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10 changed files with 95 additions and 186 deletions

View file

@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ via `snapshotOpenDetails` / `restoreOpenDetails`.
`job_queue::templates::rebuild` builds the DAG that reconciles a
container to its wanted state: `write_dropins` (the nspawn-conf
rewrite — `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`, `HOST_ADDRESS` = the bridge gateway IP,
rewrite — `PRIVATE_NETWORK=0`, clears `HOST_ADDRESS` / `LOCAL_ADDRESS`,
sets `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` — plus the systemd resource-limits drop-in)
is folded into the `Swap` node, then `nixos-container update` + stop +
start runs across the `StopForUpdate → Swap → RebuildBookkeeping`

View file

@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ the nix side sets up unconditionally:
| Internet NAT | `networking.nat { enable = true; internalInterfaces = [ bridgeName ]; }` — MASQUERADE on packets leaving via any external NIC |
| Loopback DROP | `networking.firewall.extraInputRules` — drops bridge-subnet → `127.0.0.0/8` traffic; defence-in-depth against routing table leaks |
| Gateway access | `networking.firewall.interfaces.<bridge>.allowedTCPPorts = [ 80 443 ]` — lets isolated agents (private netns, veth on bridge) reach nginx on the host |
| c0re signal | `HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE`, `HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` in `systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment` — both **required**; `hive-c0re` refuses to start without them |
| c0re signal | `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION=1`, `HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE`, `HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` in `systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment` |
`HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` is the host-side bridge IP + prefix (e.g.
`10.42.0.1/24`), **not** the canonical network address. The Rust side
@ -218,14 +218,10 @@ address arithmetic.
### What the Rust side does
`hive-c0re` reads `HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE` + `HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET` and passes
`hive-c0re` reads `HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION` and passes
`PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`, `LOCAL_ADDRESS=` (empty), `HOST_ADDRESS=<bridge-ip>`,
and `HOST_BRIDGE=<bridgeName>` via `lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags` when
creating or updating containers. Both variables are validated **once at
daemon startup**, not per container: they are process-global, so a
missing or malformed value is a misconfigured daemon rather than one bad
container, and failing at boot gives a single diagnostic instead of one
per agent. There is no non-isolated mode to fall back to. `LOCAL_ADDRESS` is left empty so the
creating or updating containers. `LOCAL_ADDRESS` is left empty so the
container's dhcpcd acquires an address from the bridge dnsmasq pool
(`networking.useDHCP = true` in `nix/agent-modules/network.nix`). This applies uniformly
to all containers — agents and service containers alike.

View file

@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ use hive_priv_sock::{BindMount, CredentialMount};
use crate::coordinator::{AgentPaths, HiveEnv};
use super::{
AGENT_PREFIX, CONTAINER_RUNTIME_MOUNT, CONTAINER_SHARED_MOUNT, container_claude_mount,
container_name, validate,
AGENT_PREFIX, CONTAINER_RUNTIME_MOUNT, CONTAINER_SHARED_MOUNT, bridge_gateway_ip,
container_claude_mount, container_name, validate,
};
/// Re-apply the per-container host-side config: nspawn flags (bind
@ -131,12 +131,9 @@ fn bind_child_agent_dirs(child: &str, binds: &mut Vec<BindMount>) {
}
/// Idempotently rewrite the lines in `/etc/nixos-containers/<container>.conf`
/// that hive-c0re owns: `PRIVATE_NETWORK` (always 1 — every container runs in
/// its own network namespace with a veth on the host bridge, and the agent's
/// web UI is reached over that bridge rather than a host-shared netns),
/// `HOST_ADDRESS` (the bridge gateway IP, so the container installs a default
/// route before DHCP completes) and `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` (the runtime-dir
/// bind). The start script expands `$EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` unquoted into the
/// that hive-c0re owns: `PRIVATE_NETWORK` (forced 0 so the agent's web UI port
/// is reachable on the host) and `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` (the runtime-dir bind).
/// The start script expands `$EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS` unquoted into the
/// `systemd-nspawn` command.
#[allow(
clippy::too_many_lines,
@ -306,17 +303,40 @@ async fn set_nspawn_flags(
read_only: false,
});
// Every container runs in a private network namespace with a veth
// pair attached to the host bridge — including the manager (all
// hive-c0re<->agent comms go through bind-mounted UDS, not TCP).
// There is no non-isolated mode to fall back to, and the settings
// are process-global, so anything wrong here was already fatal at
// daemon startup; this call cannot newly fail.
let isolation = super::network_isolation_from_env()?;
tracing::info!(
%agent_name, gateway_ip = %isolation.gateway_ip, bridge = %isolation.bridge,
"network isolation: PRIVATE_NETWORK=1 (DHCP)"
);
// Network isolation: when HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION=1 is set (by the
// hive-network.nix module's `isolateContainers` option), flip the
// container to a private network namespace with a veth pair attached
// to the host bridge. Applies to all containers including the manager
// (all hive-c0re<->agent comms go through bind-mounted UDS, not TCP).
let isolation = {
let isolate = std::env::var("HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION").ok().as_deref() == Some("1");
let bridge = std::env::var("HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE").unwrap_or_default();
let subnet = std::env::var("HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET").unwrap_or_default();
if isolate && !bridge.is_empty() && !subnet.is_empty() {
let Some(gateway_ip) = bridge_gateway_ip(&subnet) else {
tracing::warn!(
%agent_name, %subnet,
"HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is set but the bridge gateway IP is unparseable; \
skipping PRIVATE_NETWORK write to avoid an isolated container with no \
default route or resolver"
);
return crate::priv_client::write_nspawn_flags(
container,
&binds,
None,
&load_creds,
)
.await;
};
tracing::info!(
%agent_name, %gateway_ip, %bridge,
"network isolation: PRIVATE_NETWORK=1 (DHCP)"
);
Some(hive_priv_sock::NetworkIsolation { bridge, gateway_ip })
} else {
None
}
};
// Delegate the actual conf-file rewrite to hive-priv (runs as root).
crate::priv_client::write_nspawn_flags(container, &binds, isolation, &load_creds).await

View file

@ -125,56 +125,6 @@ pub fn bridge_gateway_ip(subnet_cidr: &str) -> Option<String> {
Some(ip_str.to_owned())
}
/// Build the network-isolation settings every container is configured
/// with, from the variables `hive-network.nix` sets on the `hive-c0re`
/// unit.
///
/// Isolation is the only supported mode: the on/off toggle is gone, so
/// there is no non-isolated branch to fall back to and a missing or
/// malformed value means the daemon is misconfigured — not that a
/// container should quietly come up sharing the host's netns. Silently
/// degrading here dropped a security boundary with nothing in the log
/// to say so.
///
/// Split from [`network_isolation_from_env`] so the parsing is testable
/// without touching process environment.
pub fn network_isolation_from_vars(
bridge: Option<&str>,
subnet: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<hive_priv_sock::NetworkIsolation> {
let bridge = bridge.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).context(
"HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE is unset or empty — hive-network.nix sets it on the \
hive-c0re unit, so this means the daemon is running outside its unit or \
with a broken module evaluation",
)?;
let subnet = subnet.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).context(
"HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is unset or empty — hive-network.nix sets it on the \
hive-c0re unit, so this means the daemon is running outside its unit or \
with a broken module evaluation",
)?;
let gateway_ip = bridge_gateway_ip(subnet).with_context(|| {
format!(
"HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET={subnet} is not a valid <ipv4>/<prefix> pair; \
it comes from services.hyperhive.network.bridgeIp + bridgePrefixLength"
)
})?;
Ok(hive_priv_sock::NetworkIsolation {
bridge: bridge.to_owned(),
gateway_ip,
})
}
/// [`network_isolation_from_vars`] over the real process environment.
///
/// Called once at daemon startup so a bad value fails the unit loudly,
/// and again per container — the variables are process-global, so the
/// second call cannot start failing once the first has passed.
pub fn network_isolation_from_env() -> Result<hive_priv_sock::NetworkIsolation> {
let bridge = std::env::var("HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE").ok();
let subnet = std::env::var("HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET").ok();
network_isolation_from_vars(bridge.as_deref(), subnet.as_deref())
}
/// Read the agent user's `(uid, gid)` from the container's nixos-managed
/// `/etc/passwd`. Returns `None` when the container hasn't been built
/// yet, the passwd file is unparseable, or the agent user is missing

View file

@ -65,65 +65,6 @@ fn bridge_gateway_ip_rejects_bad_input() {
assert!(bridge_gateway_ip("10.42.0/24").is_none()); // 3 octets
}
/// The presence control for the two rejection tests below: with both
/// variables set and well-formed, the settings are built. Without this,
/// a `network_isolation_from_vars` that rejected *everything* would pass
/// every absence assertion and look like a working guard.
#[test]
fn network_isolation_accepts_a_well_formed_pair() {
let iso = network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("10.42.0.1/24"))
.expect("well-formed bridge + subnet must be accepted");
assert_eq!(iso.bridge, "hive0");
// The gateway is the verbatim bridge address, prefix stripped.
assert_eq!(iso.gateway_ip, "10.42.0.1");
}
/// A missing or empty variable is fatal, not a fallback to the host
/// netns. Empty is tested alongside unset because `std::env::var` on a
/// variable set to `""` returns `Ok("")`, so treating only `None` as
/// missing would let an empty value through.
#[test]
fn network_isolation_rejects_missing_or_empty_vars() {
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(None, Some("10.42.0.1/24")).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), None).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(None, None).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some(""), Some("10.42.0.1/24")).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("")).is_err());
}
/// A malformed subnet is fatal too. Previously this logged a warning and
/// silently produced a container on the host netns — a dropped security
/// boundary with nothing in the journal saying so.
#[test]
fn network_isolation_rejects_a_malformed_subnet() {
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("notanip/24")).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("10.42.0.1")).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("10.42.0.1/33")).is_err());
assert!(network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("10.42.0.999/24")).is_err());
}
/// The error has to name the variable an operator must fix — these are
/// read at startup, so the message is the whole diagnostic.
#[test]
fn network_isolation_errors_name_the_offending_variable() {
let e = network_isolation_from_vars(None, Some("10.42.0.1/24")).unwrap_err();
assert!(
format!("{e:#}").contains("HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE"),
"bridge error must name the variable, got: {e:#}"
);
let e = network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), None).unwrap_err();
assert!(
format!("{e:#}").contains("HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET"),
"subnet error must name the variable, got: {e:#}"
);
let e = network_isolation_from_vars(Some("hive0"), Some("nope/24")).unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{e:#}");
assert!(
msg.contains("HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET") && msg.contains("nope/24"),
"malformed-subnet error must name the variable and the bad value, got: {msg}"
);
}
/// `setup_proposed` is idempotent: calling it on an existing repo is a
/// no-op (the fresh guard skips all writes).
#[tokio::test]

View file

@ -217,15 +217,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
if let Some(v) = build_slots {
sc.build_slots = v;
}
// Network isolation is required and its settings are
// process-global, so a bad value breaks every container, not
// one. Validate once here: the unit then fails visibly at
// start with a single diagnostic naming the bad value,
// instead of coming up "healthy" and failing each container
// configure separately — possibly after some already
// succeeded.
lifecycle::network_isolation_from_env()
.context("network isolation settings are required at startup")?;
cmd_serve(sc.env, sc.model_prices, sc.build_slots, db, &cli.socket).await
}
}

View file

@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ pub async fn read_container_journal(
pub async fn write_nspawn_flags(
container: &str,
binds: &[BindMount],
isolation: NetworkIsolation,
isolation: Option<NetworkIsolation>,
load_credentials: &[CredentialMount],
) -> Result<()> {
ok(call(&PrivRequest::WriteNspawnFlags {

View file

@ -291,10 +291,9 @@ pub struct CredentialMount {
pub host_path: String,
}
/// Network isolation parameters for `WriteNspawnFlags`. hive-priv writes
/// `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth bridge wiring from these; every container
/// is isolated, so they are required rather than a mode selector.
/// Containers receive their IP
/// Network isolation parameters for `WriteNspawnFlags`. When `Some`,
/// hive-priv writes `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth bridge wiring instead
/// of the default `PRIVATE_NETWORK=0`. Containers receive their IP
/// dynamically via DHCP from the bridge dnsmasq pool (`networking.useDHCP`
/// in `harness-base.nix`); no static address is pre-assigned here.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -380,19 +379,15 @@ pub enum PrivRequest {
/// Update `/etc/nixos-containers/<container>.conf`: strip old network-isolation
/// vars, write `PRIVATE_NETWORK` + bridge settings, and set `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS`
/// from the provided bind-mount list. Written by `lifecycle::set_nspawn_flags`.
/// Always writes `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth wiring: isolation is the only
/// mode, so there is no request shape that yields a container sharing the
/// host's network namespace.
/// When `isolation` is `Some`, writes `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth wiring;
/// when `None`, writes `PRIVATE_NETWORK=0`.
WriteNspawnFlags {
container: String,
binds: Vec<BindMount>,
/// Private netns with a veth on the given bridge
/// (`PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`). Required: isolation is the only
/// supported mode, so there is no value meaning "host netns".
/// Deliberately **not** `#[serde(default)]` — a request that
/// omits it is rejected rather than quietly configuring a
/// container that shares the host's network namespace.
isolation: NetworkIsolation,
/// `None` = host netns (`PRIVATE_NETWORK=0`). `Some` = private netns with
/// veth on the specified bridge (`PRIVATE_NETWORK=1`).
#[serde(default)]
isolation: Option<NetworkIsolation>,
/// Host secrets forwarded into the container's credential store via
/// nspawn `--load-credential=<name>:<host_path>`. Empty for agents
/// with no credentials configured (the common case). `#[serde(default)]`

View file

@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ async fn exec(
ref binds,
ref isolation,
ref load_credentials,
} => handle_write_nspawn_flags(container, binds, isolation, load_credentials),
} => handle_write_nspawn_flags(container, binds, isolation.as_ref(), load_credentials),
PrivRequest::WriteResourceLimits {
ref container,
@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ fn single_output_path(stdout: &str) -> Result<&str, usize> {
fn handle_write_nspawn_flags(
container: &str,
binds: &[BindMount],
isolation: &NetworkIsolation,
isolation: Option<&NetworkIsolation>,
load_credentials: &[CredentialMount],
) -> Result<(String, String)> {
validate_container_system_name(container)?;
@ -2718,13 +2718,13 @@ fn git_overlay_flags(binds: &[BindMount]) -> Vec<String> {
/// Update `/etc/nixos-containers/<container>.conf`: strip old network vars
/// (`PRIVATE_NETWORK`, `HOST_ADDRESS*`, `LOCAL_ADDRESS*`, `HOST_BRIDGE`),
/// write the current network-isolation settings, then append
/// `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS`. Always writes `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth
/// wiring — isolation is the only mode, so there is no branch that
/// leaves a container on the host's network namespace.
/// `EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS`. When `isolation` is `Some`, writes
/// `PRIVATE_NETWORK=1` + veth wiring; when `None`, writes
/// `PRIVATE_NETWORK=0`.
fn write_nspawn_flags(
container: &str,
binds: &[BindMount],
isolation: &NetworkIsolation,
isolation: Option<&NetworkIsolation>,
load_credentials: &[CredentialMount],
) -> Result<()> {
use std::fmt::Write as _;
@ -2747,8 +2747,7 @@ fn write_nspawn_flags(
if !out.is_empty() {
out.push('\n');
}
{
let iso = isolation;
if let Some(iso) = isolation {
out.push_str("PRIVATE_NETWORK=1\n");
// HOST_ADDRESS = the bridge gateway IP. nixos-container's
// container-side setup only installs a default route
@ -2767,6 +2766,13 @@ fn write_nspawn_flags(
out.push_str("HOST_ADDRESS6=\n");
out.push_str("LOCAL_ADDRESS6=\n");
let _ = writeln!(out, "HOST_BRIDGE={}", iso.bridge);
} else {
out.push_str("PRIVATE_NETWORK=0\n");
out.push_str("HOST_ADDRESS=\n");
out.push_str("LOCAL_ADDRESS=\n");
out.push_str("HOST_ADDRESS6=\n");
out.push_str("LOCAL_ADDRESS6=\n");
out.push_str("HOST_BRIDGE=\n");
}
let mut flags: Vec<String> = binds
.iter()
@ -2797,8 +2803,8 @@ fn write_nspawn_flags(
// anyway). The `hyperhive-isolated-dns` oneshot in harness-base.nix
// rewrites resolv.conf to point at the bridge resolver, but only when
// this marker exists; it carries the gateway IP so the container
// doesn't have to re-derive it. Always written — every container is
// isolated, so there is no mode in which the marker should be absent.
// doesn't have to re-derive it. Written on isolate, removed otherwise,
// so the same shared container toplevel behaves correctly in both modes.
write_bridge_dns_marker(container, isolation)?;
Ok(())
}
@ -2808,23 +2814,32 @@ fn bridge_dns_marker_path(container: &str) -> String {
format!("/var/lib/nixos-containers/{container}/etc/hyperhive-bridge-dns")
}
/// Write the bridge-DNS marker the `hyperhive-isolated-dns` oneshot keys
/// off. The marker file contains just the gateway IP. Always written:
/// every container is isolated, so there is no host-netns case that
/// wants the marker absent.
fn write_bridge_dns_marker(container: &str, isolation: &NetworkIsolation) -> Result<()> {
/// Write (isolated) or remove (host-netns) the bridge-DNS marker the
/// `hyperhive-isolated-dns` oneshot keys off. The marker file contains
/// just the gateway IP. Best-effort on removal (absence is the goal).
fn write_bridge_dns_marker(container: &str, isolation: Option<&NetworkIsolation>) -> Result<()> {
let path = bridge_dns_marker_path(container);
// On a fresh install the container's `/etc` may not exist yet
// (rootfs not fully materialised before the first start), so
// `write` would fail with ENOENT. Create the parent dir first
// — it's the container's own `/etc`, which nixos-container
// populates on start; a pre-created dir + our marker persist.
if let Some(parent) = std::path::Path::new(&path).parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.with_context(|| format!("create bridge-DNS marker dir {}", parent.display()))?;
match isolation {
Some(iso) => {
// On a fresh install the container's `/etc` may not exist yet
// (rootfs not fully materialised before the first start), so
// `write` would fail with ENOENT. Create the parent dir first
// — it's the container's own `/etc`, which nixos-container
// populates on start; a pre-created dir + our marker persist.
if let Some(parent) = std::path::Path::new(&path).parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| {
format!("create bridge-DNS marker dir {}", parent.display())
})?;
}
std::fs::write(&path, format!("{}\n", iso.gateway_ip))
.with_context(|| format!("write bridge-DNS marker {path}"))?;
}
None => match std::fs::remove_file(&path) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
Err(e) => return Err(e).with_context(|| format!("remove bridge-DNS marker {path}")),
},
}
std::fs::write(&path, format!("{}\n", isolation.gateway_ip))
.with_context(|| format!("write bridge-DNS marker {path}"))?;
Ok(())
}

View file

@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ in
# container. HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET is host-bridge IP/prefix, not canonical
# network address — the Rust side normalises before subnet arithmetic.
systemd.services.hive-c0re.environment = {
HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION = "1";
HIVE_NETWORK_BRIDGE = cfg.bridgeName;
HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET = "${cfg.bridgeIp}/${toString cfg.bridgePrefixLength}";
};