vinzenz/hyperhive
vinzenz/hyperhive
Watch
0
0
Fork
You've already forked hyperhive
 0
Code Activity

Compare commits

base: vinzenz:0d88ca5e7fa9031ce46b7e74fc2a4512b81f2e70
Branches Tags
vinzenz:main
..
compare: vinzenz:7396903994204b661b373026ddd75e9c75abcb0d
Branches Tags
vinzenz:main
12 changed files with 98 additions and 467 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

1
Cargo.lock generated
View file

@ -4701,7 +4701,6 @@ dependencies = [
"sha2 0.11.0",
"swarm-authelia-bridge-sock",
"swarm-queue-client",
"swarm-secret-client",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",

33
hive-c0re/src/workers/credential.rs
View file

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use hive_types::Ident;
use swarm_queue_client::CredentialNotice;
use swarm_secret_client::{SecretStore, matrix};
use swarm_secret_client::{SecretStore, path};
/// Read the credential `notice` names and write it into the agent's state dir.
///
@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ pub async fn deliver(notice: &CredentialNotice, cert_role: &str) -> Result<()> {
// not a round trip to the store.
let agent = Ident::parse(&notice.agent)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("agent name {:?} off the queue: {e}", notice.agent))?;
let secret_path = matrix::account_path(&notice.agent, &notice.account)
let secret_path = path::matrix_account(&notice.agent, &notice.account)
.context("building the credential's path in the store")?;
let store = SecretStore::from_env(cert_role)
.await
.context("connecting to the swarm secret store")?;
let credential: matrix::Credential = store
let value = store
.read(&secret_path)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("reading {secret_path} from the store"))?;
@ -52,18 +52,11 @@ pub async fn deliver(notice: &CredentialNotice, cert_role: &str) -> Result<()> {
// arrives owned by `hive-core` at 0600 — the daemon wakes on it appearing
// and cannot read it. hive-priv also builds the filename, so the name the
// watcher globs for is decided in one place now.
//
// A homeserver is passed through when the stored credential carries one;
// hive-priv then writes the `matrix-account-<name>.json` sidecar beside the
// token, which is how the daemon discovers an extra account's homeserver
// without a static `matrixAccounts` entry. Credentials written before that
// field existed carry `None`, and the sidecar is simply not written — the
// account then needs a configured entry, exactly as it did before.
crate::priv_client::write_agent_matrix_token(
agent.as_str(),
&credential.value,
&value,
Some(&notice.account),
credential.homeserver.as_deref(),
None,
)
.await
}
@ -74,16 +67,16 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn a_name_that_could_address_another_agent_is_refused() {
// `matrix::account_path` owns this rule; asserted here because this is
// `path::matrix_account` owns this rule; asserted here because this is
// the module that feeds it names off the wire.
assert!(matrix::account_path("../argus", "ccc").is_err());
assert!(matrix::account_path("dmatrix", "../../etc/x").is_err());
assert!(matrix::account_path("dmatrix", "ccc").is_ok());
assert!(path::matrix_account("../argus", "ccc").is_err());
assert!(path::matrix_account("dmatrix", "../../etc/x").is_err());
assert!(path::matrix_account("dmatrix", "ccc").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn an_agent_name_off_the_queue_must_pass_the_ident_parser_too() {
// Two independent refusals, not one restated: `matrix::account_path`
// Two independent refusals, not one restated: `path::matrix_account`
// guards the address in the *store*, and `Ident` guards the name this
// module hands to hive-priv, which builds the on-disk path from it.
for bad in ["../argus", "dmatrix/../argus", "Dmatrix", "d matrix", ""] {
@ -102,7 +95,7 @@ mod tests {
fn an_account_name_off_the_queue_is_refused_for_the_store_path() {
for bad in ["../argus", "a/b", "a b", ""] {
assert!(
matrix::account_path("dmatrix", bad).is_err(),
path::matrix_account("dmatrix", bad).is_err(),
"account {bad:?} must be refused"
);
}
@ -110,7 +103,7 @@ mod tests {
// passing because everything is refused. Uppercase and underscore are
// deliberate — `matrixAccounts` is an attrset, so both are names an
// operator can already write, and hive-priv must accept them too.
assert!(matrix::account_path("dmatrix", "ops-relay").is_ok());
assert!(matrix::account_path("dmatrix", "Ops_Relay9").is_ok());
assert!(path::matrix_account("dmatrix", "ops-relay").is_ok());
assert!(path::matrix_account("dmatrix", "Ops_Relay9").is_ok());
}
}

44
nix/host-modules/swarm-controller.nix
View file

@ -18,37 +18,6 @@ let
deployCfg = config.services.hyperhive.deploy;
autheliaCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia;
# Where the secret store is, and whether this host holds the controller's
# own leaf for it. ⚠️ The controller's pair, NOT `deploy.bao.clientCertFile`
# — that one is the hive reader's, and its policy scopes a hive's own
# secrets. The two are deliberately separate identities.
#
# Gated on the leaf, never on `deploy.bao.enable`: a controller three
# networks away from the store holds a leaf issued out of band and wants
# exactly this wiring. Same rule ./glue-controller-bao-identity.nix states
# for the paths themselves.
baoCfg = config.services.hyperhive.swarm.bao;
haveBaoIdentity =
deployCfg.swarm-controller.baoClientCertFile != null
&& deployCfg.swarm-controller.baoClientKeyFile != null;
# `swarm_secret_client` reads these spellings explicitly rather than
# vaultrs's `VAULT_*` defaults — falling through to those builds a client
# with no identity and fails at the TLS handshake, naming neither. `%d` and
# not the paths themselves: see the `LoadCredential` below.
baoEnv =
lib.optionalAttrs haveBaoIdentity {
BAO_ADDR = "https://${baoCfg.domain}:${toString baoCfg.port}";
BAO_CLIENT_CERT = "%d/bao-client.pem";
BAO_CLIENT_KEY = "%d/bao-client-key.pem";
}
// lib.optionalAttrs (haveBaoIdentity && deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null) {
# Absent means the system trust store — right for a real CA, wrong for
# the self-signed one ./glue-bao-tls.nix mints, which is why that file
# names this path rather than leaving it to a default.
BAO_CACERT = "%d/bao-ca.pem";
};
# What `swarmctl` needs in order to act on authelia from the host.
#
# Only set when authelia actually runs **here**: the controller can be
@ -676,17 +645,7 @@ in
]
++ lib.optional (
deployCfg.swarm-controller.forgeTokenFile != null
) "forge-token:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.forgeTokenFile}"
# The store identity, same shape and same reason as hive-c0re's: the
# key is root-owned `0600` and this daemon runs as `swarm-controller`,
# so it never gets read access to the original file.
++ lib.optionals haveBaoIdentity [
"bao-client.pem:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.baoClientCertFile}"
"bao-client-key.pem:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.baoClientKeyFile}"
]
++ lib.optional (
haveBaoIdentity && deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile != null
) "bao-ca.pem:${deployCfg.bao.serverCaFile}";
) "forge-token:${deployCfg.swarm-controller.forgeTokenFile}";
# The placeholder default that makes the above non-fatal.
# `LoadCredential=` takes priority over `SetCredential=`, so this is
@ -811,7 +770,6 @@ in
// webhookEnv
// authBridgeEnv
// swarmNameEnv
// baoEnv
// otelEnv;
};

36
nix/module-eval.nix
View file

@ -570,42 +570,6 @@ let
in
c.baoClientCertFile == null && c.baoClientKeyFile == null;
}
{
# Being *pointed at* a leaf and *being handed* one are different claims,
# and the options above were the first without the second — declared,
# defaulted, and read by nothing. This is the arm that makes them reach
# the process.
#
# ⚠️ The LoadCredential source is asserted, not just the `%d` name: the
# controller's leaf and the hive reader's are two identities with two
# policies, and wiring `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` here would satisfy
# every `%d`-only check while giving the daemon a policy that cannot
# write an agent's credential.
name = "the controller is handed its own store leaf, not the hive reader's";
ok =
let
s = baoControllerHere.systemd.services;
in
s ? swarm-controller
&& (s.swarm-controller.environment ? BAO_ADDR)
&& (s.swarm-controller.environment.BAO_CLIENT_CERT or null) == "%d/bao-client.pem"
&& (s.swarm-controller.environment.BAO_CLIENT_KEY or null) == "%d/bao-client-key.pem"
&& builtins.elem "bao-client.pem:/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/controller.pem" s.swarm-controller.serviceConfig.LoadCredential
&& builtins.elem "bao-client-key.pem:/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/controller-key.pem" s.swarm-controller.serviceConfig.LoadCredential;
}
{
# Absence arm for the one above, and what makes it mean anything: a
# controller with no leaf gets no store environment at all rather than
# variables naming files this host never receives.
name = "a controller with no store leaf is given no store environment";
ok =
let
s = controllerNoStore.systemd.services;
in
s ? swarm-controller
&& !(s.swarm-controller.environment ? BAO_ADDR)
&& !(lib.any (c: lib.hasPrefix "bao-" c) s.swarm-controller.serviceConfig.LoadCredential);
}
{
# The CN is an interface between two files: the store writes a role that
# matches it, the PKI mints a leaf that carries it. They read one option,

5
swarm-controller/Cargo.toml
View file

@ -85,11 +85,6 @@ swarm-authelia-bridge-sock.workspace = true
# not get to declare them privately.
#
swarm-queue-client = { workspace = true, features = ["kv"] }
# `matrix_account.rs` writes the credential this daemon's route accepts. Same
# crate the hive reads it back with, which is the point: the path, the field
# name and the object's shape are agreements between the two ends, and a
# second spelling here would be a store this hive could not read.
swarm-secret-client.workspace = true
# `otel_http_client.rs`'s `AuthenticatedHttpClient` — an
# `opentelemetry_http::HttpClient` impl authenticated with this crate's own
# `swarm-queue-client` identity. Lives in this crate rather than

36
swarm-controller/src/main.rs
View file

@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ mod auth;
mod config_pr;
mod forge;
mod issue_report;
mod matrix_account;
mod otel_http_client;
mod status;
mod vcs_metrics;
@ -748,13 +747,23 @@ fn agent_status_reader(
})
}
/// A hive name that is shaped like one and names a hive this swarm has.
/// Both handlers below take the same hive name and reject it the same way.
///
/// Reports the status and the detail rather than a rendered
/// `ProblemDetails`: that type is 232 bytes, which makes every `Result` in
/// this path pay for the error case it usually does not take. The handlers
/// render at the boundary, where the body is actually needed.
fn swarm_hive(state: &AppState, hive: &str) -> Result<String, (axum::http::StatusCode, String)> {
fn declaration_target(
state: &AppState,
hive: &str,
) -> Result<(Arc<wanted::WantedWriter>, String), (axum::http::StatusCode, String)> {
let writer = state.wanted.clone().ok_or_else(|| {
(
axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"this deployment wired up no swarm queue, so there is nowhere to publish a declaration"
.to_owned(),
)
})?;
let hive = hive_types::Ident::parse(hive)
.map_err(|reason| (axum::http::StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, reason.to_owned()))?
.into_string();
@ -767,25 +776,7 @@ fn swarm_hive(state: &AppState, hive: &str) -> Result<String, (axum::http::Statu
format!("{hive:?} is not a hive in this swarm"),
));
}
Ok(hive)
}
/// Both declaration handlers below take the same hive name and reject it the
/// same way, and need the writer besides.
fn declaration_target(
state: &AppState,
hive: &str,
) -> Result<(Arc<wanted::WantedWriter>, String), (axum::http::StatusCode, String)> {
// Before the name checks, so a deployment with no queue answers 503
// whatever the caller spelled.
let writer = state.wanted.clone().ok_or_else(|| {
(
axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"this deployment wired up no swarm queue, so there is nowhere to publish a declaration"
.to_owned(),
)
})?;
Ok((writer, swarm_hive(state, hive)?))
Ok((writer, hive))
}
/// Declare what this swarm wants of one agent on one hive.
@ -1661,7 +1652,6 @@ fn build_app(state: AppState) -> axum::Router {
.routes(routes!(get_agents))
.routes(routes!(get_agents_status))
.routes(routes!(set_agent_state))
.routes(routes!(matrix_account::put_matrix_account))
.routes(routes!(get_hive_wanted))
.routes(routes!(issue_report::get_repos))
.routes(routes!(issue_report::get_issue_report_all))

144
swarm-controller/src/matrix_account.rs
View file

@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
//! Give one agent an external matrix account: put the credential in the
//! swarm's secret store, then tell that agent's hive it is there.
//!
//! The hive end is `hive-c0re/src/workers/credential.rs`, which reads the
//! value under its own identity and writes it into the agent's state dir. The
//! notice carries only names, so the queue never holds the secret — see
//! [`swarm_queue_client::credential_subject`] for why that is a requirement
//! rather than a preference.
//!
//! ⚠️ Store first, notify second, and the order cannot be swapped: a notice
//! that overtakes its own write reaches a hive that reads nothing, and the
//! hive deliberately does not retry.
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::State;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use serde::Deserialize;
use swarm_queue_client::{CredentialNotice, credential_subject};
use swarm_secret_client::{SecretStore, matrix};
use utoipa::ToSchema;
use super::{AppState, error_problem, swarm_hive};
/// The cert-auth role this daemon logs into the secret store as.
///
/// `nix/host-modules/swarm-bao.nix`'s `controllerPolicyName` creates the role,
/// names the policy after it, and `nix/module-eval.nix` pins the literal.
///
/// ⚠️ Not the certificate's CN. The role *matches on* the CN
/// (`allowed_common_names`), so the two are deliberately different strings.
const CERT_ROLE: &str = "swarm-controller";
/// The credential to store for one agent's external matrix account.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct PutMatrixAccountRequest {
/// The access token. Never logged, and never returned by this route.
token: String,
/// The account's homeserver, when it is not this swarm's own.
///
/// Stored beside the token rather than sent on the notice: a notice is a
/// queue message, so a homeserver carried there would exist only in
/// flight, with nowhere to reconstruct it from on a re-delivery.
#[schema(example = "https://matrix.example.org")]
homeserver: Option<String>,
}
/// Store an agent's external matrix account credential and notify its hive.
///
/// Idempotent: the store keeps versions, so repeating a call replaces the
/// value the agent will next read rather than adding a second account.
#[utoipa::path(
put,
path = "/api/hives/{hive}/agents/{agent}/matrix-accounts/{account}",
params(
("hive" = String, Path, description = "hive whose agent receives the credential"),
("agent" = String, Path, description = "agent the credential is delivered to"),
("account" = String, Path, description = "the external account this credential authenticates as"),
),
request_body = PutMatrixAccountRequest,
responses(
(status = 200, description = "stored, and the hive has been told"),
(status = 400, description = "a name is not an identifier, the account name is not a single path segment, or the hive is not in this swarm (problem+json)", body = String),
(status = 503, description = "no swarm queue is wired up (problem+json)", body = String),
(status = 500, description = "the store write, the encode or the publish failed (problem+json)", body = String),
),
tag = "agents"
)]
pub async fn put_matrix_account(
State(state): State<AppState>,
axum::extract::Path((hive, agent, account)): axum::extract::Path<(String, String, String)>,
Json(req): Json<PutMatrixAccountRequest>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, problem_details::ProblemDetails> {
// The queue first, so a deployment that has none answers 503 whatever the
// caller spelled — and before the store is touched, so a request that
// could never be delivered does not leave a credential behind.
let Some(status) = state.status.as_ref() else {
return Err(error_problem(
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"this deployment wired up no swarm queue, so there is no hive to notify",
));
};
let hive = swarm_hive(&state, &hive).map_err(|(s, d)| error_problem(s, &d))?;
let agent = hive_types::Ident::parse(&agent)
.map_err(|reason| error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, reason))?
.into_string();
// Built before the store is reached, so a malformed account name costs a
// parse and not a login. `account_path` is the validator: the store's
// charset is its rule to state, not this handler's to restate.
let secret_path = matrix::account_path(&agent, &account)
.map_err(|e| error_problem(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, &e.to_string()))?;
let store = SecretStore::from_env(CERT_ROLE).await.map_err(|e| {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "connecting to the swarm secret store failed");
error_problem(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string())
})?;
store
.write(
&secret_path,
&matrix::Credential {
value: req.token,
homeserver: req.homeserver,
},
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
// The path names the agent and the account; the value is not in it.
tracing::warn!(path = %secret_path, error = %e, "writing the credential failed");
error_problem(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, &e.to_string())
})?;
let notice = CredentialNotice {
agent: agent.clone(),
account: account.clone(),
};
let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&notice).map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("encoding the credential notice failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
let subject = credential_subject(&hive);
let client = status.queue_client();
client
.publish(subject.clone(), payload.into())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("publishing to {subject} failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
// Flushed for the reason `publish_deploy` flushes: `publish` hands the
// message to the connection's write buffer and returns, so without this
// the response can outrun the notice it reports as sent.
client.flush().await.map_err(|e| {
error_problem(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
&format!("flushing the credential notice to {subject} failed: {e}"),
)
})?;
tracing::info!(%subject, %hive, %agent, %account, "credential stored; hive notified");
Ok(StatusCode::OK)
}

13
swarm-secret-client/README.md
View file

@ -61,23 +61,12 @@ read an error about, and none of them needs a reachable store to happen.
## Names that arrive from elsewhere
`matrix::account_path` is fallible, which for a string formatter needs saying:
`path::matrix_account` is fallible, which for a string formatter needs saying:
its segments are an agent name from the topology and an account name from that
agent's own config. A `/` turns one agent's segment into another agent's
directory and `..` walks out of the prefix entirely, so the charset it accepts
is deliberately narrower than what the store would.
## One module per kind of secret
`client` moves whatever type a caller names; it decodes nothing itself. What a
stored object _holds_ is stated in the module that also builds its path —
`matrix` today, and a second kind of swarm secret gets a module beside it.
The split is deliberate. A single shared struct that grows one field per
consumer ends up carrying, on every path, a field only one path's reader has
ever heard of; and the two things a kind of secret must pin — where it lives
and what is in it — are one agreement that reads worse split across modules.
## What this crate does not do
It has no opinion on **what** a caller may read. That is the policy attached to

44
swarm-secret-client/src/client.rs
View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//! A logged-in handle on the store, built from this deployment's environment.
use serde::{Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use vaultrs::client::{Client, VaultClient, VaultClientSettingsBuilder};
use crate::{Error, path::MOUNT};
@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ pub const ENV_CACERT: &str = "BAO_CACERT";
/// The auth mount a cert login goes through, unless a caller says otherwise.
pub const DEFAULT_CERT_MOUNT: &str = "cert";
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct Credential {
/// `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` reads the store with
/// `bao kv get -field=value`, so this name is load-bearing for a reader
/// this crate does not control. Renaming it silently breaks that unit.
value: String,
}
/// Where the store is and which identity we present to it.
///
/// Separate from the connect so the environment can be checked without one:
@ -130,25 +138,25 @@ impl SecretStore {
Ok(Self { inner })
}
/// Read the object stored at `path`, decoded as `T`.
///
/// The shape belongs to whoever owns the path — see [`crate::matrix`] for
/// the one kind of secret that exists — so this moves bytes and knows no
/// fields.
/// Read the credential stored at `path`.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::Vault`] when the path does not exist, the token's policy does
/// not cover it, or the stored object does not decode as `T`.
pub async fn read<T: DeserializeOwned>(&self, path: &str) -> Result<T, Error> {
Ok(vaultrs::kv2::read(&self.inner, MOUNT, path).await?)
/// not cover it, or the stored object has no `value` field.
pub async fn read(&self, path: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
let c: Credential = vaultrs::kv2::read(&self.inner, MOUNT, path).await?;
Ok(c.value)
}
/// Write `value` at `path`, creating a new version.
/// Write `value` as the credential at `path`, creating a new version.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::Vault`] when the token's policy does not cover the path.
pub async fn write<T: Serialize + Sync>(&self, path: &str, value: &T) -> Result<(), Error> {
vaultrs::kv2::set(&self.inner, MOUNT, path, value).await?;
pub async fn write(&self, path: &str, value: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
let body = Credential {
value: value.to_owned(),
};
vaultrs::kv2::set(&self.inner, MOUNT, path, &body).await?;
Ok(())
}
}
@ -225,4 +233,16 @@ mod tests {
other => panic!("wanted an Identity error, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[test]
fn the_value_field_matches_what_the_nix_reader_asks_for() {
// The literal is the point: `bao kv get -field=value` is the other end
// of this agreement and lives in a file no Rust test can reach, so the
// name is pinned here rather than derived from the struct.
let json = serde_json::to_string(&Credential {
value: "t".to_owned(),
})
.expect("a struct of one String serialises");
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"value":"t"}"#);
}
}

14
swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs
View file

@ -2,18 +2,12 @@
//! reach it.
//!
//! The HTTP is [`vaultrs`]'s job. What this crate owns is the *agreements* —
//! the rules every path obeys ([`path`]), the translation from this
//! deployment's environment into a logged-in client ([`client`]), and, per kind
//! of secret, the path it lives at together with the fields it holds
//! ([`matrix`]). Each of those is a thing the controller and a hive must say
//! identically, so it is said once here.
//!
//! [`client`] is deliberately ignorant of all of it: it moves whatever type a
//! caller names, so a second kind of secret is a new module beside [`matrix`]
//! and not another field on a struct shared with it.
//! the path a credential is written to and read from ([`path`]), the field its
//! bytes live in, and the translation from this deployment's environment into
//! a logged-in client ([`client`]). Each of those is a thing the controller and
//! a hive must say identically, so it is said once here.
pub mod client;
pub mod matrix;
pub mod path;
pub use client::SecretStore;

134
swarm-secret-client/src/matrix.rs
View file

@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
//! The matrix agreement: where an account's credential lives in the store, and
//! what the object at that path holds.
//!
//! Both halves are one agreement and neither end of it is senior, so they are
//! stated together here rather than split between the path module and the
//! client. Nothing in [`crate::client`] knows this shape — it moves whatever
//! type a caller names — so a second kind of swarm secret gets its own module
//! beside this one instead of another field on a shared struct.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
Error,
path::{AGENT_PREFIX, checked_segment},
};
/// The path holding `agent`'s token for the external matrix account `account`.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when either name contains anything but
/// `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`, which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing
/// another agent's secret.
pub fn account_path(agent: &str, account: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
checked_segment("agent", agent)?;
checked_segment("account", account)?;
Ok(format!("{AGENT_PREFIX}/{agent}/matrix/{account}"))
}
/// What an account's path holds: the token, plus the homeserver it belongs to.
///
/// The homeserver rides with the token rather than on the queue notice that
/// triggers a delivery, because a notice is not persistence — re-delivering a
/// credential has to reconstruct it, and the store is the only thing that keeps
/// it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Credential {
/// `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` reads the store with
/// `bao kv get -field=value`, so this name is load-bearing for a reader
/// this crate does not control. Renaming it silently breaks that unit.
pub value: String,
/// Absent on every object written before this field existed, and KV2 keeps
/// those versions forever. **`Option` is what tolerates that** — serde
/// decodes a missing field to `None` for an optional type, so the type is
/// the compatibility guarantee and changing it to a bare `String` is what
/// would break every stored credential at once.
///
/// `skip_serializing_if` is doing separate work: without it a token-only
/// credential serialises `"homeserver":null`, and this object is read by
/// `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` with `bao kv get -field=value`.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub homeserver: Option<String>,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_well_formed_pair_lands_under_the_agent_prefix() {
let p = account_path("atlas", "ops-relay").expect("both segments are legal");
assert_eq!(p, "swarm/agents/atlas/matrix/ops-relay");
assert!(p.starts_with(AGENT_PREFIX));
}
#[test]
fn a_segment_cannot_escape_its_own_directory() {
// Each of these is a *different* way to address another agent's tree,
// and the last two are the ones a charset check catches but a
// `contains("..")` check does not.
for bad in [
"../argus",
"atlas/../argus",
"atlas/matrix",
"a b",
"a.b",
"",
] {
assert!(
account_path(bad, "ops-relay").is_err(),
"agent segment {bad:?} must be refused"
);
assert!(
account_path("atlas", bad).is_err(),
"account segment {bad:?} must be refused"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
// The control for the test above: if `checked_segment` rejected
// everything, the escape cases would pass for the wrong reason.
assert!(account_path("a-b_C9", "d-e_F0").is_ok());
}
/// KV2 keeps every prior version, so objects written before `homeserver`
/// existed are still readable and still get decoded by this type. What
/// tolerates the absence is the field being `Option`, not any attribute:
/// making it a bare `String` would not surface as a migration, it would
/// surface as every previously-stored credential becoming unreadable at
/// once.
#[test]
fn a_credential_stored_before_the_homeserver_field_still_decodes() {
let old: Credential = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"value":"t"}"#)
.expect("an object written by the previous version must still decode");
assert_eq!(old.value, "t");
assert_eq!(old.homeserver, None);
// Control: the field is genuinely read when present, so the arm above
// is about absence being tolerated rather than the field being ignored.
let new: Credential = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"value":"t","homeserver":"https://hs"}"#)
.expect("an object with the field decodes too");
assert_eq!(new.homeserver.as_deref(), Some("https://hs"));
}
#[test]
fn the_value_field_matches_what_the_nix_reader_asks_for() {
// The literal is the point: `bao kv get -field=value` is the other end
// of this agreement and lives in a file no Rust test can reach, so the
// name is pinned here rather than derived from the struct.
//
// It doubles as the compatibility control for `homeserver`: a
// token-only credential must still serialise to exactly these bytes,
// with no `homeserver` key at all, so adding the field cannot change
// what that unit reads.
let json = serde_json::to_string(&Credential {
value: "t".to_owned(),
homeserver: None,
})
.expect("a struct of one String serialises");
assert_eq!(json, r#"{"value":"t"}"#);
}
}

61
swarm-secret-client/src/path.rs
View file

@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
//! The rules every path into the store obeys, whatever kind of secret it
//! addresses.
//! Where a credential lives, for both ends of the store.
//!
//! The controller writes and a hive reads, and neither is senior to the other,
//! so what they must agree on is stated once here rather than at each call
//! site. A *particular* kind of secret builds its path from these pieces in its
//! own module — [`crate::matrix`] is the one that exists.
//! so the path they must agree on is built here rather than formatted at each
//! call site.
use crate::Error;
@ -54,15 +52,34 @@ pub fn checked_segment(kind: &'static str, value: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
/// The path holding `agent`'s token for the external matrix account `account`.
///
/// # Errors
/// [`Error::PathSegment`] when either name contains anything but
/// `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`, which is what keeps one agent's name from addressing
/// another agent's secret.
pub fn matrix_account(agent: &str, account: &str) -> Result<String, Error> {
checked_segment("agent", agent)?;
checked_segment("account", account)?;
Ok(format!("{AGENT_PREFIX}/{agent}/matrix/{account}"))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_segment_that_could_change_a_paths_shape_is_refused() {
// Each of these is a *different* way to reach outside the segment the
// caller meant, and the last two are the ones a charset check catches
// but a `contains("..")` check does not.
fn a_well_formed_pair_lands_under_the_agent_prefix() {
let p = matrix_account("atlas", "ops-relay").expect("both segments are legal");
assert_eq!(p, "swarm/agents/atlas/matrix/ops-relay");
assert!(p.starts_with(AGENT_PREFIX));
}
#[test]
fn a_segment_cannot_escape_its_own_directory() {
// Each of these is a *different* way to address another agent's tree,
// and the last two are the ones a charset check catches but a
// `contains("..")` check does not.
for bad in [
"../argus",
"atlas/../argus",
@ -72,8 +89,12 @@ mod tests {
"",
] {
assert!(
checked_segment("agent", bad).is_err(),
"segment {bad:?} must be refused"
matrix_account(bad, "ops-relay").is_err(),
"agent segment {bad:?} must be refused"
);
assert!(
matrix_account("atlas", bad).is_err(),
"account segment {bad:?} must be refused"
);
}
}
@ -81,21 +102,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn the_legal_charset_is_actually_reachable() {
// The control for the test above: if `checked_segment` rejected
// everything, the escape cases would pass for the wrong reason. The
// charset is the one `hive-priv` accepts for the same names on disk,
// so uppercase and underscore have to stay legal here.
assert!(checked_segment("agent", "a-b_C9").is_ok());
assert!(checked_segment("account", "d-e_F0").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn the_rejected_segment_is_named_in_the_error() {
// The caller usually got the name from config and needs to see which
// of the two it was.
let e = checked_segment("account", "a b").expect_err("a space is not legal");
assert!(
matches!(e, Error::PathSegment { kind, ref value } if kind == "account" && value == "a b"),
"got {e:?}"
);
// everything, the escape cases would pass for the wrong reason.
assert!(matrix_account("a-b_C9", "d-e_F0").is_ok());
}
}