diff --git a/nix/host-modules/default.nix b/nix/host-modules/default.nix
index da8d748d..fd80803f 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/default.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/default.nix
@@ -26,11 +26,9 @@
     ./glue-bao-tls.nix
     ./glue-controller-bao-identity.nix
     ./glue-matrix-bao-token.nix
-    ./glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix
     ./swarm-authelia.nix
     ./swarm-bao.nix
     ./swarm-ca.nix
-    ./swarm-secret-publisher.nix
     ./swarm-nats.nix
     ./swarm-controller.nix
     ./swarm-grafana.nix
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix b/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
index 419f9c63..18549577 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
@@ -140,13 +140,6 @@ in
         # this hive's name.
         [ -s ${pkiDir}/controller.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} controller \
           ${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.controllerCommonName} "" clientAuth
-
-        # The secret publisher's, minted here for the reason the controller's
-        # line above gives — and it serves that case more often, not less: the
-        # publisher runs beside AUTHELIA, which is the one host guaranteed not
-        # to be this one whenever the store has a host of its own.
-        [ -s ${pkiDir}/secret-publisher.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} secret-publisher \
-          ${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.secretPublisherCommonName} "" clientAuth
       '';
     };
   };
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix b/nix/host-modules/glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix
deleted file mode 100644
index 88fc92b9..00000000
--- a/nix/host-modules/glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Glue: point the secret publisher at the bao leaf minted for it.
-#
-# ONE PAIRING PER FILE — publisher ← bao, and nothing else. Deleting this
-# leaves a publisher that takes operator-provided certificate paths, which is
-# what any deployment not minting its own already does.
-#
-# ⚠️ The minting is NOT here. ./glue-bao-tls.nix holds the CA and signs the
-# leaf, because the thing that owns a private key owns issuing from it. What
-# belongs here is the pairing: which paths this host's publisher reads.
-#
-# ⚠️ Gated on the leaf existing, not on the store being enabled — the same rule
-# ./glue-controller-bao-identity.nix states. A publisher on the store's own
-# host is one deployment; a publisher beside a remote authelia holding a leaf
-# issued out of band is another, and both want this wiring.
-#
-# Everything is `mkDefault`. An operator naming their own paths wins.
-{
-  lib,
-  config,
-  ...
-}:
-let
-  hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
-  deployCfg = hyperhiveCfg.deploy;
-  baoDeploy = deployCfg.bao;
-
-  # Where ./glue-bao-tls.nix puts the leaves, derived from the reader's own
-  # path rather than repeating that file's directory literal: an operator who
-  # moves the PKI moves both, and the two cannot drift apart.
-  haveMintedPki = baoDeploy.clientCertFile != null;
-  pkiDir = if haveMintedPki then builtins.dirOf baoDeploy.clientCertFile else null;
-in
-{
-  config =
-    lib.mkIf (hyperhiveCfg.enable && deployCfg.swarm-secret-publisher.enable && haveMintedPki)
-      {
-        services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher = {
-          baoClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/secret-publisher.pem";
-          baoClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/secret-publisher-key.pem";
-        };
-      };
-}
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
index 52590ec5..d18b825c 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
@@ -203,30 +203,6 @@ let
     }
   '';
 
-  # The identity that copies authelia's minted OIDC client secrets into the
-  # store. Named outside `hive-*` for the same reason as the controller's: the
-  # controller may create policies under that prefix, and a policy it can
-  # rewrite is not a constraint on anything.
-  secretPublisherPolicyName = "swarm-secret-publisher";
-  secretPublisherCn = baoDeploy.secretPublisherCommonName;
-
-  # One grant, and every narrowing in it is load-bearing.
-  #
-  # `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix, inserted by the engine rather than
-  # written by the caller — same trap as the controller's grant above.
-  #
-  # `hives/` and not `swarm/*`: this principal has no business with an agent's
-  # or a service's credentials, and the hive prefix is the only one whose paths
-  # it produces.
-  #
-  # Write-only. It copies secrets in and never reads one back; a read
-  # capability would let a file-copier recover every hive's credentials.
-  secretPublisherPolicyText = ''
-    path "${credentialMountPath}/data/swarm/hives/*" {
-      capabilities = ["create", "update"]
-    }
-  '';
-
   # The KV v2 engine the controller writes agent credentials through. Named
   # once because the grant above and the `secrets enable` in the bootstrap unit
   # have to agree: a policy pointing at a mount nobody created is precisely the
@@ -578,29 +554,6 @@ in
       '';
     };
 
-    secretPublisherCommonName = lib.mkOption {
-      type = lib.types.str;
-      default = "swarm-secret-publisher";
-      example = "swarm-secret-publisher.svc";
-      description = ''
-        Subject the store's secret-publisher cert-auth role accepts — the
-        identity that copies authelia's minted OIDC client secrets into the
-        store so a hive that does not host authelia can read its own.
-
-        A **second** identity rather than reuse of
-        {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.controllerCommonName`: the
-        controller's grant includes rewriting every hive's policy and login
-        role, which is not something a unit whose whole job is copying one file
-        should be able to do. This one's grant is `create`/`update` under the
-        hive prefix and nothing else.
-
-        ⚠️ Same collision as its sibling above, and the same answer: ./swarm.nix
-        feeds this value into the guard on
-        {option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.hives`, so a hive named after it fails
-        evaluation rather than silently receiving the publisher's grants.
-      '';
-    };
-
     serverCaFile = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
       default = null;
@@ -1007,58 +960,6 @@ in
         '';
       };
 
-      # A SIBLING rather than more script in the unit above, because that unit's
-      # name is an operator-facing string: ../../docs/getting-started/setup.md
-      # tells a reader to run `systemctl status swarm-bao-controller-policy`.
-      # Widening it to two principals would make the name wrong, and renaming it
-      # would make that instruction wrong.
-      #
-      # `after` and not `requires`: the unit above creates the KV and cert-auth
-      # mounts this one writes into, but a failed oneshot still counts as
-      # finished, so `requires` would neither wait for its success nor re-run
-      # this one when its own retry eventually lands. Ordering plus this unit's
-      # own retry is what actually converges.
-      systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy = lib.mkIf haveBootstrapToken {
-        description = "write the swarm secret publisher's bao policy and cert-auth role";
-        after = [
-          "container@${cfg.machine}.service"
-          "swarm-bao-controller-policy.service"
-        ];
-        wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
-        path = [
-          baoCli
-          pkgs.coreutils
-        ];
-        unitConfig.ConditionPathExists = baoDeploy.bootstrapTokenFile;
-        # Same unseal wait as its sibling above, for the reason stated there:
-        # under `seal = "shamir"` a human unseals by hand, which can take a day.
-        startLimitBurst = 2880;
-        startLimitIntervalSec = 90000;
-        serviceConfig = {
-          Type = "oneshot";
-          RemainAfterExit = true;
-          Restart = "on-failure";
-          RestartSec = 30;
-        };
-        script = ''
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          BAO_TOKEN="$(cat ${lib.escapeShellArg baoDeploy.bootstrapTokenFile})"
-          export BAO_TOKEN
-
-          printf '%s' ${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherPolicyText} |
-            bao policy write ${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherPolicyName} -
-        ''
-        + lib.optionalString (baoDeploy.clientCaFile != null) ''
-
-          bao write auth/cert/certs/${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherPolicyName} \
-            certificate=@${tlsDir}/client-ca.pem \
-            allowed_common_names=${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherCn} \
-            token_policies=${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherPolicyName} \
-            display_name=${lib.escapeShellArg secretPublisherCn}
-        '';
-      };
-
       containers.${cfg.machine} = {
         autoStart = true;
         ephemeral = false;
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-secret-publisher.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-secret-publisher.nix
deleted file mode 100644
index 27b68adb..00000000
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-secret-publisher.nix
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-# The unit that copies authelia's minted OIDC client secrets into the swarm's
-# secret store, so a hive that does not host authelia can read its own.
-#
-# ⚠️ IT RUNS WHERE AUTHELIA DOES, and that is the whole reason it exists as a
-# separate thing. `deploy.authelia.hostClientSecretDir`'s own description says
-# why: the plaintext's other reader lives in a **different container**, and
-# containers that share this host's network namespace still have separate
-# filesystem roots, so "the host is the only place both trees are addressable".
-# A delivery step therefore runs on the host that mints — not on the store's
-# host, and not on the reading hive's.
-#
-# ⚠️ ITS OWN STORE IDENTITY, not swarm-controller's. That principal may rewrite
-# every hive's policy and login role; a unit whose entire job is copying one
-# file has no business holding it. ./swarm-bao.nix grants this one
-# `create`/`update` under the hive prefix and nothing else.
-#
-# ⚠️ THE SECRET NEVER REACHES `argv`. `bao` is an external binary, so every
-# argument is world-readable in /proc for the life of the call — the value is
-# passed as `@<path>` and read by bao itself. (`/knowledge/secret-hygiene.md`:
-# "a path keeps the secret out of the store, and reading it into a shell
-# variable puts it straight into argv".)
-{
-  pkgs,
-  lib,
-  config,
-  ...
-}:
-let
-  hyperhiveCfg = config.services.hyperhive;
-  deployCfg = hyperhiveCfg.deploy;
-  baoDeploy = deployCfg.bao;
-  autheliaCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.authelia;
-  cfg = deployCfg.swarm-secret-publisher;
-
-  # A reader is defined by holding a certificate the store accepts, never by
-  # standing next to it — the rule ./glue-matrix-bao-token.nix states in full.
-  # `deploy.bao.enable` here would be the co-location assumption itself.
-  haveClientIdentity = cfg.baoClientCertFile != null && cfg.baoClientKeyFile != null;
-
-  # Both halves have to be here: the mint (authelia, for the plaintext) and an
-  # identity (for the store). Neither implies the other.
-  active = hyperhiveCfg.enable && cfg.enable && deployCfg.authelia.enable && haveClientIdentity;
-
-  hiveNames = lib.attrNames hyperhiveCfg.swarm.hives;
-
-  # The client id agent containers present, per hive — composed exactly as
-  # ./swarm-authelia.nix composes it, from the same two read-only options, so a
-  # rename there cannot leave this spelling behind.
-  agentClientId = hive: "${autheliaCfg.hiveClientPrefix}${hive}${autheliaCfg.agentClientSuffix}";
-in
-{
-  options.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher = {
-    enable = lib.mkOption {
-      type = lib.types.bool;
-      default = deployCfg.authelia.enable;
-      defaultText = lib.literalExpression "deploy.authelia.enable";
-      description = ''
-        Publish the OIDC client secrets this host mints into the swarm's
-        secret store, so hives that do not run authelia can read their own.
-
-        Defaults to whether this host mints them, which is the only half of
-        the question that is a property of *this* host.
-
-        ⚠️ Deliberately **not** `deploy.bao.enable`. That asks whether the
-        store stands here, and a publisher beside a remote store, holding a
-        leaf issued out of band, is a deployment this exists to serve —
-        defaulting on co-location would leave exactly that shape silently
-        publishing nothing. Whether the wiring is complete is the client
-        identity's job (see `baoClientCertFile`), not this option's.
-
-        Turning it off leaves every non-co-located hive without a delivery
-        path, which is the state this exists to end — so the honest reason
-        to set it false is a deployment delivering those secrets by some
-        other mechanism it owns.
-      '';
-    };
-
-    baoClientCertFile = lib.mkOption {
-      type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
-      default = null;
-      description = ''
-        Client certificate this publisher presents to the store. Its subject
-        must be {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.secretPublisherCommonName`
-        — cert auth matches on the CN, and the role accepts nothing else.
-
-        No default: a module that guessed would be holding the CA opinion
-        ./swarm-bao.nix deliberately does not hold.
-        ./glue-secret-publisher-bao-identity.nix points it at the leaf
-        ./glue-bao-tls.nix mints, where this host mints one.
-      '';
-    };
-
-    baoClientKeyFile = lib.mkOption {
-      type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
-      default = null;
-      description = ''
-        Private key for {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.baoClientCertFile`.
-        Both or neither — the unit does not exist unless each is set.
-      '';
-    };
-  };
-
-  config = lib.mkIf active {
-    services.hyperhive.swarm.otel.journaldUnits = [ "swarm-secret-publish" ];
-
-    # Re-publish when authelia rotates a secret. The mint writes the file, so
-    # the file is the event — there is no signal from authelia to subscribe to.
-    systemd.paths.swarm-secret-publish = {
-      description = "watch for minted OIDC client secrets to publish";
-      wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
-      pathConfig = {
-        PathChanged = deployCfg.authelia.hostClientSecretDir;
-        Unit = "swarm-secret-publish.service";
-      };
-    };
-
-    systemd.services.swarm-secret-publish = {
-      description = "publish minted OIDC client secrets to the swarm secret store";
-      wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
-      after = [ "network.target" ];
-      path = [
-        baoDeploy.package
-        pkgs.coreutils
-      ];
-      serviceConfig = {
-        Type = "oneshot";
-        RemainAfterExit = true;
-        # Bounded here rather than left to systemd's default, so the number a
-        # boot waits on is in the file that waits. A sealed store answers on
-        # the port and never answers the write.
-        TimeoutStartSec = 60;
-        Restart = "on-failure";
-        RestartSec = 30;
-      };
-      environment = {
-        BAO_ADDR = "https://${hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao.domain}:${toString hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao.port}";
-        BAO_CLIENT_CERT = cfg.baoClientCertFile;
-        BAO_CLIENT_KEY = cfg.baoClientKeyFile;
-      }
-      // lib.optionalAttrs (baoDeploy.serverCaFile != null) {
-        BAO_CACERT = baoDeploy.serverCaFile;
-      };
-      script = ''
-        set -euo pipefail
-
-        published=0
-        skipped=0
-
-        ${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (hive: ''
-          src=${lib.escapeShellArg "${deployCfg.authelia.hostClientSecretDir}/${agentClientId hive}.secret"}
-          if [ -s "$src" ]; then
-            # `value=@$src` hands bao the PATH: bao opens the file itself, so
-            # the plaintext is never an argument of this process. Writing it as
-            # `value="$(cat "$src")"` would publish it to /proc for anyone on
-            # the host to read.
-            bao kv put ${lib.escapeShellArg "secret/swarm/hives/${hive}/queue/agent"} \
-              value=@"$src" \
-              client_id=${lib.escapeShellArg (agentClientId hive)}
-            published=$((published + 1))
-          else
-            # Not an error: authelia mints on its FIRST BOOT, so an absent file
-            # is "not yet", and the path unit above re-runs this when it lands.
-            echo "no minted secret at $src yet; the path unit will re-run this" >&2
-            skipped=$((skipped + 1))
-          fi
-        '') hiveNames}
-
-        echo "published $published client secret(s), skipped $skipped"
-      '';
-    };
-  };
-}
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
index 0267d1c6..6052cc8f 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
@@ -43,10 +43,7 @@ let
   # every role added beside these widens what a hive name must not collide
   # with. A hive's own leaf carries its name as the CN, so a hive named after
   # one of these presents a certificate that role accepts.
-  certAuthCns = [
-    deployCfg.bao.controllerCommonName
-    deployCfg.bao.secretPublisherCommonName
-  ];
+  certAuthCns = [ deployCfg.bao.controllerCommonName ];
 
   # Public hostnames of the swarm's own services, in declaration order.
   # `serviceDomains` below is this set sorted + deduplicated.
diff --git a/nix/module-eval.nix b/nix/module-eval.nix
index 50313344..dea14c02 100644
--- a/nix/module-eval.nix
+++ b/nix/module-eval.nix
@@ -327,32 +327,6 @@ let
     deploy.bao.serverCaFile = lib.mkForce "/etc/pki/store-server-ca.pem";
   };
 
-  # The IdP and the store on one machine: the shape where minted plaintext and
-  # a store identity are both present without an operator placing anything.
-  # Two hives in the roster, because the publisher walks it — an arm written
-  # against a single-hive fixture passes on a hardcoded name.
-  secretPublisherHere = hive {
-    deploy.bao.enable = true;
-    deploy.authelia.enable = true;
-    swarm.hives.h2.domain = "h2.t.local";
-  };
-  # The IdP with no store on the box and a leaf placed by hand, which is the
-  # deployment this unit exists for: authelia is the one host the store is
-  # guaranteed not to share once either has a machine of its own.
-  #
-  # ⚠️ `enable` is deliberately NOT set here. It used to be, with a comment
-  # saying the default asked whether both ran on this host — which documented
-  # the co-location bug instead of catching it. Leaving it unset is what makes
-  # this fixture exercise the default rather than mask it.
-  secretPublisherRemote = hive {
-    deploy.authelia.enable = true;
-    deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.baoClientCertFile = "/etc/pki/publisher.pem";
-    deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.baoClientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/publisher-key.pem";
-  };
-  # The same IdP with the identity taken away. Minting the secrets is not being
-  # able to publish them, and this is the arm that separates the two.
-  secretPublisherNoIdentity = hive { deploy.authelia.enable = true; };
-
   # The host's `bao` wrapper, pulled apart once so each case below names one
   # property instead of a conjunction — a failing conjunction says only that
   # something is wrong.
@@ -565,15 +539,6 @@ let
     deploy.bao.controllerCommonName = "ctl";
   };
 
-  # The reserved subjects are a LIST, and a list with one consulted element and
-  # one dead one looks identical from the first element's case. This fixture
-  # collides with the SECOND, leaving the controller's at its default.
-  hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject = hive {
-    deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
-    deploy.bao.secretPublisherCommonName = "pubctl";
-    swarm.hives.pubctl.domain = "p.t.local";
-  };
-
   hiveNameWithComposedWord = hive {
     deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false;
     swarm.hives."h1-agent".domain = "a.t.local";
@@ -600,17 +565,6 @@ let
         equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterCertSubject
         && lib.any (a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'ctl'" a.message) hiveNamedAfterCertSubject.assertions;
     }
-    {
-      # Every cert-auth subject is reserved, not just the first one in the
-      # list. Without this case the second element could be dead and the case
-      # above would still pass.
-      name = "a hive named after the secret publisher's subject is refused too";
-      ok =
-        equalityGuardFired hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject
-        && lib.any (
-          a: !a.assertion && lib.hasInfix "'pubctl'" a.message
-        ) hiveNamedAfterPublisherSubject.assertions;
-    }
     {
       # Without this the case above proves nothing: an arm that fires for every
       # roster is not a guard, and `hives` is non-empty in both fixtures.
@@ -867,51 +821,6 @@ let
         in
         lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/hive-*" s && !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl/*" s);
     }
-    {
-      # Same host-side reasoning as the controller's granting unit above: the
-      # write needs a client certificate and the host is the side that has one.
-      name = "a store host with a placed bootstrap token renders the publisher's granting unit too";
-      ok =
-        let
-          u = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy;
-        in
-        u.unitConfig.ConditionPathExists == "/run/secrets/bao-bootstrap.token"
-        && lib.hasInfix "swarm-secret-publisher" u.script;
-    }
-    {
-      # The control for the case above, and the same one the controller's unit
-      # has: rendered on the host means NOT rendered in the container, where it
-      # would have neither an identity nor a route to the store.
-      name = "the publisher's granting unit is not rendered inside the store's container";
-      ok =
-        !(baoGrantHere.containers.swarm-bao.config.systemd.services ? swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy);
-    }
-    {
-      # The whole point of a second principal. `hives/` and not `swarm/`, so it
-      # cannot touch an agent's or a service's credentials; and no `read`, so a
-      # unit whose job is copying a file cannot recover what is already there.
-      # Pinned as the full capability list, because an added capability is
-      # exactly what a presence check misses.
-      name = "the publisher's grant is write-only and reaches the hive prefix alone";
-      ok =
-        let
-          s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.script;
-        in
-        lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"create\", \"update\"]" s
-        && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents" s)
-        && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/*" s)
-        && !(lib.hasInfix "sys/policies/acl" s);
-    }
-    {
-      # The ordering is load-bearing and invisible at runtime: the controller's
-      # unit creates the KV and cert-auth mounts this one writes into, so
-      # without it a cold boot races and fails with "route entry not found",
-      # which names neither unit.
-      name = "the publisher's granting unit is ordered after the one that creates the mounts";
-      ok = lib.elem "swarm-bao-controller-policy.service" (
-        baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy.after
-      );
-    }
     {
       # The policy authorising this route lives in another file, and nothing
       # else relates the grants to the paths the code actually writes.
@@ -1025,98 +934,6 @@ let
         && builtins.elem "bao-client.pem:/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/controller.pem" s.swarm-controller.serviceConfig.LoadCredential
         && builtins.elem "bao-client-key.pem:/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/controller-key.pem" s.swarm-controller.serviceConfig.LoadCredential;
     }
-    {
-      # The same hole the controller's case above names, open a second time: the
-      # PKI script grew a third leaf and no case read it.
-      name = "the store mints a leaf for the secret publisher, and the publisher is pointed at it";
-      ok =
-        let
-          m = secretPublisherHere;
-          p = m.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher;
-        in
-        lib.hasInfix "secret-publisher.pem" m.systemd.services.swarm-bao-pki.script
-        && p.baoClientCertFile == "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/secret-publisher.pem"
-        && p.baoClientKeyFile == "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/secret-publisher-key.pem";
-    }
-    {
-      # mara caught this by reading, which means no arm existed for it: the
-      # default asked `authelia.enable && bao.enable`, so the split deployment
-      # this unit is FOR defaulted off and published nothing, silently.
-      #
-      # The second clause is the control. Without it this passes on a default
-      # of plain `true`, which would be a different bug with the same symptom
-      # — an IdP-less host claiming it publishes secrets it never mints.
-      name = "the publisher defaults on where secrets are minted, whether or not the store is local";
-      ok =
-        secretPublisherRemote.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.enable
-        && !bare.services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-secret-publisher.enable;
-    }
-    {
-      # The one security property of this unit, and why its push cannot be
-      # rewritten into the obvious shape: `bao` is an external binary, so an
-      # argument is world-readable in /proc for the life of the call.
-      # `value=@<path>` hands it the path and bao opens the file itself.
-      #
-      # The second arm is what makes the first mean anything — `value=@` can
-      # sit one line above a command substitution that put the plaintext in
-      # argv anyway.
-      #
-      # ⚠️ Comments are stripped first, and that is not tidiness. A `script`
-      # renders its own comments into the text, and this unit's comments name
-      # the hazard verbatim so the next editor does not reintroduce it. Without
-      # the strip this case reads that warning and fails — a check the artifact
-      # defeats by DESCRIBING the thing it is checked for.
-      name = "the publisher hands bao the secret's path, never the secret";
-      ok =
-        let
-          s = secretPublisherHere.systemd.services.swarm-secret-publish.script;
-          code = lib.concatStringsSep "\n" (
-            lib.filter (l: builtins.match "[[:space:]]*#.*" l == null) (lib.splitString "\n" s)
-          );
-        in
-        lib.hasInfix "value=@" code && !(lib.hasInfix "$(cat" code);
-    }
-    {
-      # Two ends of a wire nothing at eval time carries end to end: this is the
-      # path `swarm_secret_client::queue` resolves for the reader. Both hives
-      # are asserted, so a publisher that knew one name rather than the roster
-      # fails here rather than on the second hive ever added to a swarm.
-      name = "the publisher writes every hive in the roster to that hive's own queue path";
-      ok =
-        let
-          s = secretPublisherHere.systemd.services.swarm-secret-publish.script;
-        in
-        lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/hives/h1/queue/agent" s
-        && lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/hives/h2/queue/agent" s;
-    }
-    {
-      # The doctrine three glue files state, as a property a rewrite has to
-      # keep: a client is defined by holding a certificate the store accepts,
-      # never by standing next to the store. Gating this on `deploy.bao.enable`
-      # would have left the unit rendering only on the one deployment that has
-      # no use for it.
-      name = "a publisher holding an identity runs on a host with no store";
-      ok =
-        let
-          m = secretPublisherRemote;
-        in
-        !m.services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.enable
-        && (m.systemd.services ? swarm-secret-publish)
-        && (m.systemd.paths ? swarm-secret-publish);
-    }
-    {
-      # What makes the arm above able to fail. Minting the secrets is not being
-      # able to publish them: with no certificate the unit would fail a TLS
-      # handshake on every rotation, so it must not exist at all.
-      name = "an IdP host with no store identity renders no publisher";
-      ok =
-        let
-          m = secretPublisherNoIdentity;
-        in
-        m.services.hyperhive.deploy.authelia.enable
-        && !(m.systemd.services ? swarm-secret-publish)
-        && !(m.systemd.paths ? swarm-secret-publish);
-    }
     {
       # A hive's cert-auth role carries the authority by value, so the daemon
       # has to be handed the file rather than a path into the store's own
diff --git a/swarm-controller/src/read_policy.rs b/swarm-controller/src/read_policy.rs
index b13103ee..af437575 100644
--- a/swarm-controller/src/read_policy.rs
+++ b/swarm-controller/src/read_policy.rs
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ async fn provision(hives: &[String]) -> Result<(), Unreachable> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// One hive's policy: its own name, its own document.
+/// One hive's policy: its own name, the shared document.
 async fn write_policy_for(store: &SecretStore, hive: &str) -> Result<()> {
     let name = policy::hive_object_name(hive)?;
     store
-        .write_policy(&name, &policy::render(hive)?)
+        .write_policy(&name, &policy::render())
         .await
         .with_context(|| format!("writing the read policy {name}"))?;
     tracing::info!(hive, policy = %name, "hive read policy in place");
diff --git a/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs b/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs
index 9f39fa9a..93891cf4 100644
--- a/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs
+++ b/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         let request = WriteAclPolicy {
             name: "hive-pr1ma".to_owned(),
-            policy: crate::policy::render("pr1ma").expect("a plain name is legal"),
+            policy: crate::policy::render(),
         };
         assert_eq!(request.path(), "sys/policies/acl/hive-pr1ma");
     }
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         let request = WriteAclPolicy {
             name: "hive-pr1ma".to_owned(),
-            policy: crate::policy::render("pr1ma").expect("a plain name is legal"),
+            policy: crate::policy::render(),
         };
         let body = request
             .body()
@@ -324,10 +324,7 @@ mod tests {
             .expect("a policy write sends one");
         let sent: serde_json::Value =
             serde_json::from_slice(&body).expect("the body is the JSON the store parses");
-        assert_eq!(
-            sent["policy"],
-            crate::policy::render("pr1ma").expect("legal")
-        );
+        assert_eq!(sent["policy"], crate::policy::render());
         assert!(
             sent.get("name").is_none(),
             "`name` addresses the policy in the path; sending it too would make \
diff --git a/swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs b/swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs
index 43815132..baf77e10 100644
--- a/swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs
+++ b/swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 //! the rules every path obeys ([`path`]), the translation from this
 //! deployment's environment into a logged-in client ([`client`]), and, per kind
 //! of secret, the path it lives at together with the fields it holds
-//! ([`matrix`], [`queue`]). Each of those is a thing the controller and a hive
-//! must say identically, so it is said once here.
+//! ([`matrix`]). Each of those is a thing the controller and a hive must say
+//! identically, so it is said once here.
 //!
 //! [`policy`] is the same kind of agreement seen from the other side: which of
 //! those paths a hive's own token may read. It belongs here rather than in the
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ pub mod client;
 pub mod matrix;
 pub mod path;
 pub mod policy;
-pub mod queue;
 
 pub use client::SecretStore;
 
diff --git a/swarm-secret-client/src/policy.rs b/swarm-secret-client/src/policy.rs
index 62201f2d..897b45b5 100644
--- a/swarm-secret-client/src/policy.rs
+++ b/swarm-secret-client/src/policy.rs
@@ -1,25 +1,16 @@
 //! The read agreement: which credentials a hive's own token may fetch.
 //!
-//! The mirror of [`crate::matrix`] and [`crate::queue`]. Those modules say
-//! where a credential lives; this one says who is allowed to read it, and the
-//! two have to agree on the same path or a delivery fails with a 403 that names
-//! nothing.
+//! The mirror of [`crate::matrix`]. That module says where a credential lives;
+//! this one says who is allowed to read it, and the two have to agree on the
+//! same path or a delivery fails with a 403 that names nothing.
 //!
-//! The document has one stanza per kind a hive reads, and the two are scoped
-//! differently on purpose:
-//!
-//! ⚠️ The **agent** stanza grants read on *every* agent's credentials rather
-//! than on the ones that hive hosts. That is a decision, not an oversight: an
-//! agent's path does not name its hive, so a per-hive grant has to be
-//! enumerated and re-emitted, and an enumeration that can silently drift
-//! advertises a boundary it does not hold. A wide grant that says so beats a
-//! narrow one that only looks narrow. The narrower shapes, and what they would
-//! cost, are in `docs/trust-boundary/security.md`.
-//!
-//! The **hive** stanza has no such problem and is therefore narrow: that path
-//! names its principal, so scoping it to the reader's own name costs nothing
-//! and drifts nowhere. Do not widen it to match its neighbour — the asymmetry
-//! is the point.
+//! ⚠️ Every hive gets the same document, and it grants read on **every**
+//! agent's credentials rather than on the ones that hive hosts. That is a
+//! decision, not an oversight: an agent's path does not name its hive, so a
+//! per-hive grant has to be enumerated and re-emitted, and an enumeration that
+//! can silently drift advertises a boundary it does not hold. A wide grant that
+//! says so beats a narrow one that only looks narrow. The narrower shapes, and
+//! what they would cost, are in `docs/trust-boundary/security.md`.
 //!
 //! Rendering stays separate from writing so the text can be asserted with no
 //! store to talk to.
@@ -46,46 +37,25 @@ pub fn hive_object_name(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
     Ok(format!("{HIVE_PREFIX}{hive}"))
 }
 
-/// One read stanza. The only shape this module emits, so "read-only" is a
-/// property of the renderer rather than of each call site.
-fn read_stanza(path: &str) -> String {
-    format!("path \"{path}\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}}\n")
-}
-
-/// Render `hive`'s policy document: read on every agent's credentials, and on
-/// this hive's own.
+/// Render the document every hive's policy holds: read on every agent's
+/// credentials.
 ///
-/// The name is the only input, and it is deploy-time — so the document is
-/// still a deploy-time object rather than derived state with a re-emission to
-/// get wrong. Nothing about which agents exist changes the text.
+/// Takes no arguments because it depends on nothing — same text for every
+/// hive, unchanged by which agents exist. That is what makes it a deploy-time
+/// object rather than derived state with a re-emission to get wrong.
 ///
 /// Read-only: the controller mints these and never reads one back.
-///
-/// ⚠️ The service and controller kinds are deliberately absent: a hive has no
-/// business reading a service's or the controller's credentials. Adding either
-/// is a boundary decision, not a consequence of the namespace growing.
-///
-/// The hive's *own* kind is granted, and that is the decision the agent-only
-/// version of this grant said had to be made rather than assumed: a hive holds
-/// the queue credential its own agents authenticate with, so it has to read the
-/// one principal named after itself — and only that one, which is why the path
-/// interpolates the name instead of widening to the whole kind.
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `hive` holds anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` — the
-/// name is interpolated into a policy path, so a name that could close the
-/// stanza could grant itself anything.
-pub fn render(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
-    checked_segment("hive", hive)?;
-    let agents = read_stanza(&format!(
-        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{}/*",
+/// ⚠️ Still the agent kind alone. The other kinds are deliberately absent: a
+/// hive has no business reading a service's or the controller's credentials,
+/// and what a hive may read of its *own* kind is a boundary question this
+/// module's header answers only for agents. Widening it is a decision, not a
+/// consequence of the namespace growing.
+#[must_use]
+pub fn render() -> String {
+    format!(
+        "path \"{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{}/*\" {{\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}}\n",
         <&str>::from(Kind::Agent)
-    ));
-    let own = read_stanza(&format!(
-        "{MOUNT}/data/{ROOT}/{}/{hive}/*",
-        <&str>::from(Kind::Hive)
-    ));
-    Ok(format!("{agents}{own}"))
+    )
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -93,19 +63,19 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
     #[test]
-    fn the_document_grants_the_whole_agent_prefix_and_this_hive_alone() {
+    fn the_document_grants_read_over_the_whole_agent_prefix() {
         assert_eq!(
-            render("pr1ma").expect("a plain name is legal"),
-            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n\
-             path \"secret/data/swarm/hives/pr1ma/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n"
+            render(),
+            "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}\n"
         );
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn the_grant_is_read_only() {
-        // A hive reads credentials; a hive that could write one could hand
-        // itself an agent's identity.
-        let p = render("pr1ma").expect("legal");
+        // The half of the old policy that survives the widening: a hive reads
+        // credentials, and a hive that could write one could hand itself an
+        // agent's identity.
+        let p = render();
         assert!(!p.contains("create"));
         assert!(!p.contains("update"));
         assert!(!p.contains("delete"));
@@ -113,36 +83,17 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn one_hives_document_does_not_reach_another_hives_path() {
-        // Replaces `every_hive_gets_a_byte_identical_document`: the hive stanza
-        // is per-reader now, so identical text is no longer the property. This
-        // is what that test was protecting — that a document says only what the
-        // deploy-time name puts in it.
-        let a = render("alpha").expect("legal");
-        assert!(a.contains("swarm/hives/alpha/*"));
-        assert!(!a.contains("beta"));
-        assert!(!a.contains("swarm/hives/*"), "the hive stanza stays narrow");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn the_same_name_still_renders_byte_identically() {
-        // The half of the old property that survives: the text is a function of
-        // the deploy-time name alone, so a re-emission cannot drift.
-        assert_eq!(
-            render("pr1ma").expect("legal"),
-            render("pr1ma").expect("legal")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_name_that_could_close_the_stanza_is_refused() {
-        // The name reaches the document now, which it did not before — so the
-        // injection case is live again in the policy TEXT, not just in the
-        // policy's identifier.
-        assert!(render("alpha/*\" { capabilities = [\"root\"] }").is_err());
+    fn no_name_reaches_the_document_at_all() {
+        // Why the injection cases that used to live here are gone rather than
+        // relaxed: nothing interpolates into the text any more, so there is no
+        // stanza for a name to close. `hive_object_name` still validates,
+        // because a name does reach the policy's *identifier*.
+        let p = render();
+        assert!(!p.contains("pr1ma"));
+        assert_eq!(p.matches("path \"").count(), 1, "one stanza, no per-agent");
         assert!(
             hive_object_name("atlas/*\" { capabilities = [\"root\"] }").is_err(),
-            "the object NAME is a place a name can do damage too"
+            "the object NAME is still a place a name can do damage"
         );
     }
 
@@ -151,7 +102,13 @@ mod tests {
         // The control for the case above: if every name were refused, that
         // assertion would pass while proving nothing.
         assert!(hive_object_name("a-b_C9").is_ok());
-        assert!(render("a-b_C9").is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_hive_gets_a_byte_identical_document() {
+        // The property the deploy-time write depends on: nothing about a hive
+        // or its agents changes the text, so there is nothing to re-emit.
+        assert_eq!(render(), render());
     }
 
     #[test]
diff --git a/swarm-secret-client/src/queue.rs b/swarm-secret-client/src/queue.rs
deleted file mode 100644
index ee424e42..00000000
--- a/swarm-secret-client/src/queue.rs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-//! The queue agreement: where a hive's agent-container credential lives in the
-//! store, and what the object at that path holds.
-//!
-//! The sibling of [`crate::matrix`], and it differs from it in one way worth
-//! reading before using either: a matrix credential is keyed per **agent**,
-//! this one per **hive**. Agents are created at runtime, so the queue
-//! identity they present is minted once per hive at deploy time and says which
-//! hive an agent belongs to, never which agent.
-
-use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-
-use crate::{
-    Error,
-    path::{Kind, principal_prefix},
-};
-
-/// The path holding the client secret that agent containers on `hive` present
-/// to the swarm queue.
-///
-/// # Errors
-/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when `hive` contains anything but `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`,
-/// which is what keeps one hive's name from addressing another hive's secret.
-pub fn agent_client_path(hive: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
-    let prefix = principal_prefix(Kind::Hive, hive)?;
-    Ok(format!("{prefix}/queue/agent"))
-}
-
-/// What the path holds: the client secret, plus the client id it belongs to.
-///
-/// The id rides with the secret for the same reason the homeserver rides with
-/// a matrix token — a credential has to be reconstructable from the store
-/// alone. Deriving it on the reading side instead would mean spelling
-/// `hive-<name>-agent` in a second place, and the authelia module's own option
-/// says what a split spelling costs: every agent is denied as a timeout.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct Credential {
-    /// The secret itself. Named to match [`crate::matrix::Credential::value`]
-    /// so a nix-side reader spells `bao kv get -field=value` for either kind.
-    pub value: String,
-
-    /// The OIDC client id the secret authenticates.
-    ///
-    /// Required, unlike [`crate::matrix::Credential::homeserver`]: that field
-    /// is optional because it was added to objects already in the store, and
-    /// this path is new. An object without an id is not a usable credential,
-    /// so failing to decode is the wanted behaviour — the alternative is a
-    /// reader holding `None` whose only recourse is to spell the id itself.
-    pub client_id: String,
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_hive_name_lands_under_its_own_principal_prefix() {
-        assert_eq!(
-            agent_client_path("alpha").expect("a plain name is legal"),
-            "swarm/hives/alpha/queue/agent"
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn a_traversal_in_the_hive_name_is_refused() {
-        let e = agent_client_path("../beta").expect_err("a traversal is not");
-        assert!(matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind: "hive", .. }), "{e}");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn two_hives_never_share_a_path() {
-        assert_ne!(
-            agent_client_path("alpha").expect("legal"),
-            agent_client_path("beta").expect("legal")
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn the_object_round_trips_through_the_store_representation() {
-        let c = Credential {
-            value: "s3cr3t".to_owned(),
-            client_id: "hive-alpha-agent".to_owned(),
-        };
-        let json = serde_json::to_string(&c).expect("serialises");
-        assert_eq!(
-            serde_json::from_str::<Credential>(&json).expect("deserialises"),
-            c
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn the_field_names_the_nix_reader_asks_for_are_the_ones_written() {
-        let json = serde_json::to_value(Credential {
-            value: "s3cr3t".to_owned(),
-            client_id: "hive-alpha-agent".to_owned(),
-        })
-        .expect("serialises");
-        assert_eq!(json["value"], "s3cr3t");
-        assert_eq!(json["client_id"], "hive-alpha-agent");
-    }
-}