It was written into gateway.md, which only owns half the story: that
doc describes the web.sock path, and before this branch it never
mentioned agent.sock at all. Putting a rule shared by hive-c0re, the
harness and nginx inside the gateway walkthrough means someone asking
"why can't c0re dial agent.sock" has no reason to look there.
boundary.md already covers who may touch what across the trust boundary
-- including the sibling case of hive-priv's socket getting its mode
from the unit rather than the process -- so the rule lives there now,
with the three principals as a table. gateway.md keeps a two-line note
about the one fact it needs (nginx traverses via o=--x) and links out.
The host admin socket `/run/hyperhive/host.sock` was `0660 root:root` (no
SocketGroup), so hivectl needed sudo. Group-own it by a new `hive-admin`
group and add a `services.hyperhive.c0re.adminUsers` allowlist: listed users
join `hive-admin` and drive hivectl without root.
- `SocketGroup = "hive-admin"`, `SocketMode = "0660"` on the hive-c0re.socket
unit.
- `/run/hyperhive` -> `0751` (traverse-only, no listing) so the group can reach
the socket path; the socket's own `0660 hive-admin` mode gates the
connection, and the per-agent subdirs keep their own restrictive perms.
- Empty `adminUsers` (the default) leaves `hive-admin` memberless -> root-only,
as before.
The admin socket is full hive control (spawn/kill/destroy/deploy), so
`adminUsers` is an explicit, opt-in trust grant. Documented in
docs/boundary.md (host admin socket access) + docs/tools/hivectl.md.
Security fixes landed without updating the security-model docs; bring them
current as present-tense invariants:
- security.md: matrix identities are public / cross-agent-readable via
GetAgentMeta while the token stays private; name validation extends to
GetAgentMeta; the nix-build blast radius has a network dimension (hive-ci
netns) alongside the 0600 token policy.
- boundary.md: the core dashboard /api has no app-layer auth — protection is
the gateway plus network isolation; stated as a standing invariant.
- ci.md: hive-ci runs in its own private netns behind the bridge, reaches the
forge via the gateway, and cannot reach host-loopback (dashboard/forge port).
- knowledge.md: /knowledge excludes .git via tmpfs so the core token in
.git/config isn't readable by agents.
Refs #2308, #2310, #2313.
All three area:ops pillars are now complete: network isolation is
always on (private netns, no shared-netns mode), the gateway is live,
and hive-c0re runs as the unprivileged hive-core user.
- Rewrite the intro to say the boundary is enforced, not aspirational
- Update 'Why network isolation is the load-bearing step' section to
use past tense for the shared-netns world and note completion
- Mark network isolation as Complete in the sequencing list
- .prettierrc: proseWrap=preserve (no prose reflow)
- .prettierignore: exclude hivectl-cli.md (auto-generated) + 11 docs
with multi-line list-item continuations prettier would strip to col 0
(CommonMark limitation in prettier's list handling)
- format 16 markdown files: cosmetic only (*→_, table alignment,
heading normalisation) — verified no broken continuations, idempotent
