Commit graph hyperhive/swarmctl/README.md
Author SHA1 Message Date
atlas
39b95c2ede treefmt: apply prettier
Pure `nix fmt` output from the commit before this one — no hand edits.
203 files: 52 md, 42 tsx, 32 js, 32 css, 21 ts, 13 html, 8 json, 3 mjs.

Reproduce with `nix develop -c nix fmt` on the parent commit; the result
should be byte-identical to this tree.

None of the 13 `.prettierignore` entries appears here — verified by
intersecting the changed-file list against the ignore file, with a
control proving the intersection finds a match when one exists.
2026-09-02 15:25:07 +02:00
atlas
6ca4887af4 docs(#3422): the user store is one file, not two
Six places asserted the old design as fact, and none of them mention the
change by name -- the class of doc breakage that is found by asking what
a diff made untrue, not by grepping for a feature:

- swarmctl/README.md and swarm-authelia-bridge/README.md both described
  their own private canonical store. The bridge's "known limitation"
  section described the seam as unsolved; it is what this fixes, so it
  becomes what both writers must uphold instead.
- docs/swarm/{sso,ui,secrets}.md described a rendered artifact.
- The repo CLAUDE.md entry for swarmctl said the same.
- docs/tools/swarmctl-cli.md is regenerated (CI diffs it against the
  clap tree), picking up the removed --store flag.

Operator-facing where it is read: the hand-editing consequence (values
survive a rewrite, comments do not) is stated in sso.md, where an
operator is being told to edit the file, rather than only in a module doc.
2026-08-18 10:34:00 +02:00
atlas
9e44efa01f feat(#3089): add swarmctl and a user-add verb for the swarm's SSO
The swarm-authelia module states that its users database is written by
swarm-controller, but nothing ever granted the means. This adds the tool
that does it.

swarmctl runs as root on the controller's host and acts directly. The
rootless alternative was examined and does not work: relocating the users
file into a directory the controller owns only turns a write problem into
a read problem, because authelia must then reach across the same boundary
in the other direction. Making that read work needs either a hand-pinned
gid or world-readable password hashes.

The user store is two files, one authoritative: users.json is canonical,
users.yml is a rendered artifact. That split is what lets the crate work
without a YAML parser -- the workspace has none, and adding one costs a
crates.io fetch, a lock update and a vendor hash for a schema we fully
control and only ever emit.

Passwords are generated by authelia rather than passed to it: argv is
world-readable, so a password on a command line is readable by any local
process for the lifetime of the call.

The three derived facts swarmctl needs about the authelia container --
machine, unit and the host-side users path -- become readOnly options on
the authelia module rather than literals repeated at the call site.
2026-08-10 21:48:45 +02:00