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compare: vinzenz:065b11a99d9458bff1d701f869f518bb35bb65d0
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vinzenz:main
2 changed files with 18 additions and 356 deletions
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19
nix/checks.nix
View file

@ -156,24 +156,7 @@ in
# per-container toplevels stay fully cached.
cargo-test = craneLib.cargoTest {
src = cleanSrc;
inherit cargoArtifacts;
# `swarm-controller`'s forge tests build a real `forgejo_api::Forgejo`
# (hence a real `reqwest::Client`) against a loopback stub server, never
# the real forge — but `reqwest`/`rustls` still resolves roots through
# `rustls-native-certs` at *client-build* time, unconditionally, even
# though every request that client ever sends is plain `http://` to
# `127.0.0.1`. The nix build sandbox has no system CA store, so that
# resolution finds zero certs and `ClientBuilder::build()` itself fails
# with "No CA certificates were loaded from the system" — the tests
# never get as far as making a request. Same root cause the runtime
# deployment already works around (see `nix/host-modules/swarm-
# controller.nix`'s `caTrust` comment) and the same fix: give
# `rustls-native-certs` something to find via `SSL_CERT_FILE`. The
# bundle's actual contents don't matter here — nothing in these tests
# ever presents or verifies a real certificate — only that the store is
# non-empty.
nativeBuildInputs = nativeBuildInputs ++ [ pkgs.cacert ];
SSL_CERT_FILE = "${pkgs.cacert}/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt";
inherit cargoArtifacts nativeBuildInputs;
pname = "hyperhive-workspace";
version = "0.1.0";
cargoTestExtraArgs = "--workspace";

355
swarm-controller/src/forge.rs
View file

@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ use forgejo_api::structs::{
AddCollaboratorOption, AddCollaboratorOptionPermission, ChangeFileOperation,
ChangeFileOperationOperation, ChangeFilesOptions, CreateBranchProtectionOption,
CreateHookOption, CreateHookOptionConfig, CreateHookOptionType, CreateRepoOption,
CreateUserOption, EditUserOption, IssueListIssuesQuery, IssueListIssuesQueryState,
IssueListIssuesQueryType, RepoGetContentsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQuery,
RepoListPullRequestsQueryState, RepoSearchQuery, StateType,
CreateUserOption, IssueListIssuesQuery, IssueListIssuesQueryState, IssueListIssuesQueryType,
RepoGetContentsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQuery, RepoListPullRequestsQueryState,
RepoSearchQuery, StateType,
};
use forgejo_api::{ApiErrorKind, Auth, Forgejo, ForgejoError};
use futures_util::{StreamExt as _, TryStreamExt as _};
@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ impl Client {
.await
}
/// Ensure `agent` exists as a Forgejo user account that cannot create
/// repos — the whole job of the `CreateForgeUser` node, and the fix for the "user does not
/// Ensure `agent` exists as a Forgejo user account — the whole job of
/// the `CreateForgeUser` node, and the fix for the "user does not
/// exist" failure `AddRepoMember` hit before this node existed: adding
/// a nonexistent user as a collaborator is a Forgejo validation error,
/// not an idempotent no-op, so something has to create the account
@ -373,8 +373,12 @@ impl Client {
/// `forgejo admin` CLI, which assumes co-location with the forge host.
/// This daemon has no such assumption — like every other call in this
/// file, it only ever talks to the forge over HTTP — so this goes through
/// `admin_create_user` instead. The password is a throwaway: 32 random
/// bytes, generated once, never persisted or read again (see
/// `admin_create_user` instead.
///
/// The password itself is a throwaway: 32 random bytes, generated once,
/// never persisted anywhere, and never needed again (unlike
/// `hive-c0re`'s CLI path, which can ask forgejo to `--random-password`
/// on its own, the HTTP admin API requires a real value up front — see
/// [`crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret`], reused here for the same
/// reason a webhook secret and this password are both "32 random bytes
/// nothing reads back").
@ -382,79 +386,19 @@ impl Client {
/// Idempotent, same as [`Self::ensure_org_repo`]: 409 folds to success
/// unconditionally, 422 only after a follow-up `user_get` confirms the
/// user (see [`folds_into_success`] — not every 422 means it exists).
///
/// Then locks the account out of creating repos
/// ([`Self::disable_repo_creation`]), whether it was just created or
/// already existed. Nothing else does that for a swarm-created agent, so
/// a failure fails the node. Does not align the account's email the way
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email` does — cosmetic, not a guard.
/// Deliberately does not align the account's email or disable its own
/// repo-creation rights the way `hive-c0re`'s per-hive provisioning does
/// (`ensure_user_email`, `ensure_repo_creation_disabled`) — this account
/// only exists so `AddRepoMember` has something to add, and the owning
/// hive's own provisioning pass self-heals both once the agent spawns.
pub async fn ensure_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
self.create_agent_user(agent).await?;
self.disable_repo_creation(agent).await
}
/// Set `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`'s account. Agents create repos
/// through the hive, never with their own token — a write-scoped token
/// can otherwise create and own a repo and self-merge in it, bypassing
/// the operator-only-merge policy. Existing repos are untouched; push,
/// PRs and clone keep working.
///
/// The PATCH itself is unconditional rather than verify-then-patch:
/// Forgejo's API never returns `max_repo_creation` (it is a field of
/// `EditUserOption` only, not of `User`), so there is no current value
/// to compare against, and setting 0 on an account already at 0 is a
/// no-op. But `create_agent_user`'s idempotent fold only proves *some*
/// account named `agent` exists — a 409 folds with no read at all, and
/// a 422's follow-up `user_get` only confirms the username, not that
/// swarm-controller created it — so before that PATCH this reads the
/// account once and checks the one thing that *is* comparable: the
/// email. A match against either [`agent_email`] (what
/// `create_agent_user` itself sets) or [`legacy_agent_email`] (what
/// `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists` used before its own
/// `ensure_user_email` alignment pass runs) counts as this agent's
/// account — the legacy value has to be accepted too, not just the
/// aligned one, because `ensure_user_email` only runs on the forge-host
/// hive and only once it has a core token and has ticked at least once,
/// so a real, existing legacy agent can still carry the old email when
/// this node reads it mid-rollout. A mismatch against both means the
/// name collided with an account this node didn't create, so it fails
/// the node rather than sending the PATCH (or silently skipping) to an
/// account nobody verified is agent-controlled.
async fn disable_repo_creation(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
let user = self
.api
.user_get(agent)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("read forge user {agent} before locking it down"))?;
let expected = agent_email(agent);
let legacy = legacy_agent_email(agent);
if !matches!(user.email.as_deref(), Some(e) if e == expected || e == legacy) {
anyhow::bail!(
"forge account `{agent}` exists but is not this agent's (email {:?}, expected \
`{expected}` or the legacy `{legacy}`); refusing to lock it down",
user.email
);
}
self.api
.admin_edit_user(agent, repo_creation_lockdown(agent))
.await
.with_context(|| {
format!("disable repo creation for forge user {agent} (max_repo_creation = 0)")
})?;
tracing::info!(%agent, "swarm forge: disabled repo creation (max_repo_creation = 0)");
Ok(())
}
/// Create `agent`'s account. Idempotent: an existing user (409/422) is
/// folded into success, same as [`Self::ensure_org_repo`].
async fn create_agent_user(&self, agent: &str) -> Result<()> {
let password = crate::webhook::generate_hex_secret()
.context("generating a throwaway password for the agent's forge account")?;
let res = self
.api
.admin_create_user(CreateUserOption {
created_at: None,
email: agent_email(agent),
email: format!("{agent}@hyperhive.local"),
full_name: None,
login_name: None,
must_change_password: Some(false),
@ -1140,63 +1084,6 @@ fn initial_flake_nix() -> &'static str {
"{\n description = \"hyperhive agent\";\n inputs = { };\n outputs =\n { self, ... }@inputs:\n {\n nixosModules.default = {\n imports = [ ./agent.nix ];\n _module.args.flakeInputs = builtins.removeAttrs inputs [ \"self\" ];\n };\n };\n}\n"
}
/// Canonical email for an agent's Forgejo account, set by
/// [`Client::create_agent_user`] at creation and checked by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`] before it sends the account's PATCH. Same
/// format string as `hive-c0re::forge::users::agent_email` — not called
/// across the crate boundary (see this module's doc comment), but both
/// creators (and `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email`, which aligns older
/// accounts to it) converge on this exact value, so it doubles as the
/// marker that distinguishes an agent's own account from an unrelated one
/// that happens to share its username.
fn agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
format!("{agent}@hyperhive.local")
}
/// The pre-alignment email `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists`
/// gave an agent account before that crate's own `ensure_user_email`
/// existed — see that function's doc comment ("Existing agents were
/// created with `{name}@hive.local`; this corrects that"). Accepted by
/// [`Client::disable_repo_creation`]'s guard alongside [`agent_email`]
/// because `ensure_user_email`'s alignment PATCH only runs on the
/// forge-host hive, and only after it has a core token and has ticked at
/// least once, so a real legacy agent can still carry this value when this
/// node reads it.
fn legacy_agent_email(agent: &str) -> String {
format!("{agent}@hive.local")
}
/// The `admin_edit_user` body that sets `max_repo_creation = 0` on `agent`
/// and nothing else. Same shape as `hive-c0re::forge::users`'
/// `sparse_edit_user_option`: `login_name` + `source_id = 0` (local auth,
/// which is what [`Client::create_agent_user`] creates) ride along because
/// Forgejo resets `use_custom_avatar` on an admin edit that omits
/// `login_name`; every other field is left unset so nothing else is touched.
fn repo_creation_lockdown(agent: &str) -> EditUserOption {
EditUserOption {
active: None,
admin: None,
allow_create_organization: None,
allow_git_hook: None,
allow_import_local: None,
description: None,
email: None,
full_name: None,
hide_email: None,
location: None,
login_name: Some(agent.to_owned()),
max_repo_creation: Some(0),
must_change_password: None,
password: None,
prohibit_login: None,
pronouns: None,
restricted: None,
source_id: Some(0),
visibility: None,
website: None,
}
}
/// Whether a create-style call failed because the object already
/// exists. Forgejo signals this as HTTP 409 (conflict) or 422
/// (validation) — match both defensively, same as
@ -1441,212 +1328,4 @@ mod tests {
"new logic: correctly refuses to fold a 422 with no confirmed existence"
);
}
/// What [`stub_forge`] saw: method, path and JSON body of each request.
type Seen = std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, String, serde_json::Value)>>>;
/// A stand-in forge on a loopback port — never the real one — answering
/// the admin user create (`POST`) with `create`, the pre-lockdown
/// `user_get` (`GET`) with `get`, and the admin user edit (`PATCH`) with
/// `edit` (status, JSON body each), and recording every request.
async fn stub_forge(
create: (u16, &'static str),
get: (u16, &'static str),
edit: (u16, &'static str),
) -> (Client, Seen) {
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode, Uri, header::CONTENT_TYPE};
let seen = Seen::default();
let recorded = seen.clone();
let app = axum::Router::new().fallback(
move |method: Method, uri: Uri, body: axum::body::Bytes| {
let recorded = recorded.clone();
async move {
let json = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap_or_default();
recorded.lock().unwrap().push((
method.to_string(),
uri.path().to_owned(),
json,
));
let (status, body) = match method {
Method::POST => create,
Method::GET => get,
Method::PATCH => edit,
_ => (404, r#"{"message":"not stubbed"}"#),
};
let status = StatusCode::from_u16(status).unwrap();
(status, [(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")], body)
}
},
);
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("http://{}/", listener.local_addr().unwrap())).unwrap();
tokio::spawn(async move { axum::serve(listener, app).await });
let api = Forgejo::new(Auth::Token("stub-token"), url).unwrap();
(Client { api }, seen)
}
/// The `PATCH` [`Client::ensure_agent_user`] sent, if any.
fn lockdown_patch(seen: &Seen, agent: &str) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
let path = format!("/api/v1/admin/users/{agent}");
seen.lock()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.find(|(method, p, _)| method == "PATCH" && *p == path)
.map(|(_, _, body)| body.clone())
}
/// The email [`stub_forge`]'s `user_get` stub should answer with for an
/// account this agent actually owns — same value
/// [`Client::create_agent_user`] itself sets.
fn own_account_get(agent: &str) -> (u16, &'static str) {
// Leaked rather than borrowed: `stub_forge`'s `get` param needs
// `&'static str` (it moves into a `'static` axum handler), and this
// helper builds the body per-agent instead of hardcoding "alice".
(
200,
Box::leak(format!(r#"{{"email":"{agent}@hyperhive.local"}}"#).into_boxed_str()),
)
}
/// A freshly created agent account is locked out of repo creation by
/// this node itself — not left for a hive-level pass to catch later —
/// and the edit sets nothing beyond `max_repo_creation` plus the
/// `login_name` / `source_id` pair Forgejo needs to leave the rest alone.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_created_agent_user_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge((201, "{}"), own_account_get("alice"), (200, "{}")).await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
let set: Vec<&str> = body
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.filter(|(_, v)| !v.is_null())
.map(|(k, _)| k.as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(set, ["login_name", "max_repo_creation", "source_id"]);
assert_eq!(body["login_name"], "alice");
assert_eq!(body["source_id"], 0);
}
/// An account that already existed is locked down too: the node is
/// re-run, and an account created before this lockdown existed must
/// not keep repo creation just because the create step folded to
/// success. 409 rather than 422 so the case doesn't hinge on how a 422
/// is disambiguated.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_existing_agent_user_still_gets_repo_creation_disabled() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(
(409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#),
own_account_get("alice"),
(200, "{}"),
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
}
/// A refused lockdown fails the node with Forgejo's own message, rather
/// than warning and reporting the account as provisioned — that is
/// `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_repo_creation_disabled` shape, which leaves an
/// agent able to create and self-merge with nothing marked failed.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_refused_lockdown_fails_the_node() {
let (client, _seen) = stub_forge(
(201, "{}"),
own_account_get("alice"),
(403, r#"{"message":"token does not have required scope"}"#),
)
.await;
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(msg.contains("max_repo_creation"), "{msg}");
assert!(msg.contains("token does not have required scope"), "{msg}");
}
/// The guard this PR adds: a name collision with a pre-existing
/// non-agent account (or any account whose email isn't the
/// `{agent}@hyperhive.local` marker) must fail the node rather than
/// PATCH `max_repo_creation`/`source_id` onto an account nobody
/// verified this node created. 409 create-fold, same as
/// `an_existing_agent_user_still_gets_repo_creation_disabled` — the
/// fold itself is untouched by this PR; the fix lives in the read right
/// before the PATCH.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_name_collision_with_a_non_agent_account_fails_without_patching() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(
(409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#),
(200, r#"{"email":"someone@example.com"}"#),
(200, "{}"),
)
.await;
let err = client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap_err();
let msg = format!("{err:#}");
assert!(msg.contains("alice"), "{msg}");
assert!(
msg.contains("not this agent's"),
"must name the collision, got: {msg}"
);
assert!(
lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").is_none(),
"a collision must never reach the PATCH"
);
}
/// A legacy account `hive-c0re::forge::users::ensure_user_exists` (or
/// its `ensure_user_email` alignment pass) created carries the same
/// `{agent}@hyperhive.local` marker, plus the `login_name`/`source_id`
/// fields its own `sparse_edit_user_option` sets — this node must still
/// lock such an account down, not just ones it created itself.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_legacy_hive_created_agent_account_still_gets_locked_down() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(
(409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#),
(
200,
r#"{"id":42,"login":"alice","login_name":"alice","email":"alice@hyperhive.local","source_id":0}"#,
),
(200, "{}"),
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
}
/// argus's round-2 🟡: `hive-c0re`'s `ensure_user_email` alignment pass
/// (the thing that rewrites a legacy `{name}@hive.local` account to
/// `{name}@hyperhive.local`) only runs on the forge-host hive, and only
/// once it has a core token and has ticked — so a real, pre-existing
/// agent can still be sitting on the pre-alignment `@hive.local` email
/// when this node reads it. The guard must accept that value too, not
/// just the aligned one, or a real agent would fail with "not this
/// agent's" during the rollout window.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_pre_alignment_legacy_email_still_gets_locked_down() {
let (client, seen) = stub_forge(
(409, r#"{"message":"user already exists"}"#),
(200, r#"{"email":"alice@hive.local"}"#),
(200, "{}"),
)
.await;
client.ensure_agent_user("alice").await.unwrap();
let body = lockdown_patch(&seen, "alice").expect("no lockdown PATCH sent");
assert_eq!(body["max_repo_creation"], 0);
}
}