`parse_bytes` knew only K/M/G/T, in either case. A size with the bare
`B` unit (`1048576B`), which `validate_memory_max` stores and systemd
enforces, became `infinity` in the agent's cap file: the cgroup was
capped while the agent was told there was no cap. It now takes exactly
the single-term forms systemd's `parse_size` does: no suffix, `B`, or
K/M/G/T/P/E, case-sensitive. Lowercase units and `4GB`, which systemd
refuses and so leaves the unit uncapped, read as `infinity` too.
A test runs every suffix form the validator accepts through it and
checks the stored value parses to the right byte count.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
The cap file was removed for a cap of `infinity` or a RAM percentage,
so the boot check warned on every start of such an agent, for a
legitimate config. The file is now written on every start:
- a size: its byte count, as before;
- `infinity`: the literal `infinity`. The generators set no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=, and the boot check is quiet;
- a percentage: resolved on the host the way systemd resolves
MemoryMax=N% for the container@ unit. That is permyriad (at most two
decimals, at most 100%) of sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) *
sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE), rounded down to a page;
- a value systemd ignores (zero, over 100%, more than two decimals,
unparseable) leaves the unit uncapped, so it is `infinity`.
The file is missing only when hive-c0re can't tell the cap: the
limits file and the kept drop-in are both unreadable, or a percentage
meets an unknown host memory size. The boot check now warns only for
a missing file or a first line that is neither a byte count nor
`infinity`.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
When hive-c0re can't read resource-limits.json and a limits drop-in
already exists, it keeps the drop-in, but it wrote no memory cap file. A
container whose runtime dir had no file yet (hive-c0re upgraded, /run
not cleared) then started with no heap ceiling and no subagent
MemoryHigh=, silently. `stage_limits` now writes the file on every
call: from the new limits, or from the last `MemoryMax=` in the kept
drop-in (`infinity` when it has none or can't be read).
A missing or malformed cap file at boot is no longer silent. The
generators run before the container's journal and an nspawn container
has no /dev/kmsg, so a oneshot `hyperhive-memory-cap-check.service`
logs a warning naming the path. The agent then runs with no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=; the container's MemoryMax= still
applies.
module-eval-agent-memory gains a case pinning how the ceiling reaches
claude: `hive-agent` and `hive-subagent-daemon` neither set nor unset
BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize, both generators and the check unit are installed.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
An agent's memory cap was rendered into its flake (`memoryMaxBytes` →
`services.hyperhive.agent.claudeMemoryMaxBytes`), so the closure depended
on it and a changed cap reached the JSC heap ceiling and the subagent
`MemoryHigh=` only after a rebuild.
hive-c0re now writes the effective `MemoryMax=` in bytes to the agent's
runtime dir (`/run/hive/memory-max-bytes` inside) in `write_dropins`,
from the same value the drop-in gets. The file is removed for
`infinity` or a RAM percentage, and left alone when the drop-in is kept.
Inside the container, `nix/agent-modules/memory-cap.nix` reads it at
boot: an environment generator sets `BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize` (75%) for
every unit and `machinectl shell`, `/etc/set-environment` exports it in
login shells, and a unit generator writes `MemoryHigh=` (2/3) as a
drop-in for `hive-subagent-daemon`.
The render drops `memoryMaxBytes`, the agent option is removed (both
spellings fail eval with a removal message), and
`effective_memory_bytes_from` goes with its only caller.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
Part of #5081 (slice S0-1a). An agent's closure no longer depends on the
name or domain of the hive that renders it.
- hive-priv writes /etc/hyperhive-hive-facts (HYPERHIVE_HIVE_NAME,
HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN) into the container from the same WriteNspawnFlags
call that writes /etc/hyperhive-bridge-dns. hive-c0re passes the values
from its own unit env. hive-priv refuses a value outside [A-Za-z0-9._-].
- A systemd environment generator in the agent (hive-facts.nix) loads the
file into the container manager's environment, so every unit sees it,
as with the systemd.globalEnvironment entries the render used to emit.
It also builds CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL_SESSION_NAME_PREFIX
(<hive>-<agent>), which left claude's managed settings.
- meta.rs stops forwarding HYPERHIVE_HIVE_{NAME,DOMAIN} and stops setting
services.hyperhive.agent.hiveName. The option is removed (both
spellings now fail with a removal message).
- otel.nix drops the agent's hive= resource label. The swarm collector
upserts hive per authenticated receiver (swarm-otel.nix resource/<h>,
on both the metrics and logs pipelines), so stored series keep it.
The otel first hop, otel enable and the dashboard port are still baked;
they are S0-1b.
hive-c0re publishes this hive's status to the swarm queue as the OIDC
client `hive-<name>`. Its secret came from
`deploy.hive-controller.statusPublish.clientSecretFile`, which defaulted
to authelia's minted file only on a host running both authelia and the
queue. Every other hive had no secret and never published, so the
controller showed it `never_reported`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, beside authelia, also copies each hive's
`hive-<name>` secret to `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`. Its policy
already allows `swarm/hives/*`. hive-c0re reads that path under the
hive's own store leaf, which the existing `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` grant
covers, and holds the value in memory.
The shared queue client no longer remembers a failed first connect for
the life of the process. A failed attempt is retried with a backoff
from 5s, doubling to a cap of 5 minutes; the dashboard banner stays up
until an attempt succeeds. The two status publishers wait for the
client instead of giving up on the first `None`, so a secret published
after boot is picked up without a restart.
Removed: the `statusPublish.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings,
now removed options with a message), its same-host default, its
LoadCredential, the assertion tying it to the other two coordinates,
and `swarm_queue_client::QueueConfig::from_env`, whose only caller was
this read. Publishing is now on wherever the queue URL and token
endpoint are set and the hive holds a store leaf.
Refs #5015
Agents keep git worktrees and cargo target dirs under /home/<agent>,
which lives in the container rootfs and is deleted on destroy. They
can't move them under state/, because a claude started there walks up
into state/CLAUDE.md and takes on the agent's identity.
Add a per-agent work/ dir next to state/ on the host
(/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/<n>/work), bind-mounted RW at
/agents/<n>/work. hive-c0re creates it in ensure_state_dir and in
set_nspawn_flags (the rebuild path reaches only the latter), the
agent's activation chowns it to the agent user like state/ and
harness/, and measure_agent_disk counts it. destroy never touches the
agent root, so work/ survives it; purge removes the whole root, so
work/ goes with it.
Closes#4977
Nothing submits an approval since scheduled prompts left hive-c0re, so the
queue only acted on rows written before that.
- hive-c0re: the approvals store and its migrations, approve/deny/
resolve actions, the ResolveApproval tail node (and meta_update's
approval_id), POST /api/approve and /api/deny, the approval views on
/api/state, the approval_resolved dashboard event, the orphan GC,
destroy/purge failing pending rows, and the approval rows in
get_loose_ends. DestroyBookkeeping loses the purge flag, which only
worded the approval-failure note.
- The CancelLooseEnd request goes: its only hive-c0re arm was the
approval one. cancel_loose_end handles reminder and todo in the harness.
- Wire types: hive_sh4re::approvals (ReminderStats moves to inbox),
LooseEnd::Approval, CancelLooseEndKind, HelperEvent::ApprovalResolved,
ToolGroup::Approvals, HostRequest::{Pending,Approve,Deny} and
HostResponse.approvals. HOST_SOCK_VERSION goes to 2 for the removed
field.
- hivectl loses the approvals verbs; docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md is
regenerated.
- The system prompt drops approval_resolved.
- The approvals table stays in broker.sqlite, unread, the same way the
operator_questions table was left when its store was removed.
- An `approvals` entry still in tool-groups.json is skipped with a warning
by ToolGroup::parse_list, like any unknown group.
- docs/agent-lifecycle/approvals.md is renamed to config-changes.md so the
code's doc pointers resolve; its content follows in the docs commit.
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf was a boot-time backstop (#2290)
that pre-created every agent's bind sources. The start preamble already
creates them for every c0re-driven start, and on this host only hive-c0re
starts agent containers. The file was also the reason the socket dir's
owner had to be declared there, which is how it spent its life at
`0777 root root` whenever the uid could not be resolved (#4742).
- hive-priv gains `EnsureAgentSocketDir { name }`, called from
`set_nspawn_flags` in every start path. It creates
`/run/hive-agent/<name>` `0751 root:root` with mkdirat relative to an
O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW fd for the parent. An existing entry has to be a
directory (fstatat AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); anything else is refused, and a
directory is left alone. hive-c0re's own create_dir_all went: its /run
is read-only under ProtectSystem=strict.
- The container's `hive-agent-user-migrate` activation chowns that dir to
the agent user and sets 0751, the same way it already handles state/ and
harness/. It refuses a symlink or non-directory there, since `test -d`
and chmod follow links. No host-side passwd parse, and no window where
the dir is world-writable.
- `/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>` stays created by hive-c0re itself
(`ensure_agent_runtime_dir`). It holds the `mcp.sock` that hive-c0re
binds as hive-core, so it must not become root- or agent-owned.
- The `/run/hive-agent` parent is declared in hive-priv.nix, `0755
root:root`, instead of hive-gateway's hive-core rule. hive-priv is its
only writer now, and hive-priv's ReadWritePaths needs it to exist.
- The manager start in `ensure_root_agent` now goes through
`converge_start_preamble` + `start_with_fallback`. It was a bare start,
so after a reboot the manager's bind sources existed only because of the
tmpfiles file, and its limits drop-in did not exist at all.
- Removed: `sync_tmpfiles`, `agent_uid_gid` / `parse_passwd_uid_gid`,
`priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles`, `AgentTmpfilesEntry`, the tmpfiles
body builder and their tests, plus the three call sites.
- Legacy: hive-priv unlinks the file at every start, ignoring ENOENT.
`SyncAgentTmpfiles` stays one release as a payload-ignoring variant that
does the same unlink and returns Ok, for an older hive-c0re.
Salvaged from #4752: the boundary.md correction that nginx only dials,
because ProtectSystem=strict makes its /run read-only.
Behaviour change: a manual `nixos-container start h-<name>` right after a
reboot, before hive-c0re has started that agent, now fails on a missing
bind source instead of starting.
Closes#4742
resource-limits.json and topology.json were read with parse errors
folded into an empty map, and written in place with std::fs::write. One
truncated resource-limits.json followed by a single set_limits call
rewrote the file with only that agent's entry, erasing every other
agent's CPU and memory overrides without a log line. topology.json had
the same shape: reconcile rebuilt it from the live set, losing pending
(provisioned, never spawned) names.
- agent_config::read_map / write_map are generic over the stored type.
tool-groups and capabilities behave as before.
- resource_limits::read / effective return an error for an existing but
unreadable file; a missing file is still the empty map. set_limits
fails without writing on such a file, and writes atomically.
- topology: reconcile fails without writing on an unreadable file and
writes atomically. all_agents logs the error and returns no agents,
so a ManageRootAgent holder starts without cross-agent mounts.
Read-path behaviour on an unreadable resource-limits.json, per caller:
- write_dropins (every spawn / swap / WriteDropin): logs the error and
keeps the limits drop-in already under /run; the agent still starts.
With no drop-in yet (first start since boot) it writes the hive
defaults, because no drop-in means an uncapped container.
- render_flake: propagates, so sync_agents (and spawn/rebuild/destroy
jobs) fail. An empty map would give tighter-capped agents the hive
memoryMaxBytes.
- container_view::build_all: logs the error each scan and renders the
rows at the hive defaults (no ContainerView wire change).
- set_resource_limits reply: propagates.
Closes#4731
set_nspawn_flags propagated has_cap's error, so one corrupt
capabilities.json failed every agent's Start, spawn and Swap. It now
goes through holds_manage_root_agent, which logs the error (agent and
file) and treats the capability as absent: the agent starts without the
cross-agent, /applied and /meta mounts. caps_for/has_cap take the file
path so that seam is testable against a tempfile.
- meta.rs: a comment at the render_flake reads records why they
propagate (an empty tool-groups map renders toolGroups = null, i.e.
AGENT_DEFAULT, which fails open for narrower explicit entries).
- capabilities::read doc: states when set_caps/remove_agent rewrite
the file instead of saying remove_agent repairs it.
- set/remove corrupt-file tests assert ErrorKind::InvalidData.
tool_groups::read and capabilities::read returned an empty map when
their file existed but didn't parse. Every set_*/remove_agent is a
read-modify-write, and write() rewrote the file in place, so a crash or
ENOSPC mid-write left a truncated file, and the next write (e.g. the
manager-spawn seed of ruth's tool groups) replaced it with a map holding
only one agent. The scheduling and approval gates then denied every
other agent, recoverable only from meta git history.
- Both registries now read through agent_config::read_map: a missing
file is still the empty map, any other read failure or a parse
failure is an io::Error. set_groups / set_caps / remove_agent fail
without writing.
- Writes go through agent_config::write_map: temp file in the same
directory, fsync, rename, fsync the directory. hive-c0re had no
shared atomic-write helper (the existing tmp+rename sites are inline
and don't fsync).
- Callers of read / groups_for / has_cap now handle the error:
* dashboard GET /api/tool-groups, /api/capabilities,
/api/permissions/stale return 500 instead of an empty table;
* the SSE permission snapshots are skipped with a warn;
* render_flake returns Result, so sync_agents fails instead of
rendering every agent without its tool groups / capabilities;
* set_nspawn_flags propagates has_cap's error;
* the socket tool-group gates deny with the read error as message;
* seed_manager_tool_groups logs and does not seed.
- capabilities::write had no callers left once set_caps writes through
write_map, and is removed.
Closes#4719
The prose added by this branch named the tracker item in seventeen
places, which check-issue-refs.sh rejects: a `#N` tag is dead weight for
anyone reading the public mirror, where no issue data exists. Each one
now states the fact it was pointing at — the parent field is gone — so
the sentence stands on its own.
Two of those lines also carried a rustdoc break: `[`write`]` in
topology.rs is ambiguous between the module's own `write` fn and the
`write!` macro, which `-D rustdoc::broken-intra-doc-links` fails. Spelled
`[`write()`]`, per rustdoc's own suggestion.
The host_config.rs rewrite is two lines rather than three so the doc
block stays under check-comment-blocks.sh's 30-line ceiling.
`topology.json` was a map of `name -> parent | null`, and that value fed
the whole agent hierarchy: `<parent>` / `<children>` recipient sentinels,
the reparenting API (CLI verb, wire verb, dashboard endpoints, DAG node),
the dashboard tree, the rebuild depth sort, and an unconditional
bind-mount grant giving every agent RW on its direct children's state.
Per the operator's ruling the field goes, and with it all of the above.
The file survives as what remains once the value is gone: the roster of
agent names, which is the set `ManageRootAgent` grants mounts over. It is
now a JSON array; `read` still accepts the old map shape and keeps its
keys, so a hive that upgrades across this does not blank its roster (and
so no capability holder loses its mounts for the length of that window).
Two sites kept their behaviour under a different recipient rather than
losing it. Both addressed `<parent>`, which the broker already resolved to
`operator` for a root agent, and every agent is now what that fallback
called a root:
- the harness's turn-failure / plugin-failure notification
(`Surface::send_to_parent` -> `send_to_operator`), and
- the send allow-list's always-permitted escape hatch, so an agent with a
restrictive allow-list still has a way to say it is stuck.
What is NOT preserved, deliberately: an agent with no capability no longer
sees any other agent's dirs. `ManageRootAgent`'s own grant is unchanged --
still every agent in the roster, still state RW + config RO, still no
`harness`.
The dashboard's reparenting control (the M0V3 picker) is deleted with its
CSS. The tree rendering that reads `ContainerView.parent` is left for the
frontend owner -- it degrades to a flat list with the field gone.
Rewrite two bare issue references (#4472, #4477) as self-standing
prose per check-issue-refs.sh's requirement — no markdown exemption,
hash-number tags are dead weight to a public forge-mirror reader.
Apply iris's vale fix to docs/agent-lifecycle/approvals.md (passive
voice, two contractions, one auto- hyphenation).
The hive had two spellings of "this agent may act on agents that aren't
its children": the `ManageRootAgent` capability, which nothing checked,
and a `can_manage_top_level_agents` role in a third meta store,
`roles.json`, which owned the real grant — the bind mounts that put
another agent's state (rw) and config (ro) inside the holder's
container. The two drifted independently, and with the parent/child
hierarchy removed the role's set (`parent.is_none()`) silently became
every agent while nothing said so.
Collapse them. The mount grant now hangs off
`Capability::ManageRootAgent`, looked up through the one capability
path that already exists (`capabilities::has_cap` over
`capabilities.json`) rather than a second mechanism. `roles.json` and
everything that read, wrote or reconciled it is gone, along with its
`meta.rs` staging and commit-label wiring; nothing in the tree reads
that file any more.
The enum variant keeps its name deliberately. Renaming it would turn
every `manage_root_agent` already stored in `capabilities.json` into an
unrecognised name that `prune_unknown` drops without asking. Its
meaning, not its spelling, is what changed: "may manage any agent". The
doc comment and the description string now say that.
`top_level_agents()`/`top_level_agents_in()` are replaced by
`all_agents()`/`all_agents_in()`. Under "manage any agent" the mounted
set is every agent by definition, so the code states it instead of
deriving it from a predicate that no longer discriminates — and the
call-site comment explains that, because it otherwise reads as a
widening. The holder is no longer bound as its own virtual child: that
reproduced the own-state and own-config mounts exactly, so dropping it
loses nothing.
`swarm-controller` mints an agent's mTLS leaf at creation and publishes it
at `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls`. Nothing read it back. This adds the
hop that carries it the rest of the way, and the in-container consumer
that proves the hop works.
Host side, `lifecycle::agent_identity` reads the row under *this hive's*
own certificate — the hive is a principal the store already knows — and
stages the leaf and its key `0600` under a new `agent-identity/<name>`
state dir, deliberately outside every bind-mounted tree. Both files go in
as systemd credentials rather than binds, the same answer and the same
mode reason as the queue secret beside it: the staged key is unreadable
to the unprivileged agent user, and the container manager reads a
`--load-credential` source as root before re-exposing it under the
consuming unit's own `User=`. The agent is never asked to authenticate in
order to obtain the thing it authenticates with.
Container side, `hive-agent-bao-identity.service` logs in with that
certificate and reads the agent's own path back, failing the unit when
either step does not succeed. It fails loudly where the hive-side readers
degrade quietly, because a refused certificate means an agent that
believes it reaches the store and never does — a cause only the login
itself can name.
The address is the whole switch, no separate `enable`, matching how
`queue.nix` and `logs.nix` already gate themselves. A hive with a store
forwards `HIVE_AGENT_BAO_ADDR` and every agent on it gets the check; a
hive without one forwards nothing and no agent does. That is what keeps
the delivery from landing in a container with nothing to read it.
The hive can now reach an agent's identity, so hive privilege covers
agent privilege. Accepted, not mitigated: the alternative is an agent
fetching its own credential with a credential it does not yet have.
Refs #4137
swarm-controller's `InitAgentConfigRepo` node already covers config-repo
creation, so this deletes a duplicate rather than a capability; old
`init_config` rows are skipped by `collect_lenient` with no migration, by
operator decision.
Refs #4398
The swarm always has exactly one queue; a hive can only lack its
address. Reworded every prose site this PR added that stated or
implied the opposite, to name what is actually absent (coordinates,
credential, or address) instead of the queue itself.
Refs #3805
hive-c0re stats the two files `swarm-bao-queue-agent` lands and forwards
them into every agent container as systemd credentials, and the harness
resolves a `QueueConfig` out of them at boot. Nothing connects yet.
A credential and not a bind mount, and the mode is what forces it: the
secret is root:0600 and the harness runs as the unprivileged agent user,
so a bind would deliver a file that user cannot open. nspawn's
`--load-credential` is read by the container manager as root and
re-exposed under the consuming unit's own `User=`. hive-c0re never reads
the bytes either way, which is just as well — it runs as `hive-core`.
Absent files stay legal and become visible rather than silent: the
publisher lives on the authelia host and mints on its first boot, so
"nothing at that path" is the ordinary early state of a swarm. c0re
forwards nothing and logs why; the harness logs that it has no queue.
The client id comes out of the delivered file rather than being rebuilt
from `hiveName` in nix, which is the agreement `swarm-secret-client`
states. `QueueConfig::from_env` wants it as a value, so the harness reads
the file itself — assigning the variable instead would need
`std::env::set_var` in a process that has already spawned threads.
Refs #3805
Per mara's go-ahead on hyperhive#3902 ("getting started is good, but
terminal rendering does not go in there i think"):
Moved 21 top-level docs/*.md files into 7 new topic subdirectories
(existing web-ui/, turn-loop/, swarm/, tools/, crates/ untouched):
getting-started/ setup.md
agent-lifecycle/ agent-hierarchy.md, approvals.md, persistence.md
trust-boundary/ boundary.md, security.md
integrations/ forge.md, matrix.md, github.md, knowledge.md
networking/ gateway.md, network.md, snapshot-store.md
scheduler/ jobq.md, coordinator.md, ci.md, observability.md
process/ conventions.md, gotchas.md, pr-review-gate.md
web-ui/ terminal-rendering.md (moved into the EXISTING dir,
per mara's correction to the original getting-started
guess -- it's UI implementation detail, not onboarding)
The physical layout now matches docs/README.md's own topical headers,
which already amounted to this taxonomy -- see the scoping comment on
the issue for the two findings that motivated this (a genuine
duplication between CLAUDE.md's old "Reading paths" list and
docs/README.md's grouped one, since drifted out of sync with each
other; and the flat layout not matching the grouping we already had).
Fixed every cross-reference this moved across the whole repo (~120
files: docs/ internal links at every depth, Rust doc comments, nix
module option docs, crate READMEs) -- verified two ways: a grep sweep
confirming zero remaining references to any old path, and a script
that resolves every markdown link in docs/**/*.md + CLAUDE.md +
README.md against the filesystem and reports anything that doesn't
exist (zero broken links).
Collapsed CLAUDE.md's "Reading paths" section (the duplicate) down to
a pointer at docs/README.md, now the single index. Rewrote
docs/README.md itself to use the new subdirectory paths and added the
one doc it was missing that CLAUDE.md's old copy had (pr-review-gate.md).
Classified all 22 docs/*.md files first via a haiku subagent (mara's
suggestion) on two axes -- proposed grouping and operator-vs-
implementation focus -- before finalizing the taxonomy; spot-checked
the report and found internal inconsistencies (its classification
table disagreed with its own summary section for a few files), so this
taxonomy is my original proposal + the one correction mara gave
directly, not a blind application of the subagent's table. The
operator-focus data it gathered is still useful for a follow-up
content pass (docs skewing 'mixed' rather than pure operator-facing),
not addressed in this PR -- structure only.
nix fmt clean, both pre-push lints clean.
The network-isolation doc comments carried prose docs/network.md
already owns, and three of them named `harness-base.nix` — a file
that does not exist. The `hyperhive-isolated-dns` oneshot lives in
nix/agent-modules/network.nix, which the doc gets right.
That is #3749's argument reproducing itself: the same fact written
in two places goes stale in the copy nobody reads. Linking removes
the class, not just the instance — a link cannot name a nonexistent
file without the doc noticing first.
Trap and measurement comments stay put, per the issue's scope: the
load-bearing HOST_ADDRESS default-route note, the unquoted
$EXTRA_NSPAWN_FLAGS expansion, and the "isolation is the only mode"
invariants are facts about this code, not about the subsystem.
set_nspawn_flags said PRIVATE_NETWORK was forced 0 for web-UI
reachability; it is now unconditionally 1 and the UI is reached over the
bridge. write_bridge_dns_marker said it writes or removes the marker;
the removal path went with the host-netns case.
Neither was reachable by the sweeps that found the earlier ones: this
prose describes the *value in words* ('forced 0'), not the code's
literal PRIVATE_NETWORK=0, and neither names the env var. Found by
reading the doc comment of every function whose body this branch
changed.
Per mara on #3725: the on/off toggle is removed, and required env vars
unset lead to a crash. HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION is gone from
hive-network.nix -- it was the toggle.
Validation happens once at daemon startup rather than per container.
The variables are process-global, so a bad value breaks every container
rather than one: failing at boot gives a single diagnostic naming the
bad value, and cannot reach a state where some containers were
configured before it was noticed.
Option<NetworkIsolation> collapses to NetworkIsolation through the wire
type, client and helper, which deletes the branch instead of leaving it
unreachable. serde(default) is dropped on that field deliberately: a
request omitting isolation is now rejected rather than defaulting to a
container sharing the host's network namespace.
What this replaces was a silent security downgrade. Of the four ways
into the old fallback, two logged nothing at all -- a container came up
without isolation and the journal agreed it was fine.
Doc comments that still described the removed branch are updated
(argus's note on #3723 scoped that to this issue). The hive-priv one is
a minimal edit inside the block #3723 rewrites; de-splicing is that
PR's job.
The host-side collector is the only path telemetry leaves a hive, so
HYPERHIVE_OTEL_HEADERS_CREDENTIAL is never emitted and everything
downstream of it is unreachable. What made it worth removing rather than
leaving inert is what it looked like to a reader: a complete,
well-commented mechanism for writing the hive's upstream credential into
a file the agent can read, described in the present tense. Anyone auditing
"can an agent obtain the OTEL token?" had to reconstruct the whole env-var
chain to find out the answer is no.
Gone: the per-agent `hyperhive.otel.headersCredential` option, the
`hive-otel-header` oneshot that merged OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS into the
agent's own settings.json, and meta.rs's field, env read and render.
⚠️ Scoped by NAMESPACE, not by name. `hyperhive.otel.headersCredential`
(per-agent) and `services.hyperhive.otel.headersCredential` (host) are
different options sharing a leaf name — the host one is read by
`stats/otel_metrics.rs` for c0re's own container-resource exporter and
stays. Sweeping the string would have taken out working code.
The comment above `otelSettingsEnv` now states the property rather than
the absence: there is no auth header and no mechanism to add one, because
an agent exports to the hive's own collector and nothing an agent can read
is a secret to the swarm. The old behaviour is named in the past tense so
it reads as removed rather than overlooked.
meta.rs's assertions that pinned the injection are deleted rather than
adjusted; the surrounding test keeps covering extraResourceAttributes and
the endpoint/protocol injection, which are live.
/agents/<name>/config bound the working clone a config change is staged
in, so an agent could see a proposal that was never approved -- a config
that does not govern its container. Both objects already exist; this
repoints the bind at the deployed one.
Both mounts (own + child) now resolve through config_bind_source() so
they cannot drift, and agent_proposed_dir's doc-comment is corrected:
it claimed to be manager-editable and bind-mounted, and neither is true.
The parent's copy is for reading a child's config; a change to it is a PR
on the child's repo, made from a clone and merged after review. A
writable mount is a second path to the same file that skips that review,
which makes the boundary a convention rather than a permission.
Confirmed with ruth before flipping: it clones from the forge and opens a
PR, including for a brand-new child's first config.
The prose was the larger half. docs/approvals.md did not merely describe
the old mount, it *instructed* agents to use it ("can therefore edit,
commit, and submit changes for any of its direct children directly inside
its container"), and the doc comment in host_config.rs asserted a
dependency that never existed: the InitConfig seed runs as hive-c0re
against the host path, and read_only on a bind constrains writers inside
the container only. That comment is what produced issue #3206, now closed
as invalid.
bind_child_agent_dirs looped over state, harness and config alike and
mounted all three read-write, while the doc comment above it defended
only state. The rationale covered one dir, the loop covered three — the
uniformity is what erased the fact that the three have three different
answers.
harness holds the child's own runtime material (bash-tasks, the
turn-stats and event sqlite dbs) and nothing argues for a parent
touching it. The only other reader is stats::hive_stats, which reads the
host path directly and needs no mount into anyone.
config stays read-write here on purpose. The ruling is that it becomes
read-only, but request_init_config still has the manager seed a new
child's config in place, so flipping the mount before relocating that
step breaks agent creation hive-wide. That ordering now lives in the doc
comment, where someone about to finish the job in one line will see it.
docs/persistence.md justified all three dirs as RW; it now states the
boundary as three answers and names the right source file.
/run/hive-agent/<name> was 0777 root root in steady state, not just during
first spawn. A directory without the sticky bit lets any user unlink files
in it, and the gateway container has all of /run/hive-agent bind-mounted
in, so anything that could reach the path could delete an agent's
agent.sock, bind its own, and receive that agent's todos from hive-c0re.
Two mechanisms were writing the dir and undoing each other: the tmpfiles.d
entry wrote 0777 root root, then hive-c0re round-tripped through hive-priv's
ChownSocketDir to narrow it. `d` re-asserts mode and owner on every apply
and the file is regenerated on any agent's spawn or destroy, so every such
event reset every agent's dir back to world-writable.
SyncAgentTmpfiles now carries each agent's container uid/gid and the entry
declares the answer: 0751 <uid> <gid>. Three principals need the dir and no
two share a group -- the harness binds its sockets (owner rwx), hive-c0re
dials agent.sock and the gateway's nginx dials web.sock (both only need
traverse, and both sockets are already 0666).
Deletes ChownSocketDir and ChmodSocketDir, both priv_client wrappers, the
either/or in host_config with its two swallowed warn!s, and the now-dead
socket_dir_path -- two verbs off the privileged helper's surface and one
round-trip off every agent spawn.
Also makes the two tmpfiles rules for /run/hive-agent itself agree: the
gateway module said hive-core, the generated file said root, and which won
depended on the order systemd read them in.
Encoding "not configured" as weight 0 worked (the writer omitted the
line) but the type lied: 0 is not a legal cgroup v2 weight, and every
reader had to know the sentinel. Use Option<u32> end to end instead —
wire type, priv_client, HiveEnv, drop-in writer — so "unset" is a state
of the type rather than a magic value.
The nix options become nullOr, keeping their default of 80; null now
expresses "leave the setting out of the drop-in entirely" declaratively,
which is the useful shape on a host whose IO scheduler ignores
io.weight anyway.
Backward compat is unchanged: the fields stay #[serde(default)], so a
request from an older hive-c0re deserialises to None and reproduces the
pre-weights drop-in byte for byte. The test that pins that now passes
None instead of 0.
`CPUQuota=`/`MemoryMax=` are hard caps: they throttle an agent even when
the host is idle, so they are the wrong tool for "be polite under
contention". The cgroup v2 relative shares are, and neither was wired.
Adds `services.hyperhive.{agentCpuWeight,agentIoWeight}` (1..=10000,
default 80) threaded through the existing drop-in path: HiveEnv ->
write_dropins -> WriteResourceLimits -> hyperhive-limits.conf, next to
the caps already there. Hive-wide only, as the operator scoped it on the
issue: no per-agent override, no resource-limits.json field, no
dashboard form.
The default of 80 is below the kernel's 100, so agent containers yield
to everything *not* on this drop-in path -- host services and the infra
containers (hive-ci, hive-forge, hive-gateway, hive-matrix). It does not
rank agents against each other; they all carry the same weight.
`WriteResourceLimits` gains two `#[serde(default)]` fields, and the
writer treats weight 0 as "not configured" and omits the line, so an
older hive-c0re talking to a newer hive-priv still produces the exact
pre-weights drop-in. The body is extracted into `limits_dropin_body` so
that is covered by a test rather than asserted by eye.
The hive applies one `agentCpuQuota` / `agentMemoryMax` to every
container. That's the right default and the wrong ceiling: a build-heavy
agent needs headroom the other twelve don't, and raising the hive-wide
value to suit it hands that headroom to everyone.
Adds a per-agent override, persisted host-side and resolved per-field
against the hive defaults.
Follows the existing `meta/*.json` pattern (`capabilities.json`,
`tool-groups.json`): a host-side map read by `hive-c0re`, staged and
committed in the meta repo so every change lands in the audit trail.
```json
{ "sock": { "cpu_quota": "400%", "memory_max": "8G" } }
```
Fallback is **per field**, not per agent: an entry with only
`memory_max` leaves that agent on the hive-wide CPU quota. Absent file,
absent agent and absent field all resolve to the hive default, so the
feature is inert until someone opts an agent in.
Unlike the other meta files this one is **not** injected into the
container — a limit is something done *to* an agent, not something it
reads about itself.
```
hivectl agents set-limits sock --cpu-quota 400% --memory-max 8G
hivectl agents set-limits sock --reset
```
Values are validated before they're persisted: they go into a systemd
drop-in verbatim, and a typo there makes the unit fail to *start* —
turning a fat-fingered quota into a container that won't come back.
The command is declarative: each call replaces the agent's whole entry.
That makes a forgotten flag a silent revert, so a bare `set-limits
<name>` is rejected at the clap layer and clearing needs an explicit
`--reset`.
`ContainerView` gains `cpu_quota` / `memory_max`, both always populated:
there's no "unset" state to render, only "same as everyone else". They
reflect what the drop-in *says* — what the next start will enforce — not
a live cgroup reading.
The write goes through `meta::commit_resource_limits` rather than the
bare setter, so it's staged and committed under `META_LOCK`. Writing
without committing would leave the meta working tree dirty for the next
`prepare_deploy` to trip over.
Docs: `persistence.md` (the new meta file, and why it isn't injected),
`tools/hivectl.md` (the prose guide), `tools/hivectl-cli.md`
(regenerated clap dump).
Closes: internal/requests issue 25
Split the priv-socket wire types (PrivRequest/PrivResponse/PrivEvent and
friends) out of hive-sh4re into their own hive-priv-sock crate, mirroring
the existing hive-host-sock split. hive-priv — the root-privileged
helper — now depends on just this narrow protocol crate instead of the
much larger daemon-shared crate, shrinking its dependency surface and
making the privsep boundary easier to audit. No server/client
implementation lives here, only the wire contract; hive-c0re still
depends on hive-sh4re directly for everything else.
All agent containers now receive their bridge IP dynamically via DHCP
from the dnsmasq pool instead of a hash-derived static address:
- nix/templates/harness-base.nix: networking.useDHCP = true
- nix/modules/hive-gateway.nix: expand DHCP pool to full usable range
(.2 to .254 on /24) — was last-14-IPs-only
- hive-sh4re/src/priv_proto.rs: remove agent_ip from NetworkIsolation
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/mod.rs: drop agent_network_ip + DHCP_POOL_SIZE
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/host_config.rs: remove agent_network_ip call
- hive-priv/src/main.rs: LOCAL_ADDRESS= empty (DHCP assigns IP);
HOST_ADDRESS still set so nixos-container installs default route
before the DHCP lease arrives
- nix/dhcp-pool-size: deleted (no longer needed)
The nix/dhcp-pool-size single-source-of-truth file and all associated
Rust/Nix dual-constant plumbing are gone — there is no static map.
bridge_gateway_ip() is retained (still needed for HOST_ADDRESS).
Closes#2363
