swarm-bao-forge-oidc fetched the forge's OIDC client secret from bao and wrote
it to /var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/<id>.secret,
on the container's persistent root, where it outlived a bao rotation and was
in every backup of that tree.
Now the fetch writes it to /run/hive-forge-oidc/<id>.secret on the host
(tmpfs, root 0400). The directory is bound read-only into the container at
the same path, and forgejo-sso-source loads it through LoadCredential. A
tmpfiles rule creates the directory at boot, so the bind source always
exists, and removes the old persistent copy.
After a reboot the file is absent until the fetch succeeds, and
forgejo-sso-source fails to start until then; the fetch starts it again once
it writes the file. Logins keep working meanwhile: forgejo holds the secret
in its login-source row.
deploy.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile (and its old swarm.forge.sso name) is
removed: it only chose where in the container the fetched file landed. The
fetch no longer needs the container's forgejo uid, so it no longer fails on a
fresh host before the container has created its state dir.
Part of #4998.
The granting units (granterPolicyUnit's 17, swarm-bao-granter-role,
swarm-bao-controller-policy, swarm-bao-agent-pki) and swarm-bao-nats-tls
copy store-retry's restart budget by hand, are Type=oneshot, and set no
TimeoutStartSec, so systemd gives each attempt no start timeout. A store
that accepts a connection and never answers leaves the attempt running
forever: Restart=on-failure never fires, units ordered after it wait, and
swarm-bao-nats-tls's daily timer starts a unit that is still activating.
Each now sets TimeoutStartSec: 60 for the granting units and the
granter's role, 2min for controller-policy (it may generate the services
root), 5min for agent-pki and nats-tls (each may wait on a blocking
restart of a server in a container). module-eval-bao-grants and
module-eval-nats-tls assert the bound is finite.
The restart budget itself is unchanged; that is #5305.
Closes#5306
The queue's metrics were scraped over loopback from the exporter, declared
only where the queue and the collector share a host, so a collector on any
other host had no job for it. Its target is now declared on every host as
`https://<swarm.nats.domain>/metrics`, and the queue's host gets a gateway
vhost on that name serving `= /metrics` from the exporter behind the
collector's auth subrequest (`/__nats_metrics_authz`, the forge's shape).
Every other path there is 403; the monitoring endpoint is never proxied.
The rules derived from `publishedScrapeTargets` admit the collector's
client and deny every other subject. The loopback entry, and with it
`glue-otel-scrape-targets.nix`, is gone.
In self-signed mode the vhost serves the queue's own `swarm-nats` leaf
(issued for exactly that name, `server_flag` set), copied 0640
root:nginx by `swarm-nats-gateway-cert`; until the leaf exists that unit
writes a throwaway pair, so nginx never starts on a missing file. The
name stays out of `swarm.serviceDomains`, so a host whose only swarm
service is the queue fronts no services name and its gateway neither
waits for nor needs the swarm-services leaf: no services-issuer pair has
to be placed on it. With ACME or an operator cert the vhost uses the
gateway's own TLS, as every other name does.
The queue's host now enables the gateway (`mkDefault`), as every other
swarm service's host does.
Fixes#5205
Thirty-three module-eval fixtures were a second (or later) full
`nixosSystem` evaluation of a config another fixture already evaluated:
16 shapes defined identically in two to seven cluster files, plus
duplicates inside agent-queue-bao, core-toggle and
swarm-services-switch. Each cluster imports ./lib.nix itself, so nothing
was shared between them.
nix/module-eval/shared.nix now defines each of those 16 shapes once.
nix/checks.nix instantiates it a single time and passes it as `shared`
to the 23 clusters that read one, and each cluster rebinds the fixture
under its existing local name. Assertions are unchanged. Case text
changes only in core-toggle, where two cases built the forge-host
fixture inline and now read the file's `forgeHere`, and in two inline
`let` bindings (bao-otel-collector, grafana) that now take the shared
fixture.
Six folds are value-equal rather than textually equal: they drop an
explicit `deploy.hive-controller.enable = false` or
`deploy.swarm-otel.enable = false` that equals what the option already
resolves to for that config. Nothing under nix/host-modules sets either
option apart from the `mkDefault allSwarmServices` on swarm-otel, and
the only option-priority read there is `domain.highestPrio`.
Part of #5171.
The case for a hive with a store leaf and no queue URL reads
systemd.services.hive-c0re, which only exists with the hive controller
enabled. Built with `hive`, the fixture had no such unit and
module-eval-nats-tls failed to evaluate:
error: attribute 'hive-c0re' missing
Refs #5015
hive-c0re publishes this hive's status to the swarm queue as the OIDC
client `hive-<name>`. Its secret came from
`deploy.hive-controller.statusPublish.clientSecretFile`, which defaulted
to authelia's minted file only on a host running both authelia and the
queue. Every other hive had no secret and never published, so the
controller showed it `never_reported`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, beside authelia, also copies each hive's
`hive-<name>` secret to `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`. Its policy
already allows `swarm/hives/*`. hive-c0re reads that path under the
hive's own store leaf, which the existing `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` grant
covers, and holds the value in memory.
The shared queue client no longer remembers a failed first connect for
the life of the process. A failed attempt is retried with a backoff
from 5s, doubling to a cap of 5 minutes; the dashboard banner stays up
until an attempt succeeds. The two status publishers wait for the
client instead of giving up on the first `None`, so a secret published
after boot is picked up without a restart.
Removed: the `statusPublish.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings,
now removed options with a message), its same-host default, its
LoadCredential, the assertion tying it to the other two coordinates,
and `swarm_queue_client::QueueConfig::from_env`, whose only caller was
this read. Publishing is now on wherever the queue URL and token
endpoint are set and the hive holds a store leaf.
Refs #5015
Drop the eval assertion b78190e1 added. It refused every self-signed
gateway host that does not run the store, which is the default hive
shape, and contradicts docs/swarm/secrets.md's supported no-store
deployment. The approved #4921 plan has such a host evaluate and fail
at runtime; `requireServicesIssuer` already exits 1 naming both
options, on the root-fetch branch and before issuing.
The module-eval case that pinned `hiveWithController { }` as refused
now pins it, and a hive-less gateway with no pair, as evaluating with
the unit's refusal in the script. The fixture pairs the assertion
forced into forge-placement, nats-tls and swarm-otel-identity are
reverted.
Refs #4921
swarm-services-cert issues the swarm-services leaf a self-signed gateway
serves, and on a host fronting no swarm name fetches the store's pki root.
It is gated on the gateway, not on a hive, yet its leaf pair was named
under deploy.hive-controller.tls and defaulted from the hive reader's cert
directory, and the root fetch presented the hive's own identity. A gateway
host with no hive had no such identity, so that branch was red by
construction.
- The pair moves to deploy.bao.servicesIssuerClient{Cert,Key}File, beside
the store's other host-unit readers, and glue-bao-tls.nix defaults it on
the store's host from the leaf it already mints. The old
deploy.hive-controller.tls.baoClient{Cert,Key}File paths are
mkRenamedOptionModule aliases. glue-services-issuer-bao-identity.nix,
which derived the default from deploy.bao.clientCertFile, is gone.
- The no-swarm-name root fetch presents the services-issuer pair. The hive
identity is now only hive-tls-resign's.
- A self-signed gateway with no pair fails evaluation, naming both options.
A pair named but unreadable still fails the unit, naming the paths.
Refs #4921
`swarm-bao-nats-callout-xkey` runs `ensure-callout-keys`, importing
/var/lib/swarm-nats-callout/{issuer,callout-user}.seed when present so the
keys keep their public halves, then fetches all three public halves from
the store. The verb removes each seed file once a read of the store returns
a seed; when the store's seed differs, it is kept and a warning names the
file. No tmpfiles rule touches those files, since one could run before the
import with the store sealed and leave the next run to mint a new key.
The server renders the issuer and user public halves from the fetched files,
checked for shape as the xkey's is, and does not start without them. The
responder reads both seeds from the store, so the copies into the container
and their LoadCredential entries are gone, and a tmpfiles rule removes the
copies a container still holds. `swarm-nats-callout-keys` is removed.
On the store's host the fetch unit is also ordered after
`swarm-bao-secret-publisher-policy`, so the publisher's denial of the seed
paths is written before the unit creates or keeps a seed there.
`deploy.nats.autoGenerateCallout`, `calloutUserPublicKey`,
`calloutIssuerPublicKey`, `calloutUserSeedFile` and `calloutIssuerSeedFile`
are removed with `mkRemovedOptionModule`, under `swarm.nats` too, each
message saying the keys live in the store.
glue-nats-bao-identity.nix and glue-matrix-ctl-bao-identity.nix defaulted
deploy.nats.baoClient{Cert,Key}File and deploy.matrix.ctlBaoClient{Cert,Key}File
to siblings of deploy.bao.clientCertFile, the hive's own store reader. That
pointed a store host whose reader was moved at files nobody mints, and on a
queue or homeserver host without the store that held a placed hive reader
invented a nats.pem / matrix-ctl.pem path beside it.
Both glues are now gated on the store running on this host
(deploy.bao.enable, the condition glue-bao-tls.nix mints under) and name the
directory the minting unit writes to, through nix/host-modules/lib/bao-pki-dir.nix.
Host shapes:
- Store host, default reader: unchanged. The evaluated paths stay
/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/nats{,-key}.pem and
/var/lib/swarm-bao-pki/matrix-ctl{,-key}.pem, and the rendered units are
the same.
- Store host whose hive reader was moved: now gets the leaf minted there.
- Queue or homeserver host without the store, holding a hive reader and not
naming these options: no default any more. It still evaluates (neither
option has an eval assertion). swarm-bao-nats-tls exits 1 naming
deploy.nats.baoClient{Cert,Key}File when the queue's certificate is missing
or due for renewal; swarm-bao-matrix-oidc exits 1 naming
ctlBaoClient{Cert,Key}File, and the swarm appservice render/publish units
and the PKI bind mount no longer render. If that host had placed nats.pem
or matrix-ctl.pem beside its hive reader, it worked before and now needs
both options named.
- Hosts without the store and without a hive reader, and hosts naming the
options: unchanged.
Both refusals and option descriptions now say the default comes from
deploy.bao.enable.
Refs #4921
The shared `hive` fixture turned `deploy.hive-controller.enable` on for
every eval test. It is now off by default; `hiveWithController` turns it
on, and the fixtures whose claims read the hive tier (hive-c0re, the
queue-agent credential, the hive leaf, `deploy.hive-controller.*`, or an
absence that is only meaningful with a hive present) use it.
glue-nats-auth-bao-identity.nix still read the renamed
`services.hyperhive.enable`, which printed the "Obsolete option" trace
six times per CI run. The term is dropped: the pairing is gated on the
queue and the minted PKI, as its sibling glue-nats-bao-identity.nix is.
The controller's OIDC client secret (client `swarm-controller`, used for
the queue connection, the auth-bridge bearer and the OTLP push) came from
an operator-placed file, `deploy.swarm-controller.queue.clientSecretFile`,
handed in by `LoadCredential=`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, which already copies authelia's minted OIDC
secrets into the store, also publishes this one, to
`swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client`. That path sits under
`controller/`, which no hive's policy reads. The controller reads it once
at start with its existing store certificate and holds it in memory, as
`swarm_queue_client::ClientSecret::Value`. If the store is down, it
retries for about a minute and then fails the start, so `Restart=` tries
again.
Policy delta: the controller gets `read` on that leaf, and the publisher
gets `create`/`update` on that leaf.
Removed: the `queue.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings, now removed
options with a message), its singleHostSwarm default, the credential and
placeholder, and the path watcher plus its restart oneshot. A controller
without a store identity is now an eval error, because it has no other
way to get the secret.
Every unit that writes a bao policy or cert-auth role ran only while the
operator-placed bootstrap token existed, and skipped silently otherwise.
The token lives 24h, so on any real swarm a PR adding or changing a grant
deployed with its unit skipped, and each one needed a manual token refresh
(plus a root `bao policy write` when it added a path).
A `bao-granter` principal now writes them. Its leaf is minted by
swarm-bao-pki on the store host (0600 root, never copied off it), and its
policy covers `swarm-*` policies, `swarm-*` cert-auth roles and
`pki/roles/swarm-*` by glob, plus the mount and services-root paths the
controller's unit already used. All ten granting units
(controller, secret-publisher, matrix-ctl, matrix-token, queue-agent,
grafana-oidc, otel-oidc, forwarder-oidc, services-issuer, nats-tls) log in
with it instead of reading the token. They keep the 2880 x 30s retry, now
require swarm-bao-pki, and when the store refuses the granter they fail
and print the one-time step instead of skipping.
swarm-bao-granter-role is the one unit left on the token. It enables the
auth mounts (moved out of the controller's unit) and writes the granter's
own policy and role. The bootstrap policy is renamed `bao-bootstrap` and
shrinks to those five stanzas; it is shipped at
/etc/hyperhive/bao-bootstrap-policy.hcl. The old name `swarm-bootstrap`
matched the granter's own `swarm-*` glob.
The granter's CN joins certAuthCns, so no hive can be named into its role.
An assertion keeps both pki role names under `swarm-`. With no client CA
the granting units no longer render, and a warning says so.
module-eval pins the granter's policy stanza by stanza, what it cannot
reach, that every call a granting unit makes is granted, and that only
swarm-bao-granter-role reads the token.
Refs #4704
A remote hive dialled nothing until an operator copied the queue's URL
into it, though the URL is the same string everywhere. statusPublish.natsUrl,
queue.agentNatsUrl and controller.queue.natsUrl now default to
tls://<swarm.nats.domain>:<port> unconditionally.
The statusPublish assertion treated a URL without a secret as a half
config. With the URL a default on every hive, only the secret claims
publishing: the assertion now refuses a secret without a URL or token
endpoint, and hive-c0re's status environment is gated on the secret too,
so a hive without one publishes nothing instead of reading a missing
credential.
The queue listened in plaintext on 4222, reached by bridge IP or loopback,
and nothing in-tree opened it to another hive. It now has a name, serves a
certificate for that name alone, and refuses clients that do not speak TLS.
- `swarm.nats.domain`, default `nats.<swarm.domain>`, a sibling name like
`swarm.bao.domain`. The queue host answers it via `gateway.localNames`;
every other hive resolves it through the operator's DNS, as for bao.
- `pki/roles/swarm-nats` allows that one name (bare domain, no subdomains,
IPs or localhost, server flag). A `swarm-nats` cert-auth role and policy
may only `update` `pki/issue/swarm-nats`, written by
`swarm-bao-nats-tls-policy`. The login leaf is minted by glue-bao-tls and
paired by glue-nats-bao-identity. `deploy.bao.natsCommonName` is reserved
as a hive name.
- `swarm-bao-nats-tls` issues the leaf into a directory bound read-only into
the container, restarts nats when it rotates, and re-runs daily.
It joins glue-bao-readers-policy-order, so it is ordered after its policy
unit (`after` and `wants`, never `requires`) where the store is on the
same host. The policy unit joins the store's journald list.
- nats gets `tls {}`, with the key via `LoadCredential`, and no
`allow_non_tls`. `validateConfig` is now off in every mode, because the
build-time check loads a leaf that only exists at runtime.
- 4222 is also open on `wg-hive` when the host is on the mesh, never
host-wide.
- `statusPublish.natsUrl`, `queue.agentNatsUrl`, the controller's URL under
`singleHostSwarm`, and the auth responder all dial
`tls://<swarm.nats.domain>:<port>`. swarm-queue-client hands its CA file
to the NATS connection too, so hive-c0re and the controller trust the
leaf's root.
- docs/swarm/README.md: the queue URL and the one DNS record a multi-host
swarm needs.
module-eval-nats-tls pins the role, the policy, the served leaf, the
firewall, the ordering, and a scan of every `*_NATS_URL` and the
responder's URL across the host and its containers.
Closes#4626
