The module hardcoded otlphttp, so a hive with protocol = "grpc" would
have had its agents' protocol respected end to end before the collector
and silently rewritten to HTTP after it. Splitting the path in two makes
the upstream half the one that has to keep honouring the option; the
agent half is pinned to the receiver's protocol and derived, not
configured.
Renders services.opentelemetry-collector on the host: OTLP/HTTP receiver
on the bridge address, otlphttp exporter to otel.endpoint, and the
upstream credential delivered as EnvironmentFile so the collector
interpolates it at runtime and nix never sees the value.
Three things worth knowing, each measured rather than assumed:
- network.exposeHostPorts already exists and is wired (it opens the port
on the bridge interface only), so bridge reachability costs nothing.
- validateConfigFile defaults to isStorePath configFile, which is null on
the settings path - so upstream's default is OFF for exactly the way
this module configures it. Set true: it runs otelcol validate at build
time. It parses, it does not prove delivery.
- headersCredential's file is already NAME=value, i.e. EnvironmentFile
format, verified against a real settings.json rather than the doc.
An assertion refuses collector.enable with no headersCredential: the
collector exists to be the only holder of that token, and without one it
is indirection that reads as security.
Adds services.hyperhive.otel.collector.{enable,port}. No implementation
yet - this commit only declares the surface, so the option docs and the
default-off invariant can be reviewed on their own.
The reason the collector exists is the credential: without it every agent
needs headersCredential to reach the upstream, and the harness delivers
that token into the agent's own settings.json where the agent can read
it. The option text states the cost too - the collector becomes a
dependency in an export path that is currently direct.
