The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container.
`nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the
`containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch
holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts,
its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`,
`networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv`
path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines.
The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by
necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge —
so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not
afford in the first place.
Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix
diff:
- The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it
with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which
it refuses to load at all.
- The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer
for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and
scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the
containment.
- The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing.
- `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter.
Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose
it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer;
it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit),
`service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the
MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as
"ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the
requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts
it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The
dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`.
Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the
container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe
because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is
no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access
control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't.
Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710
tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run
in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered
virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are
byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts
emptied.
One attrset describing every hive in the swarm including this one,
identical on every host, with hiveName selecting which entry is us.
"My peers" is derived (swarm.peerHives) rather than declared.
Every field in the old per-host peer list was intrinsic to the hive it
described, never to the pair -- so the list was a directory each host
kept its own copy of. Beyond the deduplication it removes a bug class:
two hosts could hold different endpoints for the same third hive with
nothing to detect the disagreement.
Drops the per-hive caCert. Trust inside a swarm derives from the swarm
root, which every hive chains to. What that genuinely removes is
trusting a hive whose root this swarm does not own -- a cross-swarm
problem that wants a mechanism of its own, not a field that happened to
work.
The matrix container's certificateFiles block goes with it and could
NOT be migrated: that list is read at build time and the swarm root is
a runtime file (its key must never enter the store), so there is no
build-time name to put there. caCert being a nix path was precisely
what made it the build-time distribution channel. Agents are unaffected
-- hive-tls folds the root into the hive trust bundle and the meta
renderer embeds that one file. Tracked separately.
Migration is an assertion plus warnings, not a rename: hives is peers
union {self}, and the set gains a member no existing config has written
down. A rename migrates a name and a default can re-root a meaning;
neither can conjure a new member. The warning explains, the self-entry
assertion stops the build.
The push side modelled a store per peer hive: a --peer argument, a
swarm.peers.<domain>.snapshotStorePort option, and a swarm_peers module
whose entire job was answering "which peer". A swarm has exactly one
store, so none of that had anything to select between.
The receiver already proved it. It keys destination directories by
agent, not by sending hive, precisely so an agent that migrates keeps
one unbroken incremental chain -- which only makes sense if every hive
pushes to the same place. Per-hive stores would split the chain in two,
the case that keying exists to prevent.
So the destination moves to services.hyperhive.swarm.snapshotStore,
rendered into HYPERHIVE_SNAPSHOT_STORE, and swarm_peers is deleted
rather than adapted. address has no default because it is a
deployment fact this host cannot derive; port defaults because it is a
convention both ends read from the same option docs. An unset or empty
address fails naming the option instead of connecting somewhere
arbitrary, and a test asserts the message suggests no value.
Adds the caller the fd-passing machinery existed for: hivectl agent
<name> subvol snapshot push --peer <hive> resolves the peer, connects
to its snapshot store, writes the agent header, and hands the connected
socket to hive-priv, which runs btrfs send straight into it.
The split keeps the root helper ignorant. Everything that involves
knowing where a peer is, what the wire protocol looks like, and which
hive to trust happens in the unprivileged daemon; hive-priv only ever
receives an already-open descriptor. Once btrfs send starts, neither
process is in the data path, so a multi-gigabyte transfer costs no
per-byte work and survives a hive-c0re restart.
call_with_fd takes the descriptor by value and closes it as soon as the
kernel has it. A socket stays open until every copy closes, so holding
one back would leave the receiver waiting for an EOF that never comes:
btrfs receive blocks and this side reports success for a transfer the
peer never committed. Ownership makes that unrepresentable.
The peer's store port is a new swarm.peers.<domain>.snapshotStorePort
option rather than a constant matching the module default. A pushing
hive cannot read the receiver's configuration, so assuming 51821 would
push at a port nobody promised to listen on; absent, the push fails
naming the option. swarm_peers parses the mesh address the host module
has always rendered into HYPERHIVE_PEERS but nothing read.
Both groups only ever act on a single managed agent's state dir, so
they belong in the `agents` namespace rather than as top-level verbs
next to `forge` / `matrix` / `wg`.
Renames `quota limit` -> `quota set`: the enclosing group already
carries the noun, so the bare verb matches the flat `set-parent` /
`set-limits` spelling without stuttering, and it removes the
`set-limits` (cpu/mem) vs `quota limit` (disk) ambiguity. Adds a
cross-pointer from `set-limits` to `agents quota`.
Handlers stay in their own modules; `run_agents` gains the reparenting
glue. Regenerates docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Refs #2724
The hive applies one `agentCpuQuota` / `agentMemoryMax` to every
container. That's the right default and the wrong ceiling: a build-heavy
agent needs headroom the other twelve don't, and raising the hive-wide
value to suit it hands that headroom to everyone.
Adds a per-agent override, persisted host-side and resolved per-field
against the hive defaults.
Follows the existing `meta/*.json` pattern (`capabilities.json`,
`tool-groups.json`): a host-side map read by `hive-c0re`, staged and
committed in the meta repo so every change lands in the audit trail.
```json
{ "sock": { "cpu_quota": "400%", "memory_max": "8G" } }
```
Fallback is **per field**, not per agent: an entry with only
`memory_max` leaves that agent on the hive-wide CPU quota. Absent file,
absent agent and absent field all resolve to the hive default, so the
feature is inert until someone opts an agent in.
Unlike the other meta files this one is **not** injected into the
container — a limit is something done *to* an agent, not something it
reads about itself.
```
hivectl agents set-limits sock --cpu-quota 400% --memory-max 8G
hivectl agents set-limits sock --reset
```
Values are validated before they're persisted: they go into a systemd
drop-in verbatim, and a typo there makes the unit fail to *start* —
turning a fat-fingered quota into a container that won't come back.
The command is declarative: each call replaces the agent's whole entry.
That makes a forgotten flag a silent revert, so a bare `set-limits
<name>` is rejected at the clap layer and clearing needs an explicit
`--reset`.
`ContainerView` gains `cpu_quota` / `memory_max`, both always populated:
there's no "unset" state to render, only "same as everyone else". They
reflect what the drop-in *says* — what the next start will enforce — not
a live cgroup reading.
The write goes through `meta::commit_resource_limits` rather than the
bare setter, so it's staged and committed under `META_LOCK`. Writing
without committing would leave the meta working tree dirty for the next
`prepare_deploy` to trip over.
Docs: `persistence.md` (the new meta file, and why it isn't injected),
`tools/hivectl.md` (the prose guide), `tools/hivectl-cli.md`
(regenerated clap dump).
Closes: internal/requests issue 25
A paused agent keeps its container, its claude session and its
dashboard/todo servers up, but stops driving turns. Messages queue
unacked and are drained on resume.
The whole protocol is a single marker file, `<harness>/paused`. That
directory is already a bind-mount shared between host and container, so
both sides just stat the same path: the harness reads it to decide
whether to drive a turn, hive-c0re reads it to render the badge and
writes/removes it for `hivectl pause|resume`. No new wire protocol, no
container round-trip, and it is sticky across restarts by construction.
Not calling `recv_next` while paused *is* the queueing semantic, so
there is no fencing to get wrong: reminders buffer in their unbounded
channel, the todo `Notify` permit coalesces, and a `request_next_turn`
that raced the pause survives because the gate sits above
`self_continue.take()`.
Graceful stop is handled host-side rather than in the harness: a paused
agent provably has no turn in flight, so `run_signal` skips the fence
entirely instead of eating the full `GRACEFUL_STOP_TIMEOUT` waiting for
a checkpoint turn that will never run.
`paused` is reported on `ContainerView` / `AgentStatusRow` for the
dashboard, orthogonal to `running` and reported for stopped containers
too.
Closes: hyperhive/hyperhive issue 2271
