/run/hive-agent/<name> was 0777 root root in steady state, not just during
first spawn. A directory without the sticky bit lets any user unlink files
in it, and the gateway container has all of /run/hive-agent bind-mounted
in, so anything that could reach the path could delete an agent's
agent.sock, bind its own, and receive that agent's todos from hive-c0re.
Two mechanisms were writing the dir and undoing each other: the tmpfiles.d
entry wrote 0777 root root, then hive-c0re round-tripped through hive-priv's
ChownSocketDir to narrow it. `d` re-asserts mode and owner on every apply
and the file is regenerated on any agent's spawn or destroy, so every such
event reset every agent's dir back to world-writable.
SyncAgentTmpfiles now carries each agent's container uid/gid and the entry
declares the answer: 0751 <uid> <gid>. Three principals need the dir and no
two share a group -- the harness binds its sockets (owner rwx), hive-c0re
dials agent.sock and the gateway's nginx dials web.sock (both only need
traverse, and both sockets are already 0666).
Deletes ChownSocketDir and ChmodSocketDir, both priv_client wrappers, the
either/or in host_config with its two swallowed warn!s, and the now-dead
socket_dir_path -- two verbs off the privileged helper's surface and one
round-trip off every agent spawn.
Also makes the two tmpfiles rules for /run/hive-agent itself agree: the
gateway module said hive-core, the generated file said root, and which won
depended on the order systemd read them in.
The PR added CPUWeight=/IOWeight= to the drop-in but left the prose
docs describing a two-setting file. Covers the cap-vs-share
distinction, the hive-wide-only scope (no resource-limits.json
override), and the iocost/BFQ caveat that makes IOWeight= inert on
most hosts.
Security fixes landed without updating the security-model docs; bring them
current as present-tense invariants:
- security.md: matrix identities are public / cross-agent-readable via
GetAgentMeta while the token stays private; name validation extends to
GetAgentMeta; the nix-build blast radius has a network dimension (hive-ci
netns) alongside the 0600 token policy.
- boundary.md: the core dashboard /api has no app-layer auth — protection is
the gateway plus network isolation; stated as a standing invariant.
- ci.md: hive-ci runs in its own private netns behind the bridge, reaches the
forge via the gateway, and cannot reach host-loopback (dashboard/forge port).
- knowledge.md: /knowledge excludes .git via tmpfs so the core token in
.git/config isn't readable by agents.
Refs #2308, #2310, #2313.
- .prettierrc: proseWrap=preserve (no prose reflow)
- .prettierignore: exclude hivectl-cli.md (auto-generated) + 11 docs
with multi-line list-item continuations prettier would strip to col 0
(CommonMark limitation in prettier's list handling)
- format 16 markdown files: cosmetic only (*→_, table alignment,
heading normalisation) — verified no broken continuations, idempotent
Per mara (verified in forge.rs): agents have max_repo_creation=0, so every
internal-forge repo is core-created with branch protection on by default
(merge restricted to operators team + required operators-team approval via
apply_operator_branch_protection / the config-repo equivalent), and agents
(write collaborators, not admins) can't change it or self-merge. So it's
technically enforced there, not just convention — only external VCS (GitHub)
is unprotected. Corrects my prior over-correction.
Per mara: branch protection isn't a blanket enforced check, and it's not
set up for external VCS (GitHub). Reframe the bullet as the operator-merge
*convention* — technically enforced only on the core-managed config repos,
and explicitly NOT wired up for GitHub/external VCS (process + accepted
risk there, not a control).
The trust-model insert accidentally consumed the
'## State-file endpoint security model' heading, leaving that section
floating under the new one. Re-add the heading and collapse the extra
blank lines (argus review).
Add an 'Agent trust model' framing section at the top of docs/security.md
covering the conceptual model the existing mechanism-level sections serve:
- trust boundary = the container, not credential storage (agents have
passwordless sudo by default; isolating creds from the agent itself is
not a goal — cross-tenant leakage is)
- scoped per-agent forge/matrix tokens bound the blast radius
- threat model: prompt injection -> confused deputy (untrusted input is
the adversary; the agent + its tools are trusted)
- branch protection (agents push, operator merges) as the human-in-loop
checkpoint, incl. external VCS
- capability = accepted risk ('don't grant what you can't afford to lose')
- no auto-sandboxing of external tokens (operator-accepted scope)
Emerged from the 2026-06-24 security discussion. Updates the CLAUDE.md
pointer for findability.
The hive-priv container allowlist's explicit MANAGER_NAME allow is
redundant — the bootstrap container's name passes the generic
agent-name char validation anyway. Describe the allowlist as just the
agent-name convention + the sibling service containers.
Port-range, network-isolation, state-dir, web-UI-port, priv allowlist,
and rebuild-source mentions now refer to the root/bootstrap container
rather than 'the manager' — no structural manager exists (root-ness is
topological). Real artifact names (the manager.nix template toplevel,
/run/hyperhive/manager/mcp.sock) are left as-is.
