check_fd_agreement is the guard that keeps a descriptor and the request
it arrived with in agreement, and both of its rejections were untested.
An fd-taking op with no descriptor must not fall back to anything: a
temp file or the response socket would send an agent's state somewhere
the caller never asked for. The mirror case matters for a different
reason -- returning the error is what drops the OwnedFd and closes it,
so ignoring a stray descriptor instead would leak one per bad request
in a long-lived root process.
The third test pins both agreeing combinations, so the check is
rejecting mismatches rather than descriptors in general. Descriptors
are real /dev/null handles so the closing drop is genuinely exercised.
hive-priv read requests with BufReader::lines, which cannot surface
SCM_RIGHTS: ancillary data is attached to one specific recvmsg call, so
a buffered line reader takes the bytes and silently drops the
descriptor. Replace it with a recvmsg loop.
The pairing is deliberately trivial. hive-sock-client connects per
request, so a connection carries one line and at most one descriptor;
a second descriptor arriving before its line is a protocol error rather
than something to queue. check_fd_agreement rejects both mismatches --
an fd-taking op that got none, and a descriptor sent to an op that
takes none -- and dropping the OwnedFd on that path closes it.
recv_with_fds claims every descriptor the kernel attaches, including
ones this protocol never expects, because an fd we fail to claim leaks
for the life of the process. MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC keeps a received
descriptor out of every btrfs and nixos-container child. The control
buffer is only cmsghdr-aligned, so descriptors are copied out
byte-wise instead of read through a more strictly aligned pointer.
SendAgentSnapshotToFd is SendAgentSnapshotToFile without the staging
file: same validation and -p parent handling, stdout wired to the
passed descriptor. It exists so hive-c0re can connect to a peer hive's
snapshot store, write the header itself, and hand over the connected
socket -- leaving this helper with no address, no protocol, and nobody
in the data path once the send starts.
Encoding "not configured" as weight 0 worked (the writer omitted the
line) but the type lied: 0 is not a legal cgroup v2 weight, and every
reader had to know the sentinel. Use Option<u32> end to end instead —
wire type, priv_client, HiveEnv, drop-in writer — so "unset" is a state
of the type rather than a magic value.
The nix options become nullOr, keeping their default of 80; null now
expresses "leave the setting out of the drop-in entirely" declaratively,
which is the useful shape on a host whose IO scheduler ignores
io.weight anyway.
Backward compat is unchanged: the fields stay #[serde(default)], so a
request from an older hive-c0re deserialises to None and reproduces the
pre-weights drop-in byte for byte. The test that pins that now passes
None instead of 0.
`CPUQuota=`/`MemoryMax=` are hard caps: they throttle an agent even when
the host is idle, so they are the wrong tool for "be polite under
contention". The cgroup v2 relative shares are, and neither was wired.
Adds `services.hyperhive.{agentCpuWeight,agentIoWeight}` (1..=10000,
default 80) threaded through the existing drop-in path: HiveEnv ->
write_dropins -> WriteResourceLimits -> hyperhive-limits.conf, next to
the caps already there. Hive-wide only, as the operator scoped it on the
issue: no per-agent override, no resource-limits.json field, no
dashboard form.
The default of 80 is below the kernel's 100, so agent containers yield
to everything *not* on this drop-in path -- host services and the infra
containers (hive-ci, hive-forge, hive-gateway, hive-matrix). It does not
rank agents against each other; they all carry the same weight.
`WriteResourceLimits` gains two `#[serde(default)]` fields, and the
writer treats weight 0 as "not configured" and omits the line, so an
older hive-c0re talking to a newer hive-priv still produces the exact
pre-weights drop-in. The body is extracted into `limits_dropin_body` so
that is covered by a test rather than asserted by eye.
`Coordinator::set_paused` wrote the marker directly with `std::fs::write`
from hive-c0re, which runs as the unprivileged `hive-core` user. The
agent's harness dir is chowned to the agent user on every container boot
(`user.nix`'s activation chown), mode 0755 — so hive-core can stat the
marker but gets EACCES creating or unlinking it. Pause therefore only
ever worked on an agent that had never booted; the read side works
because a stat needs traverse, not write, which is why the paused pill
and `is_paused` looked healthy.
Route both directions through hive-priv, the root helper that already
owns the other writes into agent-owned directories:
- `PrivRequest::SetAgentPaused { agent_name, paused }`, with the marker
filename constant moved to hive-priv-sock. That is the narrowest crate
all three sides share (hive-priv deliberately does not depend on
hive-sh4re, which re-exports it for the in-container resolver). A
private copy on any one side would break pause silently, since every
reader just sees "no marker".
- `write_agent_state_file` generalised to `write_agent_dir_file`, taking
the target directory: `state/` and `harness/` are both agent-owned,
which is the same reason both need root.
- resume unlinks via `remove_file`, which acts on the leaf and never
follows a symlink — an agent could otherwise plant a link at the
marker path and have root delete an arbitrary file.
`Coordinator::set_paused` becomes an async round-trip; its three call
sites were already async. Both directions stay idempotent because the
dashboard toggle and `hivectl pause|resume` fire without reading the
current state first.
`nixos-container stop` exiting 0 does not mean machined has dropped the
registration. A process sitting in the machine cgroup without being a
child of the container's init never receives the shutdown's SIGTERM if
it has been SIGSTOP'd, so the registration outlives the "successful"
stop. Every later start then fails with "Failed to register machine:
already exists", and machined re-persists the stale record across its
own restart, so there is no cleaning it up afterwards.
StopContainer now asks for the stop, waits for machined to release the
name, escalates to SIGKILL if it hasn't, re-verifies, and fails loudly
if the name is still held — so a caller is never told the stop worked
and then walks into the confusing registration error.
The probe resolves the name through machined's GetMachine, the same
lookup that later rejects the registration, rather than checking the
container's systemd unit: the unit going inactive while the name is
still held is precisely the case being caught.
Verify-and-escalate lives in the helper, not at a call site, so every
stop gets it — dashboard, reconcile, destroy, cold-start fallback. The
start path already distrusts its own exit code the same way; this is
the missing half of that pair.
Both groups only ever act on a single managed agent's state dir, so
they belong in the `agents` namespace rather than as top-level verbs
next to `forge` / `matrix` / `wg`.
Renames `quota limit` -> `quota set`: the enclosing group already
carries the noun, so the bare verb matches the flat `set-parent` /
`set-limits` spelling without stuttering, and it removes the
`set-limits` (cpu/mem) vs `quota limit` (disk) ambiguity. Adds a
cross-pointer from `set-limits` to `agents quota`.
Handlers stay in their own modules; `run_agents` gains the reparenting
glue. Regenerates docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Refs #2724
`container_run` logs every stdout line at INFO (target `nixos-container`)
as operation progress. For the read-only `list` op — called on the hot
path (dashboard rescan, forge + boot sweeps) — that stdout is the return
value, not progress, so every call logs the full ~28-line container roster
at INFO. hive-c0re calls it several times a second, flooding the host
journal.
Gate the stdout per-line INFO logging on the op not being `list`. Mutating
ops still log their progress; stderr is still logged for every op (errors
matter regardless). No behaviour change beyond log volume.
Part A of moving hive-ci runner registration off the boot-critical path.
Adds a root-side hive-priv op that writes the runner registration token to
the host env-file /run/hive-ci/runner-token (in-place, preserving the inode
the container bind-mounts) and restarts the in-container gitea-runner-hive
unit. The forge admin token stays in hive-c0re; only the registration token
reaches the host env-file the container mounts read-only. The c0re-side
caller (ensure_ci_runner_registered) + the nix boot-path change land next on
this branch.
Split the priv-socket wire types (PrivRequest/PrivResponse/PrivEvent and
friends) out of hive-sh4re into their own hive-priv-sock crate, mirroring
the existing hive-host-sock split. hive-priv — the root-privileged
helper — now depends on just this narrow protocol crate instead of the
much larger daemon-shared crate, shrinking its dependency surface and
making the privsep boundary easier to audit. No server/client
implementation lives here, only the wire contract; hive-c0re still
depends on hive-sh4re directly for everything else.
- regenerate docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md for the new `subvol snapshot send` verb
- close the TOCTOU on the no-overwrite guard: File::options().create_new(true)
(O_CREAT|O_EXCL) instead of exists()-then-create, so the guarantee is
atomic against a concurrent request racing the same dest filename
- warn (not silently swallow) if cleaning up a partial export after a
failed btrfs send itself fails, so a stuck garbage file masquerading
as a completed export is visible in the log
SendAgentSnapshotToFile priv op: btrfs send [-p <parent>] <snapshot> to a
file under MIGRATE_STAGING_ROOT. Standalone-useful as a point-in-time
snapshot export/backup today; the cross-hive ssh-piped leg (auth/trust
design posted on #1763, awaiting mara/damocles steer) is a later,
separate piece this doesn't block on.
- hive-sh4re: PrivRequest::SendAgentSnapshotToFile + MIGRATE_STAGING_ROOT
- hive-priv: validates names, refuses to overwrite an existing export,
cleans up a partial file on btrfs send failure
- hive-c0re: priv_client::send_agent_snapshot_to_file
- hivectl: `hivectl subvol snapshot send <agent> <label> [--parent <label>] --dest <file>`
Per mara: "i would have even disallowed ., we are making up the rules
here lets go strict". validate_credential_name now restricts to
[A-Za-z0-9_-] (no dot at all) instead of [A-Za-z0-9_.-] + a separate
".." substring check — simpler rule, and there's no legitimate need
for a dot in either a systemd credential id or a hive- prefixed
snapshot label. Matching hivectl client-side check + wire-proto doc
comments updated.
Per mara's review: validate_credential_name allowed any [A-Za-z0-9_.-]
byte sequence, which permits a literal ".." substring. Not currently
exploitable (snapshot_path() embeds the label inside a single
format!()'d path component with no "/" in the allowed charset, so
there's no directory to traverse into), but it's a landmine for any
future caller that builds a path via PathBuf::from(name) directly
instead of the current string-embedding. Reject ".." outright in the
shared validator, plus a matching client-side check in hivectl for
fail-fast UX (hive-priv's copy is still the authoritative one).
Per mara's PR review:
- snapshot label is now mandatory (was optional w/ timestamp default)
and must start with "hive-" — hive-priv enforces this as an
allow-list on top of the existing credential-name charset check, so
only hivectl-issued labels can reach the btrfs shellout.
- nest under `subvol snapshot create`/`subvol snapshot delete`
instead of othering delete as a separate top-level `delete-snapshot`
verb.
Per argus's review:
- regenerate docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md (hivectl markdown-docs) to
include the new subcommands — CI's hivectl-docs-fresh check compares
this file against generated output.
Adds the first missing piece from #2391's migration-gaps list: a
read-only btrfs snapshot priv op so hivectl migrate can freeze a
consistent point-in-time copy of an agent's state subvolume for
btrfs send, without stopping the live agent.
- PrivRequest::SnapshotAgentSubvolume / DeleteAgentSnapshot (hive-sh4re)
- hive-priv handlers: btrfs subvolume snapshot -r / delete, sibling
dot-prefixed path (<AGENT_STATE_ROOT>/.<agent>.snapshot.<label>)
- hive-c0re::priv_client wrappers
- hivectl subvol snapshot / delete-snapshot verbs (no agent stop needed
— btrfs snapshots are atomic against a live subvolume)
Does not yet wire actual btrfs send/receive or the hivectl migrate
verb — those stay tracked on #2391 as separate follow-up pieces.
Per mara's feedback on PR #2407 ("better: you can also provide url in
dashboard, same as with matrix, no host config"), drops
services.hyperhive.extraForges and the admin-API mint/revoke flow
entirely. The operator now creates a token on the external forge
themselves and pastes a label + base URL + access token into the
dashboard's FORGES tab, the same shape as the GitHub PAT flow plus the
base-URL field from the matrix extra-account flow. hive-c0re only ever
writes/deletes two local files per account (forge-<label>-token,
forge-<label>.json sidecar for the URL) via hive-priv — no remote
account creation, no admin token, no revoke-on-the-remote-side, no nix
config to enumerate.
- nix/host-modules/hive-forge/default.nix: removed the extraForges
option, its label-format assertion, and the HYPERHIVE_EXTRA_FORGES
env forwarding.
- hive-c0re/src/forge/extra.rs: deleted (REST admin-API provisioning,
no longer needed).
- hive-c0re/src/dashboard/extra_forges.rs: GET /api/extra-forges?
agent= lists an agent's stored forges by scanning its state dir
(mirrors matrix_accounts.rs's filename-scan listing), POST
/api/extra-forge-account (agent/label/base_url/token/
action=add|remove) stores or removes an account.
- hive-sh4re/priv_proto.rs + hive-priv/main.rs: new
WriteAgentExtraForgeAccount/DeleteAgentExtraForgeAccount priv
requests (adds base_url, writes/deletes a JSON sidecar alongside the
token).
- hive-c0re/src/priv_client.rs: matching wrapper functions.
- frontend/packages/dashboard/src/credentials.{html,js}: FORGES tab is
a per-agent list + add-account paste form (label/base_url/token), no
grant/revoke-from-catalog UI.
- docs/web-ui/dashboard.md: FORGES tab section rewritten.
Supersedes the design in PR #2407 (already approved+green on the old
admin-API model) — opening as a fresh PR against the same issues
rather than force-pushing over the approved one.
All agent containers now receive their bridge IP dynamically via DHCP
from the dnsmasq pool instead of a hash-derived static address:
- nix/templates/harness-base.nix: networking.useDHCP = true
- nix/modules/hive-gateway.nix: expand DHCP pool to full usable range
(.2 to .254 on /24) — was last-14-IPs-only
- hive-sh4re/src/priv_proto.rs: remove agent_ip from NetworkIsolation
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/mod.rs: drop agent_network_ip + DHCP_POOL_SIZE
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/host_config.rs: remove agent_network_ip call
- hive-priv/src/main.rs: LOCAL_ADDRESS= empty (DHCP assigns IP);
HOST_ADDRESS still set so nixos-container installs default route
before the DHCP lease arrives
- nix/dhcp-pool-size: deleted (no longer needed)
The nix/dhcp-pool-size single-source-of-truth file and all associated
Rust/Nix dual-constant plumbing are gone — there is no static map.
bridge_gateway_ip() is retained (still needed for HOST_ADDRESS).
Closes#2363
- Add `priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` to hive-sh4re as the shared
single source for the per-agent runtime root path. hive-priv now
imports it instead of carrying a local const with a stale comment
that still pointed at `coordinator::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` (removed in
#2285/#2367 — moved to `paths::agent_runtime_root()`).
- Add 'must stay in sync' cross-ref comments on both sides of the
privsep boundary:
· priv_proto::META_DIR ↔ paths::meta_root()
· priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT ↔ paths::AGENTS_ROOT
· priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ paths::RUNTIME_ROOT + agent_runtime_root()
· paths::AGENTS_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT
· paths::RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT
The dep graph prevents a shared import (hive-sh4re is a leaf; both
hive-c0re and hive-priv depend on it but not each other), so the
lockstep comments are the enforced contract.
The knowledge repo is cloned with credentials embedded in .git/config;
those credentials survive on disk and the entire LOCAL_DIR (including
.git/) is bind-mounted read-only into every agent container. Any
agent (or prompt-injected PR build) can read the site-admin token via
cat /knowledge/.git/config.
Defense-in-depth layer: in write_nspawn_flags, append
--tmpfs=/knowledge/.git after the --bind-ro=.../knowledge flag whenever
the /knowledge bind mount is present. systemd-nspawn processes the tmpfs
after the bind, overlaying an empty in-memory directory over .git/ inside
the container. Agents see the working-tree documents but not the repo
metadata or stored credentials.
This is independent of the complementary fix in workers/knowledge.rs
(stop embedding credentials in .git/config in the first place). Both
layers together provide defense-in-depth: even if a future credential
accidentally reaches .git/config, it stays off the container floor.
Closes part of issue 2308 (bind-mount isolation layer).
Add a [Unit] section to hyperhive-limits.conf (the drop-in written by
write_resource_limits) with:
ConditionPathIsDirectory=/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>
When this condition is not met, systemd skips the unit with result
"condition" — NOT a failure, so the start-limit counter is not
incremented. Belt-and-braces on top of the tmpfiles.d fix (subtask 2):
if a dir is somehow absent at start time, the container idles instead of
restart-looping into start-limit-hit.
Also promote AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT to a module-level const (was duplicated
inside two functions) and remove the duplicates.
systemd-tmpfiles d entries adjust mode+owner on existing dirs. Using
0755 root root would stomp live agents' socket dirs (owned by agent
uid:gid) on every sync_tmpfiles call, breaking the harness's ability
to bind new sockets until host_config rechowns them.
Fix: 0777 root root — matches the chmod_socket_dir(0o777) fallback
already used by host_config when the agent uid is unavailable. World-
writable dirs let the non-root harness bind sockets regardless of who
owns the dir. host_config's chown_socket_dir tightens ownership when
the agent uid is resolved.
Also add missing # Errors doc to priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles.
Root cause of the boot outage: container@h-* units try to start before
hive-c0re reaches ensure_runtime, so bind-mount source dirs are missing.
Fix: hive-c0re (via hive-priv, which runs as root) writes
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf whenever the agent set changes.
systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service (sysinit.target) reads it at every boot
BEFORE any container units start, pre-creating:
/run/hyperhive/agents/<name> — MCP socket dir (bind -> /run/hive)
/run/hive-agent/<name> — web socket dir (bind -> /run/hive-agent)
This alone removes the outage class: even if hive-c0re is slow to start,
the bind-mount sources exist and container units can activate.
Added:
- PrivRequest::SyncAgentTmpfiles { agents } in hive-sh4re
- sync_agent_tmpfiles() in hive-priv: generates content, writes atomically,
calls systemd-tmpfiles --create to apply immediately
- priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles() wrapper
- lifecycle::sync_tmpfiles() best-effort helper (list + priv call)
- Call sites: hive-c0re startup, handle_spawn success, destroy success
systemd will refuse to start a unit that has hit start-limit. nixos-
container start does not clear the counter first. Add a best-effort
systemctl reset-failed container@h-<name>.service
before each StartContainer so an earlier lockout cannot block a now-
correct start. Ignoring the reset exit code is intentional: the unit
may not exist yet on first-time create, and reset-failed on a clean
unit is a harmless no-op.
nixos-container has no kill verb. The KillContainer priv request was
calling nixos-container kill which always fails. Replace with:
machinectl kill <name> --signal=SIGKILL
which sends SIGKILL to all processes in the container — the correct
semantics for a forced shutdown (called after graceful stop has been
attempted). Add a machinectl_run helper alongside container_run so
callers stay consistent.
Two non-blocking points from the subvol-upgrade review:
- The start request was `?`-propagated before the migration result was
surfaced, so a restart-side failure (incl. the IPC call itself
erroring) could shadow whether the migration succeeded or failed.
Capture the start result instead and surface the migration outcome
first; the restart-failure messages now point at `hivectl start
--agent <name>` for manual recovery.
- The crash-window case (host dies between the two swap renames, leaving
the agent root missing but the original data under `.<name>.old`) now
detects the leftover and tells the operator to `mv` it back, instead
of a bare "no state dir to upgrade — nothing to do".
Replace the stringly-typed infra-control path with an InfraContainer enum
(Ci/Forge/Gateway/Matrix). The variants are the allowlist: serde rejects any
unknown or unsafe name (hive-c0re has no variant) at the wire boundary, so
hive-priv no longer needs a root-side SIBLING_CONTAINERS.contains() check on
ControlInfraContainer — the type enforces it, and 'the daemon can't stop
itself' is a compile-time guarantee.
- priv_proto: InfraContainer enum; manual Serialize/Deserialize + FromStr +
unit_name() all key off one mapping, so the wire form ('hive-ci', …) is
unchanged and there's no drift. ControlInfraContainer.container: String ->
InfraContainer.
- hive-priv / priv_client / server.rs: thread the enum; scoped_infra returns
Vec<InfraContainer>; the control handler uses unit_name().
- agent_server: the infra_admin restart gate parses the name via FromStr
instead of a slice .contains().
- SIBLING_CONTAINERS stays (validate_container_name/_system_name still use it
for journals / general container validation); a test keeps the enum and the
slice in lockstep.
New agents get a btrfs subvolume state root automatically when the host
FS is btrfs, but agents that predate that migration are left on plain
dirs and miss the subvolume feature set (snapshots, per-subvol
usage/quota, send/receive migration). Add an opt-in operator verb to
convert an existing plain-dir agent in place.
btrfs cannot promote a directory to a subvolume in place, so the new
privileged op stages a sibling subvolume mirroring the dir (create +
`cp -a --reflink=auto` preserving ownership/permissions/xattrs + match
the root's owner and mode), then atomically renames the original aside
and the subvolume into place, then removes the original. Any failure
before the swap leaves the original untouched; idempotent (no-op if
already a subvolume) and btrfs-gated.
The `hivectl subvol upgrade <agent> --yes` verb composes it client-side
like `restart`: stop the agent so its state bind-mount is released, run
the migration via hive-priv, then restart it — the restart is attempted
regardless of the migration outcome so a failed migration never leaves
the agent down.
- hive-sh4re: UpgradeAgentSubvolume priv request variant.
- hive-priv: the migration handler plus stage/cleanup helpers.
- hive-c0re: priv_client wrapper and the hivectl verb; regen CLI docs.
Select the level-0 (`0/<subvolid>`) leaf qgroup row explicitly instead
of taking the last data line, so usage parsing is unambiguous even if an
operator has assigned the subvolume to a higher-level aggregate qgroup.
`btrfs qgroup show -f <path>` already scopes the listing to qgroups
impacting the given path (excluding ancestral qgroups, per
btrfs-qgroup-show(8)); selecting the `0/` leaf among them pins it to the
subvolume's own automatic usage qgroup.
Also: case-insensitive match on the stable "quota not enabled" error
fragment (wording varies across btrfs-progs versions), `# Errors` doc
sections on the three public priv_client quota functions, and precise
doc comments on the `-f` flag semantics.
Follow-up to the btrfs-subvolume migration. Operator-opt-in disk
accounting + quotas on agent state subvolumes via btrfs qgroups:
- three privileged ops (qgroup ops need root): EnsureBtrfsQuota
(btrfs quota enable on the agent-state filesystem — statfs-gated,
idempotent, no-op off btrfs), ReadSubvolumeUsage (btrfs qgroup show
-f --raw for one agent), SetSubvolumeQuota (btrfs qgroup limit, or
clear). Reuses the is_on_btrfs helper from the subvolume work.
- priv_client wrappers, incl parse_qgroup_usage -> (referenced,
exclusive) bytes.
- hivectl 'quota' subcommand: enable / show [agent] / limit <agent>
<size|none>, with a K/M/G/T size parser + human-readable output.
Quota is deliberately NOT auto-enabled: btrfs quota enable triggers a
full rescan that is I/O-heavy on a large filesystem, and the operator
should choose when to pay that. 'quota show' on a plain-dir agent (no
subvolume) reports no qgroup data rather than erroring.
- Replace the #-number tracker references in code comments with prose
(tracker-tag lint; hive convention is prose in source).
- ensure_agent_subvolume now treats a chown failure on the freshly
created subvolume as fatal: it rolls the subvolume back (deletes it)
and returns an error, instead of warning and leaving a root-owned
subvol that hive-c0re can't write into (which would also make the
c0re-side exists-check skip the retry, wedging the agent).
Progressive enhancement: a brand-new agent's state root under
/var/lib/hyperhive/agents is created as a btrfs subvolume when the host
filesystem is btrfs, otherwise it falls back to a plain directory. No
existing agent is auto-migrated — the new path only fires when the root
does not yet exist, so plain-dir agents are left untouched until an
explicit opt-in upgrade.
Two new privileged ops (subvolume create/delete are root-only):
EnsureAgentSubvolume statfs-gates on btrfs, creates the subvolume, and
chowns it to the hive-core user so the normal state/claude/harness
mkdirs succeed inside it; DeleteAgentSubvolume btrfs-subvolume-deletes
the root iff it is actually a subvolume. hive-c0re calls Ensure before
the per-agent dirs are created (spawn/rebuild/InitConfig) and Delete on
the purge path only — destroy keeps the subvolume for revival, matching
plain-dir semantics. btrfs-progs added to the hive-priv unit PATH.
Per-subvolume usage accounting + optional quota is a separate
follow-up.
Per review: RESTARTABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS and the new CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS
were near-identical subsets of SIBLING_CONTAINERS. Drop both and validate infra
lifecycle ops against SIBLING_CONTAINERS directly (all four infra containers;
hive-c0re is never in it, so it can't stop itself). This also makes hive-matrix
restartable, including via an infra_admin agent's restart tool.
Collapse the two priv ops too: RestartInfraContainer is gone; ControlInfraContainer
{ action } is the single op (restart = action: Restart). priv_client's
restart_infra_container is now a thin wrapper over control_infra_container.
`hivectl stop` brings the whole hive down in one operator action — all
sub-agents plus the ci/forge/gateway/matrix infra containers — and
`hivectl start` brings it back up. Scope flags (--agents, --agent <name>,
--ci, --forge, --gateway, --matrix) narrow the set; a bare invocation
targets everything. hive-c0re never stops itself.
- hive-sh4re: HostRequest::{Stop,Start} + LifecycleScope wire type;
priv_proto InfraAction + ControlInfraContainer + the
CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS allowlist (adds hive-matrix, excludes
hive-c0re).
- hive-priv: control_infra_container handler (systemctl <verb>
container@<name>, allowlist-validated root-side).
- hive-c0re: handle_stop / handle_start fan out agents via lifecycle and
infra via hive-priv; per-target failures are aggregated. Infra
systemctl routes through hive-priv (the privsep boundary).
- The --graceful flag is threaded through Stop now; the per-agent quiesce
itself lands with the graceful-agent-stop work.
