`renderClient` could only emit the authorization-code shape, so a
daemon client was expressed as an interactive one with an empty
redirect list. Authelia permits only the grants a client names, and an
omitted `grant_types` means authorization-code alone — so that shape
cannot obtain a token at all.
Measured against authelia 4.39.20, rendering exactly what this module
produced for `swarm-nats`:
client_secret_basic → unauthorized_client: The OAuth 2.0 Client is
not allowed to use authorization grant
'client_credentials'
introspection → {"active":false} (works)
Introspection is all the queue's responder needs today, which is why
nothing was visibly broken while the comment in `swarm-nats.nix`
described a grant that was never configured.
Adds `kind = "interactive" | "machine"` rather than inferring from an
empty `redirectUris`, because the two differ in what authelia permits
and not merely in what is populated. `openid` is dropped from a machine
client's scopes because authelia refuses that combination outright — a
daemon receives an access token and never an id-token.
An assertion rejects redirect URIs on a machine client: they are not
harmlessly unused, they mean the author believed a browser was
involved.
Refs #3274.
Retention so a reader can ask what a hive last said without anyone
keeping a second copy. The container is ephemeral = false, so the store
survives a restart with no bind mount, and losing it degrades to the
true answer (nothing known) rather than a stale one.
The per-account grant is the part that is easy to miss: the server
option gives the SERVER JetStream, and an account gets it only from its
own. Measured against a running 2.14.1 with this exact two-account
shape - global-only makes kv operations fail 10039 while the server
starts cleanly and logs Starting JetStream, so no rendering check can
see it. Deliberately not granted to the callout account: the responder
mints credentials and has no business holding stream state.
The responder answered granted=true and the server still refused every
client:
Error non operator mode account "AUTH": attempted to use issuer_account
nats_jwt::Token::new_user always sets issuer_account, which is an
operator-mode field naming the account when a signing key rather than the
account identity key signed the token. In server-config mode - what this
module renders - its mere presence is fatal, and the account is named by
the claims' aud instead.
nats-jwt can express neither aud nor the omission, so the user JWT is now
hand-built by the same signer as the response wrapper, and nats-jwt moves
to dev-dependencies as the encoder's test oracle.
Every unit test passed throughout: they assert fields that must be
present, and the defect was a field that must be absent.
Measured against a running server built from this module's own rendered
config, not a hand-written one -- which is the fix to the method as much
as to the file. Two shapes died in a row: a bare name authenticates
anyone who sends it, and a name plus an nkey refuses to start at all
(nkey users do not take usernames or passwords).
A malformed key is fail-closed too, so the only way to a live server
here is a real key whose seed nobody but the responder holds.
argus caught it and reproduced it: a users entry carrying only a name
has no credential, so CONNECT {"user":"auth"} is accepted with no
password. The name is a literal in this module, so on the shared netns
that identity was walk-in-able from every agent container -- the same
hole the module exists to close, moved rather than closed.
An nkey rather than a password: only the public half appears in config,
the seed reaches the responder alone, so a hive with no responder has
nobody who can authenticate as it. Asserted at eval, because the
rendered config is valid and the server starts either way.
A swarm has one message queue; this is the container that runs it, in
the same shape as every other swarm service. Off by default, and off
means absent.
The auth_callout block is the interim state and the final one at once.
Measured on the pinned nats-server rather than reasoned about: an empty
authorization block, and one with an empty users list, both accept an
anonymous client and answer PONG. auth_callout sets auth_required and
refuses everyone until a responder approves them, so a config whose
responder does not exist yet denies by default -- and the responder
lands beside it without any of this being swapped out.
That matters more here than it would elsewhere because the container
shares the host netns, so an unauthenticated interim state would be
reachable from every agent container on the hive.
No package option, deliberately: nixpkgs' nats module resolves
pkgs.nats-server itself and exposes none, so one here would name
something it cannot control.
No gateway vhost either: NATS speaks its own TCP protocol, nginx cannot
front it, and cross-hive reach is the wireguard mesh.
