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@ -21,12 +21,13 @@
//! token that was minted an hour later.
//! - **`async-nats` re-runs an auth callback per connection attempt** (it is
//! handed that attempt's nonce). So the refresh belongs in the callback and
//! not in a timer: there is no window in which the client presents a token
//! that has expired since it was minted.
//! not in a timer: there is no window in which the client holds a token it
//! minted for a previous connection.
//!
//! ⚠️ That second point is also a trap that cost a production incident —
//! **anything in a retry path runs at the FAILURE rate.** See `CachedToken`
//! and `MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY`.
//! The alternative — mint once, pass a static `auth_token`, own the reconnect
//! loop — fails in the way this subsystem exists to prevent: the controller
//! keeps serving, its status data quietly stops updating, and nothing says so
//! until someone reads a dashboard.
use std::path::PathBuf;
@ -149,53 +150,12 @@ pub fn chain(error: &dyn std::error::Error) -> String {
#[cfg(feature = "kv")]
pub mod status;
/// Only the fields this needs; authelia returns several.
/// Only the one field this needs; authelia returns several.
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
struct TokenResponse {
access_token: String,
/// Seconds the token stays valid — authelia says 3599 for
/// `client_credentials`. Read rather than assumed, because it is what
/// decides when the cache below stops handing the same token back, and a
/// hardcoded hour would silently become wrong the day the identity
/// provider is retuned.
expires_in: u64,
}
/// A minted token and the moment it stops being usable.
///
/// Exists because the auth callback runs **per connection attempt**, not per
/// hour: without a cache, every reconnect mints, and a queue that cannot
/// connect turns its retry loop into a token-request loop against the
/// identity provider. That is not hypothetical — the first version of this
/// crate did exactly that, and authelia answered `429 Too Many Requests`
/// continuously until the client was changed.
struct CachedToken {
token: String,
expires_at: std::time::Instant,
}
/// Re-mint this long before expiry rather than at it. A token that expires
/// mid-CONNECT is refused by the server, which costs a whole reconnect cycle
/// to discover — far more than minting slightly early costs.
const TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(2);
/// Cap on how long `async-nats` waits between reconnect attempts.
///
/// ⚠️ Deliberately far above the library's default, and the default is the
/// bug: `reconnect_delay_callback_default` backs off exponentially but clamps
/// at **4 seconds** (`connector.rs`), forever. Every attempt runs the auth
/// callback, so an unreachable queue means one token request every 4s
/// indefinitely — measured in production as a continuous
/// `429 Too Many Requests / temporarily_unavailable` from authelia, which then
/// keeps *itself* alive: the rate limit outlives whatever first broke the
/// connection, and its log volume buries the original cause.
///
/// The cost of raising it is slower recovery from a brief outage. That is the
/// right trade for an infrastructure service: a minute of staleness is a
/// dashboard reading `stale`, whereas a hot loop against the identity provider
/// degrades every other client of it.
const MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_mins(1);
/// Where the controller finds the queue and what it authenticates with.
///
/// Every field comes from an environment variable the NixOS module sets, the
@ -286,7 +246,7 @@ impl QueueConfig {
/// authenticates as itself. Authelia refuses the `openid` scope for this grant
/// (a machine client receives an access token and never an id-token), so no
/// scope is requested.
async fn mint_token(http: &reqwest::Client, cfg: &QueueConfig) -> Result<CachedToken, Error> {
async fn mint_token(http: &reqwest::Client, cfg: &QueueConfig) -> Result<String, Error> {
// Read per call rather than caching: the file is small, and a cached
// secret would survive a rotation that the operator believes took effect.
let secret = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&cfg.client_secret_file)
@ -315,10 +275,7 @@ async fn mint_token(http: &reqwest::Client, cfg: &QueueConfig) -> Result<CachedT
}
let parsed: TokenResponse = serde_json::from_str(&body).map_err(Error::TokenResponse)?;
Ok(CachedToken {
token: parsed.access_token,
expires_at: std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(parsed.expires_in),
})
Ok(parsed.access_token)
}
/// Fail fast unless the client is actually connected.
@ -347,13 +304,7 @@ pub fn ensure_connected(client: &async_nats::Client) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
/// Connect to the swarm queue, presenting a token on each connection attempt
/// and minting a fresh one only when the cached one is near expiry.
///
/// The rejected alternative — mint once, pass a static `auth_token`, own the
/// reconnect loop — fails in the way this subsystem exists to prevent: the
/// token expires, the controller keeps serving, its status data quietly stops
/// updating, and nothing says so until someone reads a dashboard.
/// Connect to the swarm queue, minting a token for each connection attempt.
pub async fn connect(cfg: QueueConfig) -> Result<async_nats::Client, Error> {
// A timeout, because this client runs INSIDE the auth callback: a token
// endpoint that accepts the connection and then never answers would hang
@ -387,65 +338,20 @@ pub async fn connect(cfg: QueueConfig) -> Result<async_nats::Client, Error> {
let http = builder.build().map_err(Error::HttpClient)?;
let url = cfg.url.clone();
// Shared across every invocation of the callback below, which is the
// whole point: the callback fires per connection ATTEMPT, so without
// somewhere to remember the last token, "mint on demand" and "mint on
// every retry" are the same code.
let cache: std::sync::Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<CachedToken>>> =
std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None));
let client = async_nats::ConnectOptions::with_auth_callback(move |_nonce| {
let http = http.clone();
let cfg = cfg.clone();
let cache = cache.clone();
async move {
let mut slot = cache.lock().await;
// Reuse while there is comfortably more than the skew left. The
// freshness property this callback exists for is preserved — a
// reconnect an hour later finds an expired entry and re-mints —
// but a reconnect ten seconds later does NOT ask the IdP again.
let reuse = slot
.as_ref()
.filter(|t| {
t.expires_at
.saturating_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
> TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW
})
.map(|t| t.token.clone());
let token = if let Some(token) = reuse {
token
} else {
let minted = mint_token(&http, &cfg)
.await
// The callback's error type carries a string, so the
// source chain would be lost; flatten it rather than
// dropping it.
.map_err(|e| async_nats::AuthError::new(chain(&e)))?;
let token = minted.token.clone();
*slot = Some(minted);
token
};
let token = mint_token(&http, &cfg)
.await
// The callback's error type carries a string, so the source
// chain would be lost; flatten it rather than dropping it.
.map_err(|e| async_nats::AuthError::new(chain(&e)))?;
let mut auth = async_nats::Auth::new();
auth.token = Some(token);
Ok(auth)
}
})
// See `MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY`. The library's default clamps at 4s forever,
// which turns an unreachable queue into a permanent 4s poll — and, before
// the cache above, a permanent 4s token-request loop against authelia.
// Exponential from 500ms so a momentary blip still reconnects promptly.
.reconnect_delay_callback(|attempts| {
let exp = u32::try_from(attempts.saturating_sub(1)).unwrap_or(u32::MAX);
std::cmp::min(
std::time::Duration::from_millis(
500u64.saturating_mul(2u64.saturating_pow(exp.min(8))),
),
MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY,
)
})
// The controller and the queue are separate units on (possibly)
// separate hosts, and nothing orders them. Without this, a queue that
// comes up one second later leaves the controller permanently
@ -453,11 +359,8 @@ pub async fn connect(cfg: QueueConfig) -> Result<async_nats::Client, Error> {
// presents as "status has been unavailable since Tuesday".
//
// It also composes with the callback above rather than fighting it:
// each background attempt runs the callback, which hands over a token
// that is still valid — minting a new one only when the cached one is
// near expiry. (Before the cache, "runs the callback" meant "mints",
// and this retry loop was a token-request loop. See
// `MAX_RECONNECT_DELAY`.)
// each background attempt is a connection attempt, so each one mints
// its own token instead of retrying a stale one.
.retry_on_initial_connect()
.connect(&url)
.await