The docs, option descriptions and comments that named the swarm root, the
swarm CA or the hive CA as an existing trust anchor now name the secret
store's pki root or the trust bundle that holds it:
- docs/swarm/README.md, secrets.md, bao.md
- deploy.bao.clientCaFile's and gateway.verifiedProxyTo's descriptions
- comments in hive-c0re/src/meta.rs, hive-agent/src/swarm_queue.rs,
swarm-logs/src/auth.rs, swarm-controller/src/vcs_metrics.rs,
hive-forge, swarm-authelia, swarm-ci-runner, glue-bao-tls, swarm-bao,
swarm-grafana, swarm-otel, otel, hive-c0re, lib/hive-ca-trust.nix,
hive-forge/Cargo.toml and the flake-update workflow
Nothing behaves differently: every edit is a nix, Rust or TOML comment, an
option description, or a test assertion message. The Rust edits change the
workspace source, which this PR already rebuilds for hivectl.
Refs #4588
The secret store's pki root issues every hive's gateway leaf and the
swarm's service names, so the root swarm-ca.service generated on the
host anchors nothing and its key is a secret outside the store.
- swarm-ca.nix is gone: swarm-ca.service, root.pem and root-key.pem,
and the swarm.ca.{autoConfigure,stateDir,validityDays} options. A
definition of any of them fails evaluation with a removal message
(swarm-ca-removed.nix), and a tmpfiles rule deletes /var/lib/swarm-ca
on every host. singleHostSwarm no longer sets a swarm.* option.
- hive-tls-ca drops the $root slot: trust-bundle.pem holds the store's
pki root and a hive CA's public ca.pem/ca-previous.pem only.
- hivectl peer-config no longer prints the scp line for the swarm root;
the store's pki root is the one step.
- The gateway's cert import no longer stands a hive leaf or a throwaway
in for a missing swarm-services leaf where it Requires= the issuing
unit: it fails, naming swarm-services-cert.service. The stand-in stays
where the gateway does not wait (no swarm name, or the store's UI
only, whose passthrough must start with the store sealed).
Comments and docs that named swarm-ca.nix, swarm.ca.* or the host root
now name the store's pki root.
Refs #4588
The CI runner was a hive deploy module: hive-ci.nix ran it beside the
forge, and hive-c0re registered it through the forge's admin API with
the `core` token, writing the registration token through hive-priv. It
could only run on the forge's host, and it kept an admin-scoped forge
token on a hive.
Now the runner is a swarm service:
- swarm-ci-runner.nix runs it in a `swarm-ci-runner` container on the
host that sets deploy.ci-runner.enable, reaching the forge by name.
It needs neither the forge nor a hive there.
- swarm-controller reads the forge's runner registration token with its
own admin token and writes it to swarm/services/ci-runner/
registration-token whenever it differs from what it last wrote. Its
grant on that path is create/update only.
- The runner's own leaf (CN swarm-ci-runner, role and policy of the same
name) reads that one path. swarm-bao-ci-runner.service fetches it into
the runner's EnvironmentFile and restarts the runner on a change.
- A pre-start step removes .runner when the daemon's journal since its
last start holds Forgejo's "unregistered runner" refusal (the daemon
exits 1 when its startup Declare gets it), or when .runner names
another forge address; upstream's pre-start step then registers again.
Removed from the hive side: hive-ci.nix and deploy.forgejo.ci.*,
forge/ci_runner.rs, PrivRequest::RegisterCiRunner and its handler and
ReadWritePaths entry, InfraContainer::Ci with hivectl's --ci and the
dashboard's hive-ci journal entry, HYPERHIVE_FORGE_CI_ENABLED, and
read:admin,write:admin from CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES: nothing else in hive-c0re
calls /api/v1/admin/*. The old ci options, under both swarm.forge.ci and
deploy.forgejo.ci, now fail evaluation naming deploy.ci-runner.
The forge's half of the old ci.enable, the actions/checkout mirror and
DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = self, is deploy.forgejo.actionsFromSelf.
Closes#4954
The three client registrations move into glue-{controller,nats,matrix}-oidc-client.nix,
gated only on deploy.authelia.enable and reading their ids from swarm.* options,
so the host running authelia registers every one of them whichever host runs
the service. The matrix callback is a new read-only swarm.matrix.sso.redirectUri,
read by both the homeserver's config and its client entry.
swarm-secret-publish now also publishes the queue's and the homeserver's minted
secrets to swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client. The queue host reads its responder's
secret there with swarm-bao-nats-auth-oidc under the responder's own leaf
(swarm-nats-auth role gains that one read path), and the homeserver's host with
swarm-bao-matrix-oidc under matrix-ctl's leaf (swarm-matrix-ctl role gains its
one read path). The host-file copies are gone: swarm-nats-auth-secrets now
delivers only the callout seeds and the store identity, and
hive-matrix-oidc-secret is removed. A fetch unit whose leaf is unset still
renders and fails naming the option pair.
Closes#4943
Every hive's homeserver loaded a per-hive `hyperhive` appservice
registration, and the swarm minted and delivered an as_token for it
through bao. No client presented that token: swarm-controller creates
every `@hive-<hive>` sender and every agent account with the swarm
appservice token (hive_sender.rs, agent_token.rs), and no Rust code read
the per-hive one.
Removed, with everything that existed only to serve it:
- hive-matrix.nix: the `hyperhive` registration, its activation-time
render, the host bind mount of /var/lib/hyperhive/matrix-appservice,
its LoadCredential entry, and the internal options
`deploy.matrix.appserviceTokenFile` / `appserviceRegistrationScript`.
tuwunel now loads only the swarm registration.
- glue-matrix-bao-token.nix and its `swarm-bao-matrix-token` unit.
- glue-bao-tls.nix: the matrix-token leaf and its defaults.
- swarm-bao.nix: the `swarm-matrix-token-<hive>` roles and policies
(`swarm-bao-matrix-token-policy`), and the options
`deploy.bao.matrixTokenClient{Cert,Key}File` and
`matrixTokenCommonNamePrefix`, now mkRemovedOptionModule.
- swarm-secret-publisher.nix: the per-hive token mint and its state dir.
- swarm.nix: the reserved `<matrixTokenCommonNamePrefix>-<hive>` CN.
- swarm-secret-client: `matrix::appservice_token_path`.
The swarm registration (swarm-matrix-ctl, swarm-controller) is untouched.
Comments and docs that pointed at the removed glue file now point at
glue-queue-agent-credential.nix, which has the same reader shape.
Refs #4428
An agent's harness connects to the swarm queue with the agent's own
credential or not at all. The first connect retries after 5s, doubling
(7 attempts, about five minutes), with a warning per failed attempt;
when every attempt fails the harness logs an error and exits 1. Missing
coordinates (HIVE_AGENT_NATS_URL, or the secret store's BAO_ADDR /
HIVE_AGENT_NAME / certificate) fail the boot outright.
Previously the first connect's outcome was memoized for the life of the
process: a store 403 or queue refusal at boot left the agent on the
hive's shared client, or disconnected, until someone restarted it, and
an agent with no queue coordinates ran on without one. Both paths are
gone, with the hive-scoped subjects that only the shared client used.
The harness unit now restarts after 30s instead of 2s, so a swarm-wide
outage doesn't restart every agent every 2s, and has no start limit, so
it keeps coming back however long the outage lasts.
The hive's shared client credential is still imported into the harness
unit for swarm-logs; the two HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_*_FILE variables that
pointed the harness at it are dropped, as is the unset
HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CA_FILE override.
With the fallback gone, the pieces #4944 added only for it go too:
swarm_input's skip-on-shared-client branch and swarm-queue-client's
connect_with_inbox_prefix. swarm-nats-auth's grant for the hive's shared
agent client is unchanged.
Closes#4909
A gateway host without a hive whose only swarm name is the store's UI no
longer waits for swarm-services-cert: its nginx carries the stream
passthrough to the store and must come up while the store is sealed. Until
the services leaf lands, hive-gateway-self-signed-cert installs a throwaway
self-signed pair on the default and swarm-services paths there; on a host
without a hive it never references the hive leaf.
A host without a hive also no longer mints the hive-leaf identity or
defaults the options pointing at it, and does not render the hive-domain
vhost, whose upstream is hive-c0re.
Refs #4588
Every hive gets its own store identity (CN
<deploy.bao.hiveLeafCommonNamePrefix>-<hive>) and its own role on the
existing pki mount (<deploy.bao.hiveLeafPkiRolePrefix>-<hive>), whose
allowed_domains is the hive's domain and *.<domain>. The policy grants
update on that one issue path. swarm-bao-hive-leaf-policy writes role,
policy and cert-auth role for every hive in swarm.hives; the store's host
mints its own hive's identity in glue-bao-tls.nix and a new glue file
points deploy.hive-controller.tls.baoHiveIdentity{Cert,Key}File at it.
Hives on other hosts place it by hand. swarm.nix reserves the composed CN.
hive-tls-ca no longer generates a hive CA or signs a leaf: caGenScript,
signLeafScript/signHiveLeaf and the adoption block are gone, ca-key.pem
is deleted where it exists, and the unit only assembles trust-bundle.pem.
The retired ca.pem/ca-previous.pem stay in the bundle so leaves they
signed keep verifying.
hive-tls-resign becomes the bao issuance: at boot, on deploy and from a
daily timer it re-issues when the leaf is missing, past half the role's
lifetime, missing a name, or not chained to the store's pki root. Nothing
orders the gateway after it, so a valid leaf on disk never waits on the
store; a failed renewal leaves the leaf in place. A missing identity
fails the unit naming both options, as does the root fetch on a hive
fronting no swarm name, which now presents this identity instead of the
reader cert.
caValidityDays and leafValidityDays are removed (both spellings), since
nothing reads them.
Refs #4588
A hive fronting no swarm name fetches the store's pki root presenting its
reader certificate. When deploy.bao.clientCertFile or clientKeyFile is unset,
or either named file is not readable, the unit now exits 1 with a message
naming both options and their paths, instead of exiting 0 with the root
missing from the trust bundle.
The module-eval cases that asserted the quiet skip assert the failure
instead, and a new case covers the named-but-absent files.
The `want_svc=0` root fetch presents `deploy.bao.clientCertFile`/
`clientKeyFile` to a listener that demands a client certificate. On a
hive with neither set, the handshake is refused every time, and
`swarm-services-cert` went from green to failed-and-retrying for 24h.
The branch is now chosen at eval: with no reader identity, the unit
logs that the store root was not staged and names the option, then
exits 0, and no fetch is rendered. A hive with an identity fetches as
before. `hivectl peer-config` already handles the absent file.
Refs #4588 (review c88774, point 2).
A self-signed hive fronting no swarm service name never filled
`$svcroot` (/var/lib/hive-tls/swarm-services-root.pem): the only writer
was `swarm-services-cert`'s issuance, which exits early on
`want_svc=0`. So those hives' trust-bundle.pem lacked the store's `pki`
root, even though every other hive's swarm-service names chain to it.
On `want_svc=0`, `swarm-services-cert` now reads the root from the
store's unauthenticated `GET /v1/pki/ca/pem`, over the hive's existing
BAO_ADDR, `deploy.bao.serverCaFile` and reader identity
(`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`/`clientKeyFile`) at the TLS layer only; no
login. It writes `$svcroot` and restarts `hive-tls-ca` when the root
changed, as the issuing path already does. The daily
`swarm-services-cert-renew` timer runs the same script, so the copy
follows a root rotation.
The gateway no longer `Requires=` `swarm-services-cert` on such a host:
nginx reads nothing that unit writes there, and the fetch retries
against a sealed store.
`hivectl peer-config` prints the root as step 2 of the self-signed
instructions: the swarm's service names are issued under it, not the
swarm root.
No new option. Refs #4588.
render_agent gains a second stanza: list on
secret/metadata/swarm/agents/<agent>/*, next to the existing read on
secret/data/swarm/agents/<agent>/*. An agent can now learn which
credentials it holds by listing its own subtree. Metadata read, writes
and every other principal's paths stay refused.
An agent's policy was only written when it was minted, so existing agents
would never get the new stanza. swarm-controller now rewrites every
agent's policy at start (read_policy::ensure_agent_policies), with the
same 30s / 24h retry as ensure_hive_access. The roster is the store's
hive-agent-* cert-auth roles, listed with the controller's existing
`list` on auth/cert/certs; the writes use its existing grant on
sys/policies/acl/hive-*. Only the policy is written: mint_and_verify
also reissues the certificate, so the pass does not call it.
Refs #4348
swarm-bao-operator-viewer-policy exits 0 while the granter may not
configure auth/oidc, so it never retries on its own. On 2026-09-29 the
operator fixed the granter (swarm-bao-granter-role succeeded at 15:29Z),
but the viewer unit had last run on 2026-09-28 19:11Z on that exit-0
branch. auth/oidc/config and the viewer role stayed unwritten and OIDC
login failed until a manual restart.
The granter unit now restarts the viewer unit from ExecStartPost, which
runs only after its script exits 0. Restart rather than start, because
the viewer unit is RemainAfterExit and a start would be a no-op.
--no-block, because the viewer unit is ordered after the granter and a
blocking restart would deadlock. The link is one-way, so the viewer's
own Restart=on-failure never re-runs the granter.
OnSuccess= would not fire (the granter stays active under
RemainAfterExit), and Wants=/PartOf= either no-op on an active unit or
also propagate a failed restart and every stop.
The viewer's log message no longer tells the operator to restart it.
Refs #4772
The bao UI at bao-ui.<swarm> took a raw store token and nothing else.
It now offers an OIDC tab: authelia's `admins` group logs in and lands
on `swarm-operator-viewer`, which is list+read on `secret/metadata/*`
and nothing under `secret/data/` or `sys/`.
- authelia registers an interactive client `swarm-bao-ui`
(glue-bao-ui-oidc-client.nix) with redirect
`https://bao-ui.<swarm>/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback`; the secret
publisher carries its secret to
`secret/swarm/services/swarm-bao-ui/oidc/client`.
- `swarm-bao-granter-role` (bootstrap token) enables the `oidc` auth
mount with listing visibility `unauth`, asked before attempted like
cert/approle; `bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl` gains `sys/auth/oidc`.
- The granter's policy gains `auth/oidc/config`, `auth/oidc/role/swarm-*`
and read on that one secret leaf. It still holds no `sys/auth`.
- New granting unit `swarm-bao-operator-viewer-policy` writes the viewer
policy, and once the granter may configure `auth/oidc/config` (checked
through `sys/capabilities-self`), writes the mount's config from the
published secret and the role binding `groups=admins` to the viewer.
Before the bootstrap step re-runs it writes the policy, logs the step
and exits 0.
Route (a) per mara on #4775: enabling the auth method stays a
bootstrap-token step, re-run once on the live store.
module-eval pins the viewer policy's single metadata stanza, that the
granter's policy has no sys/auth path, the oidc enable in the bootstrap
unit, the exit-0 path, the config/role contents, and the client
registration + publish.
openbao gains a second listener, `ui`, on 127.0.0.1:<deploy.bao.uiPort>
(default 8204) with TLS off and no client-certificate requirement, and
`ui = true`. The existing listeners are unchanged. An nginx inside the
store's container, on 127.0.0.1:<deploy.bao.uiProxyPort> (default 8206),
forwards only /ui/ and /v1/ to it, redirects / to /ui/, answers 403 on
sys/unseal, sys/seal, sys/step-down, sys/rekey* and sys/generate-root*,
and 404 on everything else.
The gateway on the store's host serves `swarm.bao.ui.domain` (default
bao-ui.<swarm>) behind the authelia auth_request subrequest, proxying to
that nginx; the name joins serviceDomains and localNames like every
other gateway-published swarm service. authelia gets an access_control
rule restricting that name to group:admins, rendered wherever authelia
runs, since the default policy admits any session.
Trade-off, ruled by the operator on the parent issue: the UI listener
asks for no client certificate, so on that door a bao token alone is the
credential.
Three comments and a doc line claimed every API listener demands a
client certificate; they now except the loopback UI listener. The
module-eval case counting declared listeners excludes `ui` by name, as
it already did `metrics`.
On a self-signed gateway, the UI's name is a swarm service name, so its
host requests the services leaf from the store. `swarm-services-cert`
sits Before= and RequiredBy= the gateway's cert import, which nginx
Requires=. On a host whose only swarm name is the UI, that would hold
nginx, and with it the stream passthrough every reader dials, on a login
to a store that may be sealed. hive-tls drops those two edges exactly
when the UI is the only local swarm name: nginx starts on the existing
hive-leaf fallback, and the script's existing re-import reloads nginx
once the leaf issues. Every other host keeps both edges.
The controller's OIDC client secret (client `swarm-controller`, used for
the queue connection, the auth-bridge bearer and the OTLP push) came from
an operator-placed file, `deploy.swarm-controller.queue.clientSecretFile`,
handed in by `LoadCredential=`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, which already copies authelia's minted OIDC
secrets into the store, also publishes this one, to
`swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client`. That path sits under
`controller/`, which no hive's policy reads. The controller reads it once
at start with its existing store certificate and holds it in memory, as
`swarm_queue_client::ClientSecret::Value`. If the store is down, it
retries for about a minute and then fails the start, so `Restart=` tries
again.
Policy delta: the controller gets `read` on that leaf, and the publisher
gets `create`/`update` on that leaf.
Removed: the `queue.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings, now removed
options with a message), its singleHostSwarm default, the credential and
placeholder, and the path watcher plus its restart oneshot. A controller
without a store identity is now an eval error, because it has no other
way to get the secret.
An agent's store identity was signed in swarm-controller's memory by a CA
a controller-host unit generated on disk, and the listener never trusted
that CA. Agent leaves now come from the store itself: a `pki-agents` PKI
mount whose root openbao generates internally, so the agent CA's key
never exists outside the store.
- swarm-bao-agent-pki (new, store host, as the bao granter): enables and
tunes the mount, generates the root once (guarded on an empty issuer
list, no replace branch), upserts the `swarm-agent` role (client
certificates named `hive-agent-*` only, 90 days), caches the CA at
/var/lib/swarm-bao-tls/agent-ca.pem and composes the listener bundle.
- The listener's tls_client_ca_file is a new listener-client-ca.pem
(client-ca.pem, then the agent CA). Host cert-auth roles still pin
client-ca.pem, so an agent leaf satisfies no host role. swarm-bao-certs
composes the same bundle before openbao starts.
- openbao reads tls_client_ca_file only at start, so when the bundle
changed after openbao started, swarm-bao-agent-pki restarts
openbao.service in the container; under `seal = "shamir"` it prints
the step instead. Once swarm-bao-certs has a cached CA, later boots
start openbao with it and do not restart.
- The controller policy gains exactly `update` on
pki-agents/issue/swarm-agent. mint_and_verify now asks that role for
the leaf (the store generates the key), writes the agent's cert-auth
role pinning the issuing CA bao returned, and writes the agent's
policy as render_agent alone: the hive-shared queue credential stanza
is gone.
- deploy.bao.agentPkiRoleName (must start `swarm-`, asserted with the
other pki role names); swarm-controller gets
SWARM_CONTROLLER_AGENT_PKI_MOUNT/_ROLE from the deploy.bao options.
Deleted: swarm-controller-agent-ca and its options (agentCaFile,
agentCaKeyFile), env, LoadCredential entries and assertion;
agent_identity's Authority, rcgen signing and validity window; the
rcgen and time dependencies of swarm-controller (rcgen leaves the
workspace); policy::render_agent_with_queue and its tests. The CN-prefix
assertion policy.rs said was owed is not: agent and host roles pin
different CAs.
Migration is re-creating each agent after deploy; that overwrites the
stale role and policy.
Closes#4756
`swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc` fetches the store container's collector secret,
one path, and was the last reader still logging in with
`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`: the hive's own leaf, whose policy reads every
agent's credentials, the hive's tree and every service's OIDC secret. The
four-way split gave grafana's and the swarm collector's readers leaves of
their own and left this one behind.
It now holds `forwarder-oidc.pem`, minted by `swarm-bao-pki`, and logs in
under the `swarm-forwarder-oidc` cert-auth role, whose policy reads
`secret/data/swarm/services/<store forwarder client id>/oidc/client` and
nothing else. The role is written by `swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc-policy`
from the bootstrap token, which gains the two grants that unit calls, and
the reader is ordered after it. The subject is reserved as a hive name. A
store host whose pair is null is refused at eval rather than falling back
to the hive's leaf.
The hive's own role and `client.pem` are untouched; nothing is revoked.
Active-voice / contraction rewrites only, no meaning changes; the
allowed_domains/SANs sentence and the published-cert table cell were
checked against the parked services-issuer/role-type/vhost-scope
questions on #4622 and don't touch any of them.
The `pki` mount had no issuer and no principal could log in to it, so the
swarm's service certificates were still minted by two openssl hops from a
root key on disk. Close both halves and retire the openssl path with them.
The mount now generates its own root, once. The granting unit asks bao
whether an issuer already exists (`bao list pki/issuers`) before calling
`pki/root/generate/internal`, so a rebuild or a reboot re-asserts the role
and the grant without touching the anchor — a root that changed per boot
would invalidate every certificate issued under it and every browser
taught to trust it. The guard asks the store rather than looking for a
marker file on this host's disk: a file is a claim about a mount that may
have been restored from a snapshot or disabled and re-enabled underneath
it.
`swarm-services-issuer` stops being an inert policy. A fourth cert-auth
role attaches it, following the shape the controller, the publisher and
matrix-ctl already use, and glue-bao-tls.nix signs the leaf carrying its
CN — that credential is what opens the mount, so it cannot come out of it.
`swarm-services-cert.service` logs in with that leaf, calls
`pki/issue/swarm-services`, and writes the result to the path
hive-tls.nix already wrote and the gateway already copies from. The
sub-CA layer does not move; it stops existing. The role's
`allowed_domains`, read from the same `swarm.serviceDomains` the SANs
come from, enforces at issue time what the sub-CA encoded in x509
`nameConstraints`, and with the root inside the mount there is nothing
left for an intermediate to be an intermediate of.
Not a flag day: the issuing root is published beside the leaf as
`swarm-services-root.pem` (0644) and joins `trust-bundle.pem`, where the
swarm root still sits. A leaf chaining to the old sub-CA and one issued
by the store both verify against the same bundle, so hives can be
rebuilt in any order. The same file is what an operator hands a browser
— readable without a store login, which matters because every listener
demands a client certificate.
The eval-time warning about uncovered service names is gone rather than
reworded. It fired on "this host does not hold the swarm root key", which
was the reason a hive could end up serving its own leaf on a
swarm-service name. Every hive now asks the store with its own identity,
so that stopped being the thing that decides.
Closes#4586
The four-way client-cert split gives each store reader its own leaf, and
three of the four readers render only where their own leaf exists. On a
host that mints its own PKI glue-bao-tls.nix defaults all eight, so there
is nothing to do; on a hand-configured remote-store hive, omitting one
pair used to mean that unit silently did not render — a privilege-
narrowing unit absent from a green build, with the missing unit as the
only evidence.
Each of the three now asserts its own pair, shaped after
swarm-grafana.nix's haveClientIdentity assertion and named to the pair it
needs. What differs from Grafana's is the gate: these fire only where the
host demonstrably reads the store (it holds deploy.bao.clientCertFile and
clientKeyFile) and the consumer is on. A host with no store identity is
the supported no-store deployment and still evaluates; the collector's
no-secret degrade is untouched, because that host holds no clientCertFile
either.
Also rewords three passive-voice sentences in docs/swarm/secrets.md that
vale flagged, and documents what the refusal costs and where it stays
silent.
Four units read one path each out of the store, and all four logged in
holding `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` — the hive's own leaf. Bao identifies
a principal by the subject of the certificate it presents, so four
readers behind one certificate were ONE principal, and the only grant
expressible was the union of what the four need: read on
`swarm/agents/*`, `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` and `swarm/services/*`. The unit
fetching Grafana's OIDC client secret could fetch every agent credential
in the swarm; the one fetching this hive's matrix token could fetch
Grafana's. Least privilege was not misconfigured here, it was
unrepresentable.
Each now holds a leaf, a cert-auth role and a policy of its own, and each
policy is the single `secret/data/…` path that unit's own script names —
spelled to the leaf, not to a prefix, the way matrix-ctl's already is.
Following the four exemplars in-tree rather than building a mechanism:
`signLeaf` mints the leaves, `swarm-bao.nix` writes the roles from the
bootstrap token, the consumers name their own pair.
Two of the four are written PER HIVE and two are not, which is the shape
of the paths rather than a preference. A matrix appservice token and a
queue credential live under `swarm/hives/<name>/` and every hive runs a
reader for its own, so one role for all of them would have to be granted
`hives/*` — letting one hive read another's, a reach no hive has today.
An OIDC client secret lives under `swarm/services/<client-id>/` and a
swarm registers each exactly once, so one role each is enough. The
per-hive subjects are `<prefix>-<hive>` and swarm.nix reserves every
composed spelling as a hive name, so a hive cannot be named into another
hive's role.
The shared leaf stays: hive-c0re still passes it into its container, the
`bao` CLI wrapper still defaults to it, and the three
`glue-*-bao-identity.nix` files derive the PKI directory from it.
module-eval-bao-grants gains a negative arm per principal — each pins the
three stanzas the hive's leaf carried and the two wildcards a later
widening would reach for, so a policy that grows fails here rather than
in a store. Plus the consuming side: repointing a unit back at the hive's
leaf would evaluate, deploy and log in, and silently restore the union.
A hive that reads a store on another machine now places one leaf per
principal instead of one shared by four. That cost is the point, and
docs/swarm/secrets.md lists the pairs.
bao's metrics were scraped by the SWARM collector over loopback, via a
`swarm.otel.scrapeTargets.bao` entry gated on `deploy.swarm-otel.enable`
— "does the swarm's collector run on THIS host". It had to be: loopback
only reaches a reader that landed on the same host.
What that rendered everywhere else was nothing at all. Off that host the
metrics listener was not emitted, so the store's metrics reached the
store nowhere, and a host with no entry is indistinguishable from a host
nobody asked to scrape.
Moves the scrape into the collector this container already runs, per
mara on #4537: "move the existing scraper to the local collector". The
container shares the host netns (privateNetwork = false), so the scrape
still dials 127.0.0.1 — the listener keeps its address, its
`metrics_only` narrowing and its loopback-only bind, and the API
listener's `tls_require_and_verify_client_cert` is untouched.
The listener and its `prometheus_retention_time` lose their gate: the
reader ships with the store now, so there is no host where the endpoint
has none. The metrics pipeline reuses the logs pipeline's `resource`
processor and `otlphttp` exporter, so both signals carry the same
`service.name` and leave by the one hop.
Logs are unaffected: `journaldUnits` and --link-journal=host stay until
every sibling swarm container has a collector of its own.
The module-eval absence arm "a store with no collector beside it serves
no metrics" is inverted rather than dropped — the condition it asserted
is the bug. Three cases join it: the job is in swarm-bao AND gone from
swarm-otel (a move, not a copy), the scrape target and listener are both
pinned to loopback, and the metrics pipeline shares its exporter with
the logs one.
133 hits across 38 files, all previously classified during #4548's sweep
and deliberately left un-rewritten (predicate-adjective state/necessity
description, design-intent idiom, structural/type-description idiom,
no-single-actor topology claim, parallel-triple exception, vale
substring-match artifact — see hyperhive#4548's per-PR bodies for the
per-hit reasoning).
Wraps each one in a scoped <!-- vale write-good.Passive = NO/YES -->
pair (the supported mechanism — TokenIgnores has a known offset-drift
bug) rather than a blanket per-file or per-rule silence, so a *new*
passive-voice hit anywhere in these files still fails once the rule
gates CI (next commit). Table/list false positives (docs/swarm/credentials.md's
renewal-table cells) wrap the whole block, not each cell.
Part of #4546.
argus caught it on PR #4557 review: 'certificateFiles reads at system
build time' hands the option itself a verb it can't perform. The
system reads the option's value at build time, not the other way
around.
Part of #4548 — third batch. This PR: docs/swarm/secrets.md (16 hits),
docs/swarm/README.md (15 hits) = 31 more of the 353 (130 total across
the three PRs so far).
Same method as #4551/#4553: minimal, meaning-preserving active-voice
rewrites, no restructuring beyond what each flagged sentence needed,
no vale-off silencing.
Genuine false positives left in place: predicate-adjective state
descriptions ("is required" x4, "is enabled", "is disabled"), one
systemd terminology reference ("is wanted (not required)" — literally
naming systemd's Wants=/Requires= dependency-type distinction, not
passive voice), and one design-intent idiom ("both are expected" —
same shape as earlier docs-lint work).
`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` has read
`secret/swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/appservice-token` since it landed, but
nothing ever wrote that path. The store was empty in every deployment, so
every read degraded to "keep what activation minted" and each hive stayed
the origin of a value the swarm has to agree on — two hives never
converged.
`swarm-secret-publish` is now the producer. It already holds a store
identity, already writes under the hive prefix, and already runs per
hive in the roster, so the mint is a third loop beside the two OIDC
copies rather than a second shape of this unit.
Idempotence comes from a record of its own, not from the store: this
principal is granted `create`/`update` with no `read`, so it cannot ask
whether a hive already has a token. It keeps what it minted under
`StateDirectory=` (0700 dir, 0600 file) and mints only when that file is
missing or empty; the `put` runs every time, because re-putting the same
bytes changes nothing for a reader while a mint whose publish failed must
not be left as a token this host holds and no hive can reach.
The token never becomes a nix literal and never reaches argv: the mint
redirects into a file, and the publish hands bao `value=@<path>` so bao
opens it itself — the same handling the OIDC loops use.
`hive-matrix.nix`'s activation mint stays as the genuine first-boot
fallback. It already fires only when the token file is absent, so it
cannot clobber a value the store delivered; `hs_token` has no swarm half
and is still minted there for real.
Refs #4402
Nothing reads it any more: hive-c0re creates accounts as the hive's
appservice, so the mint, the host file, the bind mount, the
`LoadCredential` entry and tuwunel's `registration_token_file` all go.
⚠️ `allow_registration` has to go to `false` in the same change, and not
as hardening. tuwunel refuses to START when registration is allowed with
no token configured — it demands
`yes_i_am_very_very_sure_…_open_registration_…` instead — so dropping the
token and leaving the flag true is not a lax homeserver, it is one that
does not boot. The flag is checked only for requests arriving without an
appservice token, so hive-c0re provisions exactly as before and everyone
else is refused outright.
The swarm secret store keeps its role, repointed at the credential that
replaced the token (`swarm/hives/<hive>/matrix/appservice-token`). Its
unit now also re-runs hive-matrix's own registration renderer after
writing the file: the token is half an agreement, and a registration
still naming the previous value authenticates nobody. The renderer is
shared through an internal option rather than copied, so the
registration's shape has one home.
Both spellings of `registrationTokenFile` become
`mkRemovedOptionModule` with a message naming what replaced them. A hive
that never set the option — the default — is unaffected; one that pinned
it fails to evaluate with instructions instead of a silent no-op.
An upgraded hive needs no intervention: the activation script has both
halves in place before the homeserver restarts, existing agents keep the
tokens their devices already hold, and the old token file is left on
disk read by nothing. docs/integrations/matrix.md spells the path out.
Refs #4402
Refs #4374
- otelNoIdentity: name journaldUnits so the fixture trips the store-
identity path it's testing instead of swarm-otel's unrelated
journald-safety assertion (an empty list with log collection on is
refused as "collect everything", not "collect nothing").
- otelNoStores: give it a bao client identity. The secret gate moved
from deployCfg.authelia.enable to a real client cert/key pair, so a
fixture meaning "no telemetry stores" now needs its own secret
identity to keep exercising the exporter/authenticator wiring it
was written for.
- docs/swarm/secrets.md: two vale fixes — a contraction, and drop a
condescending "simply".
The swarm collector's OIDC client secret only existed where authelia
did: `swarm-otel-oidc-secret.service` copied the minted plaintext out
of authelia's container tree, reachable only because the two share a
host's network namespace. A swarm that placed authelia elsewhere
delivered nothing, and the option's own description said so —
"a deployment that places authelia elsewhere points this at a file it
delivers itself." Same gap as #3853 and #4234, and this is the
swarm-otel twin of #4234's fix for Grafana.
Mirrors PR #4361 (Grafana) almost exactly:
- `swarm-bao-otel-oidc.service` reads
`swarm/services/<client-id>/oidc/client` out of the store, in every
deployment, replacing the co-located copy unit outright — one
delivery route, not two, per the ruling that landed under #4234.
- Client registration moved out of `swarm-otel.nix`'s own `config`
block (gated on this host running the collector) into
`glue-swarm-otel-oidc-client.nix` (gated on this host running
authelia), the same split `glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix` made. It
was broken the same way: a split deployment registered the client
nowhere at all, so authelia never minted a secret for the publisher
to send on.
- The publisher's `services` prefix (write grant in `swarm-bao.nix`,
hive read grant in `policy::render`) already covers any service's
path — nothing to add there. `swarm-secret-publisher.nix` only grew
`serviceClientIds` by one entry.
One judgement call, stated rather than buried: the store-reading unit
renders only where this host holds a client identity
(`deploy.bao.clientCertFile`/`clientKeyFile`), rather than asserting
it the way `swarm-grafana.nix` does. Grafana's local login form is
disabled unconditionally, so a Grafana with no OIDC secret has no way
in at all — that earns a hard refusal. This collector without a
credential still receives every hive's telemetry; only its own pushes
to the stores go out unauthenticated and get refused there, an
already-supported degrade the module's own `haveCollectorSecret` flag
named before this change. So the reading unit follows the shape
`glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` and `glue-queue-agent-credential.nix` use
for their own optional readers: no unit when the identity is absent,
not a build refusal.
Fixtures mirror #4361's: `otelBaoWithAuthelia`/`otelBaoRemoteAuthelia`
are the positive pair (co-located and split, both reading through the
store), `otelNoIdentity` is the negative — no reading unit, no
assertion firing, `clientSecretFile` left null.
Refs #4258
An agent container cannot dial the store's loopback listener: the bridge
to-loopback DROP rule is there precisely to stop that, and the store
authenticates every reader by client certificate, so the usual answer —
a gateway vhost — is the one shape that cannot work. A terminating proxy
strips the certificate and bao sees nginx as the client for every hive.
nginx's stream module does not terminate. `ssl_preread` reads the SNI off
the ClientHello and splices the rest of the connection through byte for
byte, so bao completes the handshake itself and authenticates the client
it actually has. That is the no-vhost rule kept, not bent.
The listener binds the bridge IP rather than every address, because bao
already holds `127.0.0.1:<port>` in the same netns and a wildcard bind
there is EADDRINUSE — nginx would fail to start, taking the gateway with
it. Nothing moves as a result: the name already resolves two ways, so a
host-side reader still goes straight to loopback and an agent goes
through the passthrough, both on one `BAO_ADDR`.
Renders only inside the store's own `deploy.bao.enable` region; a host
that runs no store grows no listener and opens no port.
Per-agent certificates and per-agent policy are separate work.
Refs #4386
The previous commit left two delivery paths and a three-way gate:
`swarm-grafana-oidc-secret.service` copied authelia's minted plaintext
out of its host tree wherever the two were co-located,
`swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service` read the same value from the swarm
secret store wherever they were not, and `ssoConfigured && (ssoLocal ||
haveClientIdentity)` decided whether Grafana got an OIDC block at all.
Delete the co-located path. The store reader is now THE delivery unit,
in every deployment — the publisher on authelia's host writes
`swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client` whether the reader is a network away
or in the container next door. The ruling behind it: the store exists so
a host holds ONE out-of-band secret, its client certificate, and reads
everything else with it. Skipping the store when the producer happens to
be local saves a round trip and costs a second delivery unit, a second
way for the file to be wrong, and a gate to choose between them.
The gate goes too, and both of its questions become assertions, scoped
to hosts that run Grafana:
- `swarm.authelia.url` must be set. `auth.disable_login_form` is
unconditional — Grafana ships an admin/admin account on a public
vhost — so dropping the OIDC block when the swarm names no IdP
produced a container with no SSO and no password box, silently. An
eval-time refusal naming the option is the only report that reaches
anyone, the shape swarm-nats.nix already uses for the same option.
- `deploy.bao.clientCertFile` / `clientKeyFile` must be set. This
replaces a warning that nothing reads back, and its message names both
options and where the leaf comes from.
Fixtures follow. `grafanaWithAuthelia` gains the cert pair, because a
co-located host is a store reader like any other. The old
`grafanaRemoteAutheliaNoIdentity` is kept rather than deleted, renamed
`grafanaNoIdentity`: the shape is still reachable, only its deliverable
changed from silence to a refusal, and an arm now reads that refusal
back. Its mirror `grafanaNoSso` covers the other assertion, each fixture
wrong in exactly one way so an arm can name which refusal fired. Every
positive keeps an explicit negative — the one-delivery-unit arm asserts
the deleted unit is absent in both topologies rather than merely that
the store reader is present.
Refs #4234
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grafana's OIDC client secret only existed where authelia did. One
`ssoLocal` gate — `grafana.enable && authelia.enable` — decided the
client registration, the minted secret's delivery and the whole
`auth.generic_oauth` block, so a swarm whose authelia runs on another
host got Grafana with no SSO wiring at all. The local login form is
disabled unconditionally, so that is no way in.
Split the one gate into the two questions it was conflating:
- `ssoConfigured` — does this SWARM have an identity provider
(`swarm.authelia.url`, which is swarm-wide and whose own description
makes null mean "no SSO configured"). With a delivery route present
this is what emits Grafana's OIDC block.
- `ssoLocal` — is authelia on THIS host, now spelled as the forge and
matrix modules spell it. It decides only which unit delivers the
secret.
Where authelia is elsewhere, `swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.service` reads the
secret from the swarm secret store, shaped after
glue-queue-agent-credential.nix: cert login fails loudly because a retry
fixes every state it fails on, the read degrades quietly because no
retry turns "no value there" into a value, and nothing writes a
stand-in. The producer is the publisher that already runs on authelia's
host, which gains the swarm's service clients beside the per-hive ones
at `swarm/services/<id>/oidc/client` — with the write grant in
swarm-bao.nix and the hive read grant in `policy::render` to match.
Registration moved to glue-grafana-oidc-client.nix. It has to be
declared where authelia's config is rendered, and swarm-grafana.nix's
config block hangs off this host running Grafana.
Two judgement calls stated rather than buried: a hive's read policy now
grants the whole `services` prefix, because a service's path names the
service and nothing swarm-wide records which hive runs it (cost recorded
in docs/trust-boundary/security.md); and the client is registered on any
authelia host, because no swarm-wide "this swarm has a Grafana" fact
exists to gate it on.
Refs #4234
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The swarm always has exactly one queue; a hive can only lack its
address. Reworded every prose site this PR added that stated or
implied the opposite, to name what is actually absent (coordinates,
credential, or address) instead of the queue itself.
Refs #3805
The host end: `HIVE_C0RE_AGENT_QUEUE_CREDENTIAL_DIR` tells the daemon
where the reader unit put the files, and a new
`deploy.hive-controller.queue.agentNatsUrl` says where the queue is as an
agent *container* reaches it. That address defaults to the bridge one and
never to loopback — `statusPublish.natsUrl` beside it is loopback and
correct, because hive-c0re shares the host netns and an agent does not.
Paired with the swarm's token endpoint, gated together, and forwarded by
`hive_c0re::meta` as both an env var and an agent option: the harness
reads the variable at runtime, its unit is built from the option.
The agent end: `nix/agent-modules/queue.nix` declares that option pair
and, when set, has the harness unit inherit the two credentials by name.
Bare-id `LoadCredential=` is the terse form documented for inheriting
what the service manager received, and is non-fatal when the credential
is absent — which a hive whose publisher has not run yet needs.
No `HIVE_AGENT_OIDC_CA_FILE`: the meta flake already embeds the hive CA
and the swarm root into each container's trust store at build time, and
reqwest's rustls backend verifies against it.
Refs #3805
Ruled: swarm-bao-queue-agent.service must run before hive-c0re.service
and be wanted (not required) by it, so no agent container renders
ahead of the reader's attempt at its credential. An unreachable store
delays hive-c0re's start by the reader's own start-limit window rather
than failing it outright.
Refs #4314
The publisher on the authelia host has been writing
`secret/swarm/hives/<hive>/queue/agent` — the OIDC client secret agent
containers present to the swarm queue, plus the client id it belongs to —
and nothing read it. This is the reader: a oneshot `swarm-bao-queue-agent`
that logs in with the host's certificate and lands the two fields as two
files under `deploy.hive-controller.queue.agentCredentialDir`, the secret
`0600` and the client id `0644`.
Two files rather than one because that is the consumer's shape:
`swarm_queue_client::QueueConfig::from_env` takes the secret as a path and
the client id as a value, so the split here is what keeps the next slice
from parsing anything.
Same shape as the store's first reader, `glue-matrix-bao-token.nix` — a
cert login that fails loudly under `Restart=on-failure` because every state
it fails on is one a retry fixes, then reads that degrade quietly because no
retry turns "no value there" into a value. Unlike the matrix token there is
no local fallback and none is possible, so absent files mean this hive's
agents do not connect, which is the ordinary state of a swarm before the
publisher has run.
Nothing consumes the files yet and this unit is ordered `Before=` nothing.
The next slice bind-mounts them into agent containers through hive-c0re and
adds the ordering edge along with them.
Refs #3805
secrets.md said the swarm collector's OIDC secret is copied "when authelia is
enabled on this host and something published is being scraped; otherwise no
secret is needed and none is placed". The second condition left the tree in
5478e0bf (#3554): `swarm-otel-oidc-secret` and the client registration it
delivers for are both `lib.mkIf deployCfg.authelia.enable`, and
`publishedScrapeTargets` appears in neither guard. swarm-otel.nix:589 says why
in as many words — authelia refuses a bearer-authz client with no audience,
which is what the old guard was for, and the push audiences are unconditional,
so there is now always one.
The sentence survived because I rewrote the paragraph around it a day later
(8cba57e0) for the collector-elsewhere case and carried the clause through.
What a reader loses: with authelia on and nothing published, the page promises
the delivery is inert. It is not — the unit runs, waits a bounded 120s for
authelia's mint, and fails the collector's container start if the secret never
appears. So the case documented as quiet is one that can fail a boot, and the
operator debugging it has a page saying this path was not taken. The
replacement states the single real condition and that failure mode.
Closes#4210.
Per mara's ruling on hyperhive#4041 (Microsoft.We): keep the rule enabled,
same treatment as the 'backend' rewrites. Traced all 21 genuine hits (4
gateway.md 'Let's Encrypt' hits are a substring-match false positive, left
alone) to their actual referent: some name a specific component already
established nearby in the same doc (forge_notify, hive-github-notify's
poller, hive-forge, hive-agent/the harness, colors.css, the dashboard),
others were pure filler that adds nothing once dropped.
Read all 94 write-good.Passive hits across docs/swarm/ (ca.md,
README.md, secrets.md, services.md, sso.md, ui.md) in context. 44 are
genuine catches with a nameable, usually already-established actor
(swarm-controller, authelia, swarmctl, the controller, the gateway,
this module, hyperhive itself, or 'the operator' for manual actions) —
rewritten to active. 50 are legitimate passives or false catches, left
alone: predicate-adjective state descriptions (is expected/misconfigured/
broken), negative-capability idioms (no X is needed/placed, can't be
Yed/listed/fetched), config-state conditionals (whenever/when X is
enabled/configured/set), requirement-list labels (is required),
'is tracked as' idiom, backward-looking changelog facts with no actor
(was removed/verified/introduced), ambiguous-actor statements left
conservatively alone (agents are created and destroyed — could be
hive-c0re or swarm-controller, doc doesn't say), and a couple of
deliberately-parallel idiom pairs.
Several sibling-inconsistency fixes: a passive clause sitting next to
an already-active sibling describing the same fact/mechanism (ca.md's
two-bullet consumer list, README's 4-item WireGuard-mesh bullet list,
README's controller-registers-hooks paragraph, sso.md's followed-a-302
sentence).
Verified via vale on the whole directory, diffed against main's exact
baseline (not just the Passive count): write-good.Passive 94 -> 50
exactly, every other category unchanged (1 pre-existing
Microsoft.Contractions error at services... at secrets.md:182,
8 TooWordy, 1 Microsoft.We, 1 Microsoft.FirstPerson — same counts,
same locations).
Fixes the "obvious ones first" slice of #4042 (mara: do the obvious
ones first) -- 81 hits across write-good.So, write-good.ThereIs, and
write-good.Weasel, all in docs/. Each is a genuine sentence rewrite
(lead with the real subject instead of "There is/are", drop a
sentence-initial "So ", replace a vague intensifier), not a blind
regex substitution -- read every hit in its real file context before
touching it.
3 of the 81 hits were in CI-generated CLI docs (docs/tools/{hivectl,
swarmctl,forge}-cli.md) -- fixed at the clap #[arg(...)]/doc-comment
source in hivectl/src/cli.rs, swarmctl/src/main.rs, and
hive-forge/src/verbs/repo_add_collaborator.rs, then regenerated via
each crate's `markdown-docs` subcommand so CI's freshness check stays
green.
Verified: fresh vale re-run shows 0 remaining So/ThereIs/Weasel hits
and no new hits introduced (983->982, exactly the one incidental fix
this pass also picked up at docs/scheduler/observability.md:48).
cargo fmt --check and clippy clean on the three touched crates.
Remaining write-good backlog (Passive: 726, TooWordy: 207) is
judgment-heavy and left for a follow-up slice of #4042, not bulk-
rewritten here.
Slices 8 and 9 of the swarm/deploy split, and the last two.
statusPublish had three coordinates under one namespace. Two of them
are this machine's — where the queue listens *as seen from here*, and
where its client secret sits on this disk — so they move to
`deploy.hive-controller.statusPublish.*`, the namespace of the daemon
that is their only reader. `tokenEndpoint` is the swarm's one address,
so it stays. That leaves `swarm.statusPublish` holding a single option:
a legitimate split, not a botched move.
The all-or-nothing assertion now spans both namespaces. It is repointed
in both its condition and its message, and the message spells all three
paths in full so an operator is never told to set two options under a
path that only has one. `environment.nix`'s guard and the value beside
it likewise read different namespaces on purpose.
The collector's secret moves the same way, for the same reason, to
`deploy.swarm-otel.*` — `enable` already lives there. That also retires
one of the eight cross-namespace assignments tracked in #4048: the
delivery unit set a `swarm.*` value under a `deploy.*` gate, and now
sets a `deploy.*` value under one.
module-eval gets a fixture per slice. `otelRemoteAuthelia` already set
the collector secret through its pre-rename path, so it becomes slice
9's old-path case as it stands — left spelled that way deliberately,
with a comment, so it is not read later as a missed site.
That fixture also turned out to be describing an impossible hive: it
said authelia lives elsewhere without saying where, so the
authenticator interpolated a null `swarm.authelia.url` into its
`token_url`. Nothing to do with the rename, and invisible to the
existing case over the same fixture, which reads `? auth` and `elem` —
both stop at names and never force the extension's value. Given the
address a remote-IdP deployment has.
Verified: 49 -> 51 properties, all holding.
Review pass on top of the previous commit (85a94671) turned up three
real issues its own vale-only verification didn't catch:
- 'has not' -> 'hasn't' fired inside 'has nothing', corrupting
docs/swarm/README.md into 'hasn'thing to say upward'. Restored
'has nothing'.
- ~44 hits where the original text was genuinely sentence-initial
('It is', 'That is', 'They are', 'What is', 'Do not', ...) got
contracted in lowercase, silently de-capitalizing the start of a
sentence. Checked each one's real surrounding text and capitalized
the ones that needed it.
- Confirmed (by reading the actual text, not just trusting vale) that
the 3 remaining 'is not'/'has not'/'it is' hits after those fixes are
vale's own false positives: it matches these as a bare substring with
no trailing word boundary, so it also fires on 'is nothing', 'has
nothing', and the already-correct 'it isn't'. Left those alone --
there's no real issue in the text.
Re-verified with a fresh vale run: the remaining 17 hits are exactly
the union of the 14 legitimate ALL-CAPS/bold-emphasis skips from the
first commit and these 3 false positives. Full accounting in
/agents/iris/state/haiku-batches/contractions-report.md.
Apply contraction fixes across ~40 doc files (setup, integrations, lifecycle,
networking, scheduler, swarm, tools, trust-boundary, UI, etc.). Skipped 14 hits:
- 10 where words appear in ALL CAPS for deliberate emphasis (is NOT, do NOT, etc.)
- 4 where text could not be safely located due to markdown formatting or column position
Applied via systematic scan with checks for fenced code blocks, inline code spans,
and intentional caps. Preserves sentence-initial capitalization throughout.
`swarm.*` is what a hive needs to be a *client* of the swarm. For the
queue that is the ports it answers on, the client id it is registered
under, and the responder package. Whether this host mints its own
auth-callout keypairs and where the seeds sit are decisions of the
machine running it, so autoGenerateCallout, both seed files and both
public keys move to `deploy.nats.*`.
The two PUBLIC keys are the non-obvious half, so the reasoning is here
rather than in a comment nobody re-reads. A public key looks swarm-wide,
and docs/swarm/secrets.md says the user key "is published to every
client that connects" — which is true and does not make it swarm
config: peers RECEIVE it over the wire at connect time, they never
configure it. What decides the placement is that its seed is
unambiguously host-side, and splitting a keypair across two namespaces
is worse than either placement.
local-defaults.nix set `nats.autoGenerateCallout` from INSIDE
`config.services.hyperhive.swarm = { ... }`, so the bare prefix meant
`swarm.nats` and no full-path grep could see it. It moves out of that
block into a `deploy` statement rather than being rewritten in place.
swarm-controller.nix bound `natsCfg` and never used it — one mention,
no bare pass, while its sibling bindings have 5 and 10. Pre-existing
dead code, found by this slice's own alias sweep, removed with it.
Four assertion messages and five doc lines named moved options by a
short form (`nats.calloutUserSeedFile`) that is ambiguous now that both
`swarm.nats` and `deploy.nats` exist; one opened with
"services.hyperhive.swarm.nats has callout public keys", which the split
makes false. Prose that names a VALUE rather than a path — the `nk`
pipeline's `# -> calloutUserPublicKey` — is left bare on purpose.
module-eval configures a hive through all five OLD paths and asserts the
responder's delivery unit exists and interpolates the seed path.
`autoGenerateCallout` is deliberately FALSE there: that is what makes
the seed options decide `responderConfigured`, so the assertion is about
the seeds rather than about the auto-mint branch.
`swarm.*` is what a hive needs to be a *client* of the swarm; the mesh is
none of it. A peer needs this host's `wireguardEndpoint` -- the roster entry
in swarm.nix, which stays -- and nothing about the interface this host
brings up. The module already said so: "plain host networking that a machine
which runs no hive at all still needs."
All five options move, so the namespace relocates rather than splitting.
`listenPort` is the one that reads the other way: it is what this host
*binds*, while the port a peer *dials* lives inside `wireguardEndpoint`.
Declared in swarm-wireguard.nix under the `deploy.*` path, following
swarm-victorialogs.nix; deploy.nix carries only the renames, per its own
"a single file to delete when the deprecation window closes". Deliberately
NOT added to deploy.nix's own options block: every entry there is a swarm
service this host deploys, and the mesh is host networking.
hivectl/src/wg.rs generates the config snippet an operator pastes, so it
moves too -- otherwise the tool's own output trips the deprecation warning.
module-eval gains a case that configures a host through the OLD path and
asserts the rendered wg-hive interface, because the new path evaluates
fine without the shim: dropping it reads as a clean tree.
Pure `nix fmt` output from the commit before this one — no hand edits.
203 files: 52 md, 42 tsx, 32 js, 32 css, 21 ts, 13 html, 8 json, 3 mjs.
Reproduce with `nix develop -c nix fmt` on the parent commit; the result
should be byte-identical to this tree.
None of the 13 `.prettierignore` entries appears here — verified by
intersecting the changed-file list against the ignore file, with a
control proving the intersection finds a match when one exists.
This PR makes a swarm collector on a host with neither store — and no
authelia — an expressible deployment; `module-eval`'s `otelRemoteAuthelia`
case is exactly that. `secrets.md` still asserted the opposite in two
places, and one of them was the "hive elsewhere" column reading `n/a`.
The delivery unit is the convenience for the co-located case, not the
definition of it: whether the collector authenticates follows the
credential, never another service's placement.
