with Let's Encrypt or any standard CA cert.
- **Set** (`"sha256:…"`) — pin a specific cert fingerprint. Use this
for peers whose self-signed TLS cert doesn't chain to a CA your
host trusts.
`certFingerprint` scopes **only** to hive-c0re's own peer HTTPS checks
(the P33RS dashboard links and agent peer discovery below). It is
**not** consulted by matrix federation — tuwunel validates a peer's
federation certificate against the system CA bundle independently (see
*Matrix federation* below), so pinning a fingerprint here does nothing
for a self-signed matrix gateway cert.
- **`certFingerprint`** (`"sha256:…"`) — pin the peer's TLS *leaf*
fingerprint. Scopes **only** to hive-c0re's own peer HTTPS checks
(the P33RS dashboard links + agent peer discovery below). It is
**not** consulted by matrix federation — tuwunel validates a peer's
federation certificate against the system CA bundle independently
(see *Matrix federation* below), so a fingerprint pin does nothing
for a self-signed matrix cert.
- **`caCert`** (path to the peer's root CA PEM) — embeds that CA (at
build time, into the nix store — no runtime file on the host) and
trusts it **everywhere the hive's own internal CA is**: it rides
alongside `hive-ca.pem` in every agent's
`security.pki.certificateFiles` (via the meta-flake renderer) **and**
in the matrix container's trust bundle, so tuwunel validates the
peer's *federation* TLS when it chains to that CA. Trust stays
**inside the hive** (agents + the matrix container), never the host
system trust store. **This is the knob that unblocks federation with
a self-signed peer hive** — use it instead of `certFingerprint` when
you control the peer's CA. (It does not affect hive-c0re's own peer
HTTPS checks — those stay on `certFingerprint` / the system bundle.)
- **Both omitted** — the stock system CA bundle validates the peer
(correct for Let's Encrypt / any publicly-trusted peer).
### Fingerprint format
@ -114,13 +124,13 @@ environment and forwarded to agent containers.
3. **Matrix federation** — when `matrix.enable` is on, tuwunel
federates with the peer's matrix server (discovered via the peer's
`.well-known/matrix/server` delegation, which the gateway serves).
Federation validates the peer's TLS certificate against the
**system CA bundle** — independently of `certFingerprint`, which it
never consults. A self-signed gateway certificate therefore won't
federate even with a fingerprint pinned above: the peers need
CA-issued certs (ACME) or a shared private CA trusted on both
gateway hosts. See `docs/matrix.md` for federation firewall + TLS
requirements.
Federation validates the peer's TLS certificate against the matrix
**container's** trust bundle — independently of `certFingerprint`,
which it never consults. A self-signed gateway certificate therefore
won't federate unless the peer's root CA is trusted: set `caCert`
above (embeds the peer CA into the matrix container's trust bundle),
or give the peers CA-issued certs (ACME). See `docs/matrix.md` for
federation firewall + TLS requirements.
## Bilateral setup

View file

@ -12,7 +12,25 @@ as a proper Rust binary). Use it instead of ad-hoc curl pipelines.
## Verbs
**Kind-namespaced commands (preferred):** issue/PR operations are grouped
under `issue` and `pr` parent commands — `hive-forge pr close 42`,
`hive-forge issue create --title …`, `hive-forge pr status --pr 42`. The
`pr <verb>` / `issue <verb>` forms validate the number's kind (e.g. `pr close`
refuses an issue number, which the old generic `close` couldn't). Run
`hive-forge pr --help` / `hive-forge issue --help` for the full subcommand
list (show/create/edit/status/merge/reviews/commits/diff/view/comment/
comments/close/labels/assign/timeline as applicable).
The flat forms below (`close 42`, `pr-create …`, `pr-status …`, …) still work
as **hidden back-compat aliases** during the transition and are dropped from
`--help`; prefer the namespaced form. They'll be removed in a later sweep.
```bash
hive-forge pr close 42 # close a PR (kind-validated)
hive-forge issue close 42 # close an issue (kind-validated)
hive-forge pr status --pr 42 # PR health (mergeable / CI / reviews)
hive-forge issue create --title "..." --body "..."
# --- flat aliases below remain valid (hidden) ---
hive-forge view 42 # title + body + comments
hive-forge comments 42 # list all comments (human-readable)
hive-forge comments 42 --tail 10 # last 10 comments (count-then-page; efficient on long threads)

View file

@ -231,20 +231,37 @@ read from `GET /api/matrix-accounts?agent=<name>` →
`{ accounts: [ { name, homeserver, token_present, live, user_id } ], as_of_unix }`.
`token_present` is whether a token is **stored**; `live`, `homeserver`,
and `user_id` are backfilled from the matrix daemon's
`matrix-accounts.json` snapshot — a host-visible file the daemon writes at
startup after its sessions restore (an account with a token but absent
from the snapshot reports `live: false`). `as_of_unix` is the snapshot's
mtime (null when absent), so the dot can show "live as of N ago". The
snapshot is rewritten each daemon (re)start, so an old `as_of_unix` is
ambiguous (stable uptime vs dead daemon) — the live-status dot rendering
(3-state + snapshot-age tooltip, cross-referencing container-running
state) is the dashboard-side follow-up.
`matrix-accounts.json` snapshot — a host-visible file the daemon
**force-rewrites every ~30s** (a heartbeat), so `as_of_unix` (the
snapshot mtime) advances while the daemon is alive and a *stalled* value
genuinely means "stopped publishing", not just "old snapshot". An account
with a token but absent from the snapshot reports `live: false`.
The status dot renders these states:
- **green**`live` and the container is running: online.
- **dim green**`live` but `as_of_unix` hasn't advanced in > ~90s (3
missed heartbeats) while the container is *not* down: the daemon stopped
publishing, so the snapshot's `live` is no longer trustworthy (likely
dead/wedged). Labelled "online · no heartbeat".
- **amber**`live` but the container is **down** (a stopped container
⟹ a dead daemon, so the snapshot is stale); also the `token_present &&
!live` "provisioned but offline" case.
- **grey** — no token (not provisioned).
The container-down cross-reference (`/api/state`) takes precedence over
the age check. `as_of_unix` is tooltipped ("live as of N ago") throughout
so freshness is always legible. When `live` is absent (an older backend
without the snapshot) the dot falls back to a token-present rendering.
The provision form (account name, homeserver, login method) posts
`POST /matrix-account-login` (`x-www-form-urlencoded`, operator-auth):
`POST /api/matrix-account-login` (`x-www-form-urlencoded`, operator-auth):
fields `agent, account, homeserver, mode=password|token, user_id?,
password?, token?` → `2xx { ok, user_id }` on success or
`4xx { error }` on failure. The host coordinator performs the login
password?, token?` → `200 { ok, user_id }` on success. Failures come back
as RFC 9457 `application/problem+json` (`{ type, title, status, detail }`)
with the human-readable message in `detail` and the status code reflecting
the cause (400 for a validation error, 500 for a login / `whoami` /
internal failure); the page reads `detail` for display. The host coordinator performs the login
(password) or validates the token (`whoami`) and writes the bearer to
the agent's `matrixAccounts.<account>.tokenFile` via the same
privileged write path as the hive-internal `matrix-token`; the token is

View file

@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
//! Background Forgejo notification poller. Polls
//! `GET /notifications?all=false` every 30s, formats each unread
//! notification as a broker `Wake { from: "forge" }` message, and
//! marks it read after delivery so failures resurface next tick.
//! delivers it to the agent's inbox. Delivered threads are deliberately
//! left UNREAD in forge — the hive-forge read-before-comment guard keys
//! off forge's own unread-state, and the agent reading the thread via the
//! CLI is what marks it read. An in-memory delivery-dedupe cursor
//! (thread id → last-delivered `updated_at`) stops the still-unread
//! notification from re-firing a wake every poll; self-echo and
//! drop-listed notifications are still marked read directly.
//!
//! Activation gates, self-notification filtering, body excerpt +
//! truncation + heading escape, wrapper formats (comment / review /
@ -9,7 +15,7 @@
//! reason drop-list, and auto-unsubscribe on broad watches all live
//! in [`docs/forge.md::Notification poller`](../../../docs/forge.md).
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::fmt::Write as _;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::Duration;
@ -139,6 +145,19 @@ pub async fn run(socket: PathBuf) {
// across polls so we don't hammer DELETE on every cycle.
let mut unsubbed_repos: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
// Delivery-dedupe cursor: notification thread id -> the `updated_at`
// of the version we last woke the agent for. We no longer mark a
// thread read on delivery (that would consume the unread signal the
// hive-forge read-before-comment guard relies on), so this in-memory
// map is what stops the same unread notification from re-firing a
// wake every poll. A new comment bumps `updated_at`, so the thread
// re-delivers. This is purely anti-spam, NOT a correctness oracle:
// lost on harness restart it just re-delivers currently-unread
// threads once (harmless — recv tolerates redelivery), so it carries
// none of the persisted-mirror fragility that sank the on-disk
// cursor approach.
let mut delivered: HashMap<u64, String> = HashMap::new();
loop {
interval.tick().await;
poll_once(
@ -148,6 +167,7 @@ pub async fn run(socket: PathBuf) {
&socket,
keep_subscriptions,
&mut unsubbed_repos,
&mut delivered,
&own_login,
&skip_reasons,
)
@ -723,9 +743,9 @@ fn days_from_civil(y: i64, m: i64, d: i64) -> i64 {
#[allow(
clippy::too_many_arguments,
reason = "the notification poll's config + mutable subscription state, \
wired once from the poll loop; a struct would just move the \
same fields one level out"
reason = "the notification poll's config + mutable subscription / \
delivery-dedupe state, wired once from the poll loop; a struct \
would just move the same fields one level out"
)]
#[allow(
clippy::too_many_lines,
@ -740,6 +760,7 @@ async fn poll_once(
socket: &Path,
keep_subscriptions: bool,
unsubbed_repos: &mut HashSet<String>,
delivered: &mut HashMap<u64, String>,
own_login: &str,
skip_reasons: &[String],
) {
@ -784,6 +805,17 @@ async fn poll_once(
continue;
};
// Delivery-dedupe: we no longer mark threads read on delivery, so
// an unread notification reappears in every `?all=false` poll.
// Skip it silently unless its `updated_at` advanced since the
// version we last delivered a wake for (i.e. genuinely new
// activity). See the `delivered` cursor note in `run`.
let updated_at = notif["updated_at"].as_str().unwrap_or("").to_owned();
if !should_deliver(delivered, id, &updated_at) {
debug!(%id, "forge_notify: skipping (already delivered this version)");
continue;
}
// Reason drop-list: suppress noisy reasons; null/unknown pass
// through so directed signals stay deliverable (see
// `docs/forge.md::Reason drop-list`).
@ -809,12 +841,21 @@ async fn poll_once(
body,
transient: false,
};
let delivered = crate::client::request::<_, hive_sh4re::Response>(socket, &req)
let deliver_result = crate::client::request::<_, hive_sh4re::Response>(socket, &req)
.await
.map(|_| ());
match delivered {
match deliver_result {
Ok(()) => {
debug!(%id, "forge_notify: delivered");
// Record the delivered version in the dedupe cursor INSTEAD
// of marking the thread read. Leaving it unread is
// deliberate: the hive-forge read-before-comment guard keys
// off forge's own unread-state, and the agent reading the
// thread via the CLI is what marks it read. Recorded only
// here in the Ok arm — a failed delivery hits the Err arm
// and `continue`s without recording, so it re-delivers next
// tick.
delivered.insert(id, updated_at);
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(%id, error = ?e, "forge_notify: deliver failed — leaving unread");
@ -822,10 +863,6 @@ async fn poll_once(
}
}
// Mark as read only after successful delivery so a failed-delivery
// notification resurfaces on the next poll tick.
mark_read(client, forge_url, token, id).await;
// Auto-unsubscribe from broad repo watches after delivering a
// `subscribed` notification. Gated by HIVE_FORGE_KEEP_SUBSCRIPTIONS
// for triage / firehose agents (see
@ -856,12 +893,34 @@ async fn poll_once(
}
}
}
// Prune the dedupe cursor down to the threads still present in this
// poll's unread set. Once the agent reads a thread (marking it read
// via the CLI) it drops out of `?all=false`, so its cursor entry is
// dead weight; dropping it bounds the map to the current unread size.
// If such a thread later goes unread again it carries a fresh
// `updated_at` and re-delivers correctly.
let current_ids: HashSet<u64> = notifications
.iter()
.filter_map(|n| n["id"].as_u64())
.collect();
delivered.retain(|id, _| current_ids.contains(id));
}
/// Whether a notification should be delivered as a wake given the
/// delivery-dedupe cursor. Delivers when the thread has never been
/// delivered, or when its `updated_at` advanced since the last delivered
/// version (genuinely new activity). Pure for unit testing.
fn should_deliver(delivered: &HashMap<u64, String>, id: u64, updated_at: &str) -> bool {
delivered.get(&id).is_none_or(|seen| seen != updated_at)
}
/// Mark a notification thread as read. Best-effort — logs on failure but
/// does not abort the poll loop. A notification left unread will resurface
/// on the next poll tick (desirable for delivery failures; for self-echo
/// silencing we call this without prior delivery).
/// does not abort the poll loop. Called only on the self-echo and
/// drop-listed paths (the agent's own writes / explicitly-suppressed
/// reasons) — delivered threads are deliberately left unread for the
/// read-before-comment guard, and a failed delivery is left unread + out
/// of the dedupe cursor so it resurfaces on the next poll tick.
async fn mark_read(client: &reqwest::Client, forge_url: &str, token: &str, id: u64) {
let mark_url = format!("{forge_url}/api/v1/notifications/threads/{id}");
match client
@ -886,6 +945,38 @@ async fn mark_read(client: &reqwest::Client, forge_url: &str, token: &str, id: u
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn should_deliver_when_thread_never_seen() {
let delivered = HashMap::new();
assert!(should_deliver(&delivered, 42, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z"));
}
#[test]
fn should_not_deliver_same_version_again() {
// The dedupe case: an unread thread reappears every poll with the
// same `updated_at` — must not re-fire a wake.
let mut delivered = HashMap::new();
delivered.insert(42, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z".to_owned());
assert!(!should_deliver(&delivered, 42, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z"));
}
#[test]
fn should_deliver_when_updated_at_advanced() {
// A new comment bumps `updated_at` → genuinely new activity →
// deliver again.
let mut delivered = HashMap::new();
delivered.insert(42, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z".to_owned());
assert!(should_deliver(&delivered, 42, "2026-06-22T16:05:00Z"));
}
#[test]
fn should_deliver_tracks_per_thread() {
// A cursor for one thread says nothing about another.
let mut delivered = HashMap::new();
delivered.insert(42, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z".to_owned());
assert!(should_deliver(&delivered, 99, "2026-06-22T16:00:00Z"));
}
#[test]
fn escape_md_headings_escapes_top_level_atx() {
// Argus reviews start with `## argus review`, which would

View file

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ tokio.workspace = true
tokio-stream.workspace = true
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
problem_details = { version = "0.9.0", features = ["axum"] }
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"

View file

@ -1133,19 +1133,21 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn problem_body_has_rfc9457_members() {
// about:blank type → title is the canonical status reason phrase,
// status is the numeric code, detail is the caller message.
let body = problem_body(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad input");
assert_eq!(body["type"], "about:blank");
assert_eq!(body["title"], "Bad Request");
assert_eq!(body["status"], 400);
assert_eq!(body["detail"], "bad input");
// error_response (the 500 wrapper) carries the same shape with the
// internal-error status.
let five = problem_body(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "boom");
assert_eq!(five["status"], 500);
assert_eq!(five["title"], "Internal Server Error");
fn problem_details_carry_rfc9457_status_and_detail() {
// Contract the frontend depends on: the problem_details crate
// serialises the RFC 9457 members we rely on — `status` (numeric)
// and `detail` (the caller message; the FE reads `.detail`).
let pd = problem_details::ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("bad input");
let v = serde_json::to_value(&pd).expect("problem details serialise");
assert_eq!(v["status"], 400);
assert_eq!(v["detail"], "bad input");
// The 500 wrapper path carries the internal-error status.
let five =
problem_details::ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)
.with_detail("boom");
let fv = serde_json::to_value(&five).expect("problem details serialise");
assert_eq!(fv["status"], 500);
}
#[test]
@ -1655,44 +1657,23 @@ fn strip_container_prefix(name: &str) -> String {
.to_owned()
}
/// The RFC 9457 problem-details media type.
const PROBLEM_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE: &str = "application/problem+json";
/// Build the RFC 9457 problem-details body for `status` + `detail`. The
/// object carries the standard members: `type` ("about:blank", i.e. no
/// problem-specific type), `title` (the HTTP status reason phrase),
/// `status` (numeric code) and `detail` (the caller-supplied message).
/// Split from [`problem_response`] so the member shape is unit-testable
/// without axum response plumbing.
fn problem_body(status: StatusCode, detail: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"type": "about:blank",
"title": status.canonical_reason().unwrap_or("Error"),
"status": status.as_u16(),
"detail": detail,
})
/// The common internal-error case as a `ProblemDetails`: a 500 RFC 9457
/// (`application/problem+json`) value via the `problem_details` crate.
/// `from_status_code` sets `status` + `title` (the canonical reason phrase)
/// and leaves `type` as the default `about:blank`; `with_detail` carries the
/// caller message; the crate's axum `IntoResponse` emits the
/// `application/problem+json` body the frontend parses (it reads `detail`).
/// Handlers that surface client failures return `Result<_, ProblemDetails>`
/// and hand this (or an inline `from_status_code(4xx)`) straight to `Err` —
/// no manual `.into_response()`.
fn error_problem(message: &str) -> problem_details::ProblemDetails {
problem_details::ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)
.with_detail(message)
}
/// Build an RFC 9457 (`application/problem+json`) error response.
/// Centralising this keeps every dashboard error on one machine-readable
/// shape the frontend can parse (read `detail` for display) instead of
/// guessing between plain text and JSON.
fn problem_response(status: StatusCode, detail: &str) -> Response {
let body = serde_json::to_string(&problem_body(status, detail))
.expect("problem+json body is always serialisable");
(
status,
[(axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE, PROBLEM_JSON_CONTENT_TYPE)],
body,
)
.into_response()
}
/// Convenience wrapper for the common internal-error case: a 500
/// problem-details response (see [`problem_response`]). Most dashboard
/// handlers funnel their errors through here; handlers with a more
/// specific failure (bad input, not found) call [`problem_response`]
/// directly with the right status.
/// `Response` wrapper around [`error_problem`] for the many handlers typed
/// `-> Response` whose only failure mode is a 500 — they funnel errors
/// through here rather than threading a `Result` return type.
fn error_response(message: &str) -> Response {
problem_response(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, message)
error_problem(message).into_response()
}

View file

@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ use axum::{
use hive_sh4re::Approval;
use serde::Deserialize;
use super::{AppState, error_response};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, error_response};
use crate::actions;
use crate::coordinator::Coordinator;
use crate::lifecycle;
@ -178,19 +180,22 @@ pub(super) async fn get_approval_diff(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<i64>,
axum::extract::Query(q): axum::extract::Query<DiffBaseQuery>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let base = q.base.as_deref().unwrap_or("applied");
let approval = match state.coord.approvals.get(id) {
Ok(Some(a)) => a,
Ok(None) => return error_response(&format!("approval {id} not found")),
Err(e) => return error_response(&format!("approval {id}: {e:#}")),
Ok(None) => return Err(error_problem(&format!("approval {id} not found"))),
Err(e) => return Err(error_problem(&format!("approval {id}: {e:#}"))),
};
if !matches!(approval.kind, hive_sh4re::ApprovalKind::ApplyCommit) {
return error_response("spawn approvals carry no commit to diff");
return Err(error_problem("spawn approvals carry no commit to diff"));
}
let applied = Coordinator::agent_applied_dir(&approval.agent);
if !applied.join(".git").exists() {
return plain_text(format!("(no applied git repo at {})", applied.display()));
return Ok(plain_text(format!(
"(no applied git repo at {})",
applied.display()
)));
}
let target = format!("refs/tags/proposal/{id}");
let base_ref = match base {
@ -209,18 +214,23 @@ pub(super) async fn get_approval_diff(
.max()
.map(|n| format!("refs/tags/proposal/{n}"))
}
other => return error_response(&format!("unknown diff base {other:?}")),
other => {
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("unknown diff base {other:?}")));
}
};
let Some(base_ref) = base_ref else {
return plain_text(match base {
return Ok(plain_text(match base {
"approved" => "(no earlier approved proposal to diff against)".to_owned(),
_ => "(no previous proposal to diff against)".to_owned(),
});
}));
};
match git_diff_refs(&applied, &base_ref, &target).await {
Ok(s) if s.is_empty() => plain_text("(identical — no changes vs this base)".to_owned()),
Ok(s) => plain_text(s),
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("git diff: {e:#}")),
Ok(s) if s.is_empty() => Ok(plain_text(
"(identical — no changes vs this base)".to_owned(),
)),
Ok(s) => Ok(plain_text(s)),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("git diff: {e:#}"))),
}
}

View file

@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ use axum::{
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use super::{error_response, strip_container_prefix, validate_agent_name};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{error_problem, strip_container_prefix, validate_agent_name};
use crate::lifecycle;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@ -34,13 +36,14 @@ pub(super) struct JournalQuery {
pub(super) async fn get_journal(
AxumPath(name): AxumPath<String>,
axum::extract::Query(q): axum::extract::Query<JournalQuery>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
// Defense-in-depth format check so weird chars never reach the
// shellout below — the `lifecycle::list()` existence check would
// catch them anyway, but rejecting at the boundary keeps the
// failure mode crisp.
if let Some(reason) = validate_agent_name(&name) {
return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, format!("bad agent name: {reason}")).into_response();
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("bad agent name: {reason}")));
}
// Validate the container name against the list of managed
// containers so we don't shell out with arbitrary input.
@ -48,7 +51,8 @@ pub(super) async fn get_journal(
let prefixed = format!("{}{container}", lifecycle::AGENT_PREFIX);
let live = lifecycle::list().await.unwrap_or_default();
if !live.iter().any(|c| c == &prefixed) {
return error_response(&format!("journal: no managed container {prefixed:?}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
.with_detail(format!("journal: no managed container {prefixed:?}")));
}
let lines = q.lines.unwrap_or(500).min(5000);
let unit = match q.unit.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
@ -61,7 +65,8 @@ pub(super) async fn get_journal(
format!("{u}.service")
};
if !allowed.contains(&unit.as_str()) {
return error_response(&format!("journal: unknown unit {unit:?}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("journal: unknown unit {unit:?}")));
}
Some(unit)
}
@ -86,9 +91,9 @@ pub(super) async fn get_journal(
body.push_str("\n--- stderr ---\n");
body.push_str(&stderr);
}
([("content-type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")], body).into_response()
Ok(([("content-type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")], body).into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("journal read: {e:#}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("journal read: {e:#}"))),
}
}
@ -108,7 +113,7 @@ pub(super) struct JournalHostQuery {
/// dashboard binding to a host-only port.
pub(super) async fn get_journal_host(
axum::extract::Query(q): axum::extract::Query<JournalHostQuery>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let lines = q.lines.unwrap_or(500).min(5000);
let allowed = ["hive-c0re.service"];
let mut cmd = tokio::process::Command::new("journalctl");
@ -121,7 +126,8 @@ pub(super) async fn get_journal_host(
format!("{u}.service")
};
if !allowed.contains(&unit.as_str()) {
return error_response(&format!("journal-host: unknown unit {unit:?}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("journal-host: unknown unit {unit:?}")));
}
cmd.args(["-u", &unit]);
}
@ -132,8 +138,8 @@ pub(super) async fn get_journal_host(
body.push_str("\n--- stderr ---\n");
body.push_str(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr));
}
([("content-type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")], body).into_response()
Ok(([("content-type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")], body).into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("journalctl spawn: {e}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("journalctl spawn: {e}"))),
}
}

View file

@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ use axum::{
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::{AppState, error_response, guard_agent_name, strip_container_prefix};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, guard_agent_name, strip_container_prefix};
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct ToolGroupsSnapshot {
@ -112,15 +114,19 @@ pub(super) async fn post_tool_groups(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(name): AxumPath<String>,
axum::Json(body): axum::Json<SetToolGroupsBody>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let logical = strip_container_prefix(&name);
// `guard_agent_name` yields a ready-made rejection `Response`; pass it
// through as `Ok` (axum sends it verbatim) rather than re-deriving a
// `ProblemDetails` — the guard is shared with `-> Response` handlers.
if let Some(reject) = guard_agent_name(&state, &logical).await {
return reject;
return Ok(reject);
}
// Validate group names before queuing — fail fast so the operator
// sees the error immediately rather than waiting for the worker.
if let Err(e) = crate::tool_groups::validate_groups(&body.groups) {
return error_response(&format!("invalid tool-groups for {logical}: {e}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("invalid tool-groups for {logical}: {e}")));
}
// Enqueue a PermChange so the JSON file write is serialised through
// the FIFO worker. Prevents concurrent batch-apply actions for
@ -135,7 +141,7 @@ pub(super) async fn post_tool_groups(
);
state.coord.emit_rebuild_queue_snapshot();
tracing::info!(agent = %logical, groups = ?body.groups, "operator: set tool-groups via dashboard");
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@ -193,10 +199,10 @@ pub(super) async fn post_capabilities(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(name): AxumPath<String>,
axum::Json(body): axum::Json<SetCapabilitiesBody>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let logical = strip_container_prefix(&name);
if let Some(reject) = guard_agent_name(&state, &logical).await {
return reject;
return Ok(reject);
}
let known: Vec<&str> = hive_sh4re::Capability::ALL
.iter()
@ -204,7 +210,8 @@ pub(super) async fn post_capabilities(
.collect();
for cap in &body.caps {
if !known.contains(&cap.as_str()) {
return error_response(&format!("unknown capability: {cap}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("unknown capability: {cap}")));
}
}
// Enqueue a PermChange so the JSON file write is serialised through
@ -220,7 +227,7 @@ pub(super) async fn post_capabilities(
);
state.coord.emit_rebuild_queue_snapshot();
tracing::info!(agent = %logical, caps = ?body.caps, "operator: set capabilities via dashboard");
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
/// One agent's slice of a batch permission change. Sparse: an omitted
@ -255,7 +262,7 @@ type StagedPerm = (String, Option<Vec<String>>, Option<Vec<String>>);
pub(super) async fn post_permissions(
State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::Json(body): axum::Json<BatchPermsBody>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let known_caps: Vec<&str> = hive_sh4re::Capability::ALL
.iter()
.map(|c| c.as_str())
@ -267,17 +274,19 @@ pub(super) async fn post_permissions(
for change in &body.changes {
let logical = strip_container_prefix(&change.agent);
if let Some(reject) = guard_agent_name(&state, &logical).await {
return reject;
return Ok(reject);
}
if let Some(groups) = &change.tool_groups
&& let Err(e) = crate::tool_groups::validate_groups(groups)
{
return error_response(&format!("invalid tool-groups for {logical}: {e}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("invalid tool-groups for {logical}: {e}")));
}
if let Some(caps) = &change.capabilities {
for cap in caps {
if !known_caps.contains(&cap.as_str()) {
return error_response(&format!("unknown capability for {logical}: {cap}"));
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail(format!("unknown capability for {logical}: {cap}")));
}
}
}
@ -300,7 +309,7 @@ pub(super) async fn post_permissions(
tracing::info!(agent = %logical, "operator: batch perm change via dashboard");
}
state.coord.emit_rebuild_queue_snapshot();
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
#[cfg(test)]

View file

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ use axum::{
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, error_response};
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@ -26,7 +28,8 @@ pub(super) struct AnswerForm {
/// cross-origin form-POST couldn't already reach. This shim disappears
/// once the unifying gateway makes the agent page same-origin; see
/// `docs/boundary.md`.
fn with_cors(mut resp: Response) -> Response {
fn with_cors(resp: impl IntoResponse) -> Response {
let mut resp = resp.into_response();
resp.headers_mut().insert(
axum::http::header::ACCESS_CONTROL_ALLOW_ORIGIN,
axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static("*"),
@ -41,7 +44,10 @@ pub(super) async fn post_answer_question(
) -> Response {
let answer = form.answer.trim();
if answer.is_empty() {
return with_cors(error_response("answer: required"));
return with_cors(
ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("answer: required"),
);
}
let resp = match state
.coord

View file

@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ use axum::{
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use super::{AppState, error_response};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, error_response};
pub(super) async fn api_reminders(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
match state.coord.broker.list_pending_reminders() {
@ -22,15 +24,18 @@ pub(super) async fn api_reminders(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
pub(super) async fn post_cancel_reminder(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<i64>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
match state.coord.broker.cancel_reminder(id) {
Ok(0) => error_response(&format!("reminder {id} not pending (already delivered?)")),
Ok(0) => Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
.with_detail(format!("reminder {id} not pending (already delivered?)"))),
Ok(_) => {
tracing::info!(%id, "operator cancelled reminder");
state.coord.emit_reminders_snapshot();
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("cancel reminder {id} failed: {e:#}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!(
"cancel reminder {id} failed: {e:#}"
))),
}
}
@ -42,14 +47,15 @@ pub(super) async fn post_cancel_reminder(
pub(super) async fn post_retry_reminder(
State(state): State<AppState>,
AxumPath(id): AxumPath<i64>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
match state.coord.broker.reset_reminder_failure(id) {
Ok(0) => error_response(&format!("reminder {id} not pending (already delivered?)")),
Ok(0) => Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
.with_detail(format!("reminder {id} not pending (already delivered?)"))),
Ok(_) => {
tracing::info!(%id, "operator reset reminder failure for retry");
state.coord.emit_reminders_snapshot();
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("retry reminder {id} failed: {e:#}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("retry reminder {id} failed: {e:#}"))),
}
}

View file

@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ use axum::{
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
};
use super::{AppState, error_response};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, error_response};
/// `GET /api/schedules` — snapshot of every schedule for the
/// scheduled-prompts tab. Returns the wire shape directly
@ -49,15 +51,18 @@ pub(super) async fn api_schedules(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Response {
pub(super) async fn post_schedule_new(
State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::Json(payload): axum::Json<hive_sh4re::SchedulePromptPayload>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
if payload.targets.is_empty() {
return error_response("schedule must have at least one target");
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("schedule must have at least one target"));
}
if payload.body.trim().is_empty() {
return error_response("schedule body must be non-empty");
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("schedule body must be non-empty"));
}
if let Some(0) = payload.interval_seconds {
return error_response("interval_seconds must be > 0 (use None for one-shot)");
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("interval_seconds must be > 0 (use None for one-shot)"));
}
let new = crate::scheduled_prompts::NewSchedule {
owner: hive_sh4re::OPERATOR_RECIPIENT.to_owned(),
@ -71,9 +76,9 @@ pub(super) async fn post_schedule_new(
match state.coord.scheduled_prompts.submit(&new) {
Ok(id) => {
state.coord.emit_schedules_snapshot();
axum::Json(serde_json::json!({"id": id})).into_response()
Ok(axum::Json(serde_json::json!({"id": id})).into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("schedule submit: {e:#}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("schedule submit: {e:#}"))),
}
}

View file

@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ use axum::{
};
use serde::Deserialize;
use super::{AppState, error_response};
use problem_details::ProblemDetails;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, error_response};
/// `POST /api/topology/set-parent` body. `child` is required.
/// `new_parent` may be:
@ -50,10 +52,11 @@ pub(super) struct SetParentBulkEntry {
pub(super) async fn post_set_parent(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Form(form): Form<SetParentForm>,
) -> Response {
) -> Result<Response, ProblemDetails> {
let child = form.child.trim().to_owned();
if child.is_empty() {
return error_response("set-parent: `child` required");
return Err(ProblemDetails::from_status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)
.with_detail("set-parent: `child` required"));
}
// Empty / whitespace-only `new_parent` ⇒ promote to root. Web
// forms submit the empty string for a "no value" radio button,
@ -79,9 +82,9 @@ pub(super) async fn post_set_parent(
new_parent = ?new_parent,
"operator: set-parent via dashboard"
);
(StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response()
Ok((StatusCode::OK, "ok").into_response())
}
Err(e) => error_response(&format!("set-parent {child} failed: {e}")),
Err(e) => Err(error_problem(&format!("set-parent {child} failed: {e}"))),
}
}

View file

@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ pub async fn sync_agents(hive: &HiveEnv, agents: &[AgentSpec]) -> Result<()> {
let on_disk = std::fs::read_to_string(&flake_path).unwrap_or_default();
let initial = !dir.join(".git").exists();
// Hive CA embedding (self-signed TLS): keep `./hive-ca.pem` at the meta
// root in lockstep with the host CA so the build-time `certificateFiles`
// reference render_flake emits always resolves. `ca_desired` is empty
// when self-signed TLS isn't active (cert / ACME mode).
let ca_path = dir.join(HIVE_CA_FILE);
let (ca_desired, ca_changed) = hive_ca_state(&dir);
// Embedded-CA list (self-signed hive CA + peer CAs): keep the
// `./hive-ca.pem` / `./peer-ca-<N>.pem` files at the meta root in
// lockstep with their host sources so the build-time `certificateFiles`
// list render_flake emits always resolves. Empty when neither a
// self-signed hive CA nor any peer CA is configured.
let (ca_files, ca_changed) = ca_embed_state(&dir);
// Skip only when both the flake AND the embedded CA are unchanged — a
// CA rotation with an otherwise-identical flake must still re-commit.
@ -98,15 +98,10 @@ pub async fn sync_agents(hive: &HiveEnv, agents: &[AgentSpec]) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::write(&flake_path, &new_flake)
.with_context(|| format!("write {}", flake_path.display()))?;
// Materialise (or drop) the embedded hive CA next to flake.nix. When
// self-signed TLS is off, `ca_desired` is empty and we remove any stale
// cert so the flake (which no longer references it) stays buildable.
if ca_desired.is_empty() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&ca_path);
} else if ca_changed {
std::fs::write(&ca_path, &ca_desired)
.with_context(|| format!("write {}", ca_path.display()))?;
}
// Materialise the embedded CA list next to flake.nix + drop any stale
// CA file; `ca_touched` is every filename written or removed, staged
// for commit below. Public CA certs only; no private key is embedded.
let ca_touched = materialise_ca_files(&dir, &ca_files)?;
// Reconcile topology.json against the live agent set — adds
// entries for newly-spawned agents (default: manager as parent,
@ -148,11 +143,13 @@ pub async fn sync_agents(hive: &HiveEnv, agents: &[AgentSpec]) -> Result<()> {
// contain '/flake.nix'". Lock then commit once with both
// flake.nix and flake.lock — single commit per change.
git(&dir, &["add", "flake.nix"]).await?;
// Stage the embedded hive CA — added/updated when self-signed TLS is on,
// or its deletion when it was just removed. `git add <path>` stages a
// deletion when the path is tracked and now gone; best-effort so the
// never-tracked-and-absent case (pathspec mismatch) is a harmless no-op.
let _ = git(&dir, &["add", "--", HIVE_CA_FILE]).await;
// Stage every embedded CA file we wrote or removed (hive CA + peer
// CAs). `git add <path>` stages a deletion when the path is tracked
// and now gone; best-effort so the never-tracked-and-absent case
// (pathspec mismatch) is a harmless no-op.
for name in &ca_touched {
let _ = git(&dir, &["add", "--", name]).await;
}
// Stage topology.json on every sync (regenerated by reconcile
// above when the agent set changed). git add is a no-op when the
// file content is unchanged.
@ -200,6 +197,7 @@ pub async fn sync_agents(hive: &HiveEnv, agents: &[AgentSpec]) -> Result<()> {
"flake.nix" => Some("flake"),
"flake.lock" => Some("lock"),
"hive-ca.pem" => Some("hive-ca"),
f if f.starts_with("peer-ca-") && has_pem_ext(f) => Some("peer-ca"),
"topology.json" => Some("topology"),
"capabilities.json" => Some("capabilities"),
"tool-groups.json" => Some("tool-groups"),
@ -576,10 +574,10 @@ fn forwarded_env_vars() -> Vec<(&'static str, String)> {
.collect()
}
/// Filename the hive CA cert is embedded under at the meta-flake root.
/// `sync_agents` writes it and `render_flake` references `./hive-ca.pem`
/// in `security.pki.certificateFiles` so every agent trusts it at build
/// time.
/// Filename the hive's own self-signed CA cert is embedded under at the
/// meta-flake root. One entry of the embedded-CA list `render_flake`
/// references in `security.pki.certificateFiles` (see `embedded_ca_files`);
/// peer CAs sit alongside it as `peer-ca-<N>.pem`.
const HIVE_CA_FILE: &str = "hive-ca.pem";
/// Host path of the hive CA *certificate*, when self-signed TLS is active.
@ -597,17 +595,113 @@ fn hive_ca_source() -> Option<String> {
Some(path)
}
/// Embedded-CA state for the meta repo: `(desired_contents, changed)`.
/// `desired_contents` is the host hive CA cert (empty when self-signed TLS
/// is inactive); `changed` is true when it differs from what's already
/// embedded at `<dir>/hive-ca.pem`, so a CA rotation re-commits even when
/// the flake itself is byte-identical.
fn hive_ca_state(dir: &std::path::Path) -> (String, bool) {
let on_disk = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join(HIVE_CA_FILE)).unwrap_or_default();
let desired = hive_ca_source()
.and_then(|p| std::fs::read_to_string(p).ok())
.unwrap_or_default();
let changed = desired != on_disk;
/// Host paths of peer-hive root CA certificates, from `HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS`
/// (colon-separated; set by hive-c0re.nix from `swarm.peers.<d>.caCert`).
/// Each is embedded alongside the hive CA so a peer's CA is trusted
/// everywhere the hive's own internal CA is — i.e. by every agent. Empty
/// segments and paths that don't resolve to a file are dropped, so we
/// never reference a `certificateFiles` entry we couldn't embed.
fn peer_ca_sources() -> Vec<String> {
let Ok(raw) = std::env::var("HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS") else {
return Vec::new();
};
raw.split(':')
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|p| !p.is_empty() && std::path::Path::new(p).is_file())
.map(ToOwned::to_owned)
.collect()
}
/// The ordered set of CA certs embedded next to the meta flake, as
/// `(filename, host_source_path)`. The self-signed hive CA (when active)
/// is `hive-ca.pem`; each peer CA is `peer-ca-<N>.pem` in declaration
/// order. `render_flake` emits exactly these filenames into
/// `security.pki.certificateFiles` and `sync_agents` materialises them,
/// so the rendered reference and the embedded files always agree.
fn embedded_ca_files() -> Vec<(String, String)> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
if let Some(p) = hive_ca_source() {
out.push((HIVE_CA_FILE.to_owned(), p));
}
for (i, p) in peer_ca_sources().into_iter().enumerate() {
out.push((format!("peer-ca-{i}.pem"), p));
}
out
}
/// Write each desired embedded CA file next to `flake.nix` and remove
/// any stale one (a hive CA turned off, or a peer dropped from config),
/// so the flake never references a file we didn't write. Returns every
/// filename written or removed, for the caller to stage. The public CA
/// certs only; no private key is ever embedded.
fn materialise_ca_files(dir: &Path, ca_files: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let desired: std::collections::HashSet<&str> =
ca_files.iter().map(|(n, _)| n.as_str()).collect();
let mut touched: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) {
for e in entries.flatten() {
let fname = e.file_name();
let Some(name) = fname.to_str() else { continue };
if is_embedded_ca_name(name) && !desired.contains(name) {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(dir.join(name));
touched.push(name.to_owned());
}
}
}
for (name, content) in ca_files {
let path = dir.join(name);
std::fs::write(&path, content).with_context(|| format!("write {}", path.display()))?;
touched.push(name.clone());
}
Ok(touched)
}
/// True for a filename `embedded_ca_files` can produce — the hive CA or
/// a `peer-ca-<N>.pem`. Lets `sync_agents` find stale CA files to clean
/// up (a CA dropped from config) without touching unrelated meta files.
fn is_embedded_ca_name(name: &str) -> bool {
name == HIVE_CA_FILE || (name.starts_with("peer-ca-") && has_pem_ext(name))
}
/// True when `name` ends in a `.pem` extension (case-insensitive). Split
/// out so the embedded-CA filename checks share one spelling and dodge
/// clippy's case-sensitive-extension lint.
fn has_pem_ext(name: &str) -> bool {
Path::new(name)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("pem"))
}
/// Embedded-CA state for the meta repo: `(desired_files, changed)`.
/// `desired_files` is `(filename, contents)` for every CA that should sit
/// next to flake.nix (the hive CA + each peer CA). `changed` is true when
/// the on-disk set differs in any way — a file's contents changed, a new
/// CA appeared, or a previously-embedded CA (`hive-ca.pem` /
/// `peer-ca-*.pem`) is no longer wanted (stale, to be removed). Drives
/// both the re-commit decision and the materialise/cleanup in
/// `sync_agents`, so a CA rotation or a peer-set change re-commits even
/// when the flake itself is byte-identical.
fn ca_embed_state(dir: &std::path::Path) -> (Vec<(String, String)>, bool) {
let desired: Vec<(String, String)> = embedded_ca_files()
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(name, path)| std::fs::read_to_string(&path).ok().map(|c| (name, c)))
.collect();
let desired_names: std::collections::HashSet<&str> =
desired.iter().map(|(n, _)| n.as_str()).collect();
let mut changed = desired.iter().any(|(name, content)| {
std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join(name)).unwrap_or_default() != *content
});
// A previously-embedded CA file no longer wanted → stale (removal is
// a change even when every desired file already matches on disk).
if !changed && let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) {
changed = entries.flatten().any(|e| {
e.file_name()
.to_str()
.is_some_and(|name| is_embedded_ca_name(name) && !desired_names.contains(name))
});
}
(desired, changed)
}
@ -748,16 +842,26 @@ where
{
"#,
);
// Self-signed TLS trust: embed the hive CA so every agent validates the
// gateway's self-signed leaf at build time. `security.pki.certificateFiles`
// is build-time, so the CA travels with the flake source — `sync_agents`
// writes `./hive-ca.pem` next to flake.nix and stages it. Only the public
// CA cert is embedded; the private key never leaves the host. Emitted only
// when hive-tls.nix signalled a CA (HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH) and the cert exists,
// matching the write condition in `sync_agents` so we never reference a
// file we didn't embed.
if hive_ca_source().is_some() {
out.push_str(" security.pki.certificateFiles = [ ./hive-ca.pem ];\n");
// CA trust: embed every hive-trusted CA so each agent validates them at
// build time. The list is the hive's own self-signed CA (when active)
// plus every peer-hive root CA (`swarm.peers.<d>.caCert`) — a peer CA is
// trusted everywhere the hive's own internal CA is. `certificateFiles` is
// build-time, so the certs travel with the flake source: `sync_agents`
// writes `./hive-ca.pem` + `./peer-ca-<N>.pem` next to flake.nix and
// stages them. Only public CA certs are embedded; no private key ever
// leaves the host. The filename list matches `sync_agents` exactly (both
// derive it from `embedded_ca_files`), so we never reference a file we
// didn't embed; emitted only when the list is non-empty.
let ca_refs: Vec<String> = embedded_ca_files()
.into_iter()
.map(|(name, _)| format!("./{name}"))
.collect();
if !ca_refs.is_empty() {
let _ = writeln!(
out,
" security.pki.certificateFiles = [ {} ];",
ca_refs.join(" ")
);
}
out.push_str(
r#" # The harness service inside the container runs as a
@ -1228,23 +1332,64 @@ mod tests {
)
};
// Two peer-hive CA temp files for the list cases.
let peer0 = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("peer-ca0-test-{}.pem", std::process::id()));
let peer1 = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("peer-ca1-test-{}.pem", std::process::id()));
std::fs::write(
&peer0,
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\np0\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
)
.expect("write peer CA 0");
std::fs::write(
&peer1,
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\np1\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
)
.expect("write peer CA 1");
let peer_paths = format!("{}:{}", peer0.display(), peer1.display());
// All env mutations are serialised within this one test (no other
// test asserts on these vars), restored before returning.
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var("HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS");
std::env::set_var("HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH", &ca_file);
}
let with_ca = render();
// Hive CA + peer CAs: the list carries all three, hive CA first.
unsafe {
std::env::set_var("HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS", &peer_paths);
}
let with_peers = render();
// Peers only (this hive on ACME, federating with self-signed peers).
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var("HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH");
}
let peers_only = render();
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var("HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS");
}
let without_ca = render();
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&ca_file);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&peer0);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&peer1);
assert!(
with_ca.contains("security.pki.certificateFiles = [ ./hive-ca.pem ]"),
"CA cert must be wired into certificateFiles when signalled:\n{with_ca}"
);
assert!(
with_peers.contains(
"security.pki.certificateFiles = [ ./hive-ca.pem ./peer-ca-0.pem ./peer-ca-1.pem ]"
),
"hive CA + peer CAs must all appear in the certificateFiles list:\n{with_peers}"
);
assert!(
peers_only
.contains("security.pki.certificateFiles = [ ./peer-ca-0.pem ./peer-ca-1.pem ]"),
"peer CAs must be trusted even when this hive has no self-signed CA:\n{peers_only}"
);
assert!(
!without_ca.contains("security.pki.certificateFiles"),
"no certificateFiles reference without the HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH signal:\n{without_ca}"
"no certificateFiles reference without any CA signal:\n{without_ca}"
);
}
}

View file

@ -47,39 +47,54 @@ struct Cli {
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Verb {
// The kind verbs below are hidden back-compat aliases of the new
// `pr <verb>` / `issue <verb>` forms (`pr-close` -> `pr close`, bare
// `close` -> `pr close` / `issue close`, etc.). They still parse but are
// dropped from `--help`; a later change removes them once usage migrates.
/// Dump title + body + all comments for an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
View(verbs::view::Args),
/// Print key fields of an issue as JSON.
Issue(verbs::issue::Args),
/// Issue-scoped commands: `issue <show|create|edit|view|comment|comments|close|labels|assign|timeline> …`.
Issue(verbs::issue_cmd::Args),
/// Create an issue. Prints the issue URL on success.
#[command(hide = true)]
IssueCreate(verbs::issue_create::Args),
/// Edit an issue's title, body, state, or milestone.
#[command(hide = true)]
IssueEdit(verbs::issue_edit::Args),
/// Print key fields of a PR as JSON.
Pr(verbs::pr::Args),
/// PR-scoped commands: `pr <show|status|create|merge|reviews|commits|diff|view|comment|comments|close|labels|assign|timeline> …`.
Pr(verbs::pr_cmd::Args),
/// List a PR's commits as JSON (sha, message, author date, author).
/// Survives rebase-rewritten shas — message + author date let a
/// caller match the rows against linear `main` history.
#[command(hide = true)]
PrCommits(verbs::pr_commits::Args),
/// Create a pull request. Prints the PR URL on success.
#[command(hide = true)]
PrCreate(verbs::pr_create::Args),
/// Post a comment on an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Comment(verbs::comment::Args),
/// List all comments on an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Comments(verbs::comments::Args),
/// Print the body (or full JSON) of a single comment by id.
CommentShow(verbs::comment_show::Args),
/// Edit an existing comment by id.
CommentEdit(verbs::comment_edit::Args),
/// Assign or unassign a user on an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Assign(verbs::assign::Args),
/// Close an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Close(verbs::close::Args),
/// List, add, or remove labels on an issue or PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Labels(verbs::labels::Args),
/// PR health view: mergeable state, CI checks, requested reviewers +
/// review verdicts, last-comment time (`--pr <n>`). `--sha` is a
/// CI-only fast path. Exit code is a merge-readiness verdict.
#[command(hide = true)]
PrStatus(verbs::pr_status::Args),
/// Clone a forge repo (default `-r`/`HIVE_FORGE_REPO`) with
/// credentials auto-injected. Pairs with `pr-create --agit`.
@ -113,21 +128,25 @@ enum Verb {
/// Merge a PR (`--method merge|rebase`, default merge). Refuses unless
/// mergeable + CI not red + no changes requested (`--force` overrides).
/// Deletes the head branch unless `--keep-branch`. No squash option.
#[command(hide = true)]
PrMerge(verbs::pr_merge::Args),
/// List a PR's reviews, or submit one: `--approve` /
/// `--request-changes` / `--comment` (with `-m` for the body).
#[command(hide = true)]
PrReviews(verbs::pr_reviews::Args),
/// List branches, optionally filtered.
Branches(verbs::branches::Args),
/// Print the tree SHA at a branch or commit.
TreeSha(verbs::tree_sha::Args),
/// Print the unified diff for a PR.
#[command(hide = true)]
Diff(verbs::diff::Args),
/// Get or set this user's watch subscription on a repo.
Subscription(verbs::subscription::Args),
/// List timeline events on an issue or PR (closes, label adds,
/// assignments, commit refs, pushes, etc.) — the audit trail
/// `view` + `comments` don't surface.
#[command(hide = true)]
Timeline(verbs::timeline::Args),
/// Upload a file as an attachment to an issue.
AttachIssue(verbs::attach::IssueArgs),
@ -152,10 +171,10 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
let client = client::Client::from_env(cli.repo, cli.json).context("initialize forge client")?;
match cli.verb {
Verb::View(a) => verbs::view::run(&client, a),
Verb::Issue(a) => verbs::issue::run(&client, a),
Verb::Issue(a) => verbs::issue_cmd::run(&client, a),
Verb::IssueCreate(a) => verbs::issue_create::run(&client, a),
Verb::IssueEdit(a) => verbs::issue_edit::run(&client, a),
Verb::Pr(a) => verbs::pr::run(&client, a),
Verb::Pr(a) => verbs::pr_cmd::run(&client, a),
Verb::PrCommits(a) => verbs::pr_commits::run(&client, a),
Verb::PrCreate(a) => verbs::pr_create::run(&client, a),
Verb::Comment(a) => verbs::comment::run(&client, a),

View file

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::verbs::print_json;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
/// User login to assign (or unassign with `--remove`).
user: String,
/// Remove the user instead of adding.

View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use crate::verbs::print_json;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
}
pub fn run(client: &Client, args: Args) -> Result<()> {

View file

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use crate::verbs::print_json;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
/// Inline body text.
#[arg(long, conflicts_with = "body_file")]
body: Option<String>,

View file

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ const PAGE_SIZE: usize = 50;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
/// Page size for the head-of-thread shape (Forgejo caps at 50).
/// Mutually exclusive with `--tail`.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 50, conflicts_with = "tail")]

View file

@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
//! `issue <verb>` — issue-scoped sub-commands. Wraps the per-verb modules
//! under an `issue` parent so `hive-forge issue close 42`, `issue create …`,
//! etc. read as kind-namespaced commands. The generic verbs that also work on
//! PRs (view/comment/comments/close/labels/assign/timeline) kind-check the
//! number is an issue first (`assert_kind`); the issue-only verbs are
//! kind-correct by construction. The flat `issue-*` + bare generic verbs stay
//! as hidden back-compat aliases (see `main.rs`).
use anyhow::Result;
use clap::{Args as ClapArgs, Subcommand};
use crate::client::Client;
use crate::verbs::{self, Kind, assert_kind};
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
#[command(subcommand)]
cmd: Cmd,
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Cmd {
/// Show issue metadata as JSON.
Show(verbs::issue::Args),
/// Create an issue.
Create(verbs::issue_create::Args),
/// Edit an issue's title / body / state / milestone.
Edit(verbs::issue_edit::Args),
/// Show title + body + comments.
View(verbs::view::Args),
/// Post a comment on the issue.
Comment(verbs::comment::Args),
/// List comments on the issue.
Comments(verbs::comments::Args),
/// Close the issue.
Close(verbs::close::Args),
/// List / add / remove labels.
Labels(verbs::labels::Args),
/// Assign or unassign a user.
Assign(verbs::assign::Args),
/// List timeline events.
Timeline(verbs::timeline::Args),
}
pub fn run(client: &Client, args: Args) -> Result<()> {
match args.cmd {
// Issue-only verbs.
Cmd::Show(a) => verbs::issue::run(client, a),
Cmd::Create(a) => verbs::issue_create::run(client, a),
Cmd::Edit(a) => verbs::issue_edit::run(client, a),
// Generics shared with `pr` — verify the number is an issue first.
Cmd::View(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::view::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Comment(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::comment::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Comments(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::comments::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Close(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::close::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Labels(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::labels::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Assign(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::assign::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Timeline(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Issue)?;
verbs::timeline::run(client, a)
}
}
}

View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use crate::verbs::print_json;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
#[command(subcommand)]
action: Option<Action>,
}

View file

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ pub mod comment_show;
pub mod comments;
pub mod diff;
pub mod issue;
pub mod issue_cmd;
pub mod issue_create;
pub mod issue_edit;
pub mod labels;
@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ pub mod lint;
pub mod list;
pub mod milestone;
pub mod pr;
pub mod pr_cmd;
pub mod pr_commits;
pub mod pr_create;
pub mod pr_merge;
@ -52,6 +54,37 @@ pub(crate) fn print_json(v: &Value) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Issue-vs-PR kind, for the `pr <verb>` / `issue <verb>` sub-command
/// validation.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub(crate) enum Kind {
Pr,
Issue,
}
/// Verify `number` is the expected kind before a kind-namespaced verb (one
/// of the generics that work on both — close/comment/labels/…) acts on it —
/// the validation win the `pr <verb>` / `issue <verb>` split buys over the
/// old generic verbs. Forgejo's `/issues/{n}` endpoint serves both issues and
/// PRs and marks PRs with a non-null `pull_request` field, so one GET
/// classifies it. Errors with a "use the other command" message on mismatch.
pub(crate) fn assert_kind(client: &Client, number: u64, expected: Kind) -> Result<()> {
let repo = client.repo();
let v = client.get_json(&format!("/repos/{repo}/issues/{number}"))?;
let is_pr = v.get("pull_request").is_some_and(|p| !p.is_null());
match (expected, is_pr) {
(Kind::Pr, false) => {
anyhow::bail!(
"#{number} is an issue, not a PR — use `hive-forge issue <verb> {number}`"
)
}
(Kind::Issue, true) => {
anyhow::bail!("#{number} is a PR, not an issue — use `hive-forge pr <verb> {number}`")
}
_ => Ok(()),
}
}
/// Minimal RFC 3986 unreserved-set percent encoder. Covers the subset of
/// characters that show up in the values we splice into request paths —
/// usernames, label names, artifact names — without pulling in a fresh

View file

@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
//! `pr <verb>` — PR-scoped sub-commands. Wraps the per-verb modules under a
//! `pr` parent so `hive-forge pr close 42`, `pr status --pr 42`, etc. read as
//! kind-namespaced commands. The generic verbs that also work on issues
//! (view/comment/comments/close/labels/assign/timeline) kind-check the number
//! is a PR first (`assert_kind`); the PR-only verbs hit `/pulls/…` and are
//! kind-correct by construction. The flat `pr-*` + bare generic verbs stay as
//! hidden back-compat aliases (see `main.rs`).
use anyhow::Result;
use clap::{Args as ClapArgs, Subcommand};
use crate::client::Client;
use crate::verbs::{self, Kind, assert_kind};
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
#[command(subcommand)]
cmd: Cmd,
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Cmd {
/// Show PR metadata as JSON.
Show(verbs::pr::Args),
/// List the PR's commits as JSON.
Commits(verbs::pr_commits::Args),
/// Create a pull request.
Create(verbs::pr_create::Args),
/// PR health view: mergeable / CI / reviews.
Status(verbs::pr_status::Args),
/// Merge the PR.
Merge(verbs::pr_merge::Args),
/// List a PR's reviews, or submit one.
Reviews(verbs::pr_reviews::Args),
/// Print the PR's unified diff.
Diff(verbs::diff::Args),
/// Show title + body + comments.
View(verbs::view::Args),
/// Post a comment on the PR.
Comment(verbs::comment::Args),
/// List comments on the PR.
Comments(verbs::comments::Args),
/// Close the PR.
Close(verbs::close::Args),
/// List / add / remove labels.
Labels(verbs::labels::Args),
/// Assign or unassign a user.
Assign(verbs::assign::Args),
/// List timeline events.
Timeline(verbs::timeline::Args),
}
pub fn run(client: &Client, args: Args) -> Result<()> {
match args.cmd {
// PR-only verbs — kind-correct by construction (hit `/pulls/…`).
Cmd::Show(a) => verbs::pr::run(client, a),
Cmd::Commits(a) => verbs::pr_commits::run(client, a),
Cmd::Create(a) => verbs::pr_create::run(client, a),
Cmd::Status(a) => verbs::pr_status::run(client, a),
Cmd::Merge(a) => verbs::pr_merge::run(client, a),
Cmd::Reviews(a) => verbs::pr_reviews::run(client, a),
Cmd::Diff(a) => verbs::diff::run(client, a),
// Generics shared with `issue` — verify the number is a PR first.
Cmd::View(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::view::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Comment(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::comment::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Comments(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::comments::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Close(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::close::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Labels(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::labels::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Assign(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::assign::run(client, a)
}
Cmd::Timeline(a) => {
assert_kind(client, a.number, Kind::Pr)?;
verbs::timeline::run(client, a)
}
}
}

View file

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ use crate::verbs::print_json;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
/// Page size (Forgejo caps at 50). Returns the first `N` events.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 50)]
limit: u64,

View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use crate::client::Client;
#[derive(ClapArgs)]
pub struct Args {
/// Issue or PR number.
number: u64,
pub(crate) number: u64,
}
pub fn run(client: &Client, args: Args) -> Result<()> {

View file

@ -213,6 +213,35 @@ in
then strip the colons and prepend `sha256:`. A malformed
value is ignored with a warning rather than weakening
trust. See docs/swarm.md for the full recipe.
Scopes only to hive-c0re's own peer HTTPS checks it does
NOT help Matrix federation (tuwunel validates against its
container trust bundle). For a self-signed peer whose root
CA you want trusted hive-wide (every agent + Matrix
federation), set `caCert` below.
'';
};
caCert = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.path;
default = null;
example = "./peers/edge-ca.pem";
description = ''
Path to this peer hive's root CA certificate (PEM). When
set, the CA is embedded (at build time, into the nix store
no runtime file on the host) and trusted **everywhere the
hive's own internal CA is**: it rides alongside `hive-ca.pem`
in each agent's `security.pki.certificateFiles` (via the
meta-flake renderer), and is added to the Matrix homeserver
container's trust bundle so tuwunel validates *federation*
TLS from a self-signed peer hive whose cert chains to it.
This is the CA-trust path that `certFingerprint`
(leaf-pinning, c0re-only) can't cover, and is what unblocks
Matrix federation with a self-signed peer hive. Trust stays
inside the hive (agents + the Matrix container), never the
host system trust store. Mutually complementary with
`certFingerprint`; set `caCert` for the federation case. See
docs/swarm.md.
'';
};
@ -825,7 +854,26 @@ in
}
) config.services.hyperhive.swarm.peers
);
};
}
//
lib.optionalAttrs
(lib.any (p: p.caCert != null) (lib.attrValues config.services.hyperhive.swarm.peers))
{
# Peer-hive root CA file paths (colon-joined), one per peer that
# declares `swarm.peers.<domain>.caCert`. hive-c0re's meta-flake
# renderer (meta.rs) embeds each next to every agent's flake and
# adds it to `security.pki.certificateFiles`, so a peer CA is
# trusted everywhere the hive's own internal CA (`hive-ca.pem`)
# is — i.e. by every agent. The matrix container trusts the same
# CAs separately for federation TLS. The `caCert` files are
# copied into the nix store at build, so these are store paths —
# nothing mutable lives on the host.
HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS = lib.concatStringsSep ":" (
lib.filter (c: c != null) (
lib.mapAttrsToList (_domain: p: p.caCert) config.services.hyperhive.swarm.peers
)
);
};
serviceConfig = {
ExecStart = "${cfg.package}/bin/hive-c0re --socket /run/hyperhive/host.sock serve --config ${serveConfig}";
# Migrate hive-c0re's *own* state to the service user after an

View file

@ -358,6 +358,21 @@ in
{
system.stateVersion = "26.05";
# Peer-hive root CAs (`swarm.peers.<domain>.caCert`) added to THIS
# container's trust bundle so tuwunel validates *federation* TLS
# from a self-signed peer hive (it checks the peer's federation
# cert against its trust bundle). Peer CAs are trusted everywhere
# the hive's own internal CA is — agents get them via the
# meta-flake renderer (`HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS` → each agent's
# `security.pki.certificateFiles`); this block is the matrix
# container's copy, since the host `security.pki` store doesn't
# cross the container boundary. They are never installed in the
# HOST trust store. Null entries (CA-bundle / fingerprint-pinned
# peers) drop out.
security.pki.certificateFiles = lib.filter (c: c != null) (
lib.mapAttrsToList (_domain: p: p.caCert) config.services.hyperhive.swarm.peers
);
# tuwunel hard-fails to boot if `/etc/resolv.conf` has no
# `nameserver` line (`Failed to configure DNS resolver ... no
# nameservers found in config` → exit 1). This declarative