main is already unborked -- the constraint-syntax fix landed directly in
31e47632 and the hive-tls-ca ordering race in b5066ad0. What is left is
the reason the syntax bug became an OUTAGE rather than a warning, and it
is independent of both.
nginx refuses to load a config naming a cert file that does not exist:
`cannot load certificate ... no such file` fails the pre-start test, so
the vhost does not degrade -- the ENTIRE proxy dies and restart-loops
into start-limit-hit, taking the forge, the dashboard and matrix with
it. Signing tolerated the leaf's absence and the container import
tolerated it; the vhost reference did not, and that is the one that
decides whether anything serves.
Absence stays a normal state here: the leaf only exists where the swarm
CA is autoconfigured. So the import now installs the HIVE leaf at the
services path instead of removing the file. That is a name mismatch on
those vhosts -- browsers warn, strict clients refuse -- and every other
name keeps working. A bad certificate is a bad afternoon; a dead gateway
is a dead hive.
Also keeps the comment explaining why every nameConstraints entry needs
its own `permitted;` prefix, so the next reader doesn't re-derive it
from an outage.
The swarm's service names cannot go on the hive leaf: the hive CA is
name-constrained to the hive domain and those names are siblings of
it. So there is a second leaf, signed by the services sub-CA.
signLeafScript is parameterised rather than duplicated -- same
ceremony, different issuer and names -- so the two cannot drift in
how they are built. The name list itself is derived once, as a
read-only swarm.serviceDomains, and read by both the sub-CA that
name-constrains those names and the leaf that carries them as SANs:
two modules each assembling the list is how they stop agreeing.
The renewal unit is the point of this commit as much as the leaf.
hive-tls-resign now knows about both, because a leaf that first-boot
issuance creates and weekly renewal ignores looks perfect for its
entire validity and then expires with no warning -- the failure is
invisible until it is total. The freshness test became a function
over a leaf rather than a check of one, so adding a third leaf is a
line rather than a rewrite.
The services leaf is skipped where the sub-CA is absent: it exists
only where the swarm CA is autoconfigured, and on a hive whose certs
come from its operator the correct state is no leaf, not a stale one.
Also drops a comment that documented signLeafScript's old signature
from above an unrelated binding.
The swarm's own service names cannot be signed by any hive CA: each
hive CA is name-constrained to its hive's domain, and the service
names are siblings of that domain, not children. Adding them to a
leaf's SAN list only trades a name-mismatch error for a
constraint-violation one.
So the root issues one more intermediate, constrained to exactly the
configured service names -- not to the whole swarm domain. A leaked
services CA mints forge./chat./auth. and nothing else.
Rotation is why this is separate rather than a second leaf off the
root: the constraint enumerates the names, so adding a service
re-issues this CA and never touches the root or any hive CA. The
name set is written beside the cert and compared on each start, which
is what makes re-issuance happen exactly when the names change --
not every boot, and not never. The list is sorted and deduplicated
for the same reason: an unstable order would churn a CA that things
are meant to pin.
Validity is deliberately much shorter than the root's. This CA is
meant to be re-issued, so a long window buys nothing and a short one
keeps the rotation path exercised rather than theoretical.
Carries the root's half-provisioned guard: a key beside a cert that
did not sign it looks like it works and issues nothing anyone trusts.
One attrset describing every hive in the swarm including this one,
identical on every host, with hiveName selecting which entry is us.
"My peers" is derived (swarm.peerHives) rather than declared.
Every field in the old per-host peer list was intrinsic to the hive it
described, never to the pair -- so the list was a directory each host
kept its own copy of. Beyond the deduplication it removes a bug class:
two hosts could hold different endpoints for the same third hive with
nothing to detect the disagreement.
Drops the per-hive caCert. Trust inside a swarm derives from the swarm
root, which every hive chains to. What that genuinely removes is
trusting a hive whose root this swarm does not own -- a cross-swarm
problem that wants a mechanism of its own, not a field that happened to
work.
The matrix container's certificateFiles block goes with it and could
NOT be migrated: that list is read at build time and the swarm root is
a runtime file (its key must never enter the store), so there is no
build-time name to put there. caCert being a nix path was precisely
what made it the build-time distribution channel. Agents are unaffected
-- hive-tls folds the root into the hive trust bundle and the meta
renderer embeds that one file. Tracked separately.
Migration is an assertion plus warnings, not a rename: hives is peers
union {self}, and the set gains a member no existing config has written
down. A rename migrates a name and a default can re-root a meaning;
neither can conjure a new member. The warning explains, the self-entry
assertion stops the build.
mara: enableAllLocalDefaults is more of a deployment mode via settings
set, less a default setting.
That reframing is the change. A mode asserts values; an option declares
what it is when nobody asks. Written as default = <flag>, every service
option had to name a switch it has no relationship to, and the answer to
what does all-local turn on was spread across five files.
Two modules now hold the two tiers - local-defaults.nix for the mode and
what it asserts directly, swarm-required-services.nix for the
services-live-here switch and the per-service enables under it. Each
service module keeps its own declaration and loses only the line about
when a deployment wants it.
mkDefault is the right precedence rather than a compromise: it beats an
option default and yields to any explicit definition, so the mode fills
in for an operator who has not spoken and never argues with one who has.
Evaluated config is unchanged in both directions.
`services.hyperhive.enableAllLocalDefaults` is the single "everything
runs on this box" toggle, and the autoconfigurable settings default from
it: `swarm.enableRequiredServices` (new — the swarm's shared services
run here) and `swarm.ca.autoConfigure` (previously an explicit false).
Off by default, unchanged from before: a host cannot tell whether it is
the one meant to hold the swarm's services or its CA, so this stays an
operator saying "this is that box". What it replaces is one toggle per
service for the deployment where the answer is "all of them".
Each derived toggle can still be set on its own, so "all local except X"
needs no further option.
A swarm's services and its hives can live on different hosts, and a host
has no way to tell whether it is the one holding the root — so setting
the swarm CA up is an operator action, not something a host infers.
`swarm.ca.autoConfigure` is off by default and is the only thing that
issues a hive sub-CA, which is also the only case that *can*: signing
one needs the root's private key, and that key is deliberately not on a
hive host otherwise.
With the flag off, a hive self-signs its CA exactly as it always has.
That keeps a plain hive working out of the box; what it gives up is
membership of a swarm's trust hierarchy, which is the right thing to
give up for a hive nobody has federated.
Replaces a default derived from `swarm.peers == { }`. That read "no
peers declared" as "everything is local", which is not the same claim —
a hive can belong to a swarm it has not declared yet, or to one whose
services run elsewhere entirely.
Cross-hive trust was O(n²) hand-pinning: every hive had to name every
peer's CA. A swarm root makes it O(1) — trust the root once and every
present and future peer validates.
The root is generated by a new `swarm-ca` unit on a single-host swarm
and operator-provided otherwise; `swarm.ca.autoConfigure` picks between
them and derives its default from `swarm.peers` being empty, so "all on
one host" is read off the deployment rather than remembered. Both modes
produce the same artifacts in the same places, so splitting hosts later
is moving the service dirs, not switching code paths. The root key never
enters the nix store, and the root is never regenerated automatically —
replacing it invalidates every peer at once.
Each hive CA carries `nameConstraints` pinned to that hive's domain, so
a leaked hive CA can only mint names inside its own subdomain, enforced
by verifiers rather than by convention.
`ca.pem` was serving as both the issuer and the anchor consumers trust;
those are the same file only while it is self-signed. openssl will not
terminate a chain at a trusted cert that isn't self-signed (rustls and
Go will), so the promotion would have broken some consumers and not
others. `hive-tls-ca` now also writes `trust-bundle.pem` — the hive CA
plus whatever it is rooted at — and every anchor consumer reads that:
agents, the CI and forge containers, and the peer-config recipe. On a
hive with no swarm root the bundle is just that CA, so nothing consuming
it needs a mode to branch on.
