hive-claude 0.1.3 spawns claude as the leader of its own process group,
and its `Cancel::cancel` and idle watchdog signal that group instead of
claude's pid alone. Commands claude started (a `nix build`, a test run)
used to survive a subagent `interrupt` and keep running.
Bump hive-claude to 0.1.3. The subagent `interrupt` call site needs no
code change: `Cancel::cancel(force)` kept its signature.
The harness's `/cancel` and `/logout` did not go through hive-claude:
they ran `kill -INT <pid>` on the claude child they found in /proc. They
now SIGINT the group that child leads, through `libc::kill`. A `claude`
child that leads no group (the `claude plugin` calls) shares the
harness's group and is still signalled alone.
Tests: an interrupted subagent's grandchild dies, for both SIGINT and
`force`, and fails on hive-claude 0.1.2; a harness cancel stops a
turn's grandchild, and fails when only the pid is signalled.
Eleven doc comments pointed at `docs/` files as markdown links. Ten of
them render as broken hyperlinks in the docs rustdoc CI builds, and
nothing in the tree can tell.
Rustdoc renders a page at `target/doc/<crate>/<module…>/`, so a relative
link resolves against that directory and not against the source file it
was typed in. Every one of these except the single crate-root `//!` was
written for a reader resolving from the source tree, which is one `../`
short at module level and two short one directory deeper.
Two measurements on a throwaway crate, same build and same
`RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D rustdoc::all"`:
* a bogus intra-doc link `[`no_such_item`]` is a hard error, so the
`docs-rustdoc` check in nix/checks.nix works for its class;
* a relative link to a nonexistent file in the same comment produces
no diagnostic at all and lands in the html verbatim as
href="../../../docs/does-not-exist.md".
So the class is invisible to the one gate whose stated purpose is to
stop a doc pointer dangling — and it is worse than the plain-text
failure that gate's comment describes, because a broken href still
looks clickable.
Fixing the depths was the other option and is rejected: the correct
depth is a function of how deeply the module is nested, so any module
move silently breaks it again, and no check we have would notice.
The link text was already the canonical pointer — `docs/x.md::Section`,
the same repo-root-relative form used everywhere else in the tree and
the form scripts/check-doc-refs.sh gates. Dropping the `[…](…)` wrapper
keeps every byte of information a reader uses and removes the only part
that was ever wrong.
Refs #3926.
Closes#2831. post_logout's wipe_summary only checked whether cleared.wiped
was empty, so a real .credentials.json blocked by EPERM (nothing made it
into wiped) got reported as 'no credential files present (already logged
out)' in the same breath as a warning saying the delete failed -- self
contradictory and misleading, since the file is still there un-deleted.
Extracted the branch into a pure wipe_summary() helper (wiped file(s) named >
warnings-only failure > genuinely nothing found) with unit tests covering
the exact permission-error shape from the issue.
