Six places asserted the old design as fact, and none of them mention the
change by name -- the class of doc breakage that is found by asking what
a diff made untrue, not by grepping for a feature:
- swarmctl/README.md and swarm-authelia-bridge/README.md both described
their own private canonical store. The bridge's "known limitation"
section described the seam as unsolved; it is what this fixes, so it
becomes what both writers must uphold instead.
- docs/swarm/{sso,ui,secrets}.md described a rendered artifact.
- The repo CLAUDE.md entry for swarmctl said the same.
- docs/tools/swarmctl-cli.md is regenerated (CI diffs it against the
clap tree), picking up the removed --store flag.
Operator-facing where it is read: the hand-editing consequence (values
survive a rewrite, comments do not) is stated in sso.md, where an
operator is being told to edit the file, rather than only in a module doc.
Per mara on the CA question: outside all-local this is an ops problem,
and what is missing is documentation rather than machinery.
One row per secret, read against three topologies, because the same
credential is generated in place on one and handed over by an operator on
another. sso.md's table is replaced by a pointer -- two tables listing the
same secrets would drift, and its prose about why a secret is generated
in-container is the half worth keeping there.
States the constraint the whole thing rests on: a hive CA is name-
constrained to the hive domain and a swarm service name is a sibling of
it, so a hive CA cannot issue a swarm-service certificate at all. That is
why placing the swarm root is an operations decision.
The registration half is shared; what each service does with the result
is not, so the differences get a table rather than a second page.
States why matrix reads its secret through LoadCredential and why
/_matrix/ is not a forward-auth surface -- both are conclusions a reader
would otherwise have to re-derive from the module.
`user add` refuses on an existing name, so the `--group` flag it takes at
creation time could not be added afterwards at all: repairing an account
meant hand-editing both users.json and the rendered users.yml as root.
mara, on #3167: "i will not edit those files by hand, we will have the
same issues elsewhere".
The merge rules live in users.rs as a pure function over a UserUpdate, so
they are testable without a command line, a container or a running
authelia — main.rs's arm only loads, applies, publishes and prints.
Removals are strict and everything else is idempotent, which is the one
asymmetry here and is deliberate: a --remove-group naming a group the
user does not have fails, because a revocation that reports success
without revoking is the outcome nobody re-checks; while refusing an
already-satisfied set would make the multi-attribute call this verb
exists for break whenever one of the values was already right.
A command that changes nothing at all still fails — it would otherwise
rewrite both files and restart the SSO provider to no effect.
Passwords are out of scope: regenerating a credential is a different
intent from editing an attribute, and folded together an attribute edit
can invalidate a login by accident.
Extracts publish() from user_add so both verbs share the
render -> store -> users.yml -> restart ordering and the comment that
explains why that order, rather than the second verb copying it.
`swarm/sso.md` described the empty user store as a resting state — a
provider that is reachable but has nobody in it yet. It isn't. Authelia
validates the store at startup and treats zero users as fatal:
error reading the authentication database: could not validate the
schema: users: non zero value required
so it exits 1, systemd restarts it, and an enabled-but-unbootstrapped
swarm presents as a crash-looping container behind a vhost that is
working correctly. The observed symptom is `502 Bad Gateway`, which
reads as a proxy fault and is not one.
Says so, gives the error text to grep for, and marks the `swarmctl user
add` step as required to finish the install rather than as a first-login
convenience. `gateway.md` gains the same warning next to the vhost,
because that is where someone lands when the 502 is what they can see.
The reason the store ships empty is unchanged and still right: seeding
an account means a credential in a config file. What was wrong was
calling the resulting state harmless.
The vhost half of this change is only useful with an account behind it,
and the provider is generated with an empty user set on purpose. Document
the `swarmctl user add` step rather than automating it: bootstrapping an
IdP non-interactively means a secret arriving from a file, an env var or a
nix expression, all worse than one command typed once.
The gateway and network pages gain the rows they would otherwise be
missing — vhost map, local-dev hosts entry, and the resolver's
authoritative-name list.
The question this answers is "what do I have to configure, and where" —
so the table of secrets is the deliverable and the prose is scaffolding
around it.
The organising idea worth keeping: a secret belongs in-container when
nothing outside that container reads it. Every one of authelia's own
secrets passes that test; the client secret's plaintext fails it, which
is what makes delivery a problem at all rather than a detail.
