diff --git a/hive-claude/src/classify.rs b/hive-claude/src/classify.rs index 826bacf3..45a82e20 100644 --- a/hive-claude/src/classify.rs +++ b/hive-claude/src/classify.rs @@ -75,18 +75,27 @@ impl Sentinels { if matches!(ty, Some("assistant" | "user")) { return; } - // The terminal `result` event carries the model's final answer in its - // `result` field — model-authored text, same trust level as an - // assistant message. A marker quoted there (e.g. the model explaining - // *this* code, or echoing an error string back) would falsely trip a - // sentinel and needlessly kill/downgrade the turn. So for a `result` - // event, scan the control fields (`subtype` / `error` / `is_error`) - // but scrub the model-authored `result` field first; a genuine - // prompt-too-long/auth/session signal lives in those control fields - // (it's emitted *instead of* a successful model answer), never in the - // `result` text. Other control events (`error` / `system`) are - // claude-authored end to end, so they scan raw. - if ty == Some("result") { + // A `result` event's `result` field is model-authored answer text on a + // SUCCESSFUL turn — same trust level as an assistant message. A marker + // quoted there (the model explaining *this* code, or echoing an error + // string back) would falsely trip a sentinel and needlessly kill / + // downgrade the turn, so for a successful result we scrub `result` + // before scanning and rely on the other (claude-authored) fields. + // + // On a FAILED result the same `result` field instead carries + // claude-code's OWN failure text, emitted *instead of* a model answer. + // The real event (verified against captured stream-json) is: + // {"type":"result","is_error":true,"subtype":"success", + // "result":"Prompt is too long","terminal_reason":"blocking_limit"} + // Note `subtype` is "success" even on a hard failure — so `is_error` is + // the only reliable discriminator, and the model can't forge it (the CLI + // sets it from the real outcome). Scan those raw. Scrubbing `result` + // unconditionally (the original fix) blinded prompt-too-long / auth + // detection. Other control events are claude-authored throughout, so + // they also scan raw. + let error_result = ty == Some("result") + && event.get("is_error").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_bool) == Some(true); + if ty == Some("result") && !error_result { let mut scrubbed = event.clone(); if let Some(obj) = scrubbed.as_object_mut() { obj.remove("result"); @@ -157,11 +166,21 @@ mod tests { } #[test] - fn control_event_marker_is_detected() { + fn genuine_failure_result_is_detected() { + // Both fixtures are the real claude-code failure shape, verified against + // captured stream-json: the marker lives in the `result` field with + // `is_error: true` and — counterintuitively — `subtype: "success"`. The + // earlier unconditional `result` scrub blinded this; `is_error` is the + // discriminator that restores it (and the model can't forge it). let s = Sentinels::default(); - let raw = r#"{"type":"result","subtype":"error","error":"Prompt is too long"}"#; + let raw = r#"{"type":"result","is_error":true,"subtype":"success","result":"Prompt is too long","terminal_reason":"blocking_limit","stop_reason":"stop_sequence"}"#; s.scan_stdout_json(&json(raw), raw); assert!(matches!(s.soft_error(), Some(Error::PromptTooLong))); + + let s = Sentinels::default(); + let raw = r#"{"type":"result","is_error":true,"subtype":"success","result":"Failed to authenticate. API Error: 401 Invalid authentication credentials","api_error_status":401}"#; + s.scan_stdout_json(&json(raw), raw); + assert!(matches!(s.soft_error(), Some(Error::AuthFailed))); } #[test]