diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index b91f2f1a..c38666f9 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -193,6 +193,15 @@ hand-maintained per-file tree drifts out of sync with the code.
   `claude --print` per classification (no tools, no session) and replies
   with the rows and the overall verdict. Holds no forge credential. Design:
   [`docs/swarm/review-classifier.md`](docs/swarm/review-classifier.md).
+- **`swarm-agent-verify/`** — the check that a presented
+  `swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>` token holds the secret stored at
+  `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`, read under the verifier's own certificate.
+  Shared by `swarm-nats-auth` (the queue's auth callout) and
+  `swarm-logs-auth`.
+- **`swarm-logs-auth/`** — the log store gateway's `auth_request` responder
+  for agents: nginx sends it `/select/logsql/` requests carrying an agent
+  token, it answers 200 or 401 via `swarm-agent-verify`. Runs on the log
+  store's host (`swarm-victorialogs.nix`).
 - **`swarmctl/`** — swarm-level operator CLI, installed by the
   swarm-controller module on the host that runs the daemon. Runs as
   **root and acts directly** — it serves no socket, publishes no HTTP
diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock
index adf97684..f5de553e 100644
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -4789,6 +4789,18 @@ version = "2.6.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "13c2bddecc57b384dee18652358fb23172facb8a2c51ccc10d74c157bdea3292"
 
+[[package]]
+name = "swarm-agent-verify"
+version = "0.1.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "anyhow",
+ "subtle",
+ "swarm-queue-client",
+ "swarm-secret-client",
+ "tokio",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "swarm-authelia-bridge"
 version = "0.1.0"
@@ -4870,6 +4882,23 @@ dependencies = [
  "reqwest",
  "serde_json",
  "swarm-queue-client",
+ "swarm-secret-client",
+ "tokio",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "swarm-logs-auth"
+version = "0.1.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "anyhow",
+ "axum",
+ "clap",
+ "swarm-agent-verify",
+ "swarm-queue-client",
+ "swarm-secret-client",
+ "tokio",
+ "tracing",
+ "tracing-subscriber",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -4910,7 +4939,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sha2 0.11.0",
- "subtle",
+ "swarm-agent-verify",
  "swarm-queue-client",
  "swarm-secret-client",
  "tokio",
diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index 2271332d..7d8112bd 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ members = [
   "hive-subagent-mcp",
   "hive-types",
   "hivectl",
+  "swarm-agent-verify",
   "swarm-authelia-bridge",
   "swarm-authelia-bridge-sock",
   "swarm-controller",
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ members = [
   "swarm-queue-client",
   "swarm-review-classifier",
   "swarm-logs",
+  "swarm-logs-auth",
   "swarm-secret-client",
   "swarmctl",
 ]
@@ -104,6 +106,7 @@ hive-priv-sock = { path = "hive-priv-sock" }
 hive-runtime = { path = "hive-runtime" }
 hive-sock-client = { path = "hive-sock-client" }
 hive-types = { path = "hive-types" }
+swarm-agent-verify = { path = "swarm-agent-verify" }
 swarm-authelia-bridge-sock = { path = "swarm-authelia-bridge-sock" }
 swarm-matrix-client = { path = "swarm-matrix-client" }
 swarm-queue-client = { path = "swarm-queue-client" }
@@ -234,7 +237,7 @@ futures-util = "0.3"
 hmac = "0.13"
 sha2 = "0.11"
 # Constant-time comparison of a presented secret against the stored one
-# (`swarm-nats-auth::agent_token`). Already in the tree through the TLS stack.
+# (`swarm-agent-verify`). Already in the tree through the TLS stack.
 subtle = "2.6"
 # The NATS protocol client, for the swarm queue's auth-callout responder.
 # `default-features = false` because the default set is broad - jetstream, kv,
diff --git a/docs/swarm/README.md b/docs/swarm/README.md
index 0535bd71..7deba5bc 100644
--- a/docs/swarm/README.md
+++ b/docs/swarm/README.md
@@ -182,8 +182,9 @@ the credential from the store again for each attempt.
 
 The hive's shared queue client is still delivered into the harness unit's
 credentials directory, and `swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint` still reaches
-the container, but only for `swarm-logs`: the harness never connects with
-them.
+the container, but only for a `swarm-logs` built before it read the agent's
+own queue secret: the harness never connects with them, and a current
+`swarm-logs` presents that secret to the log store instead.
 
 <details><summary>What an agent publishes over the queue</summary>
 
diff --git a/docs/swarm/credentials.md b/docs/swarm/credentials.md
index c285080e..a1aaf9b7 100644
--- a/docs/swarm/credentials.md
+++ b/docs/swarm/credentials.md
@@ -55,27 +55,27 @@ of the cell says how.
 
 <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO -->
 
-| store path                                                  | minter                                                                                                                                                              | reader — pulls at runtime, holds in memory                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | automatic re-mint                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | automatic re-pull                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
-| ----------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main`                          | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass                                                                  | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ✅ the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ✅ `hive-matrix-daemon` exits when the homeserver rejects its token, and a five-minute timer restarts it, which reads the store again                                                                                                                                                     |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>`                     | `swarm-controller`                                                                                                                                                  | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once                                                                                                        | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ❌ `swarm-matrix-ctl` mints it once; the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ✅ the controller reads it on every five-minute matrix pass                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
-| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client`             | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in                                                                                                    | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, once at start                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ❌ read once at start; the controller holds the old value until it restarts                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
-| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token`             | the forge, inside the `hive-forge` container, once; `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` on the forge's host copies it in under its own certificate, with a write-only grant | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, at start                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | ❌ the forge mints it once and keeps its copy in the container; the publisher writes that copy each time the forge container starts and each time the mint writes the file                                                                                                                                                                                           | ❌ the controller reads it at start, and in the background with backoff until it first finds it; a replaced token reaches it with the next restart                                                                                                                                        |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls`                             | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation                            | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config; then `hive-agent-bao-identity` in the agent container, under the leaf it holds                                                                                                                       | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-issues a live agent's leaf once it's past half its validity (45 of 90 days, read from the certificate itself)                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ✅ `hive-agent-bao-identity` re-reads it every 10 minutes and swaps a new leaf into `/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/`, which every store login in the container presents. It reads under the leaf it holds, so it renews only while that leaf is valid                                      |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`                                | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation                                                                                                                               | `hive-agent` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, held in memory — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive                                                                                                                 | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-mints a live agent's secret once it's 45 days old by `minted_at` on the stored object; a secret with no `minted_at` gets one stamped, value unchanged. The pass skips agents declared `Destroyed` — declaring an agent destroyed deletes every version of the path instead, the undo of the mint rather than another one | ✅ `hive-agent` reads the path before its first connect and again on every reconnect attempt, so a reconnect after a re-mint presents the new secret. An open connection keeps the secret it connected with; after a revocation the agent keeps retrying under the queue client's backoff |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token`                          | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity                                                          | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token`                                                                                                                                                                                            | ✅ the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge/<label>`                        | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links an external forge account in the swarm UI                                                                                | `hive-agent-forge-accounts` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/forge-<label>-token` and `forge-<label>.json`                                                                                                                                               | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking the label again                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
-| `swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token`                         | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links a GitHub account in the swarm UI                                                                                         | `hive-agent-github-token` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/github-token`                                                                                                                                                                                 | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking it again                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer, and `hive-github-notify` re-reads the file on every poll                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| `swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token`                    | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass                                                        | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `stored_sender_token()`, under the hive's own certificate                                                                                                                                       | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ✅ hive-c0re's matrix sweep reads the store every run and overwrites its token file when the store's token differs                                                                                                                                                                        |
-| `swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token`                            | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass                                                               | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `forge::reader_token()`, under the hive's own certificate                                                                                                                                       | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ✅ hive-c0re reads the store on every forge read                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
-| `swarm/hives/<hive>/queue/agent`                            | authelia                                                                                                                                                            | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host, under its own per-hive certificate; no agent's policy reaches it                                                                                                                                                                                     | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`                            | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in                                                                                                    | hive-c0re, under the hive's own certificate, when it first connects to the queue                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ❌ read until the first connect succeeds, retried with a backoff of up to five minutes while it's missing; then held until hive-c0re restarts                                                                                                                                             |
-| `swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client`                     | authelia                                                                                                                                                            | that service's own reader, under its own certificate — the queue responder's under `swarm-nats-auth`'s, the homeserver's under `swarm-matrix-ctl`'s, the forge's under `swarm-forge-publisher`'s, the review classifier's under `swarm-review-classifier`'s; the bao UI's by the store's granter | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| `swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token`               | `swarm-controller`, from the forge's admin API, at start and in a five-minute pass; its grant on the path is write-only                                             | `swarm-bao-ci-runner` on the runner's host, under the runner's own certificate, into a file only `swarm-ci-runner-register` in the runner's container loads; no other principal's policy reads it                                                                                                | ❌ the forge hands out one token until an admin resets it; the controller writes a reset token within five minutes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | ✅ `swarm-bao-ci-runner` reads it at boot, on deploy and every ten minutes, and restarts the runner when the value changed                                                                                                                                                                |
-| `swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key`        | the operator, by hand in the store's UI, field `api_key`                                                                                                            | `swarm-review-classifier` in its container, under its own certificate, at the start of every run; held for that run and handed to `claude`'s environment only; no other principal's policy reads it                                                                                              | ❌ an operator's key; replaced by writing a new one                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ✅ read on every run, so a written or removed key takes effect on the next run                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| `swarm/services/review-classifier/forge/token`              | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for its `review-classifier` account, at start and in a five-minute pass; the secret publisher's policy denies it    | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and on every review it posts as the account; the classifier service's policy doesn't read it                                                                                                                    | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ✅ the controller reads the store on every review it posts                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
-| _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf                     | the store's own PKI, or an operator placing it by hand                                                                                                              | its own client, off disk — the exception above, because it's what makes every other row's pull possible                                                                                                                                                                                          | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| store path                                                  | minter                                                                                                                                                              | reader — pulls at runtime, holds in memory                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | automatic re-mint                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | automatic re-pull                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main`                          | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass                                                                  | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | ✅ the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ✅ `hive-matrix-daemon` exits when the homeserver rejects its token, and a five-minute timer restarts it, which reads the store again                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>`                     | `swarm-controller`                                                                                                                                                  | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once                                                                                                        | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | ❌ `swarm-matrix-ctl` mints it once; the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ✅ the controller reads it on every five-minute matrix pass                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client`             | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in                                                                                                    | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, once at start                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ❌ read once at start; the controller holds the old value until it restarts                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/forge/token`             | the forge, inside the `hive-forge` container, once; `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` on the forge's host copies it in under its own certificate, with a write-only grant | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, at start                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ❌ the forge mints it once and keeps its copy in the container; the publisher writes that copy each time the forge container starts and each time the mint writes the file                                                                                                                                                                                           | ❌ the controller reads it at start, and in the background with backoff until it first finds it; a replaced token reaches it with the next restart                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls`                             | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation                            | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config; then `hive-agent-bao-identity` in the agent container, under the leaf it holds                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-issues a live agent's leaf once it's past half its validity (45 of 90 days, read from the certificate itself)                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ✅ `hive-agent-bao-identity` re-reads it every 10 minutes and swaps a new leaf into `/run/hive-agent-bao-identity/`, which every store login in the container presents. It reads under the leaf it holds, so it renews only while that leaf is valid                                                                                                      |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`                                | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation                                                                                                                               | `hive-agent` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, held in memory — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive; `swarm-logs` in the agent container, under the same certificate, on every query, as the bearer it presents at the log store; `swarm-nats-auth` and `swarm-logs-auth`, each under its own certificate, to check a presented secret | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-mints a live agent's secret once it's 45 days old by `minted_at` on the stored object; a secret with no `minted_at` gets one stamped, value unchanged. The pass skips agents declared `Destroyed` — declaring an agent destroyed deletes every version of the path instead, the undo of the mint rather than another one | ✅ `hive-agent` reads the path before its first connect and again on every reconnect attempt, so a reconnect after a re-mint presents the new secret. An open connection keeps the secret it connected with; after a revocation the agent keeps retrying under the queue client's backoff. `swarm-logs` reads it on every query and once more after a 401 |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token`                          | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity                                                          | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | ✅ the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge/<label>`                        | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links an external forge account in the swarm UI                                                                                | `hive-agent-forge-accounts` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/forge-<label>-token` and `forge-<label>.json`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking the label again                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| `swarm/agents/<agent>/github-token`                         | `swarm-controller`, when an operator links a GitHub account in the swarm UI                                                                                         | `hive-agent-github-token` in the agent container, under the agent's own certificate, into `<state>/github-token`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ❌ an operator's token; replaced only by deleting it and linking it again                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 2-minute timer, and `hive-github-notify` re-reads the file on every poll                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| `swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/sender-token`                    | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass                                                        | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `stored_sender_token()`, under the hive's own certificate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | ✅ hive-c0re's matrix sweep reads the store every run and overwrites its token file when the store's token differs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+| `swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token`                            | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for every hive in its directory in a five-minute pass                                                               | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `forge::reader_token()`, under the hive's own certificate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ✅ hive-c0re reads the store on every forge read                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
+| `swarm/hives/<hive>/queue/agent`                            | authelia                                                                                                                                                            | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host, under its own per-hive certificate; no agent's policy reaches it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`                            | authelia, at its first boot; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in                                                                                                    | hive-c0re, under the hive's own certificate, when it first connects to the queue                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | ❌ read until the first connect succeeds, retried with a backoff of up to five minutes while it's missing; then held until hive-c0re restarts                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
+| `swarm/services/<clientId>/oidc/client`                     | authelia                                                                                                                                                            | that service's own reader, under its own certificate — the queue responder's under `swarm-nats-auth`'s, the homeserver's under `swarm-matrix-ctl`'s, the forge's under `swarm-forge-publisher`'s, the review classifier's under `swarm-review-classifier`'s; the bao UI's by the store's granter                                                                                                                    | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| `swarm/services/ci-runner/registration-token`               | `swarm-controller`, from the forge's admin API, at start and in a five-minute pass; its grant on the path is write-only                                             | `swarm-bao-ci-runner` on the runner's host, under the runner's own certificate, into a file only `swarm-ci-runner-register` in the runner's container loads; no other principal's policy reads it                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | ❌ the forge hands out one token until an admin resets it; the controller writes a reset token within five minutes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | ✅ `swarm-bao-ci-runner` reads it at boot, on deploy and every ten minutes, and restarts the runner when the value changed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| `swarm/services/review-classifier/anthropic-api-key`        | the operator, by hand in the store's UI, field `api_key`                                                                                                            | `swarm-review-classifier` in its container, under its own certificate, at the start of every run; held for that run and handed to `claude`'s environment only; no other principal's policy reads it                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ❌ an operator's key; replaced by writing a new one                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | ✅ read on every run, so a written or removed key takes effect on the next run                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| `swarm/services/review-classifier/forge/token`              | `swarm-controller`, with the forge's admin API, for its `review-classifier` account, at start and in a five-minute pass; the secret publisher's policy denies it    | `swarm-controller` under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and on every review it posts as the account; the classifier service's policy doesn't read it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | ✅ the controller's pass re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ✅ the controller reads the store on every review it posts                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf                     | the store's own PKI, or an operator placing it by hand                                                                                                              | its own client, off disk — the exception above, because it's what makes every other row's pull possible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | must be stated                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
 
 <!-- vale write-good.Passive = YES -->
 
diff --git a/docs/swarm/secrets.md b/docs/swarm/secrets.md
index 003c81fa..260bd2d7 100644
--- a/docs/swarm/secrets.md
+++ b/docs/swarm/secrets.md
@@ -259,8 +259,9 @@ The store's **first reader** is the agent containers' queue credential:
 `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` lands it as two files, the client secret and
 the client id it authenticates, because that's how a queue client reads them —
 the secret by path, the id by value. No local fallback exists, and none is
-possible, so absent files mean this hive's agents have no `swarm-logs`, which
-is what a swarm looks like before the publisher on the authelia host has run.
+possible, so absent files mean an agent built before `swarm-logs` read its own
+queue secret has no working `swarm-logs`, which is what a swarm looks like
+before the publisher on the authelia host has run.
 The reader runs before `hive-c0re.service`, which wants it (doesn't require
 it), so an agent container never renders ahead of the credential; an
 unreachable store delays the daemon's start rather than failing it.
@@ -274,8 +275,8 @@ it needs no read access to either — and hands them to
 `systemd-nspawn --load-credential` through `hive-priv`, which runs as root.
 Inside, `hive-agent.service` names the same two ids in `LoadCredential=`, which
 lands them in its own `$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY`, owned by the agent user and by
-nobody else, where the agent's `swarm-logs` reads them. The harness itself
-doesn't: it connects to the queue with the agent's own credential. `hive-c0re`
+nobody else, where a `swarm-logs` built before it read the agent's own queue
+secret reads them. The harness itself doesn't: it connects to the queue with the agent's own credential. `hive-c0re`
 never reads the bytes at any point: it runs as `hive-core`, which is the reason
 a copy wasn't an option either. When the files aren't there the daemon forwards
 nothing and says so in its journal, and the container starts without them.
diff --git a/docs/trust-boundary/security.md b/docs/trust-boundary/security.md
index 3181a3fe..b2fda6c9 100644
--- a/docs/trust-boundary/security.md
+++ b/docs/trust-boundary/security.md
@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ A hive reads no **swarm service's** OIDC client secret. Every reader of
 collector and the store forwarder each fetch theirs with a leaf of their own,
 and the store's granter fetches the bao UI's.
 
+Two services read **every agent's queue secret**
+(`swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`), each under a leaf of its own whose policy
+reaches that one leaf per agent and nothing else: the queue's auth callout
+(`swarm-nats-auth`) and the log store's agent check (`swarm-logs-auth`, on the
+log store's host). Either one compromised can present any agent's queue
+secret, at the queue and at the log store's query route alike.
+
 ### Per-hive credentials live under the hive kind
 
 `swarm_secret_client::policy` scopes the **hive** stanza narrowly (unlike the
diff --git a/flake.nix b/flake.nix
index 974055dc..36c927d1 100644
--- a/flake.nix
+++ b/flake.nix
@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@
               services.hyperhive.deploy.swarm-ui.package =
                 lib.mkDefault
                   self.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.swarm-ui;
+              services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authPackage =
+                lib.mkDefault
+                  self.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.swarm-logs-auth;
               services.hyperhive.deploy.nats.authPackage =
                 lib.mkDefault
                   self.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.swarm-nats-auth;
diff --git a/nix/agent-modules/logs.nix b/nix/agent-modules/logs.nix
index 31849f21..d6a07240 100644
--- a/nix/agent-modules/logs.nix
+++ b/nix/agent-modules/logs.nix
@@ -7,13 +7,11 @@
 # and a default inside the binary would be an address we hope points at
 # something.
 #
-# ⚠️ Gated on the queue being configured as well as on the query URL, because
-# the identity this CLI presents IS the queue's: one per-hive machine client,
-# one credential pair, delivered once. A swarm with a log store and no agent
-# credential has nothing for this to authenticate as, and installing a binary
-# that can only fail would be worse than leaving it off PATH — an agent would
-# read the 401 as "no logs", which is the exact confusion the store's machine
-# route was added to end.
+# ⚠️ Gated on the secret store's address as well as on the query URL, because
+# the identity this CLI presents is the agent's own queue secret, read from the
+# store with the certificate ./bao.nix keeps. Without a store there is nothing
+# to authenticate as, and a binary that can only fail would read its 401 as
+# "no logs".
 {
   lib,
   pkgs,
@@ -22,22 +20,22 @@
 }:
 let
   cfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.logs;
-  queueCfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.queue;
-  configured = cfg.queryUrl != null && queueCfg.tokenEndpoint != null;
+  baoCfg = config.services.hyperhive.agent.bao;
+  configured = cfg.queryUrl != null && baoCfg.addr != null;
 
-  # The four coordinates `swarm-logs` reads, all-or-none on its side. Bound
-  # here as one attrset so the wrapper below cannot set three of them: a
-  # half-set environment is the failure the binary reports as a deployment
-  # bug, and it should not be reachable from the module that sets it.
+  # The same store coordinates ./queue-identity.nix gives the harness, except
+  # the CA: `%d` expands only inside a unit, so it is spelled as the harness
+  # unit's credentials directory, which the agent user's shells can read.
   #
-  # 🩸 Two of these are credential **paths**. Neither the id nor the secret
-  # is read here — a value in `--set` lands in the wrapper script, which is
-  # in the world-readable nix store.
+  # 🩸 Paths and a name only. A value in `--set` lands in the wrapper script,
+  # which is in the world-readable nix store.
   wrapperEnv = {
     HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL = cfg.queryUrl;
-    HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT = queueCfg.tokenEndpoint;
-    HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE = queueCfg.clientIdFile;
-    HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE = queueCfg.clientSecretFile;
+    HIVE_AGENT_NAME = config.services.hyperhive.agent.user.name;
+    BAO_ADDR = baoCfg.addr;
+    BAO_CLIENT_CERT = baoCfg.clientCertFile;
+    BAO_CLIENT_KEY = baoCfg.clientKeyFile;
+    BAO_CACERT = "/run/credentials/hive-agent.service/hive-agent-bao-server-ca";
   };
 
   # Same shape `swarm-controller.nix` wraps `swarmctl` in — `symlinkJoin` +
@@ -71,12 +69,6 @@ in
         Set by the generated meta flake from the host's own
         {option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.victorialogs.domain`.
 
-        ⚠️ The **whole URL**, not a host to build one from, because this same
-        string is also the audience `swarm-logs` mints its token for. Two
-        spellings of one address present as a valid token refused at the
-        store — the rule `swarm-otel.nix` already states over its own push
-        targets.
-
         `null` means this hive has not been given the log store's address for
         its agents, and `swarm-logs` is then not installed at all. Deliberately
         not defaulted: a guessed address resolves cleanly to the wrong place.
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/default.nix b/nix/host-modules/default.nix
index 4960a1e7..90a46a5d 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/default.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/default.nix
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
     ./glue-forge-oidc-client.nix
     ./glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix
     ./glue-hive-tls-bao-identity.nix
+    ./glue-logs-auth-bao-identity.nix
     ./glue-matrix-ctl-bao-identity.nix
     ./glue-matrix-oidc-client.nix
     ./glue-nats-auth-bao-identity.nix
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix b/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
index fc162442..64aee3a9 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/glue-bao-tls.nix
@@ -270,6 +270,13 @@ in
         [ -s ${pkiDir}/nats-auth.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} nats-auth \
           ${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.natsAuthCommonName} "" clientAuth
 
+        # The log store's agent auth responder, which reads agent queue
+        # credentials. Minted here for the matrix-ctl leaf's reason: the log
+        # store is a swarm singleton, so elsewhere this is the file an operator
+        # copies.
+        [ -s ${pkiDir}/logs-auth.pem ] || ${signLeaf} ${pkiDir} logs-auth \
+          ${lib.escapeShellArg deployCfg.bao.logsAuthCommonName} "" clientAuth
+
         # The CI runner's token fetch. Minted here for the matrix-ctl leaf's
         # reason: the runner is a swarm singleton, so on a runner host without
         # the store this is the file an operator copies.
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/glue-logs-auth-bao-identity.nix b/nix/host-modules/glue-logs-auth-bao-identity.nix
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9b39e896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nix/host-modules/glue-logs-auth-bao-identity.nix
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Glue: point the log store's agent auth responder at the bao leaf minted for it.
+#
+# ONE PAIRING PER FILE — the swarm-logs-auth principal ← bao, and nothing else.
+# Deleting this leaves a log store with no responder identity unless the
+# operator names one, which ./swarm-victorialogs.nix refuses at eval.
+#
+# ⚠️ The minting is NOT here. ./glue-bao-tls.nix holds the CA and signs the
+# leaf. What belongs here is the pairing: which paths the responder presents.
+#
+# ⚠️ Gated on the store running on this host, the only place the leaf is
+# minted. A log-store host without the store gets no default here; the
+# operator places the responder's leaf and names it.
+#
+# Everything is `mkDefault`. An operator naming their own paths wins.
+{
+  lib,
+  config,
+  ...
+}:
+let
+  deployCfg = config.services.hyperhive.deploy;
+  pkiDir = import ./lib/bao-pki-dir.nix;
+in
+{
+  config = lib.mkIf (deployCfg.victorialogs.enable && deployCfg.bao.enable) {
+    services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs = {
+      authBaoClientCertFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/logs-auth.pem";
+      authBaoClientKeyFile = lib.mkDefault "${pkiDir}/logs-auth-key.pem";
+    };
+  };
+}
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/hive-c0re/environment.nix b/nix/host-modules/hive-c0re/environment.nix
index 766a2012..7dce9fa8 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/hive-c0re/environment.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/hive-c0re/environment.nix
@@ -271,29 +271,19 @@ in
       HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint;
     }
 //
-  # Where an agent reads the swarm's logs, forwarded the same way and gated on
-  # the same credential: `swarm-logs` authenticates as the queue's own per-hive
-  # machine client, so an address with no credential behind it would put a
-  # binary on PATH that can only ever answer 401 — which an agent reads as "no
-  # logs", the exact confusion the store's machine route was added to end.
+  # Where an agent reads the swarm's logs. Gated on the store identity below,
+  # because `swarm-logs` authenticates with the agent's own queue secret, read
+  # from the store: an address with nothing to authenticate as would put a
+  # binary on PATH that can only ever answer 401, which an agent reads as "no
+  # logs".
   #
   # The **machine** route (`^~ /select/logsql/`), not the browser one at `/`:
   # that one ends in `error_page 401 =302` and hands a machine caller
   # authelia's login page as a 200 with an HTML body. See
   # `swarm-victorialogs.nix`'s location for the whole reasoning.
-  #
-  # ⚠️ The full URL rather than the domain, because the same string is also
-  # the audience the token is minted for — `swarm-otel.nix` states that rule
-  # over its own push targets, and two spellings present as a valid token
-  # refused at the store.
-  lib.optionalAttrs
-    (
-      config.services.hyperhive.deploy.hive-controller.queue.agentNatsUrl != null
-      && config.services.hyperhive.swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint != null
-    )
-    {
-      HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL = "https://${config.services.hyperhive.swarm.victorialogs.domain}/select/logsql/query";
-    }
+  lib.optionalAttrs haveBaoClientIdentity {
+    HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL = "https://${config.services.hyperhive.swarm.victorialogs.domain}/select/logsql/query";
+  }
 //
   # Where the swarm's secret store is, and the identity this hive presents to
   # it (hive-c0re::lifecycle::agent_identity). `swarm_secret_client` reads these
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
index 2392aec7..5fd0df35 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix
@@ -964,6 +964,17 @@ let
     }
   '';
 
+  # The log store's agent auth responder, which checks the secret an agent
+  # presents against the one stored for it: the same `+` leaf as the queue
+  # responder's, and nothing else.
+  logsAuthReaders = [
+    {
+      name = "swarm-logs-auth";
+      cn = baoDeploy.logsAuthCommonName;
+      policyText = readStanza "${credentialMountPath}/data/swarm/agents/+/queue";
+    }
+  ];
+
   # The CI runner's token fetch. The one reader of the path, which the
   # controller writes and cannot read back.
   ciRunnerReaders = [
@@ -1797,6 +1808,19 @@ in
       '';
     };
 
+    logsAuthCommonName = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.str;
+      default = "swarm-logs-auth";
+      description = ''
+        Subject the store's `swarm-logs-auth` cert-auth role accepts: the
+        identity the log store's agent auth responder presents to read agent
+        queue credentials, `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` and nothing else under
+        an agent.
+
+        ⚠️ Reserved as a hive name by ./swarm.nix, like its siblings.
+      '';
+    };
+
     ciRunnerCommonName = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.str;
       default = "swarm-ci-runner";
@@ -3171,6 +3195,8 @@ in
 
       systemd.services.swarm-bao-nats-auth-policy = readerPolicyUnit "write the queue responder's agent-credential-reader bao policy and cert-auth role" natsAuthReaders;
 
+      systemd.services.swarm-bao-logs-auth-policy = readerPolicyUnit "write the log store responder's agent-credential-reader bao policy and cert-auth role" logsAuthReaders;
+
       systemd.services.swarm-bao-ci-runner-policy = readerPolicyUnit "write the CI runner's registration-token-reader bao policy and cert-auth role" ciRunnerReaders;
 
       systemd.services.swarm-bao-review-classifier-policy = readerPolicyUnit "write the review classifier's API-key-reader bao policy and cert-auth role" reviewClassifierReaders;
@@ -3302,6 +3328,7 @@ in
           "swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy.service"
           "swarm-bao-hive-leaf-policy.service"
           "swarm-bao-ci-runner-policy.service"
+          "swarm-bao-logs-auth-policy.service"
           "swarm-bao-forge-publisher-policy.service"
         ]
         ++ granterAfter;
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-victorialogs.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-victorialogs.nix
index 3f2f0d27..f01d6338 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-victorialogs.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm-victorialogs.nix
@@ -52,6 +52,22 @@ let
     error_page 401 =302 https://${hyperhiveCfg.swarm.authelia.domain}/?rd=$target_url;
   '';
 
+  # The agents' `auth_request` responder (`swarm-logs-auth`). Its socket's
+  # directory holds that socket alone and is traverse-only for others, the
+  # shape `swarm-controller.nix` gives its own.
+  logsAuthUnit = "swarm-logs-auth";
+  logsAuthSocket = "/run/${logsAuthUnit}/auth.sock";
+  logsAuthCredential = id: "/run/credentials/${logsAuthUnit}.service/${id}";
+  # Credential id → host path of the responder's store identity.
+  logsAuthStoreFiles = {
+    "bao-client.pem" = deployCfg.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile;
+    "bao-client-key.pem" = deployCfg.victorialogs.authBaoClientKeyFile;
+  }
+  // lib.optionalAttrs (deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null) {
+    "bao-ca.pem" = deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile;
+  };
+  baoCfg = hyperhiveCfg.swarm.bao;
+
   # Shared host netns, like every sibling swarm container: the collector
   # and Grafana reach this at 127.0.0.1:<port>.
   privateNetwork = false;
@@ -88,7 +104,74 @@ in
     '';
   };
 
+  options.services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authPackage = lib.mkOption {
+    type = lib.types.package;
+    defaultText = lib.literalExpression "hyperhive.packages.\${system}.swarm-logs-auth";
+    description = ''
+      The `swarm-logs-auth` package: the gateway's `auth_request` responder
+      that checks an agent's `swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>` bearer on
+      `/select/logsql/` against the secret store.
+    '';
+  };
+
+  options.services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile = lib.mkOption {
+    type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
+    default = null;
+    example = "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/logs-auth.pem";
+    description = ''
+      Client certificate `swarm-logs-auth` presents to the swarm's secret store
+      to read agents' queue secrets. Its subject must be
+      {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.logsAuthCommonName`.
+
+      Required when `deploy.victorialogs.enable` is set; unset fails at eval.
+      ./glue-logs-auth-bao-identity.nix points it at the leaf
+      ./glue-bao-tls.nix mints on a host that runs the store; on any other
+      log-store host it is a file the operator places.
+
+      A path, never a value.
+    '';
+  };
+
+  options.services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authBaoClientKeyFile = lib.mkOption {
+    type = lib.types.nullOr lib.types.str;
+    default = null;
+    example = "/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/logs-auth-key.pem";
+    description = ''
+      Private key for {option}`services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile`.
+      A path, never a value.
+    '';
+  };
+
   config = lib.mkIf deployCfg.victorialogs.enable {
+    assertions = [
+      {
+        assertion =
+          deployCfg.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile != null
+          && deployCfg.victorialogs.authBaoClientKeyFile != null;
+        message = ''
+          services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs.authBaoClientCertFile and
+          authBaoClientKeyFile must both be set.
+
+          swarm-logs-auth reads agents' queue secrets from the swarm's secret
+          store with this certificate. They default to the leaf the store
+          mints where services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.enable is set on this
+          host; elsewhere, issue a leaf whose CN is
+          services.hyperhive.deploy.bao.logsAuthCommonName and name it in
+          both options.
+        '';
+      }
+    ];
+
+    # Which check a `/select/logsql/` request gets. `auth_request` takes a
+    # fixed URI, so it names `/__swarm_logs_auth`, which rewrites to the
+    # target this map picks from the caller's `Authorization`.
+    services.nginx.appendHttpConfig = ''
+      map $http_authorization $swarm_logs_auth_target {
+        "~^Bearer swarm-agent\." /__swarm_logs_agent_auth;
+        default /__hive_authelia;
+      }
+    '';
+
     # This store publishes its own health as prometheus metrics on the same
     # listener it serves queries on, so the swarm's collector scrapes it with
     # no exporter and no extra port — same arrangement as the metrics store.
@@ -174,12 +257,35 @@ in
           # logs. That is the rule in force, not an omission: read
           # permissions are a later thing, and this location is where one
           # attaches when it exists.
+          #
+          # Two checks: an agent's own `swarm-agent.` bearer goes to
+          # `swarm-logs-auth`, anything else to authelia (`appendHttpConfig`
+          # above picks).
           "^~ /select/logsql/" = {
             # No URI part, so the request path and its query string reach
             # the store as the caller sent them.
             proxyPass = "http://127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.port}";
             extraConfig = ''
-              auth_request /__hive_authelia;
+              auth_request /__swarm_logs_auth;
+            '';
+          };
+
+          # `rewrite … last` re-matches locations, so the subrequest lands in
+          # one of the two internal locations named by the map.
+          "= /__swarm_logs_auth" = {
+            extraConfig = ''
+              internal;
+              rewrite ^ $swarm_logs_auth_target last;
+            '';
+          };
+
+          # The `Authorization` header rides the subrequest unchanged.
+          "= /__swarm_logs_agent_auth" = {
+            proxyPass = "http://unix:${logsAuthSocket}:/";
+            extraConfig = ''
+              internal;
+              proxy_pass_request_body off;
+              proxy_set_header Content-Length "";
             '';
           };
 
@@ -207,6 +313,53 @@ in
         };
       };
 
+    # The agents' check on `/select/logsql/`. On the host rather than in the
+    # store's container: it needs nothing of the store, only nginx's reach to
+    # its socket and its own store identity.
+    systemd.services.${logsAuthUnit} = {
+      description = "swarm log store auth_request responder for agent credentials";
+      wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
+      # Where the store's PKI is minted on this host, the leaf is one of its
+      # files. Ordering only: elsewhere the unit does not exist.
+      after = [
+        "network.target"
+        "swarm-bao-pki.service"
+      ];
+      serviceConfig = {
+        ExecStart = lib.concatStringsSep " " [
+          "${deployCfg.victorialogs.authPackage}/bin/swarm-logs-auth"
+          "--socket ${logsAuthSocket}"
+          # The role ./swarm-bao.nix writes on the store's `cert` mount.
+          "--store-cert-role swarm-logs-auth"
+        ];
+        # Paths only: `argv` is world-readable via /proc/<pid>/cmdline.
+        LoadCredential = lib.mapAttrsToList (id: path: "${id}:${path}") logsAuthStoreFiles;
+        DynamicUser = true;
+        RuntimeDirectory = logsAuthUnit;
+        # Traverse-only for others, so nginx reaches the socket path.
+        RuntimeDirectoryMode = "0751";
+        # The path never vanishes from under a running nginx; the responder
+        # unlinks a stale socket as it starts.
+        RuntimeDirectoryPreserve = "yes";
+        Restart = "on-failure";
+        RestartSec = "5s";
+        SyslogIdentifier = logsAuthUnit;
+        ProtectSystem = "strict";
+        ProtectHome = true;
+        PrivateTmp = true;
+        PrivateDevices = true;
+        NoNewPrivileges = true;
+      };
+      environment = {
+        BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
+        BAO_CLIENT_CERT = logsAuthCredential "bao-client.pem";
+        BAO_CLIENT_KEY = logsAuthCredential "bao-client-key.pem";
+      }
+      // lib.optionalAttrs (logsAuthStoreFiles ? "bao-ca.pem") {
+        BAO_CACERT = logsAuthCredential "bao-ca.pem";
+      };
+    };
+
     containers.${cfg.machine} = {
       autoStart = true;
       ephemeral = false;
diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
index a92479d1..4479321f 100644
--- a/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
+++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm.nix
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ let
     deployCfg.bao.granterCommonName
     deployCfg.bao.natsAuthCommonName
     deployCfg.bao.ciRunnerCommonName
+    deployCfg.bao.logsAuthCommonName
     deployCfg.bao.reviewClassifierCommonName
     deployCfg.bao.forgePublisherCommonName
   ]
diff --git a/nix/module-eval/agent-queue-bao.nix b/nix/module-eval/agent-queue-bao.nix
index 34acf91c..75c01bc5 100644
--- a/nix/module-eval/agent-queue-bao.nix
+++ b/nix/module-eval/agent-queue-bao.nix
@@ -40,8 +40,45 @@ let
 
   agentNoBao = shared.agentBare;
 
+  # `swarm-logs` authenticates with the agent's queue secret from the store, so
+  # the store address gates it beside the query URL.
+  logsUrl = "https://logs.t.local/select/logsql/query";
+  agentLogs = agentWith {
+    services.hyperhive.agent.bao.addr = "https://bao.t.local:8200";
+    services.hyperhive.agent.logs.queryUrl = logsUrl;
+  };
+  agentLogsNoBao = agentWith { services.hyperhive.agent.logs.queryUrl = logsUrl; };
+  swarmLogsIn =
+    machine:
+    lib.findFirst (
+      p: (p.name or "") == "swarm-logs-configured"
+    ) null machine.environment.systemPackages;
+
   agentBaoIdentity = machine: machine.systemd.services.hive-agent-bao-identity;
   cases = [
+    {
+      # The wrapper names the store identity ./queue-identity.nix gives the
+      # harness, by path, and nothing of the hive's shared OIDC client.
+      name = "swarm-logs is wrapped with the agent's own store identity";
+      ok =
+        let
+          w = (swarmLogsIn agentLogs).buildCommand;
+          a = agentLogs.services.hyperhive.agent;
+          set = k: v: lib.hasInfix "--set ${k} ${lib.escapeShellArg v}" w;
+        in
+        set "HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL" logsUrl
+        && set "HIVE_AGENT_NAME" a.user.name
+        && set "BAO_ADDR" "https://bao.t.local:8200"
+        && set "BAO_CLIENT_CERT" a.bao.clientCertFile
+        && set "BAO_CLIENT_KEY" a.bao.clientKeyFile
+        && set "BAO_CACERT" "/run/credentials/hive-agent.service/hive-agent-bao-server-ca"
+        && !(lib.hasInfix "OIDC" w);
+    }
+    {
+      # A query URL with nothing to authenticate as installs nothing.
+      name = "an agent with a log store but no secret store gets no swarm-logs";
+      ok = swarmLogsIn agentLogsNoBao == null && swarmLogsIn agentLogs != null;
+    }
     {
       # Both ids or neither: the secret authenticates nobody without the id it
       # belongs to, and `swarm-logs` reads both.
diff --git a/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix b/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix
index 793c8a79..0fe075a1 100644
--- a/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix
+++ b/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ let
     _: u: (u.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT or null) == granterCertFile
   ) baoGrantWithConsumers.systemd.services;
 
-  # The sixteen units that write a `swarm-*` grant, by name, for the discovery
+  # The seventeen units that write a `swarm-*` grant, by name, for the discovery
   # control below.
   grantingUnitNames = [
     "swarm-bao-controller-policy"
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ let
     "swarm-bao-operator-viewer-policy"
     "swarm-bao-hive-leaf-policy"
     "swarm-bao-ci-runner-policy"
+    "swarm-bao-logs-auth-policy"
     "swarm-bao-forge-publisher-policy"
     "swarm-bao-review-classifier-policy"
   ];
@@ -704,6 +705,31 @@ let
         in
         lib.hasInfix "/nats-auth.pem ]" s && lib.hasInfix "swarm-nats-auth \"\" clientAuth" s;
     }
+    {
+      # The same `+` leaf as the queue responder, read-only, and nothing else:
+      # this principal checks a presented secret and does nothing with it.
+      name = "the log store responder's grant is every agent's queue secret, read-only, and nothing else";
+      ok =
+        let
+          s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-logs-auth-policy.script;
+        in
+        lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/+/queue\" {\n  capabilities = [\"read\"]\n}" s
+        && lib.length (lib.filter lib.isList (builtins.split "path \"" s)) == 1
+        && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/agents/*" s)
+        && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/hives" s)
+        && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/data/swarm/services" s)
+        && lib.hasInfix "auth/cert/certs/swarm-logs-auth" s
+        && lib.hasInfix "allowed_common_names=swarm-logs-auth" s
+        && lib.hasInfix "token_policies=swarm-logs-auth" s;
+    }
+    {
+      name = "the PKI unit signs the log store responder's leaf under its own subject";
+      ok =
+        let
+          s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-pki.script;
+        in
+        lib.hasInfix "/logs-auth.pem ]" s && lib.hasInfix "swarm-logs-auth \"\" clientAuth" s;
+    }
     {
       # 🩸 The half that makes the policies above bind: a policy grants only
       # through a token that carries it, and a token is minted by a cert-auth
@@ -915,24 +941,24 @@ let
     }
     {
       # A store host without the granter's pair writes its grants some other
-      # way, so none of the sixteen units may exist. Without this arm
+      # way, so none of the seventeen units may exist. Without this arm
       # `lib.mkIf haveGranter` could be dropped from any of them and every other
       # case here would still pass.
-      name = "without the granter's pair none of the sixteen granting units render";
+      name = "without the granter's pair none of the seventeen granting units render";
       ok =
         let
           s = baoGranterOptOut.systemd.services;
         in
         lib.all (unit: !(s ? ${unit})) (grantingUnitNames ++ [ "swarm-bao-granter-role" ])
-        # The control: the same store with the pair renders all sixteen.
+        # The control: the same store with the pair renders all seventeen.
         && lib.all (unit: baoGrantHere.systemd.services ? ${unit}) grantingUnitNames;
     }
     {
-      # 🩸 What replaced the silent skip. With no bootstrap token the sixteen still
+      # 🩸 What replaced the silent skip. With no bootstrap token the seventeen still
       # render, and a refused granter fails them with the step that fixes it.
       # A store host that never named a token is told to name one, since the
       # unit that sets the granter up renders only where it has.
-      name = "a store host without a bootstrap token renders the sixteen, each failing loudly with the one-time step";
+      name = "a store host without a bootstrap token renders the seventeen, each failing loudly with the one-time step";
       ok =
         let
           s = baoGranterNoToken.systemd.services;
@@ -1695,8 +1721,8 @@ let
     }
     {
       # What makes the case above mean something: discovery by the granter's
-      # certificate reaches all sixteen units, and each yields calls.
-      name = "the granter-policy check sees all sixteen granting units, and parses calls from each";
+      # certificate reaches all seventeen units, and each yields calls.
+      name = "the granter-policy check sees all seventeen granting units, and parses calls from each";
       ok =
         lib.sort lib.lessThan (lib.attrNames granterUnits) == lib.sort lib.lessThan grantingUnitNames
         && lib.all (u: baoCalls u.script != [ ]) (lib.attrValues granterUnits)
diff --git a/nix/module-eval/core-toggle.nix b/nix/module-eval/core-toggle.nix
index 1eb84e82..522e4629 100644
--- a/nix/module-eval/core-toggle.nix
+++ b/nix/module-eval/core-toggle.nix
@@ -504,6 +504,44 @@ let
         && !(lib.hasInfix "$args" q.extraConfig)
         && !(lib.hasInfix "?" q.proxyPass);
     }
+    {
+      # `auth_request` takes a fixed URI, so the split between the agents'
+      # responder and authelia is a map plus a rewrite in an internal
+      # location. Every link of that chain is pinned: the map keys on the
+      # agent-token prefix and falls back to authelia, the query location
+      # names the switch, the switch rewrites to the map's pick, and the
+      # agent target reaches the responder's socket, which the unit binds.
+      name = "the machine query location sends agent bearers to swarm-logs-auth and the rest to authelia";
+      ok =
+        let
+          l = allLocal.services.nginx.virtualHosts."logs.t.local".locations;
+          http = allLocal.services.nginx.appendHttpConfig;
+          unit = allLocal.systemd.services.swarm-logs-auth;
+        in
+        lib.hasInfix "map \$http_authorization \$swarm_logs_auth_target" http
+        && lib.hasInfix "\"~^Bearer swarm-agent\\.\" /__swarm_logs_agent_auth;" http
+        && lib.hasInfix "default /__hive_authelia;" http
+        && lib.hasInfix "auth_request /__swarm_logs_auth;" l."^~ /select/logsql/".extraConfig
+        && lib.hasInfix "rewrite ^ \$swarm_logs_auth_target last;" l."= /__swarm_logs_auth".extraConfig
+        && lib.hasInfix "internal;" l."= /__swarm_logs_agent_auth".extraConfig
+        && l."= /__swarm_logs_agent_auth".proxyPass == "http://unix:/run/swarm-logs-auth/auth.sock:/"
+        && lib.hasInfix "--socket /run/swarm-logs-auth/auth.sock" unit.serviceConfig.ExecStart
+        && l ? "= /__hive_authelia";
+    }
+    {
+      # The responder reads the store as itself, with the leaf the store's
+      # host mints for it.
+      name = "swarm-logs-auth presents its own store leaf";
+      ok =
+        let
+          v = allLocal.services.hyperhive.deploy.victorialogs;
+          lc = allLocal.systemd.services.swarm-logs-auth.serviceConfig.LoadCredential;
+        in
+        lib.hasSuffix "/logs-auth.pem" v.authBaoClientCertFile
+        && lib.hasSuffix "/logs-auth-key.pem" v.authBaoClientKeyFile
+        && builtins.elem "bao-client.pem:${v.authBaoClientCertFile}" lc
+        && builtins.elem "bao-client-key.pem:${v.authBaoClientKeyFile}" lc;
+    }
     {
       # The absence arm for the case above, and the option's own rule — a
       # service declares its entry under its own `enable` — made checkable.
diff --git a/nix/packages/default.nix b/nix/packages/default.nix
index 072e2055..ba9b8091 100644
--- a/nix/packages/default.nix
+++ b/nix/packages/default.nix
@@ -163,6 +163,10 @@ in
   # rather than every hive's.
   swarm-nats-auth = mkBinPackage "swarm-nats-auth" "hyperhive swarm queue auth-callout responder";
 
+  # The log store gateway's `auth_request` responder for agents. Out of
+  # `daemonBins` like the responder above: it runs on the log store's host only.
+  swarm-logs-auth = mkBinPackage "swarm-logs-auth" "hyperhive swarm log store agent auth responder";
+
   # The matrix container's control binary; `mint` publishes the sender token. Out of `daemonBins` for
   # "runs *inside* a container, not on the host" reason as the responder
   # above, and with a second one: putting it in the core bundle would place
diff --git a/swarm-agent-verify/Cargo.toml b/swarm-agent-verify/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d247c10f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/swarm-agent-verify/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+[package]
+name = "swarm-agent-verify"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+# Comparing an agent's presented secret with the stored one.
+subtle.workspace = true
+# The agent-token spelling the agent also uses.
+swarm-queue-client.workspace = true
+# The read of the stored credential the token is checked against.
+swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
diff --git a/swarm-agent-verify/src/lib.rs b/swarm-agent-verify/src/lib.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..24c6ad9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/swarm-agent-verify/src/lib.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+//! Checking an agent's own credential against the swarm secret store.
+//!
+//! The token is `swarm_queue_client::agent_token`'s spelling: a prefix, the
+//! agent's name, and its secret. The name is only a claim. It becomes an
+//! identity when the secret equals the one stored at
+//! `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`, and [`verify`] grants nothing on the name
+//! alone: every path that does not reach that comparison, and every lookup
+//! that fails, is a denial.
+//!
+//! Two verifiers use this: the queue's auth callout (`swarm-nats-auth`) and
+//! the log store's `auth_request` responder (`swarm-logs-auth`). Each reads
+//! the store under its own certificate.
+
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use anyhow::Context;
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use swarm_queue_client::agent_token::AgentToken;
+use swarm_secret_client::client::{DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, Settings};
+use swarm_secret_client::queue::{self, AgentCredential};
+
+/// Where the stored credential for an agent comes from.
+pub trait CredentialSource {
+    /// The object at `agent`'s queue path, `None` when nothing is stored
+    /// there, or an error when the store could not answer.
+    fn lookup(
+        &self,
+        agent: &str,
+    ) -> impl Future<Output = anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>>> + Send;
+}
+
+/// The swarm secret store, reached with the verifier's own certificate.
+pub struct Store {
+    settings: Settings,
+    cert_role: String,
+}
+
+impl Store {
+    /// The store at `settings`, logged in to as `cert_role`.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(settings: Settings, cert_role: String) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            settings,
+            cert_role,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl CredentialSource for Store {
+    /// Logs in per lookup, so no token is left to expire inside a long-lived
+    /// process.
+    async fn lookup(&self, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>> {
+        let path = queue::agent_queue_path(agent)?;
+        let store = swarm_secret_client::SecretStore::connect(
+            &self.settings,
+            &self.cert_role,
+            DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT,
+        )
+        .await
+        .context("logging in to the secret store")?;
+        store
+            .read_optional(&path)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("reading {path}"))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether `token`'s secret is the one stored for the agent it names.
+///
+/// The lookup is bounded by `timeout`, after which this denies.
+pub async fn verify(
+    source: &impl CredentialSource,
+    token: &AgentToken<'_>,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> bool {
+    let agent = token.agent;
+    let stored = match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, source.lookup(agent)).await {
+        Ok(Ok(Some(stored))) => stored,
+        Ok(Ok(None)) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                agent,
+                "no queue credential is stored for this agent; denying"
+            );
+            return false;
+        }
+        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                agent,
+                error = format!("{e:#}"),
+                "credential lookup failed; denying"
+            );
+            return false;
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            tracing::warn!(agent, "credential lookup timed out; denying");
+            return false;
+        }
+    };
+    if stored.agent != agent {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            agent,
+            stored_agent = %stored.agent,
+            "the stored credential names a different agent than its path; denying"
+        );
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Constant time, so the time to refuse says nothing about how much of the
+    // secret was right. A length mismatch returns early; the length is not
+    // secret, every minted secret has the same one.
+    stored
+        .value
+        .as_bytes()
+        .ct_eq(token.secret.as_bytes())
+        .into()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use swarm_queue_client::agent_token::parse_agent_token;
+
+    /// A store holding at most one credential, or failing outright.
+    enum Fake {
+        /// `credential` is stored at `path_agent`'s queue path.
+        Holds {
+            path_agent: &'static str,
+            credential: AgentCredential,
+        },
+        Fails,
+        /// A store that accepts the request and never answers.
+        Hangs,
+    }
+
+    impl CredentialSource for Fake {
+        async fn lookup(&self, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>> {
+            match self {
+                Self::Holds {
+                    path_agent,
+                    credential,
+                } => Ok((agent == *path_agent).then(|| credential.clone())),
+                Self::Fails => anyhow::bail!("store unreachable"),
+                Self::Hangs => std::future::pending().await,
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn stored(path_agent: &'static str, named: &str) -> Fake {
+        Fake::Holds {
+            path_agent,
+            credential: AgentCredential {
+                value: "Ab9_-zSECRET".to_owned(),
+                agent: named.to_owned(),
+                minted_at: None,
+            },
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn atlas() -> Fake {
+        stored("atlas", "atlas")
+    }
+
+    const BOUND: Duration = Duration::from_millis(200);
+
+    async fn verified(source: &Fake, token: &str) -> bool {
+        let token = parse_agent_token(token)
+            .expect("an agent token")
+            .expect("well-formed");
+        verify(source, &token, BOUND).await
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn the_stored_secret_is_accepted() {
+        assert!(verified(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_wrong_secret_is_denied() {
+        assert!(!verified(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECREX").await);
+        assert!(!verified(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRE").await);
+    }
+
+    /// The secret check is what stops one agent claiming another's name: the
+    /// right secret under someone else's name finds that agent's credential,
+    /// or none.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn another_agents_name_with_this_agents_secret_is_denied() {
+        assert!(!verified(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.argus.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn an_agent_with_nothing_stored_is_denied() {
+        assert!(!verified(&stored("argus", "argus"), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_failed_lookup_is_denied() {
+        assert!(!verified(&Fake::Fails, "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_store_that_never_answers_is_denied_within_the_bound() {
+        let started = std::time::Instant::now();
+        assert!(!verified(&Fake::Hangs, "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+        let took = started.elapsed();
+        assert!(took >= BOUND, "denied before the bound: {took:?}");
+        assert!(
+            took < BOUND + Duration::from_millis(250),
+            "denied well after the bound: {took:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_stored_object_naming_another_agent_is_denied() {
+        assert!(!verified(&stored("argus", "atlas"), "swarm-agent.argus.Ab9_-zSECRET").await);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/swarm-logs-auth/Cargo.toml b/swarm-logs-auth/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ca6bdcfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/swarm-logs-auth/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+[package]
+name = "swarm-logs-auth"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "swarm-logs-auth"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+axum.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+swarm-agent-verify.workspace = true
+# The agent-token spelling, and the rustls provider the store client needs.
+swarm-queue-client.workspace = true
+swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+
+[lints]
+workspace = true
diff --git a/swarm-logs-auth/src/main.rs b/swarm-logs-auth/src/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a141492a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/swarm-logs-auth/src/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+//! The log store gateway's `auth_request` responder for agents.
+//!
+//! nginx sends it every `/select/logsql/` request whose `Authorization` is
+//! `Bearer swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>` (`swarm-victorialogs.nix`). It answers
+//! 200 when the secret is the one stored at `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`, and
+//! 401 otherwise, store failures included: `auth_request` turns any other
+//! status into a 500 for the caller.
+//!
+//! It reads the store under its own certificate, whose policy reaches every
+//! agent's `queue` secret and nothing else. It serves a unix socket whose
+//! directory only the gateway's nginx may enter.
+
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use anyhow::Context as _;
+use axum::extract::State;
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode, header};
+use clap::Parser;
+use swarm_agent_verify::CredentialSource;
+use swarm_queue_client::agent_token::parse_agent_token;
+
+/// How long one store lookup may take before the request is denied. Well
+/// under nginx's 60s `proxy_read_timeout`, so a slow store reads as a 401
+/// rather than a gateway timeout.
+const LOOKUP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
+
+#[derive(Parser)]
+#[command(about = "auth_request responder: checks an agent's queue secret against the store")]
+struct Args {
+    /// Unix socket to serve on.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    socket: PathBuf,
+    /// Cert-auth role this responder logs in to the store as.
+    #[arg(long, default_value = "swarm-logs-auth")]
+    store_cert_role: String,
+}
+
+/// The answer for one subrequest's `Authorization` header.
+async fn decide(source: &impl CredentialSource, authorization: Option<&str>) -> StatusCode {
+    let Some(token) = authorization.and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer ")) else {
+        tracing::warn!("no bearer token; denying");
+        return StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED;
+    };
+    let token = match parse_agent_token(token) {
+        Some(Ok(token)) => token,
+        Some(Err(e)) => {
+            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "malformed agent token; denying");
+            return StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED;
+        }
+        None => {
+            tracing::warn!("not an agent token; denying");
+            return StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED;
+        }
+    };
+    if swarm_agent_verify::verify(source, &token, LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).await {
+        tracing::info!(agent = token.agent, "verified");
+        StatusCode::OK
+    } else {
+        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+    }
+}
+
+async fn handle(
+    State(store): State<Arc<swarm_agent_verify::Store>>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+) -> StatusCode {
+    let authorization = headers
+        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+    decide(store.as_ref(), authorization).await
+}
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    swarm_queue_client::install_crypto_provider();
+    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+        .with_env_filter(
+            tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("info")),
+        )
+        // stdout is journald, which keeps ANSI escapes as raw bytes.
+        .with_ansi(false)
+        .init();
+    let args = Args::parse();
+
+    let settings = swarm_secret_client::client::Settings::from_env()
+        .context("reading the secret store's address and this responder's identity")?;
+    let store = Arc::new(swarm_agent_verify::Store::new(
+        settings,
+        args.store_cert_role,
+    ));
+
+    // `RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes` can leave the previous run's socket; the
+    // directory is this unit's alone, so unlinking it is safe.
+    if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_file(&args.socket)
+        && e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound
+    {
+        return Err(e)
+            .with_context(|| format!("clearing stale socket at {}", args.socket.display()));
+    }
+    let listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&args.socket)
+        .with_context(|| format!("binding {}", args.socket.display()))?;
+    // nginx is another user and `connect(2)` needs write. The directory is
+    // the access control, not this mode.
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&args.socket, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o666))
+        .with_context(|| format!("chmod {}", args.socket.display()))?;
+    tracing::info!(socket = %args.socket.display(), "swarm-logs-auth listening");
+
+    let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(handle).with_state(store);
+    axum::serve(listener, app).await.context("serving")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use swarm_secret_client::queue::AgentCredential;
+
+    /// A store holding atlas's credential.
+    struct Atlas;
+
+    impl CredentialSource for Atlas {
+        async fn lookup(&self, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>> {
+            Ok((agent == "atlas").then(|| AgentCredential {
+                value: "Ab9_-zSECRET".to_owned(),
+                agent: "atlas".to_owned(),
+                minted_at: None,
+            }))
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn the_stored_secret_is_200() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            decide(&Atlas, Some("Bearer swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET")).await,
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn everything_else_is_401() {
+        for authorization in [
+            None,
+            Some("swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET"),
+            Some("Basic swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET"),
+            Some("Bearer swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECREX"),
+            Some("Bearer swarm-agent.argus.Ab9_-zSECRET"),
+            Some("Bearer swarm-agent.atlas"),
+            Some("Bearer authelia_at_abc.def"),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                decide(&Atlas, authorization).await,
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                "{authorization:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/swarm-logs/Cargo.toml b/swarm-logs/Cargo.toml
index ca59942b..7dd4a491 100644
--- a/swarm-logs/Cargo.toml
+++ b/swarm-logs/Cargo.toml
@@ -12,13 +12,15 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 anyhow.workspace = true
 clap.workspace = true
 clap-markdown = "0.1"
-# The whole point of the crate's dependency list: minting the access token
-# is `swarm_queue_client::mint_token_for_blocking`, not a second copy of
-# the `client_credentials` request. See `src/auth.rs`.
+# The agent-token spelling the gateway's responder parses, and the rustls
+# provider the store client needs.
 swarm-queue-client.workspace = true
-# Blocking, not async: this binary makes exactly two requests and exits, so
-# a reactor would exist only to be torn down. It also matches the token
-# minter reached for above, which is `swarm-queue-client`'s blocking one.
+# The read of this agent's own queue secret.
+swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
+# Only to drive that one async read; the query itself is blocking.
+tokio.workspace = true
+# Blocking, not async: this binary makes one request (two on a 401) and
+# exits, so a reactor would exist only to be torn down.
 reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["blocking"] }
 serde_json.workspace = true
 
diff --git a/swarm-logs/README.md b/swarm-logs/README.md
index 3cfa7d06..8a259989 100644
--- a/swarm-logs/README.md
+++ b/swarm-logs/README.md
@@ -20,40 +20,19 @@ attach at the gateway location, not in this binary.
 
 ## How it authenticates
 
-The agent container already holds one identity, the per-hive machine client
-`hive-<name>-agent`, delivered as a systemd credential pair. This binary
-presents a `client_credentials` access token minted from it as
-`Authorization: Bearer`.
+As the agent itself. On each query it reads the agent's own queue secret,
+`swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`, from the swarm secret store with the agent's
+store certificate (`nix/agent-modules/bao.nix`), the same read `hive-agent`
+makes for its queue connection. It sends the secret as
+`Authorization: Bearer swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>`, spelled by
+`swarm_queue_client::agent_token`.
 
-Minting is **not** implemented here — `swarm_queue_client::mint_token_for_blocking`
-already owns the request, its error type and its CA handling, and a
-token-endpoint fix has to be findable in one place. What this crate adds is
-the agent-shaped half: the client id arrives as a _file_ beside the secret, so
-nothing outside `nix/agent-modules/queue.nix` spells `hive-<name>-agent`
-twice. That is the same problem `hive-agent/src/swarm_queue.rs` solves, and
-`src/auth.rs` is its `decide` restated over this binary's inputs.
+At the gateway, nginx hands a bearer of that shape to `swarm-logs-auth`, which
+compares it with the stored secret (`swarm-agent-verify`, the check the queue's
+auth callout also uses). A 401 makes `swarm-logs` read the secret again and
+retry once, which covers a secret re-minted between the read and the check.
 
-🩸 Every credential here is a **path**. The secret's contents are read at the
-moment of the request, inside `swarm-queue-client`, and are never bound to a
-name in this crate, logged, or rendered into an error.
-
-### The audience is the URL
-
-`swarm-logs` mints its token with the query URL as the requested audience,
-because that is what authelia checks at the authz endpoint the gateway's
-`auth_request` calls. The same rule `swarm-otel.nix` states over its own push
-targets: one binding for the address and the audience, since two spellings of
-one address present as a valid token refused at the store.
-
-⚠️ That requires the agent client to be _registered_ for that audience and to
-hold `authelia.bearer.authz`. Both are set in `swarm-authelia.nix`'s
-`agentClients`; without them authelia answers `invalid_target` at the token
-endpoint, or the gateway answers 401 with no explanation.
-
-⚠️ Registration is not issuance, so the token request _asks_ for both: the
-audience and the scope are named in the `client_credentials` form, because a
-client that is registered for a scope it does not request is handed a token
-carrying none, and the gateway refuses that with the same bare 401.
+🩸 The secret is never logged or rendered into an error.
 
 ## Configuration
 
@@ -62,19 +41,17 @@ shape `swarmctl` is configured in, and for the same reason: every value is
 derived from an option that module owns, so a default here would be an address
 we _hope_ points at something.
 
-| variable                             | what                                                 |
-| ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------- |
-| `HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL`          | the LogsQL query endpoint; also the token's audience |
-| `HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT`     | authelia's token endpoint                            |
-| `HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE`     | path of the delivered client-id credential           |
-| `HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE` | path of the delivered secret credential              |
-| `HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CA_FILE`            | optional extra trust anchor; unset in this tree      |
+| variable                    | what                                             |
+| --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
+| `HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL` | the LogsQL query endpoint                        |
+| `HIVE_AGENT_NAME`           | this agent's name; the store path and role       |
+| `BAO_ADDR`                  | the secret store's address                       |
+| `BAO_CLIENT_CERT`           | path of the agent's live store certificate       |
+| `BAO_CLIENT_KEY`            | path of its key                                  |
+| `BAO_CACERT`                | path of the store's CA; missing or empty is fine |
 
-`HIVE_AGENT`, the same prefix the harness reads, because it is the same
-identity — an agent authenticates as its hive's agent client whether the
-caller is the harness or a CLI the agent typed. The first four are all-or-none:
-a half-set environment is a deployment bug, and this binary says so by name
-rather than behaving like an unconfigured one.
+With no `HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL` the binary says there is no log store;
+with the URL and no store address it reports a deployment bug by name.
 
 ## Output
 
diff --git a/swarm-logs/src/auth.rs b/swarm-logs/src/auth.rs
index 236592b1..e19b6376 100644
--- a/swarm-logs/src/auth.rs
+++ b/swarm-logs/src/auth.rs
@@ -1,187 +1,149 @@
-//! The access token this CLI presents to the log store's gateway route.
+//! The credential this CLI presents to the log store's gateway route: the
+//! agent's own queue secret, read from the swarm secret store with the agent's
+//! store certificate.
 //!
-//! Minting it is **not** implemented here. `swarm-queue-client` already owns
-//! the `client_credentials` request against authelia — the basic-auth form,
-//! the per-call secret read, the CA-trust builder and the error type that
-//! surfaces authelia's own `error_description` — and this crate calls
-//! [`swarm_queue_client::mint_token_for_blocking`] rather than writing a
-//! second copy of it. A token-endpoint fix has to be findable in one place.
+//! The read is `hive-agent`'s `swarm_queue` one: the same variables, the same
+//! path (`swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`) and the same cert-auth role. The secret
+//! goes out as `Bearer swarm-agent.<agent>.<secret>`, spelled by
+//! `swarm_queue_client::agent_token`; the gateway's `swarm-logs-auth`
+//! responder checks it against the store.
 //!
-//! What *is* here is the shape of an agent's identity, which differs from the
-//! daemons that crate was written for in exactly one way: **the client id
-//! arrives as a file, not as a value.** It rides in the same systemd
-//! credential pair as the secret so that nothing outside `queue.nix` ever
-//! spells `hive-<name>-agent` again. That is the same problem
-//! `hive-agent/src/swarm_queue.rs` solves, and [`Config::from_env`] below is
-//! that module's `decide` restated over this binary's inputs — including its
-//! rule that a *half*-set environment is a deployment bug rather than an
-//! absent integration.
-//!
-//! 🩸 Every credential in here is a **path**. The secret's contents are read
-//! by `swarm-queue-client` at the moment of the request and are never bound to
-//! a name in this crate, never logged and never rendered into an error.
-
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+//! 🩸 The secret is never logged and never rendered into an error.
 
 use anyhow::{Context as _, Result, bail};
-use swarm_queue_client::{ClientSecret, QueueConfig};
+use swarm_secret_client::client::{DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, Settings};
+use swarm_secret_client::queue::{self, AgentCredential};
+use swarm_secret_client::{SecretStore, policy};
 
-/// Variable prefix for this binary's coordinates.
-///
-/// `HIVE_AGENT`, deliberately the **same** prefix the harness reads, because
-/// it is the same identity: an agent authenticates as its hive's agent client
-/// whether the caller is the harness or a CLI the agent typed. A prefix of its
-/// own would be a second set of variables carrying one fact, which is the
-/// disagreement `queue.nix`'s credential pair exists to prevent.
-const ENV_PREFIX: &str = "HIVE_AGENT";
+/// The full URL of the LogsQL query endpoint, gateway side.
+const ENV_QUERY_URL: &str = "HIVE_AGENT_LOGS_QUERY_URL";
+/// This agent's name, which the store path and the role are built from.
+const ENV_AGENT_NAME: &str = "HIVE_AGENT_NAME";
+/// The store's address; the rest of its coordinates are `Settings`'s.
+const ENV_ADDR: &str = "BAO_ADDR";
+/// The store's CA bundle, which may name an undelivered credential.
+const ENV_CACERT: &str = "BAO_CACERT";
 
 /// Where this CLI queries, and who it queries as.
 pub struct Config {
     /// Full URL of the LogsQL query endpoint, gateway side.
-    ///
-    /// The whole URL rather than a host to build one from, because this same
-    /// string is **also the audience** the token is minted for — the rule
-    /// `swarm-otel.nix` states over its own push targets ("one binding
-    /// because the same string is both the address requested and the audience
-    /// the token is minted for — two spellings present as a valid token
-    /// refused at the store"). Splitting it would reintroduce exactly that.
     pub query_url: String,
-    /// Everything needed to mint a token, in the form the minter wants it.
-    pub queue: QueueConfig,
+    agent: String,
+    settings: Settings,
+    role: String,
+    path: String,
 }
 
 impl Config {
     /// Read the configuration out of the environment the wrapper sets.
     ///
-    /// All four coordinates or none, for the reason `swarm-queue-client`'s
-    /// README gives and `hive-agent`'s `swarm_queue` repeats: a half-set
-    /// environment produces a process that looks configured and never
-    /// authenticates. Unlike the harness, this binary *errors* on the absent
-    /// case rather than degrading — a CLI whose only
-    /// job is the query has nothing left to do without it, and an operator
-    /// running it wants to be told why rather than handed an empty result
-    /// they will read as "no logs matched".
+    /// Errors rather than degrading: a CLI whose only job is the query has
+    /// nothing to do without it, and an empty result would read as "no logs
+    /// matched".
     pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self> {
-        let var = |suffix: &str| std::env::var(format!("{ENV_PREFIX}_{suffix}")).ok();
+        Self::from_lookup(|k| std::env::var(k).ok())
+    }
 
-        let query_url = var("LOGS_QUERY_URL");
-        let token_endpoint = var("OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT");
-        let client_id_file = var("OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE");
-        let client_secret_file = var("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE");
-
-        // Outside the all-or-none group on purpose: a swarm behind a
-        // publicly-trusted certificate needs no extra anchor, so a CA path
-        // with no endpoint is meaningless rather than half-configured. Nothing in this tree sets
-        // it for an agent — a container already trusts the store's root, which
-        // `hive_c0re::meta` embeds at build time.
-        let ca_file = var("OIDC_CA_FILE").map(PathBuf::from);
-
-        let (query_url, token_endpoint, client_id_file, client_secret_file) = match (
-            query_url,
-            token_endpoint,
-            client_id_file,
-            client_secret_file,
-        ) {
-            (Some(u), Some(t), Some(i), Some(s)) => (u, t, i, s),
-            (None, None, None, None) => bail!(
-                "this agent has no swarm log store configured: \
-                     {ENV_PREFIX}_LOGS_QUERY_URL, {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, \
-                     {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE and \
-                     {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE are all unset"
-            ),
-            _ => bail!(
-                "swarm log store half-configured: {ENV_PREFIX}_LOGS_QUERY_URL, \
-                     {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_CLIENT_ID_FILE \
-                     and {ENV_PREFIX}_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE are set together or not \
-                     at all — this is a deployment bug, not a missing feature"
-            ),
+    fn from_lookup(get: impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let set = |k: &str| get(k).filter(|v| !v.is_empty());
+        let Some(query_url) = set(ENV_QUERY_URL) else {
+            bail!("this agent has no swarm log store configured: {ENV_QUERY_URL} is unset");
         };
-
-        let client_id = read_client_id(Path::new(&client_id_file))?;
-
+        if set(ENV_ADDR).is_none() {
+            bail!(
+                "{ENV_QUERY_URL} is set but {ENV_ADDR} is not, so there is no secret store \
+                 to read this agent's credential from — this is a deployment bug"
+            );
+        }
+        let agent =
+            set(ENV_AGENT_NAME).with_context(|| format!("{ENV_AGENT_NAME} is unset or empty"))?;
+        let settings =
+            Settings::from_lookup(|k| set(k).filter(|v| k != ENV_CACERT || ca_is_usable(v)))
+                .context("reading the swarm secret store's coordinates from the environment")?;
         Ok(Self {
             query_url,
-            queue: QueueConfig {
-                // 🩸 Unused by the token mint and deliberately not read from
-                // the environment. `QueueConfig` is the queue's connect
-                // config as well as its token config, and this binary needs
-                // only the second half — taking `HIVE_AGENT_NATS_URL` for it
-                // would make a broker address a prerequisite for reading
-                // logs, which is a coupling with no cause. Named so a reader
-                // of a stack trace is not left wondering.
-                url: String::from("unused: swarm-logs mints a token and never connects"),
-                token_endpoint,
-                client_id,
-                client_secret: ClientSecret::File(PathBuf::from(client_secret_file)),
-                ca_file,
-            },
+            role: policy::agent_object_name(&agent)?,
+            path: queue::agent_queue_path(&agent)?,
+            agent,
+            settings,
         })
     }
+
+    /// Read this agent's secret from the store and spell it as the bearer.
+    ///
+    /// Read on every call, so a caller that was refused can call again and
+    /// present a secret re-minted since.
+    pub fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String> {
+        let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
+            .enable_all()
+            .build()
+            .context("starting the runtime for the secret store read")?;
+        let stored: Option<AgentCredential> = runtime.block_on(async {
+            SecretStore::connect(&self.settings, &self.role, DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT)
+                .await
+                .context("logging in to the swarm secret store with this agent's certificate")?
+                .read_optional(&self.path)
+                .await
+                .with_context(|| format!("reading {}", self.path))
+        })?;
+        let stored = stored.with_context(|| format!("nothing is stored at {}", self.path))?;
+        swarm_queue_client::agent_token::format_agent_token(&self.agent, &stored.value)
+            .with_context(|| format!("spelling the credential stored at {}", self.path))
+    }
 }
 
-/// Read the OIDC client id out of the file the systemd credential landed at.
-///
-/// Trailing newline stripped and an empty file refused, both copied from
-/// `hive-agent`'s `read_client_id`: the writing unit ends the file with a
-/// newline, and an id carrying one authenticates as nobody. Where the harness
-/// treats absence as the ordinary state of a hive whose credential has not
-/// been published yet and carries on, this errors — see [`Config::from_env`]
-/// for why a CLI has nothing to carry on with.
-fn read_client_id(path: &Path) -> Result<String> {
-    let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
-        .with_context(|| format!("reading the OIDC client id from {}", path.display()))?;
-    let id = raw.trim();
-    if id.is_empty() {
-        bail!(
-            "the OIDC client id at {} is empty — the queue credential has not \
-             been published to this hive yet",
-            path.display()
-        );
-    }
-    Ok(id.to_owned())
+/// Whether the CA bundle at `path` is a file with bytes in it. `BAO_CACERT`
+/// names a systemd credential that may not have been delivered; absent means
+/// the container's own trust store.
+fn ca_is_usable(path: &str) -> bool {
+    std::fs::metadata(path).is_ok_and(|m| m.len() > 0)
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    #[test]
-    fn client_id_loses_its_trailing_newline() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("swarm-logs-id-{}", std::process::id()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("temp dir");
-        let path = dir.join("client-id");
-        std::fs::write(&path, "hive-alpha-agent\n").expect("write");
-        assert_eq!(read_client_id(&path).expect("read"), "hive-alpha-agent");
-        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).expect("cleanup");
+    fn env(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> impl Fn(&str) -> Option<String> {
+        let pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = pairs
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(k, v)| ((*k).to_owned(), (*v).to_owned()))
+            .collect();
+        move |k| pairs.iter().find(|(n, _)| n == k).map(|(_, v)| v.clone())
     }
 
-    /// An empty credential file is the shape a hive has before its secret
-    /// store has published anything, and it must not become a token request
-    /// that authenticates as the empty string.
+    const FULL: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
+        (ENV_QUERY_URL, "https://logs.example/select/logsql/query"),
+        (ENV_AGENT_NAME, "atlas"),
+        (ENV_ADDR, "https://bao.example:8200"),
+        ("BAO_CLIENT_CERT", "/nonexistent/cert"),
+        ("BAO_CLIENT_KEY", "/nonexistent/key"),
+    ];
+
     #[test]
-    fn an_empty_client_id_is_refused_by_name() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("swarm-logs-empty-{}", std::process::id()));
-        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("temp dir");
-        let path = dir.join("client-id");
-        std::fs::write(&path, "\n").expect("write");
-        let err = read_client_id(&path).expect_err("empty id must not be accepted");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string().contains("is empty"),
-            "error should say the id is empty, got: {err}"
-        );
-        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).expect("cleanup");
+    fn no_query_url_says_there_is_no_log_store() {
+        let err = Config::from_lookup(env(&[])).err().expect("refused");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("no swarm log store"), "{err}");
     }
 
-    /// A missing file names the path, because the operator's next move is to
-    /// look at whether the credential was delivered at all.
     #[test]
-    fn a_missing_client_id_file_names_its_path() {
-        let path = Path::new("/nonexistent/swarm-logs/client-id");
-        let err = read_client_id(path).expect_err("missing file must not be accepted");
-        assert!(
-            err.to_string()
-                .contains("/nonexistent/swarm-logs/client-id"),
-            "error should name the path, got: {err}"
-        );
+    fn a_query_url_without_a_store_is_a_deployment_bug() {
+        let err = Config::from_lookup(env(&FULL[..2])).err().expect("refused");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("deployment bug"), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_missing_agent_name_is_named() {
+        let mut pairs = FULL.to_vec();
+        pairs.retain(|(k, _)| *k != ENV_AGENT_NAME);
+        let err = Config::from_lookup(env(&pairs)).err().expect("refused");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains(ENV_AGENT_NAME), "{err}");
+    }
+
+    /// The path and role are the agent's own, the ones its policy grants.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_read_is_the_agents_own_queue_secret() {
+        let cfg = Config::from_lookup(env(FULL)).expect("configured");
+        assert_eq!(cfg.path, "swarm/agents/atlas/queue");
+        assert_eq!(cfg.role, policy::agent_object_name("atlas").expect("valid"));
     }
 }
diff --git a/swarm-logs/src/main.rs b/swarm-logs/src/main.rs
index 340e1c6d..1fb0189e 100644
--- a/swarm-logs/src/main.rs
+++ b/swarm-logs/src/main.rs
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
             // keep working on a machine that has no log store wired up at
             // all — `markdown-docs` in particular runs in a nix check, where
             // no credential exists and none should.
+            swarm_queue_client::install_crypto_provider();
             let cfg = auth::Config::from_env()?;
             let stdout = std::io::stdout();
             query::run(&cfg, &logsql, limit, format, &mut stdout.lock())
diff --git a/swarm-logs/src/query.rs b/swarm-logs/src/query.rs
index 13eba69c..4ca0eb10 100644
--- a/swarm-logs/src/query.rs
+++ b/swarm-logs/src/query.rs
@@ -46,41 +46,29 @@ pub fn run(
     format: Format,
     out: &mut impl Write,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    // Minted per invocation, with the query URL as the audience and the
-    // `authelia.bearer.authz` scope. All three are load-bearing: authelia
-    // refuses a token carrying no audience at the authz endpoint the
-    // gateway's `auth_request` calls, and the audience it checks is the URL
-    // being requested — so the string sent here and the string requested
-    // below must be one binding, which is why `Config` holds exactly one.
-    //
-    // The scope has to be ASKED for, not merely registered: the agent client
-    // is granted `authelia.bearer.authz` by the `agentClients` entry in
-    // `swarm-authelia.nix`, but an OAuth2 server issues no scope the client
-    // never requested, and a scopeless token is refused at the authz endpoint
-    // exactly as an unauthenticated one is — a bare nginx 401 with nothing in
-    // it that names the scope. `swarm-otel.nix` records the same failure
-    // against the collector's client, on the same string.
-    let token = swarm_queue_client::mint_token_for_blocking(
-        &cfg.queue,
-        Some(&cfg.query_url),
-        Some("authelia.bearer.authz"),
-    )
-    .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("{}", swarm_queue_client::chain(&e)))
-    .context("minting an access token for the swarm log store")?;
-
-    let http = build_http_client(cfg)?;
+    let http = build_http_client()?;
 
     let mut form = vec![("query", logsql.to_owned())];
     if let Some(limit) = limit {
         form.push(("limit", limit.to_string()));
     }
+    let send = || -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Response> {
+        let bearer = cfg
+            .bearer()
+            .context("reading this agent's credential for the swarm log store")?;
+        http.post(&cfg.query_url)
+            .bearer_auth(bearer)
+            .form(&form)
+            .send()
+            .with_context(|| format!("querying the swarm log store at {}", cfg.query_url))
+    };
 
-    let response = http
-        .post(&cfg.query_url)
-        .bearer_auth(&token)
-        .form(&form)
-        .send()
-        .with_context(|| format!("querying the swarm log store at {}", cfg.query_url))?;
+    let mut response = send()?;
+    // A 401 can be a secret re-minted between the store read and the check,
+    // so it is read again and the query sent once more.
+    if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED {
+        response = send()?;
+    }
 
     let status = response.status();
     if !status.is_success() {
@@ -140,37 +128,13 @@ fn render(line: &str, format: Format) -> String {
     }
 }
 
-/// The HTTP client for the query itself.
+/// The HTTP client for the query itself, trusting the container's own roots.
 ///
-/// Separate from the one `swarm-queue-client` builds for the token endpoint
-/// because they are two hosts — `auth.<swarm>` and `logs.<swarm>` — and the
-/// CA-trust knob is declared per endpoint. Same optional anchor, same reason:
-/// without it a swarm using its own CA fails at TLS with
-/// `invalid peer certificate: UnknownIssuer`, having never looked at the
-/// anchor sitting on the host.
-///
-/// No timeout, deliberately, where the token client has one: a query over a
-/// long retention window legitimately takes longer than any number that would
-/// be right for a token request, and a client-side cut would truncate a
-/// correct answer into a shorter one with no marker saying so.
-fn build_http_client(cfg: &Config) -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
-    let mut builder = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder();
-    if let Some(path) = &cfg.queue.ca_file {
-        let pem = std::fs::read(path).with_context(|| {
-            format!(
-                "reading the log-store CA certificate from {}",
-                path.display()
-            )
-        })?;
-        let cert = reqwest::Certificate::from_pem(&pem).with_context(|| {
-            format!(
-                "parsing the log-store CA certificate from {} as PEM",
-                path.display()
-            )
-        })?;
-        builder = builder.add_root_certificate(cert);
-    }
-    builder
+/// No timeout, deliberately: a query over a long retention window legitimately
+/// takes long, and a client-side cut would truncate a correct answer into a
+/// shorter one with no marker saying so.
+fn build_http_client() -> Result<reqwest::blocking::Client> {
+    reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
         .build()
         .context("building the log-store HTTP client")
 }
diff --git a/swarm-nats-auth/Cargo.toml b/swarm-nats-auth/Cargo.toml
index 99f03a91..7ba2da59 100644
--- a/swarm-nats-auth/Cargo.toml
+++ b/swarm-nats-auth/Cargo.toml
@@ -23,17 +23,16 @@ serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
 # The jti digest: base32hex(sha256(claims)) over every JWT this crate signs.
 sha2.workspace = true
-# Comparing an agent's presented secret with the stored one.
-subtle.workspace = true
 # For `status::BUCKET` and `notices::STREAM` - the subjects a hive may
 # publish to are derived from these names, and every end that touches them
 # must agree on the same one. Deliberately WITHOUT the `kv` feature: this
 # crate derives subject strings, it never opens the bucket. `notices`
 # is name-only too (no `jetstream`/`kv` surface), same reason.
 swarm-queue-client = { workspace = true, features = ["notices"] }
-# The agent-token spelling the agent also uses, and the read of the stored
-# credential it is checked against.
+# The store reads: the callout keys, its own OIDC secret, and the agent
+# credentials `swarm-agent-verify` checks a presented token against.
 swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
+swarm-agent-verify.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
 tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
diff --git a/swarm-nats-auth/src/agent_token.rs b/swarm-nats-auth/src/agent_token.rs
index c8254033..82f947bc 100644
--- a/swarm-nats-auth/src/agent_token.rs
+++ b/swarm-nats-auth/src/agent_token.rs
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
-//! Verifying an agent's own credential, presented as `auth_token`.
+//! Classifying a presented `auth_token`, and the grant for an agent's own.
 //!
 //! The spelling is `swarm_queue_client::agent_token`'s, shared with the agent
-//! that presents it: a prefix, the agent's name, and its secret. The name is only a
-//! claim. It becomes an identity when the secret equals the one stored at
-//! `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue`, and nothing in this module grants on the name
-//! alone: every path that does not reach that comparison, and every lookup
-//! that fails, is a denial.
+//! that presents it. Whether its secret is the stored one is
+//! [`swarm_agent_verify::verify`]'s answer; nothing here grants on the name
+//! alone.
 //!
 //! A token without the prefix is not this module's: it goes to introspection
 //! unchanged.
 
-use std::future::Future;
-
-use anyhow::Context;
-use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
+use swarm_agent_verify::CredentialSource;
 use swarm_queue_client::agent_token::{AgentToken, Malformed, parse_agent_token};
-use swarm_secret_client::client::{DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT, Settings};
-use swarm_secret_client::queue::{self, AgentCredential};
 
 use crate::policy::{Permissions, Policy};
 
@@ -41,112 +34,18 @@ pub fn classify(token: &str) -> Presented<'_> {
     }
 }
 
-/// Where the stored credential for an agent comes from.
-pub trait CredentialSource {
-    /// The object at `agent`'s queue path, `None` when nothing is stored
-    /// there, or an error when the store could not answer.
-    fn lookup(
-        &self,
-        agent: &str,
-    ) -> impl Future<Output = anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>>> + Send;
-}
-
-/// The swarm secret store, reached with this responder's own certificate.
-pub struct Store {
-    settings: Settings,
-    cert_role: String,
-}
-
-impl Store {
-    /// The store at `settings`, logged in to as `cert_role`.
-    pub fn new(settings: Settings, cert_role: String) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            settings,
-            cert_role,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl CredentialSource for Store {
-    /// Logs in per lookup. An agent connects once per boot and per reconnect,
-    /// so a login each time costs little, and it leaves no token to expire
-    /// inside a long-lived process.
-    async fn lookup(&self, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>> {
-        let path = queue::agent_queue_path(agent)?;
-        let store = swarm_secret_client::SecretStore::connect(
-            &self.settings,
-            &self.cert_role,
-            DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT,
-        )
-        .await
-        .context("logging in to the secret store")?;
-        store
-            .read_optional(&path)
-            .await
-            .with_context(|| format!("reading {path}"))
-    }
-}
-
-/// Whether `token`'s secret is the one stored for the agent it names.
+/// The grant for an agent token, or `None` for a denial.
 ///
-/// The lookup is bounded by introspection's budget, under the server's
+/// The store lookup is bounded by introspection's budget, under the server's
 /// `authorization.timeout`. The callout loop answers one request at a time, so
 /// a store that does not answer holds every request behind it, OIDC ones
 /// included, for at most that long, and this then denies.
-async fn verify(source: &impl CredentialSource, token: &AgentToken<'_>) -> bool {
-    let agent = token.agent;
-    let stored = match tokio::time::timeout(
-        crate::introspect::INTROSPECTION_TIMEOUT,
-        source.lookup(agent),
-    )
-    .await
-    {
-        Ok(Ok(Some(stored))) => stored,
-        Ok(Ok(None)) => {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                agent,
-                "no queue credential is stored for this agent; denying"
-            );
-            return false;
-        }
-        Ok(Err(e)) => {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                agent,
-                error = format!("{e:#}"),
-                "credential lookup failed; denying"
-            );
-            return false;
-        }
-        Err(_) => {
-            tracing::warn!(agent, "credential lookup timed out; denying");
-            return false;
-        }
-    };
-    if stored.agent != agent {
-        tracing::warn!(
-            agent,
-            stored_agent = %stored.agent,
-            "the stored credential names a different agent than its path; denying"
-        );
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Constant time, so the time to refuse says nothing about how much of the
-    // secret was right. A length mismatch returns early; the length is not
-    // secret, every minted secret has the same one.
-    stored
-        .value
-        .as_bytes()
-        .ct_eq(token.secret.as_bytes())
-        .into()
-}
-
-/// The grant for an agent token, or `None` for a denial.
 pub async fn authorize(
     policy: &Policy,
     source: &impl CredentialSource,
     token: &AgentToken<'_>,
 ) -> Option<Permissions> {
-    if !verify(source, token).await {
+    if !swarm_agent_verify::verify(source, token, crate::introspect::INTROSPECTION_TIMEOUT).await {
         return None;
     }
     let permissions = policy.agent_token_permissions(token.agent);
@@ -162,47 +61,28 @@ pub async fn authorize(
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use swarm_secret_client::queue::AgentCredential;
 
-    /// A store holding at most one credential, or failing outright.
+    /// A store holding atlas's credential, or one that never answers.
+    /// The store's own denials are `swarm_agent_verify`'s tests.
     enum Fake {
-        /// `credential` is stored at `path_agent`'s queue path.
-        Holds {
-            path_agent: &'static str,
-            credential: AgentCredential,
-        },
-        Fails,
-        /// A store that accepts the request and never answers.
+        Atlas,
         Hangs,
     }
 
     impl CredentialSource for Fake {
         async fn lookup(&self, agent: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<AgentCredential>> {
             match self {
-                Self::Holds {
-                    path_agent,
-                    credential,
-                } => Ok((agent == *path_agent).then(|| credential.clone())),
-                Self::Fails => anyhow::bail!("store unreachable"),
+                Self::Atlas => Ok((agent == "atlas").then(|| AgentCredential {
+                    value: "Ab9_-zSECRET".to_owned(),
+                    agent: "atlas".to_owned(),
+                    minted_at: None,
+                })),
                 Self::Hangs => std::future::pending().await,
             }
         }
     }
 
-    fn stored(path_agent: &'static str, named: &str) -> Fake {
-        Fake::Holds {
-            path_agent,
-            credential: AgentCredential {
-                value: "Ab9_-zSECRET".to_owned(),
-                agent: named.to_owned(),
-                minted_at: None,
-            },
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn atlas() -> Fake {
-        stored("atlas", "atlas")
-    }
-
     fn policy() -> Policy {
         Policy::new(
             "hive-".to_owned(),
@@ -229,7 +109,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn a_valid_agent_token_is_granted_exactly_its_own_subjects() {
-        let g = grant(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET")
+        let g = grant(&Fake::Atlas, "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET")
             .await
             .expect("granted");
         assert_eq!(
@@ -245,42 +125,7 @@ mod tests {
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn a_wrong_secret_is_denied() {
         assert!(
-            grant(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECREX")
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-        assert!(
-            grant(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRE")
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-    }
-
-    /// The secret check is what stops one agent claiming another's name: the
-    /// right secret under someone else's name finds that agent's credential,
-    /// or none.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn another_agents_name_with_this_agents_secret_is_denied() {
-        assert!(
-            grant(&atlas(), "swarm-agent.argus.Ab9_-zSECRET")
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn an_agent_with_nothing_stored_is_denied() {
-        assert!(
-            grant(&stored("argus", "argus"), "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET")
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn a_failed_lookup_is_denied() {
-        assert!(
-            grant(&Fake::Fails, "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET")
+            grant(&Fake::Atlas, "swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECREX")
                 .await
                 .is_none()
         );
@@ -305,15 +150,6 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn a_stored_object_naming_another_agent_is_denied() {
-        assert!(
-            grant(&stored("argus", "atlas"), "swarm-agent.argus.Ab9_-zSECRET")
-                .await
-                .is_none()
-        );
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn a_verified_agent_with_no_subjects_configured_is_denied() {
         let bare = Policy::new(
@@ -327,7 +163,7 @@ mod tests {
         let Presented::Agent(token) = classify("swarm-agent.atlas.Ab9_-zSECRET") else {
             panic!("an agent token");
         };
-        assert!(authorize(&bare, &atlas(), &token).await.is_none());
+        assert!(authorize(&bare, &Fake::Atlas, &token).await.is_none());
     }
 
     /// Everything without the prefix reaches introspection as it arrived.
diff --git a/swarm-nats-auth/src/main.rs b/swarm-nats-auth/src/main.rs
index 31d7d2ce..49bb645b 100644
--- a/swarm-nats-auth/src/main.rs
+++ b/swarm-nats-auth/src/main.rs
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ async fn serve(args: &Args) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     .context("logging in to the secret store for the callout keys and the OIDC client secret")?;
     let (callout_xkey, issuer, user_seed) = load_callout_keys(&keys).await?;
     let client_secret = load_client_secret(&keys, args).await?;
-    let store = agent_token::Store::new(settings, args.store_cert_role.clone());
+    let store = swarm_agent_verify::Store::new(settings, args.store_cert_role.clone());
     let client = async_nats::ConnectOptions::with_nkey(user_seed)
         .name("swarm-nats-auth")
         .connect(&args.nats_url)