diff --git a/hive-priv/src/main.rs b/hive-priv/src/main.rs
index fb9b8ee7..2b819c7c 100644
--- a/hive-priv/src/main.rs
+++ b/hive-priv/src/main.rs
@@ -1700,18 +1700,61 @@ fn validate_forge_admin_arg(arg: &str) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 /// Redact a line before it hits the (root-readable, but still
-/// unnecessarily exposed) host journal. `forgejo admin user create
-/// --random-password` prints the generated password straight to stdout —
-/// case-insensitive substring match on "password" is deliberately broad
-/// (not pinned to forgejo's exact wording, which can change across
-/// versions) so any password-bearing line gets caught rather than relying
-/// on a phrase that could silently drift out of sync.
-fn redact_password_line(line: &str) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> {
+/// unnecessarily exposed) host journal.
+///
+/// Two independent rules, because the previous single rule failed open.
+/// It matched only the substring "password", chosen to be robust against
+/// forgejo *rewording* its password line — and the leak arrived from the
+/// other axis entirely: a **different kind of secret** on a differently
+/// worded line. `forgejo admin user generate-access-token` prints
+/// `Access token was successfully created: <40 hex>`, which contains no
+/// "password" and went to the journal verbatim for every agent ever
+/// provisioned.
+///
+/// So the second rule matches on **shape, not vocabulary**: a long
+/// unbroken run of secret-alphabet characters. A new secret type is then
+/// caught by default rather than by someone remembering to add a keyword.
+///
+/// ⚠️ This deliberately over-matches. A nix store hash is also a long
+/// opaque run and will redact its line. That is the correct direction to
+/// be wrong in: the cost of a false positive is one less log line, and
+/// the cost of a false negative is a live credential in a journal that
+/// any `read_host_journal` holder can read.
+fn redact_secret_line(line: &str) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> {
     if line.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("password") {
-        std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed("[redacted: line mentions a password]")
-    } else {
-        std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(line)
+        return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed("[redacted: line mentions a password]");
     }
+    if contains_secret_shaped_run(line) {
+        return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed("[redacted: line contains a secret-shaped token]");
+    }
+    std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(line)
+}
+
+/// True when the line contains an unbroken run of at least 32 characters
+/// from the hex / base64url alphabet. 32 sits below forgejo's 40-hex
+/// access token and above the ordinary words and path segments that
+/// appear in `forgejo admin` output.
+///
+/// ⚠️ Scans for a RUN, not for a whitespace-delimited word. An earlier
+/// version split on whitespace and required the whole word to match,
+/// which a secret with punctuation glued to it defeats: `"<token>,"` and
+/// `"[<token>]"` both fail an all-chars check on the word while still
+/// containing the credential in full. Whitespace is not what delimits a
+/// secret — the alphabet is (thanks @argus for catching it).
+fn contains_secret_shaped_run(line: &str) -> bool {
+    const MIN: usize = 32;
+    let mut run = 0usize;
+    for b in line.bytes() {
+        if b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(b, b'+' | b'/' | b'=' | b'_' | b'-') {
+            run += 1;
+            if run >= MIN {
+                return true;
+            }
+        } else {
+            run = 0;
+        }
+    }
+    false
 }
 
 /// Run `forgejo admin <args>` inside the `hive-forge` container as the
@@ -1741,18 +1784,33 @@ async fn run_forge_admin(args: &[String]) -> Result<(String, String)> {
         .context("invoke nixos-container run hive-forge -- forgejo admin")?;
     let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned();
     let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).into_owned();
+    // stdout at DEBUG, not INFO: on the success path this stream carries
+    // the *product* of the command (the freshly minted token, the created
+    // user's details) and nothing an operator needs at default verbosity.
+    // Redaction stays on as the second layer — the level decides who sees
+    // it, the redactor decides what it says, and neither alone is enough.
     for line in stdout.lines() {
-        tracing::info!(target: "forgejo-admin", "{}", redact_password_line(line));
+        tracing::debug!(target: "forgejo-admin", "{}", redact_secret_line(line));
     }
     for line in stderr.lines() {
-        tracing::warn!(target: "forgejo-admin", "{}", redact_password_line(line));
+        tracing::warn!(target: "forgejo-admin", "{}", redact_secret_line(line));
     }
     if !out.status.success() {
+        // Redact here too. The error string is propagated to the caller and
+        // ends up logged; a partial-failure stderr can carry the same
+        // material stdout would have. Redacting the log but not the error
+        // is the same "two of three sites" gap that makes these leaks
+        // survive a fix.
+        let safe_stderr: String = stderr
+            .lines()
+            .map(|l| redact_secret_line(l).into_owned())
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join("; ");
         bail!(
             "forgejo admin {} failed ({}): {}",
             args.join(" "),
             out.status,
-            stderr.trim()
+            safe_stderr.trim()
         );
     }
     Ok((stdout, stderr))
@@ -2480,8 +2538,8 @@ async fn sync_agent_tmpfiles(agents: &[AgentTmpfilesEntry]) -> Result<(String, S
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::{
-        OwnedFd, PAUSED_MARKER_FILE, PrivRequest, check_fd_agreement, limits_dropin_body,
-        redact_password_line, remove_marker_in, write_state_file_nofollow,
+        OwnedFd, PAUSED_MARKER_FILE, PrivRequest, check_fd_agreement, contains_secret_shaped_run,
+        limits_dropin_body, redact_secret_line, remove_marker_in, write_state_file_nofollow,
     };
     use std::path::PathBuf;
     use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering};
@@ -2586,19 +2644,84 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn redacts_lines_mentioning_password_case_insensitively() {
         assert_eq!(
-            redact_password_line("New password: hunter2"),
+            redact_secret_line("New password: hunter2"),
             "[redacted: line mentions a password]"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            redact_password_line("PASSWORD=hunter2"),
+            redact_secret_line("PASSWORD=hunter2"),
             "[redacted: line mentions a password]"
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            redact_password_line("User \"foo\" was successfully created."),
+            redact_secret_line("User \"foo\" was successfully created."),
             "User \"foo\" was successfully created."
         );
     }
 
+    /// The regression this function exists for. The keyword rule passes
+    /// this line straight through — it says nothing about a password — so
+    /// only the shape rule catches it.
+    #[test]
+    fn redacts_access_token_line_which_mentions_no_password() {
+        let line =
+            "Access token was successfully created: 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567";
+        assert!(
+            !line.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("password"),
+            "fixture must not contain the keyword, or it proves nothing"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_secret_line(line),
+            "[redacted: line contains a secret-shaped token]"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_shape_boundaries() {
+        // Ordinary forgejo-admin output survives: no run is long enough.
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_secret_line("Command 'user' 'create' finished with no errors."),
+            "Command 'user' 'create' finished with no errors."
+        );
+        // 31 chars is below the floor, 32 is at it.
+        assert!(!contains_secret_shaped_run(&"a".repeat(31)));
+        assert!(contains_secret_shaped_run(&"a".repeat(32)));
+        // Punctuation breaks the run — a sentence never trips it however long.
+        assert!(!contains_secret_shaped_run(
+            "this.is.a.very.long.dotted.identifier.but.not.a.secret"
+        ));
+        // base64url and hex alphabets both count.
+        assert!(contains_secret_shaped_run(
+            "ZGVhZGJlZWZkZWFkYmVlZmRlYWRiZWVmZGVhZA=="
+        ));
+        assert!(contains_secret_shaped_run(
+            "aG93-dy_there-aG93dy1theresomething"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// argus on the review: a whitespace-delimited check is defeated by
+    /// punctuation glued to the secret — the punctuation joins the "word"
+    /// and fails the alphabet test for the whole run, while the credential
+    /// sits there in full. Scanning for a RUN rather than a WORD closes it.
+    /// These are the shapes that used to slip through.
+    #[test]
+    fn secret_is_caught_with_punctuation_glued_to_it() {
+        const TOK: &str = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567";
+        for line in [
+            format!("token: {TOK},"),
+            format!("token: {TOK}."),
+            format!("using [{TOK}] now"),
+            format!("value=\"{TOK}\""),
+            format!("(created {TOK})"),
+            // no whitespace anywhere -- one glued blob
+            format!("Bearer:{TOK};next"),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                redact_secret_line(&line),
+                "[redacted: line contains a secret-shaped token]",
+                "leaked through: {line}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Unique scratch dir per test, no external tempfile dep.
     fn scratch() -> PathBuf {
         static CTR: AtomicU32 = AtomicU32::new(0);