The operator-boundary sentence about config PRs moves into the config:repo
block, the extra MCP servers bullet no longer names agent.nix, and agent
creation is described without a config repo. config_bind_source's doc
covers the empty mount of an archetype agent. The archetype doc says to
deploy swarm-nats-auth before the hives.
Refs #5386
The hive reads the agent-archetype key when it provisions and rebuilds an
agent and keeps it in swarm-agent-archetypes.json. For an archetype agent
the meta flake has no agent-<name> input and mkAgent imports
hyperhive.hyperhiveArchetypes.<name>.module; provisioning, rebuilds, the
meta-input cascade, a deploy's rev and the startup migration skip the
config repos. The harness gets HIVE_ARCHETYPE and the system prompt says
the agent has no config repo. The create form sends the picked archetype.
Adds the android-dev built-in.
Refs #5386
Delete nix/templates/ruth.nix, the ruth nixosConfiguration, module and
toplevel, the hive-c0re managerToplevel option, and the meta flake's
isManager switch with lifecycle::MANAGER_NAME. Every agent, ruth
included, now builds from nix/templates/agent.nix. The template's only
content beyond agent.nix was docs.enable = mkDefault true; docs.enable
is off by default for every agent and ruth's own agent.nix turns it on.
Refs #5377
Permission::default_for and hive-sh4re's MANAGER_AGENT are gone: every
agent with no permissions key holds Permission::DEFAULT, ruth included.
The agent-name parameters that only fed default_for go with it
(permissions::effective, HiveCopy::before_read/after_read and their
callers).
swarm-controller seeds the grant ruth held by name: at start, a declared
ruth whose permissions are unset gets DEFAULT plus manage_root_agent
written into her key, once, logged. A set key is never touched. It is a
one-shot to delete once every swarm has passed it.
The swarm UI setup assistant opens the create form with
manage_root_agent checked, so a new ruth is created with the grant.
permissions_import no longer adds ruth to the import or splits her
default. Docs and help text no longer say ruth holds the grant by
default; swarmctl-cli.md regenerated.
start_manager bound the same path register_agent binds. The migrate branch, hive-priv-sock::MANAGER_NAME and MANAGER_CONTAINER were no-ops or dead. The send allow-list docs promised a manager exemption the code never had. Tests that used ruth as the manager fixture use plain names.
ruth is created from the swarm dashboard like any agent. An existing ruth container starts at boot through the boot reconcile, like every other agent. A definition of services.hyperhive.ruthless now fails evaluation with a removal message.
Until its first successful read of its key, the harness read its
permissions as the default set, `execution` included. So did the
subagent daemon. An agent the operator had narrowed ran wider than
granted after every restart while the queue was unreachable, and in the
gap before the first 10 s poll. During the meta-repo import, every
non-ruth key is still unset, and the agent read that as the default too,
for as long as the import stayed pending.
mara picked option (a) on #5293: "a, removal of the old path as a follow
up in 1w".
hive-c0re now writes each agent's entry from
swarm-agent-permissions.json into the agent's runtime dir as
swarm-permissions.json (/run/hive in the container), together with
whether the import is still pending. It writes the file at every start
(write_dropins) and after every 30 s pass of the permissions worker. The
harness and the subagent daemon hold that stored list until their own
first read succeeds. While the import is pending, an unset key keeps
the stored list rather than reverting it to the default. A queue that
is down never blocks a start: the agent runs on the stored grant.
The decision lives in swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::HiveCopy,
shared by both readers.
Part of #5170.
mara on #5170: "dont split caps and perms. its all perms. / dont include
the now empty tool groups / nothing set -> default / also add perms to
agent creation screen".
- hive-sh4re: one `Permission` enum (messaging, meta, inbox, execution,
web_tools, manage_root_agent) replaces `ToolGroup` and `Capability`;
`lifecycle`/`forge` are gone. `Permission::default_for` is the default
for an agent the swarm sets nothing for.
- The record is `{ "permissions": [...] }`. Missing key, unset field or
no successful read yet = default; `[]` = none; a failed read after a
good one keeps the last value.
- hive-agent reads its own key every 10s and builds each turn's --tools,
--allowedTools and MCP config (rewritten before every turn) from it;
the subagent daemon reads it on each start/continue. Agents get a
read-only grant on their own key.
- hive-c0re restarts an agent only when its manage_root_agent changes.
The import now merges meta/capabilities.json and meta/tool-groups.json
into one list per agent and deletes both; the "import pending, don't
read" decision is `ImportOutcome::read_allowed`, table-tested.
- swarm-controller: `GET /api/permissions` (names + default) and an
optional `permissions` on `POST /api/agents`, stored before the job is
queued. swarm-ui's create-agent form gets a permissions field.
- Deleted: HIVE_TOOL_GROUPS and its forward to the subagent daemon,
tool_groups.rs, ruth's tool-group seed, the permissions rebuild job
(PermPayload/WritePermFile/perm_change), the dashboard permissions tab
and its stale-entries panel.
Part of #5170.
An agent's capabilities move from the hive's meta repo
(`meta/capabilities.json`, injected as `HIVE_CAPABILITIES`) into the
`capabilities` field of its key in a new `agent-permissions` KV bucket,
which swarm-controller alone writes.
- swarm-queue-client: `agent_permissions` (bucket, key, `AgentPermissions`,
direct-get read, the import subject and its wire types).
- swarm-controller: creates the bucket at start; `GET|PUT|DELETE
/api/agents/{name}/permissions` (deny_unknown_fields and unknown
capability ⇒ 422, duplicate ⇒ 400, agent must be declared by a hive);
answers each hive's one-shot import, writing a key only where there is
none and only for agents that hive's wanted state declares.
- swarmctl: `agent permissions get|set|clear`.
- swarm-nats-auth: a hive reads every key of the bucket and sends its
import on its own subject; the controller subscribes to the imports and
may answer them (`responses`).
- hive-c0re: reads each of its agents' keys every 30s into
/var/lib/hyperhive/swarm-agent-permissions.json and restarts an agent,
gracefully, when its capabilities change. Unset is the compiled-in
default (ruth: manage_root_agent; everyone else: none). A failed read
keeps the stored value. On first boot it seeds that file from
meta/capabilities.json, sends the grants to the controller, and deletes
the file once the controller answers.
Deleted: the capabilities.json reader/writer, `HIVE_CAPABILITIES` in the
rendered meta flake, ruth's capability seed, the capabilities half of the
permissions rebuild job (`PermPayload::Capabilities`/`Combined`), the
dashboard's capabilities table and `capabilities_changed` event, and the
now-unused `Capability::description`.
Part of #5170.
The hive no longer sets an agent's CPU or memory cap: caps come from the swarm, else the hive-wide defaults. The container load tab was the only hive UI that set them, and its figures are already exported as OTEL metrics, so with the tab gone nothing wrote meta/resource-limits.json.
Removed: the file's reader and writer, the `hivectl agent set-limits` verb with its host-socket request, the `GET /api/container-resources` and `POST /api/resource-limits/{name}` dashboard endpoints, and the `cpu_quota`/`memory_max` fields of the container view that only the tab read. A leftover resource-limits.json is ignored.
mara's ruling: "swarm level overrides replace the hive ui limits. otherwise
dont change the logic."
swarm value present -> it is the value; nothing hive-side is consulted
swarm value absent -> exactly today's chain: per-agent field, else hive
Per field, so a swarm memory ceiling leaves CPU on the hive's chain.
The fallback chain itself is not touched: effective_from_with_swarm calls
effective_from as it was and lets the swarm replace its result, and
effective_with_swarm delegates to effective, so there stays one place the
chain lives. `an_empty_swarm_map_leaves_the_existing_chain_bit_for_bit`
asserts the wrapper is a no-op across every shape the chain distinguishes.
The swarm's caps live in their own swarm-resource-limits.json, not in the
operator's resource-limits.json: different writers, different lifetimes,
and a swarm write into the operator's file would make "reset to hive
defaults" destroy something the operator never set. It is read and written
through the same read_map / write_map, so an unreadable file is an error,
and write_dropins resolves both files through limits_to_apply, whose
keep-the-last-applied-drop-in policy covers the swarm file too.
stage_limits hands limits_to_apply the swarm caps file too, so the
agent's memory-max-bytes copy, which it sizes its heap and subagents
against, is the MemoryMax= systemd enforces: the swarm cap when there is
one.
Nothing writes swarm-resource-limits.json yet; the reader comes with the
swarm's agent-limits bucket later in this series.
`parse_bytes` knew only K/M/G/T, in either case. A size with the bare
`B` unit (`1048576B`), which `validate_memory_max` stores and systemd
enforces, became `infinity` in the agent's cap file: the cgroup was
capped while the agent was told there was no cap. It now takes exactly
the single-term forms systemd's `parse_size` does: no suffix, `B`, or
K/M/G/T/P/E, case-sensitive. Lowercase units and `4GB`, which systemd
refuses and so leaves the unit uncapped, read as `infinity` too.
A test runs every suffix form the validator accepts through it and
checks the stored value parses to the right byte count.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
The cap file was removed for a cap of `infinity` or a RAM percentage,
so the boot check warned on every start of such an agent, for a
legitimate config. The file is now written on every start:
- a size: its byte count, as before;
- `infinity`: the literal `infinity`. The generators set no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=, and the boot check is quiet;
- a percentage: resolved on the host the way systemd resolves
MemoryMax=N% for the container@ unit. That is permyriad (at most two
decimals, at most 100%) of sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) *
sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE), rounded down to a page;
- a value systemd ignores (zero, over 100%, more than two decimals,
unparseable) leaves the unit uncapped, so it is `infinity`.
The file is missing only when hive-c0re can't tell the cap: the
limits file and the kept drop-in are both unreadable, or a percentage
meets an unknown host memory size. The boot check now warns only for
a missing file or a first line that is neither a byte count nor
`infinity`.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
When hive-c0re can't read resource-limits.json and a limits drop-in
already exists, it keeps the drop-in, but it wrote no memory cap file. A
container whose runtime dir had no file yet (hive-c0re upgraded, /run
not cleared) then started with no heap ceiling and no subagent
MemoryHigh=, silently. `stage_limits` now writes the file on every
call: from the new limits, or from the last `MemoryMax=` in the kept
drop-in (`infinity` when it has none or can't be read).
A missing or malformed cap file at boot is no longer silent. The
generators run before the container's journal and an nspawn container
has no /dev/kmsg, so a oneshot `hyperhive-memory-cap-check.service`
logs a warning naming the path. The agent then runs with no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=; the container's MemoryMax= still
applies.
module-eval-agent-memory gains a case pinning how the ceiling reaches
claude: `hive-agent` and `hive-subagent-daemon` neither set nor unset
BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize, both generators and the check unit are installed.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
An agent's memory cap was rendered into its flake (`memoryMaxBytes` →
`services.hyperhive.agent.claudeMemoryMaxBytes`), so the closure depended
on it and a changed cap reached the JSC heap ceiling and the subagent
`MemoryHigh=` only after a rebuild.
hive-c0re now writes the effective `MemoryMax=` in bytes to the agent's
runtime dir (`/run/hive/memory-max-bytes` inside) in `write_dropins`,
from the same value the drop-in gets. The file is removed for
`infinity` or a RAM percentage, and left alone when the drop-in is kept.
Inside the container, `nix/agent-modules/memory-cap.nix` reads it at
boot: an environment generator sets `BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize` (75%) for
every unit and `machinectl shell`, `/etc/set-environment` exports it in
login shells, and a unit generator writes `MemoryHigh=` (2/3) as a
drop-in for `hive-subagent-daemon`.
The render drops `memoryMaxBytes`, the agent option is removed (both
spellings fail eval with a removal message), and
`effective_memory_bytes_from` goes with its only caller.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
Part of #5081 (slice S0-1a). An agent's closure no longer depends on the
name or domain of the hive that renders it.
- hive-priv writes /etc/hyperhive-hive-facts (HYPERHIVE_HIVE_NAME,
HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN) into the container from the same WriteNspawnFlags
call that writes /etc/hyperhive-bridge-dns. hive-c0re passes the values
from its own unit env. hive-priv refuses a value outside [A-Za-z0-9._-].
- A systemd environment generator in the agent (hive-facts.nix) loads the
file into the container manager's environment, so every unit sees it,
as with the systemd.globalEnvironment entries the render used to emit.
It also builds CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL_SESSION_NAME_PREFIX
(<hive>-<agent>), which left claude's managed settings.
- meta.rs stops forwarding HYPERHIVE_HIVE_{NAME,DOMAIN} and stops setting
services.hyperhive.agent.hiveName. The option is removed (both
spellings now fail with a removal message).
- otel.nix drops the agent's hive= resource label. The swarm collector
upserts hive per authenticated receiver (swarm-otel.nix resource/<h>,
on both the metrics and logs pipelines), so stored series keep it.
The otel first hop, otel enable and the dashboard port are still baked;
they are S0-1b.
hive-c0re publishes this hive's status to the swarm queue as the OIDC
client `hive-<name>`. Its secret came from
`deploy.hive-controller.statusPublish.clientSecretFile`, which defaulted
to authelia's minted file only on a host running both authelia and the
queue. Every other hive had no secret and never published, so the
controller showed it `never_reported`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, beside authelia, also copies each hive's
`hive-<name>` secret to `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`. Its policy
already allows `swarm/hives/*`. hive-c0re reads that path under the
hive's own store leaf, which the existing `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` grant
covers, and holds the value in memory.
The shared queue client no longer remembers a failed first connect for
the life of the process. A failed attempt is retried with a backoff
from 5s, doubling to a cap of 5 minutes; the dashboard banner stays up
until an attempt succeeds. The two status publishers wait for the
client instead of giving up on the first `None`, so a secret published
after boot is picked up without a restart.
Removed: the `statusPublish.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings,
now removed options with a message), its same-host default, its
LoadCredential, the assertion tying it to the other two coordinates,
and `swarm_queue_client::QueueConfig::from_env`, whose only caller was
this read. Publishing is now on wherever the queue URL and token
endpoint are set and the hive holds a store leaf.
Refs #5015
Bounding is_running turned a hung systemctl into "not running" for
callers that record or act on the answer: the broad-stop restore set
dropped the agent, start_many could rebuild-and-restart a running
agent, reconcile could seed Offline. is_running is back to the
unbounded call it was.
The periodic workers read through the bounded running_state instead:
crash_watch (unchanged), and the swarm_agent_status publisher via the
new container_view::read_agent_status_bounded, which skips the agent
for that sweep when the unit state is unreadable. The GetAgentMeta
socket handler keeps the unbounded read_agent_status_live.
priv_client::list_containers now waits at most 30s (LIST_WAIT) for
hive-priv's `nixos-container list`, via the existing `within` helper. Its
periodic callers (crash_watch, agent_sockets, swarm_agent_status, wanted,
mcp_sockets, swarm_status via container_view) already treat an Err as a
skipped cycle, so a hung listing no longer stops their loops for good.
lifecycle::is_running / unit_state run `systemctl is-active` with
kill_on_drop and a 10s timeout (IS_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT); a timeout warns and
reads as not-running / UnitState::Other, the same as a systemctl that
could not be spawned. The new lifecycle::running_state returns None for
that case, and crash_watch keeps the agent's previous observation on None
so a hung systemctl is neither reported as a crash nor as a recovery.
`call` itself and every mutating op (start/stop/destroy/send-snapshot/
daemon-reload) stay unbounded.
Closes#5061
Add secret_file::write_secret_0600: create the parent dir, write a
sibling temp file opened create_new + mode 0600, sync_all, rename over
the target. Use it for the matrix sender token, the space/chat room-id
files and the forge core token, which previously wrote at the process
umask, then chmod-ed with the error discarded, and dropped the
create_dir_all error. agent_identity::write_identity uses it too
instead of its own open-0600 loop; that loop opened with create +
truncate, so a pre-existing file kept its old mode.
Also log instead of discarding:
- the manager's applied-rev marker write in auto_update
- the knowledge `git remote set-url` scrub (spawn error and non-zero
exit; the exit status only, since stderr may echo the old URL)
- the parent create_dir_all in paths::move_if_legacy
Closes#5037
swarm-controller now gives every hive in its directory a forge account,
`hive-<hive>`, in a new `hives` team of `agent-configs` (read on
`repo.code` + `repo.pulls`, every repo including later ones), and mints
one `read:repository` token named `swarm-hive` into the store at
`swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token`. A five-minute pass queues a
`MintHiveForgeToken` node for a hive whose token is missing or no longer
matches the forge, whose account is missing, or whose team membership or
team settings drifted. A hive whose store or forge read failed is never
queued, so an outage cannot rotate every hive's token. The token decision
reuses `agent_token`'s classifier and replace step, now parameterised by
name and scopes.
An agent may be called `hive-<x>`. The hive account is created with
`hive-<hive>@hives.hyperhive.local` and the job refuses an account by that
name with any other email before it locks it down, adds it to the team or
mints for it; agent creation already refuses the hive's account by the
same email check.
The controller's bao policy gains the `swarm/hives/+/forge/token` leaf
(create/read/update), pinned by the bao-grants module-eval assertion. The
hive's own policy already reads `swarm/hives/<hive>/*`.
hive-c0re reads that token through `forge::reader_token()`, falling back
to the core token file when the store holds none, and uses it for:
fetching a merged config rev (swarm deploy, `hivectl forge
reconcile-config`), reseeding a purged `applied`, the meta-update
cascade's fast-forward, seeding `proposed` on first deploy, and finding
the PR that merged a refused rev. Those reads no longer require a local
`hive-forge` container. The `/knowledge` clone moves from the forge
host's boot sweep into the knowledge pull, so every hive clones it.
Posting the deploy-failure comment on that PR stays on the core token.
Refs #4851
The reseed bail text, the `ensure_all` doc, the forge module doc and a
rebuild comment still described hive-c0re mirroring the applied config to
`agent-configs/<name>`. State what the code does now; scope the
config-changes doc to swarm-created agents and say what a legacy agent
whose repo has no `main` gets.
Refs #4851
Per the operator's ruling on #4851 (option (a)): the hive holds no
write identity on the forge, so the `push_config` mirror of an applied
repo's tags and `main` to `agent-configs/<name>` is removed, along with
its `run_config_push` helper and its call in `sync_agent`.
Docs and comments that described the mirror now say that forge `main`
advances only by an operator's merge.
Refs #4851
Agents keep git worktrees and cargo target dirs under /home/<agent>,
which lives in the container rootfs and is deleted on destroy. They
can't move them under state/, because a claude started there walks up
into state/CLAUDE.md and takes on the agent's identity.
Add a per-agent work/ dir next to state/ on the host
(/var/lib/hyperhive/agents/<n>/work), bind-mounted RW at
/agents/<n>/work. hive-c0re creates it in ensure_state_dir and in
set_nspawn_flags (the rebuild path reaches only the latter), the
agent's activation chowns it to the agent user like state/ and
harness/, and measure_agent_disk counts it. destroy never touches the
agent root, so work/ survives it; purge removes the whole root, so
work/ goes with it.
Closes#4977
Nothing submits an approval since scheduled prompts left hive-c0re, so the
queue only acted on rows written before that.
- hive-c0re: the approvals store and its migrations, approve/deny/
resolve actions, the ResolveApproval tail node (and meta_update's
approval_id), POST /api/approve and /api/deny, the approval views on
/api/state, the approval_resolved dashboard event, the orphan GC,
destroy/purge failing pending rows, and the approval rows in
get_loose_ends. DestroyBookkeeping loses the purge flag, which only
worded the approval-failure note.
- The CancelLooseEnd request goes: its only hive-c0re arm was the
approval one. cancel_loose_end handles reminder and todo in the harness.
- Wire types: hive_sh4re::approvals (ReminderStats moves to inbox),
LooseEnd::Approval, CancelLooseEndKind, HelperEvent::ApprovalResolved,
ToolGroup::Approvals, HostRequest::{Pending,Approve,Deny} and
HostResponse.approvals. HOST_SOCK_VERSION goes to 2 for the removed
field.
- hivectl loses the approvals verbs; docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md is
regenerated.
- The system prompt drops approval_resolved.
- The approvals table stays in broker.sqlite, unread, the same way the
operator_questions table was left when its store was removed.
- An `approvals` entry still in tool-groups.json is skipped with a warning
by ToolGroup::parse_list, like any unknown group.
- docs/agent-lifecycle/approvals.md is renamed to config-changes.md so the
code's doc pointers resolve; its content follows in the docs commit.
An operator's merge on the forge deploys a config PR through
swarm-controller's DeployRequest{rev}. The hive-side path that queued a
MergeConfigPr approval and merged the PR as `core` goes:
- the `/webhook/config-pr` receiver, its HMAC secret, the WebhookRegister
boot node and the org-hook registration; the hive vhost's `/webhook/`
location
- the 5-minute config-PR poll
- ApprovalKind::MergeConfigPr, its dashboard card, and the deploy DAG it
drove (DeployWindow, MergeVerify, DeployApply, FinalizeDeploy,
DeployTail), with verify_commit, the two-phase meta deploy, rollback
refs, the PR-failure comment and forge/pr_merge.rs
- `fetched_sha`, `sha_short`/`pr_number` on approval events, and
`sha`/`tag` on HelperEvent::ApprovalResolved: only the merge path set
them
`config_repo`, `merged_pr_for_commit` and `post_pr_comment` move to
forge/pr_comment.rs for the merged-rev deploy's refusal comment.
Approvals v5 drops stored `merge_config_pr` rows; a test reopens a v4
database holding them.
Closes#4850
hive-matrix-daemon now learns which external matrix accounts it has from
the swarm secret store, under the agent's own certificate, and the hive
push chain for matrix is gone.
The daemon lists swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/ (the `list` its policy
grants on its own metadata subtree), reads each account's homeserver
from its credential, and brings the accounts up with their tokens from
the store. Every two minutes it lists again and exits with 75 when the
set of linked accounts changed; the unit restarts on 75 without counting
a failure. A listed name whose credential reads as absent is skipped and
logged once. At start it removes the matrix-token-<a> /
matrix-account-<a>.json pairs a hive delivered (a sidecar marks a pair
as delivered; a declared tokenFile keeps its token).
Removed: CredentialNotice and the $SWARM.credential.* subject and NATS
grant, the controller's publish and its queue precondition on the PUT
route, hive-c0re's credential subscription arm and workers/credential.rs,
priv_client::write_agent_matrix_token, hive-priv's WriteAgentMatrixToken
and its helpers, and the daemon's state-dir account discovery.
Kept: WriteAgentGithubToken and the external-forge path
(WriteAgentExtraForgeAccount, extra_forges.rs) are untouched, and a
declared matrixAccounts tokenFile is still read when the store has no
token for that account.
Refs #4348
prebuild_toplevel awaited nix build with a bare child.wait().await, so
a wedged nix-daemon (unreachable remote builder, stuck build slot)
hung the rebuild job forever with no way for the job queue to recover
short of restarting hive-c0re.
Mirrors #4741's hive-priv fix: the child now leads its own process
group, and after PREBUILD_TIMEOUT (1h, four times CI's observed
cold-cache flake check) the whole group is SIGKILLed and the call
fails with a named timeout error instead of hanging.
Refs #4723, #4741
hive-screen-mcp ran `grim` / `wtype` through an unbounded
`Command::output()` and spoke RFB to neatvnc with no deadline, so a
wedged compositor or a VNC server that accepts and never speaks held the
agent's turn forever. Each subprocess now has a 30s limit and is killed
when it hits it; each RFB exchange has a 10s limit. Both come back to the
agent as the tool's text result, like every other failure in this crate.
hive-c0re operator-facing text that described behaviour the code lacks:
- `hivectl matrix reset-password` printed a "next: hivectl matrix
create-user" hint that fails for every target (agents are refused, a
non-agent hits M_USER_IN_USE). The line is gone.
- a failed `nixos-container update` appended the container's journal
tail, read with `journalctl -M`. Since the job DAG, `update` only runs
from the `Swap` node on a stopped container, so the read always came
back empty. The helper is removed; the error still points at the
build log.
- the matrix sweep comment in main.rs said it re-provisions agent token
files; `ensure_all` creates no agent accounts or tokens.
- the knowledge-pull comments named a webhook caller that no longer
exists and claimed a race was "fixed at its source".
- `handle_spawn`'s doc and the `mcp_sockets` module doc named callers of
`register_agent` / a rollback that do not exist.
Refs #4723
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf was a boot-time backstop (#2290)
that pre-created every agent's bind sources. The start preamble already
creates them for every c0re-driven start, and on this host only hive-c0re
starts agent containers. The file was also the reason the socket dir's
owner had to be declared there, which is how it spent its life at
`0777 root root` whenever the uid could not be resolved (#4742).
- hive-priv gains `EnsureAgentSocketDir { name }`, called from
`set_nspawn_flags` in every start path. It creates
`/run/hive-agent/<name>` `0751 root:root` with mkdirat relative to an
O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW fd for the parent. An existing entry has to be a
directory (fstatat AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); anything else is refused, and a
directory is left alone. hive-c0re's own create_dir_all went: its /run
is read-only under ProtectSystem=strict.
- The container's `hive-agent-user-migrate` activation chowns that dir to
the agent user and sets 0751, the same way it already handles state/ and
harness/. It refuses a symlink or non-directory there, since `test -d`
and chmod follow links. No host-side passwd parse, and no window where
the dir is world-writable.
- `/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>` stays created by hive-c0re itself
(`ensure_agent_runtime_dir`). It holds the `mcp.sock` that hive-c0re
binds as hive-core, so it must not become root- or agent-owned.
- The `/run/hive-agent` parent is declared in hive-priv.nix, `0755
root:root`, instead of hive-gateway's hive-core rule. hive-priv is its
only writer now, and hive-priv's ReadWritePaths needs it to exist.
- The manager start in `ensure_root_agent` now goes through
`converge_start_preamble` + `start_with_fallback`. It was a bare start,
so after a reboot the manager's bind sources existed only because of the
tmpfiles file, and its limits drop-in did not exist at all.
- Removed: `sync_tmpfiles`, `agent_uid_gid` / `parse_passwd_uid_gid`,
`priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles`, `AgentTmpfilesEntry`, the tmpfiles
body builder and their tests, plus the three call sites.
- Legacy: hive-priv unlinks the file at every start, ignoring ENOENT.
`SyncAgentTmpfiles` stays one release as a payload-ignoring variant that
does the same unlink and returns Ok, for an older hive-c0re.
Salvaged from #4752: the boundary.md correction that nginx only dials,
because ProtectSystem=strict makes its /run read-only.
Behaviour change: a manual `nixos-container start h-<name>` right after a
reboot, before hive-c0re has started that agent, now fails on a missing
bind source instead of starting.
Closes#4742
An agent name that is not a valid Ident made `Coordinator::agent_paths`
panic. Job payloads carry names as plain strings (the swarm's published
wanted state is one source), and a panic inside a job-queue node never
reaches `complete_growing`, so the node's resources (the deploy
window included) were held until hive-c0re restarted. `agent_paths` now
returns an error; the job-queue nodes, the admin-socket spawn and
set-limits paths, the root-agent spawn and the dashboard set-limits
handler propagate it.
`lifecycle::list().await.unwrap_or_default()` turned a failed container
list into "no agents":
- meta-update cascade: the lock bump committed and zero rebuilds fanned
out, reported as success. The cascade is now resolved before the lock
bump and a list failure fails the node.
- dashboard update-all: queued nothing and returned 200 "ok". Now 500
with the error.
- container rescan: every row was emitted as removed and the cache
emptied. Now the last snapshot stands; `hivectl status` gets an error.
- dashboard journal: answered 404 "no managed container". Now 500.
- spawn/rebuild port-collision check: silently skipped. Now fails.
- startup migration: the per-agent phases ran over nothing, and phase 3
handed an empty agent list to `meta::sync_agents`, which renders the
meta flake with exactly the agents it is given. Both now log the list
failure and skip.
The hive-jobq scheduler still leaks a node's resources on any executor
panic; that root is not addressed here.
Refs #4723
resource-limits.json and topology.json were read with parse errors
folded into an empty map, and written in place with std::fs::write. One
truncated resource-limits.json followed by a single set_limits call
rewrote the file with only that agent's entry, erasing every other
agent's CPU and memory overrides without a log line. topology.json had
the same shape: reconcile rebuilt it from the live set, losing pending
(provisioned, never spawned) names.
- agent_config::read_map / write_map are generic over the stored type.
tool-groups and capabilities behave as before.
- resource_limits::read / effective return an error for an existing but
unreadable file; a missing file is still the empty map. set_limits
fails without writing on such a file, and writes atomically.
- topology: reconcile fails without writing on an unreadable file and
writes atomically. all_agents logs the error and returns no agents,
so a ManageRootAgent holder starts without cross-agent mounts.
Read-path behaviour on an unreadable resource-limits.json, per caller:
- write_dropins (every spawn / swap / WriteDropin): logs the error and
keeps the limits drop-in already under /run; the agent still starts.
With no drop-in yet (first start since boot) it writes the hive
defaults, because no drop-in means an uncapped container.
- render_flake: propagates, so sync_agents (and spawn/rebuild/destroy
jobs) fail. An empty map would give tighter-capped agents the hive
memoryMaxBytes.
- container_view::build_all: logs the error each scan and renders the
rows at the hive defaults (no ContainerView wire change).
- set_resource_limits reply: propagates.
Closes#4731
set_nspawn_flags propagated has_cap's error, so one corrupt
capabilities.json failed every agent's Start, spawn and Swap. It now
goes through holds_manage_root_agent, which logs the error (agent and
file) and treats the capability as absent: the agent starts without the
cross-agent, /applied and /meta mounts. caps_for/has_cap take the file
path so that seam is testable against a tempfile.
- meta.rs: a comment at the render_flake reads records why they
propagate (an empty tool-groups map renders toolGroups = null, i.e.
AGENT_DEFAULT, which fails open for narrower explicit entries).
- capabilities::read doc: states when set_caps/remove_agent rewrite
the file instead of saying remove_agent repairs it.
- set/remove corrupt-file tests assert ErrorKind::InvalidData.
tool_groups::read and capabilities::read returned an empty map when
their file existed but didn't parse. Every set_*/remove_agent is a
read-modify-write, and write() rewrote the file in place, so a crash or
ENOSPC mid-write left a truncated file, and the next write (e.g. the
manager-spawn seed of ruth's tool groups) replaced it with a map holding
only one agent. The scheduling and approval gates then denied every
other agent, recoverable only from meta git history.
- Both registries now read through agent_config::read_map: a missing
file is still the empty map, any other read failure or a parse
failure is an io::Error. set_groups / set_caps / remove_agent fail
without writing.
- Writes go through agent_config::write_map: temp file in the same
directory, fsync, rename, fsync the directory. hive-c0re had no
shared atomic-write helper (the existing tmp+rename sites are inline
and don't fsync).
- Callers of read / groups_for / has_cap now handle the error:
* dashboard GET /api/tool-groups, /api/capabilities,
/api/permissions/stale return 500 instead of an empty table;
* the SSE permission snapshots are skipped with a warn;
* render_flake returns Result, so sync_agents fails instead of
rendering every agent without its tool groups / capabilities;
* set_nspawn_flags propagates has_cap's error;
* the socket tool-group gates deny with the read error as message;
* seed_manager_tool_groups logs and does not seed.
- capabilities::write had no callers left once set_caps writes through
write_map, and is removed.
Closes#4719
lifecycle::destroy logged a failed `nixos-container destroy` and returned
Ok, so the DestroyContainer node went green, the agent was unregistered,
and with purge the after_ok PurgeState deleted its state while the
container config and root still existed.
Propagate the error unless the container list, read after the failure,
no longer names the container. An unreadable list fails too.
The prose added by this branch named the tracker item in seventeen
places, which check-issue-refs.sh rejects: a `#N` tag is dead weight for
anyone reading the public mirror, where no issue data exists. Each one
now states the fact it was pointing at — the parent field is gone — so
the sentence stands on its own.
Two of those lines also carried a rustdoc break: `[`write`]` in
topology.rs is ambiguous between the module's own `write` fn and the
`write!` macro, which `-D rustdoc::broken-intra-doc-links` fails. Spelled
`[`write()`]`, per rustdoc's own suggestion.
The host_config.rs rewrite is two lines rather than three so the doc
block stays under check-comment-blocks.sh's 30-line ceiling.
`topology.json` was a map of `name -> parent | null`, and that value fed
the whole agent hierarchy: `<parent>` / `<children>` recipient sentinels,
the reparenting API (CLI verb, wire verb, dashboard endpoints, DAG node),
the dashboard tree, the rebuild depth sort, and an unconditional
bind-mount grant giving every agent RW on its direct children's state.
Per the operator's ruling the field goes, and with it all of the above.
The file survives as what remains once the value is gone: the roster of
agent names, which is the set `ManageRootAgent` grants mounts over. It is
now a JSON array; `read` still accepts the old map shape and keeps its
keys, so a hive that upgrades across this does not blank its roster (and
so no capability holder loses its mounts for the length of that window).
Two sites kept their behaviour under a different recipient rather than
losing it. Both addressed `<parent>`, which the broker already resolved to
`operator` for a root agent, and every agent is now what that fallback
called a root:
- the harness's turn-failure / plugin-failure notification
(`Surface::send_to_parent` -> `send_to_operator`), and
- the send allow-list's always-permitted escape hatch, so an agent with a
restrictive allow-list still has a way to say it is stuck.
What is NOT preserved, deliberately: an agent with no capability no longer
sees any other agent's dirs. `ManageRootAgent`'s own grant is unchanged --
still every agent in the roster, still state RW + config RO, still no
`harness`.
The dashboard's reparenting control (the M0V3 picker) is deleted with its
CSS. The tree rendering that reads `ContainerView.parent` is left for the
frontend owner -- it degrades to a flat list with the field gone.
Rewrite two bare issue references (#4472, #4477) as self-standing
prose per check-issue-refs.sh's requirement — no markdown exemption,
hash-number tags are dead weight to a public forge-mirror reader.
Apply iris's vale fix to docs/agent-lifecycle/approvals.md (passive
voice, two contractions, one auto- hyphenation).
The hive had two spellings of "this agent may act on agents that aren't
its children": the `ManageRootAgent` capability, which nothing checked,
and a `can_manage_top_level_agents` role in a third meta store,
`roles.json`, which owned the real grant — the bind mounts that put
another agent's state (rw) and config (ro) inside the holder's
container. The two drifted independently, and with the parent/child
hierarchy removed the role's set (`parent.is_none()`) silently became
every agent while nothing said so.
Collapse them. The mount grant now hangs off
`Capability::ManageRootAgent`, looked up through the one capability
path that already exists (`capabilities::has_cap` over
`capabilities.json`) rather than a second mechanism. `roles.json` and
everything that read, wrote or reconciled it is gone, along with its
`meta.rs` staging and commit-label wiring; nothing in the tree reads
that file any more.
The enum variant keeps its name deliberately. Renaming it would turn
every `manage_root_agent` already stored in `capabilities.json` into an
unrecognised name that `prune_unknown` drops without asking. Its
meaning, not its spelling, is what changed: "may manage any agent". The
doc comment and the description string now say that.
`top_level_agents()`/`top_level_agents_in()` are replaced by
`all_agents()`/`all_agents_in()`. Under "manage any agent" the mounted
set is every agent by definition, so the code states it instead of
deriving it from a predicate that no longer discriminates — and the
call-site comment explains that, because it otherwise reads as a
widening. The holder is no longer bound as its own virtual child: that
reproduced the own-state and own-config mounts exactly, so dropping it
loses nothing.
`swarm-controller` mints an agent's mTLS leaf at creation and publishes it
at `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls`. Nothing read it back. This adds the
hop that carries it the rest of the way, and the in-container consumer
that proves the hop works.
Host side, `lifecycle::agent_identity` reads the row under *this hive's*
own certificate — the hive is a principal the store already knows — and
stages the leaf and its key `0600` under a new `agent-identity/<name>`
state dir, deliberately outside every bind-mounted tree. Both files go in
as systemd credentials rather than binds, the same answer and the same
mode reason as the queue secret beside it: the staged key is unreadable
to the unprivileged agent user, and the container manager reads a
`--load-credential` source as root before re-exposing it under the
consuming unit's own `User=`. The agent is never asked to authenticate in
order to obtain the thing it authenticates with.
Container side, `hive-agent-bao-identity.service` logs in with that
certificate and reads the agent's own path back, failing the unit when
either step does not succeed. It fails loudly where the hive-side readers
degrade quietly, because a refused certificate means an agent that
believes it reaches the store and never does — a cause only the login
itself can name.
The address is the whole switch, no separate `enable`, matching how
`queue.nix` and `logs.nix` already gate themselves. A hive with a store
forwards `HIVE_AGENT_BAO_ADDR` and every agent on it gets the check; a
hive without one forwards nothing and no agent does. That is what keeps
the delivery from landing in a container with nothing to read it.
The hive can now reach an agent's identity, so hive privilege covers
agent privilege. Accepted, not mitigated: the alternative is an agent
fetching its own credential with a credential it does not yet have.
Refs #4137
swarm-controller's `InitAgentConfigRepo` node already covers config-repo
creation, so this deletes a duplicate rather than a capability; old
`init_config` rows are skipped by `collect_lenient` with no migration, by
operator decision.
Refs #4398
The swarm always has exactly one queue; a hive can only lack its
address. Reworded every prose site this PR added that stated or
implied the opposite, to name what is actually absent (coordinates,
credential, or address) instead of the queue itself.
Refs #3805
hive-c0re stats the two files `swarm-bao-queue-agent` lands and forwards
them into every agent container as systemd credentials, and the harness
resolves a `QueueConfig` out of them at boot. Nothing connects yet.
A credential and not a bind mount, and the mode is what forces it: the
secret is root:0600 and the harness runs as the unprivileged agent user,
so a bind would deliver a file that user cannot open. nspawn's
`--load-credential` is read by the container manager as root and
re-exposed under the consuming unit's own `User=`. hive-c0re never reads
the bytes either way, which is just as well — it runs as `hive-core`.
Absent files stay legal and become visible rather than silent: the
publisher lives on the authelia host and mints on its first boot, so
"nothing at that path" is the ordinary early state of a swarm. c0re
forwards nothing and logs why; the harness logs that it has no queue.
The client id comes out of the delivered file rather than being rebuilt
from `hiveName` in nix, which is the agreement `swarm-secret-client`
states. `QueueConfig::from_env` wants it as a value, so the harness reads
the file itself — assigning the variable instead would need
`std::env::set_var` in a process that has already spawned threads.
Refs #3805
`agent_uid_gid` returns `None` for all 13 agents on every sync, and the
tmpfiles caller answers that `None` by writing `d /run/hive-agent/<name>
0777 root root` instead of `0751 <uid> <gid>` — a world-writable socket
dir, which docs/trust-boundary/boundary.md spells out as letting anything
that can reach the path unlink an agent's socket and bind its own.
Which failure fires could not be determined, because the read used
`.ok()?` and collapsed every io::Error into the same `None` a missing
user produces. None of the three causes the doc comment enumerated (not
built yet, unparseable, missing user) fits 13 long-lived containers whose
agent user demonstrably exists — from inside one:
srw-rw-rw- atlas atlas /run/hive-agent/atlas/agent.sock
So the live cause was outside the documented set and unidentifiable. Both
`None` arms now log, with the path and the error.
Splitting the pure parser out to make it testable surfaced a second,
narrower bug. The old scan used `?` on the field reads, and those are
only reached once the name matches — so an unusable row *for the wanted
user* returned `None` from the whole function instead of skipping, hiding
a usable entry below it. (Rows for other users were always skipped fine:
`split(':')` always yields at least one item, so the first `?` could not
fire.) It now skips unusable rows and keeps looking.
Does not pre-empt #3047, which removes the lookup entirely and stays
blocked on #3998; this only makes the lookup honest about failing while
it exists.
Closes#4197.
