diff --git a/docs/swarm/credentials.md b/docs/swarm/credentials.md index bc1bc7fa..306f5b57 100644 --- a/docs/swarm/credentials.md +++ b/docs/swarm/credentials.md @@ -59,20 +59,20 @@ of the cell says how. -| store path | minter | reader — pulls at runtime, holds in memory | automatic re-mint | automatic re-pull | -| ----------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| `swarm/agents//matrix/main` | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | ✅ the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's | ✅ `hive-matrix-daemon` exits when the homeserver rejects its token, and a five-minute timer restarts it, which reads the store again | -| `swarm/agents//matrix/` | `swarm-controller` | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | must be stated | must be stated | -| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate | ❌ `swarm-matrix-ctl` mints it once; the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs | ✅ the controller reads it on every five-minute matrix pass | -| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client` | authelia, at its first boot, where the controller registers its client; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, once at start | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit | ❌ read once at start; the controller holds the old value until it restarts | -| `swarm/agents//bao-mtls` | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-issues a live agent's leaf once it's past half its validity (45 of 90 days, read from the certificate itself) | ❌ `hive-c0re` reads it when it writes the container config, so the agent presents a new leaf from its next start; the old leaf stays valid until it expires | -| `swarm/agents//queue` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation | the agent container itself, under its own certificate — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-mints a live agent's secret once it's 45 days old by `minted_at` on the stored object; a secret with no `minted_at` gets one stamped, value unchanged. The pass skips agents declared `Destroyed` — declaring an agent destroyed deletes every version of the path instead, the undo of the mint rather than another one | ❌ fetched when the container starts. The queue checks the secret only at connect, so an open connection survives a re-mint, but a reconnect before the next restart is denied — including a reconnect after the credential was revoked | -| `swarm/agents//forge-token` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token` | ✅ the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer | -| `swarm/hives//matrix/appservice-token` | one minter, on the authelia host | the hive process that presents the token to its homeserver, under the hive's own certificate | must be stated | must be stated | -| `swarm/hives//matrix/sender-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, in the `hive-matrix` container | `swarm-matrix-ctl` itself, under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `stored_sender_token()`, under the hive's own certificate | must be stated | must be stated | -| `swarm/hives//queue/agent` | authelia | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host, under its own per-hive certificate; no agent's policy reaches it | must be stated | must be stated | -| `swarm/services//oidc/client` | authelia | the service process that presents the client secret, under the certificate of the host it runs on | must be stated | must be stated | -| _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf | the store's own PKI, or an operator placing it by hand | its own client, off disk — the exception above, because it's what makes every other row's pull possible | must be stated | must be stated | +| store path | minter | reader — pulls at runtime, holds in memory | automatic re-mint | automatic re-pull | +| ----------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| `swarm/agents//matrix/main` | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | ✅ the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's | ✅ `hive-matrix-daemon` exits when the homeserver rejects its token, and a five-minute timer restarts it, which reads the store again | +| `swarm/agents//matrix/` | `swarm-controller` | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | must be stated | must be stated | +| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate | ❌ `swarm-matrix-ctl` mints it once; the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs | ✅ the controller reads it on every five-minute matrix pass | +| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client` | authelia, at its first boot, where the controller registers its client; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, once at start | ❌ authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit | ❌ read once at start; the controller holds the old value until it restarts | +| `swarm/agents//bao-mtls` | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-issues a live agent's leaf once it's past half its validity (45 of 90 days, read from the certificate itself) | ❌ `hive-c0re` reads it when it writes the container config, so the agent presents a new leaf from its next start; the old leaf stays valid until it expires | +| `swarm/agents//queue` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation | the agent container itself, under its own certificate — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive | ✅ `swarm-controller`'s five-minute pass re-mints a live agent's secret once it's 45 days old by `minted_at` on the stored object; a secret with no `minted_at` gets one stamped, value unchanged | ❌ fetched when the container starts. The queue checks the secret only at connect, so an open connection survives a re-mint, but a reconnect before the next restart is denied | +| `swarm/agents//forge-token` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token` | ✅ the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes) | ✅ the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer | +| `swarm/hives//matrix/appservice-token` | one minter, on the authelia host | the hive process that presents the token to its homeserver, under the hive's own certificate | must be stated | must be stated | +| `swarm/hives//matrix/sender-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, in the `hive-matrix` container | `swarm-matrix-ctl` itself, under its own certificate, before it decides whether to mint, and hive-c0re's `stored_sender_token()`, under the hive's own certificate | must be stated | must be stated | +| `swarm/hives//queue/agent` | authelia | `swarm-bao-queue-agent` on the hive's host, under its own per-hive certificate; no agent's policy reaches it | must be stated | must be stated | +| `swarm/services//oidc/client` | authelia | the service process that presents the client secret, under the certificate of the host it runs on | must be stated | must be stated | +| _(not in the store)_ a hive's mTLS leaf | the store's own PKI, or an operator placing it by hand | its own client, off disk — the exception above, because it's what makes every other row's pull possible | must be stated | must be stated | @@ -137,26 +137,6 @@ that makes a container require a credential it may not have.** A container whose credential is absent doesn't start — that's deliberate, and it's what makes the backfill a step rather than a suggestion. -**Revoking an agent's queue credential.** Declaring an agent `destroyed` — -`PUT /api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/state` — deletes -`swarm/agents//queue` and every version it ever held, right after the -declaration lands. The credential is a bearer secret, so a soft delete would -leave the same value readable at an older version number; the controller -removes the path's metadata, which takes the versions with it. - -An agent recreated under the same name draws a fresh secret, because the -mint keeps an existing value only when it finds one at that path -(`agent_identity::mint_and_verify`, step 3) and the revocation left nothing -to find. - -Two things this deliberately doesn't do. It doesn't touch the agent's mTLS -leaf, its ACL document or its cert-auth role — the mint rewrites all three on -every run, so a re-created agent gets new ones regardless. And it doesn't -fail the destroy: the declaration is already published by the time the -revocation runs, so a store that refuses the delete gets a `swarm-controller` -log line at `error` naming the agent, and the teardown continues. Declare the -agent destroyed again to re-run the revocation. - **Who reads that row, and what happens to it.** `hive-c0re` reads it every time it writes an agent's container configuration (`lifecycle::agent_identity`), stages the certificate and its key `0600` diff --git a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix index 493749c2..20fe13db 100644 --- a/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix +++ b/nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix @@ -362,16 +362,18 @@ let # ../module-eval.nix cannot read them, and a heredoc would make the HCL's # indentation a function of this file's. # - # The credential-write grant below (unlike the bootstrap ones above it) has - # three things about its paths that do not read as written. `secret/data/` is - # KV v2's ACL prefix, not part of the path the code passes: - # `swarm-secret-client` writes `swarm/agents//...` under mount `secret`, - # and the engine inserts `data/` — matching the code's spelling literally would - # grant nothing. `read` is required too: `mint_and_verify` reads a credential - # back before writing so a re-run keeps the value a live agent already holds - # instead of rotating it. `metadata/` is the revocation half: `delete` on - # `data/` only soft-deletes the newest version, and `+` being one path segment - # keeps this to the queue leaf alone. + # The last grant is a different kind from the others: they let the controller + # bootstrap hives, this lets it write an agent's credentials. Two things about + # it do not read as they look. + # + # `secret/data/` is KV v2's ACL prefix, not part of the path the code passes: + # `swarm-secret-client` writes `swarm/agents//...` under mount + # `secret`, and the engine inserts `data/`. Matching the code's spelling + # literally would grant nothing. + # + # `read` too: `mint_and_verify` reads a credential back before writing so a + # re-run keeps the value a live agent already holds instead of rotating it — + # the read is required, not incidental. # # The swarm appservice token and its own OIDC client secret, read-only: it # uses both and writes neither. matrix-ctl publishes the token @@ -400,10 +402,6 @@ let capabilities = ["create", "read", "update"] } - path "${credentialMountPath}/metadata/swarm/agents/+/queue" { - capabilities = ["delete"] - } - path "${credentialMountPath}/data/${swarmAppserviceTokenLeaf}" { capabilities = ["read"] } diff --git a/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix b/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix index 0c4ac164..cd66ed66 100644 --- a/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix +++ b/nix/module-eval/bao-grants.nix @@ -1147,29 +1147,6 @@ let in lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/data/swarm/agents/*\" {\n capabilities = [\"create\", \"read\", \"update\"]" s; } - { - # Revocation, and the reason it is a stanza of its own: `delete` on the - # `data/` path soft-deletes the newest version and leaves earlier ones - # readable, so a credential the mint had ever rewritten would survive it. - # `metadata/` is the path that removes every version, and the store ACLs - # it separately — without this grant the revocation is a 403 and a - # destroyed agent's credential stays valid. - # - # `+` is one path segment, so this reaches `swarm/agents//queue` - # and nothing else an agent holds; `agents/*` would reach every object - # under the prefix, which `revoke_queue_credential` never asks the store - # to delete. Pinned as the whole capability list too: `read` or `list` - # here would let the controller read back the queue-secret version - # history it is meant only to delete. - name = "the controller may revoke an agent's queue credential, and only that one"; - ok = - let - s = baoGrantHere.systemd.services.swarm-bao-controller-policy.script; - in - lib.hasInfix "path \"secret/metadata/swarm/agents/+/queue\" {\n capabilities = [\"delete\"]" s - && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/metadata/swarm/agents/*" s) - && !(lib.hasInfix "secret/metadata/*" s); - } { # The swarm appservice token is a homeserver-admin credential. The # controller mints agents' accounts with it and has no business replacing diff --git a/swarm-controller/src/agent_identity.rs b/swarm-controller/src/agent_identity.rs index c36f1e6b..1bab3eac 100644 --- a/swarm-controller/src/agent_identity.rs +++ b/swarm-controller/src/agent_identity.rs @@ -220,54 +220,6 @@ pub async fn mint_and_verify(agent: &str) -> Result<()> { Ok(()) } -/// Revoke `agent`'s queue credential: delete the path -/// [`mint_and_verify`]'s step 3 published, and everything ever written at it. -/// -/// The undo of that one step and of no other. The leaf, the ACL document and -/// the cert-auth role that make up the rest of an agent's identity stay where -/// they are — they are what a *hive* uses to collect an agent's secrets, they -/// are minted afresh on every run of the mint, and tearing them down is not -/// what the queue credential outliving its holder is about. -/// -/// **Deletes every version, not the newest one.** The mint rewrites this path -/// whenever the principal it names has to be corrected, so a soft delete would -/// leave the identical secret sitting in version history, readable at -/// `?version=N` by anything that can read the path at all — a value still -/// recoverable has not been revoked. See -/// [`SecretStore::delete_all_versions`][swarm_secret_client::SecretStore::delete_all_versions]. -/// -/// **Idempotent**: revoking an agent that never had a credential, or one -/// already revoked, succeeds and says so. A teardown that runs twice is -/// ordinary, and a second run that failed would be a worse fault than the one -/// this exists to fix. -/// -/// # Errors -/// When the store cannot be reached or refuses the delete. The caller decides -/// what that costs — `set_agent_state` logs it and lets the destroy proceed, -/// since a credential that is still live is a smaller harm than an agent that -/// cannot be torn down. -pub async fn revoke_queue_credential(agent: &str) -> Result<()> { - let queue_path = queue::agent_queue_path(agent)?; - let store = crate::store::connect() - .await - .context("logging in to the swarm secret store")?; - store - .delete_all_versions(&queue_path) - .await - .with_context(|| format!("revoking the agent queue credential at {queue_path}"))?; - // At `info` and unconditional: an unlogged revocation is indistinguishable - // from a leak, and this line is the only record an operator has that the - // credential stopped being usable. It cannot say whether one was there — - // the controller's grant on these paths is write-only by design, so it - // deletes blind. - tracing::info!( - agent, - %queue_path, - "agent queue credential revoked: every version of the path deleted" - ); - Ok(()) -} - /// The consumer of everything [`mint_and_verify`] wrote: log in **as the /// agent**, with the leaf just issued, and read back both paths just /// published. @@ -364,39 +316,6 @@ mod tests { assert!(!a.contains('='), "{a}"); } - /// Revocation undoes step 3 of the mint and nothing else, and both ends - /// spell the path through one function — the property that keeps a - /// revocation from missing the object it is meant to remove. - /// - /// The second half is what stops this being a tautology: the agent's - /// other published object, the mTLS leaf, is at a different path and is - /// deliberately left alone. Revoking both would take away the identity a - /// re-created agent is re-minted under, for a credential problem that is - /// only about the queue. - #[test] - fn revocation_names_the_path_the_mint_published_and_not_the_leaf_beside_it() { - use swarm_secret_client::{mtls, queue}; - - assert_eq!( - queue::agent_queue_path("atlas").expect("a plain name is legal"), - "swarm/agents/atlas/queue" - ); - assert_ne!( - queue::agent_queue_path("atlas").expect("legal"), - mtls::identity_path("atlas").expect("legal"), - ); - } - - /// A name the store must never be asked to delete under. `revoke_queue_credential` - /// builds its path with the same validating function the mint does, so a - /// traversal is refused before a request is made rather than addressing - /// some other principal's secret. - #[test] - fn a_traversal_never_becomes_a_revocation() { - swarm_secret_client::queue::agent_queue_path("../pr1ma") - .expect_err("a traversal is not a legal agent name"); - } - fn both(k: &str) -> Option { match k { ENV_AGENT_PKI_MOUNT => Some("pki-agents".to_owned()), diff --git a/swarm-controller/src/main.rs b/swarm-controller/src/main.rs index 4adcde3d..cacd1454 100644 --- a/swarm-controller/src/main.rs +++ b/swarm-controller/src/main.rs @@ -1050,56 +1050,9 @@ async fn set_agent_state( tracing::warn!(hive = %hive, agent = %agent, error = %format!("{e:#}"), "declaring agent state failed"); error_problem(wanted_error_status(&e), &format!("{e:#}")) })?; - - // After the declaration and never before it: the write above is the - // destroy order, and until it lands the agent is not being torn down, so - // its credential has to keep working. Sequenced rather than spawned so - // the revocation attempt is finished — and its outcome logged — by the - // time the operator's call returns. - if revokes_queue_credential(req.state) { - revoke_or_complain(&hive, &agent).await; - } Ok(Json(render(&declaration))) } -/// Whether declaring an agent into `state` ends its queue credential's life. -/// -/// Exhaustive on purpose, like every other match on -/// [`AgentState`][swarm_queue_client::wanted::AgentState] in this -/// tree: a state added later has to say whether it revokes rather than -/// inheriting "no" from a catch-all. `Offline` and `Paused` deliberately do -/// not — both are states an agent comes back from, and revoking on either -/// would mean an agent that could be stopped but never restarted. -fn revokes_queue_credential(state: swarm_queue_client::wanted::AgentState) -> bool { - use swarm_queue_client::wanted::AgentState; - match state { - AgentState::Destroyed => true, - AgentState::Up | AgentState::Offline | AgentState::Paused => false, - } -} - -/// Revoke the credential, and make a failure impossible to miss without -/// letting it stop the teardown. -/// -/// **The destroy is not blocked by this.** The declaration is already -/// published, the hive will converge on it, and refusing the operator's call -/// at this point would leave them with an agent they cannot destroy — the -/// larger of the two harms. What is left is that the failure must not be -/// quiet, or the outcome is the silent orphan this whole path exists to -/// remove: hence `error`, naming the agent, with the cause chain attached. -async fn revoke_or_complain(hive: &str, agent: &str) { - if let Err(e) = agent_identity::revoke_queue_credential(agent).await { - tracing::error!( - hive, - agent, - error = %format!("{e:#}"), - "revoking this agent's queue credential FAILED; it was destroyed anyway, so \ - the credential outlives it and may still authenticate. Declaring the agent \ - destroyed again re-runs this revocation." - ); - } -} - /// What this swarm currently declares for a hive. /// /// Read back from the bucket rather than from a second copy kept here: the @@ -3309,32 +3262,6 @@ mod tests { ); } - /// `Destroyed` is the one declaration that ends an agent's life, so it is - /// the one that revokes. The credential is a bearer secret: left behind, - /// anything that recovers it still authenticates as an agent that no - /// longer exists. - #[test] - fn declaring_an_agent_destroyed_revokes_its_queue_credential() { - assert!(crate::revokes_queue_credential( - swarm_queue_client::wanted::AgentState::Destroyed - )); - } - - /// The control, and the more expensive half to get wrong: a revocation on - /// `Offline` or `Paused` would give an agent that can be stopped and never - /// restarted. Every non-terminal state is listed rather than sampled, so - /// a state added later shows up here as well as in the match itself. - #[test] - fn no_state_an_agent_comes_back_from_revokes() { - use swarm_queue_client::wanted::AgentState; - for state in [AgentState::Up, AgentState::Offline, AgentState::Paused] { - assert!( - !crate::revokes_queue_credential(state), - "{state:?} is a state an agent returns from" - ); - } - } - /// The whole point of the node: a freshly created agent is declared /// `Paused`, so it does not start driving turns the moment its hive /// brings it up. Any other state here is the bug this fixes. diff --git a/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs b/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs index 7a80b89b..4b5d8e05 100644 --- a/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs +++ b/swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs @@ -211,41 +211,6 @@ impl SecretStore { Ok(()) } - /// Delete `path` outright: every version of it, and the metadata that - /// lists them. - /// - /// The undo of [`write`][Self::write], and deliberately **not** KV v2's - /// plain delete. That one soft-deletes the newest version only, leaving - /// every earlier one readable at `?version=N` and the newest one - /// recoverable by `undelete` — so a caller revoking a bearer secret that - /// [`write`][Self::write] has ever replaced would leave the old value - /// sitting in version history, still usable. `metadata` is the one verb - /// that removes the lot. - /// - /// Addresses `secret/metadata/`, which the store ACLs separately - /// from the `secret/data/` the other methods here use: a token - /// granted write on the data path is refused at this one until its policy - /// names the metadata path too. - /// - /// **Idempotent.** Deleting a path that holds nothing succeeds, because - /// the caller is tearing something down and a teardown that runs twice — - /// or on a principal that never got a secret — must not fail the second - /// time. Only a 404 is absence, exactly as in - /// [`read_optional`][Self::read_optional]: a 403 stays an error, or a - /// principal whose grant does not cover the path would report a - /// revocation it never performed. - /// - /// # Errors - /// [`Error::Vault`] for anything that is not a 404 — a denial, or a store - /// that could not be reached. - pub async fn delete_all_versions(&self, path: &str) -> Result<(), Error> { - match vaultrs::kv2::delete_metadata(&self.inner, MOUNT, path).await { - Ok(()) => Ok(()), - Err(e) if is_absent(&e) => Ok(()), - Err(e) => Err(e.into()), - } - } - /// Replace the ACL policy named `name` with `policy`. /// /// A whole-document write, not a merge: the store has no other verb, and @@ -343,17 +308,6 @@ impl SecretStore { } } -/// Whether a failed store call means the path holds nothing — the one status -/// [`SecretStore::delete_all_versions`] is allowed to treat as success. -/// -/// The same rule [`SecretStore::read_optional`] documents, named here because -/// the delete side has to be able to state it in a test: a 403 is a principal -/// whose grant misses the path, and swallowing that would let a caller report -/// a revocation the store refused to perform. -fn is_absent(e: &vaultrs::error::ClientError) -> bool { - matches!(e, vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { code: 404, .. }) -} - /// Write an ACL policy, spelled out here because [`vaultrs`] does not have it: /// its `sys::policy` module targets `sys/policy/`, the deprecated alias, /// and the store ACLs that path separately from `sys/policies/acl/`. A @@ -600,66 +554,4 @@ mod tests { assert!(!e.to_string().contains("SECRET-KEY-BYTES"), "{e}"); } } - - /// What makes [`SecretStore::delete_all_versions`] safe to run twice: the - /// second run finds nothing and must still succeed. A teardown that - /// hard-errors on an already-revoked credential is a worse fault than the - /// credential outliving its holder. - #[test] - fn a_path_that_holds_nothing_is_not_a_failed_delete() { - assert!(is_absent(&vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { - code: 404, - errors: vec![], - })); - } - - /// The other half, and the one that matters for a revocation: a token - /// whose policy misses the path is refused with a 403, and reading that - /// as "nothing was there" would log a revocation the store never made. - #[test] - fn a_denial_is_not_absence() { - for code in [400, 403, 500, 503] { - assert!( - !is_absent(&vaultrs::error::ClientError::APIError { - code, - errors: vec![], - }), - "{code} must stay a failure" - ); - } - } - - /// Revocation addresses `secret/metadata/…`, not `secret/data/…`. - /// - /// The distinction is the whole point of the verb: the data path's delete - /// leaves earlier versions readable, so revoking a secret that was ever - /// rewritten there would leave the old value recoverable. - /// - /// Asserted on [`vaultrs`]'s own request type rather than on a call, since - /// there is no store to call: it pins the endpoint - /// `kv2::delete_metadata` targets, which is the string - /// `swarm-bao.nix`'s grant has to match. A dependency bump that moved it - /// would otherwise surface as a 403 at the first revocation, far from - /// here. - #[test] - fn a_revocation_targets_every_version_and_not_just_the_newest() { - use rustify::endpoint::Endpoint as _; - - let request = vaultrs::api::kv2::requests::DeleteSecretMetadataRequest::builder() - .mount(MOUNT) - .path("swarm/agents/atlas/queue") - .build() - .expect("the request builds"); - assert_eq!(request.path(), "secret/metadata/swarm/agents/atlas/queue"); - - // The control: the verb deliberately not used, which addresses the - // data path and soft-deletes exactly one version of it. - let soft = vaultrs::api::kv2::requests::DeleteLatestSecretVersionRequest::builder() - .mount(MOUNT) - .path("swarm/agents/atlas/queue") - .build() - .expect("the request builds"); - assert_eq!(soft.path(), "secret/data/swarm/agents/atlas/queue"); - assert_ne!(request.path(), soft.path()); - } }