A hung forge fetch inside `nix flake update hyperhive` (or any other meta
git/nix child) now fails after its deadline with an error naming the command,
the child is killed, and META_LOCK, BuildSlot and MetaWindow are released. The
boot sweep already treats that failure as a warning and fans out the rebuilds.
A wait on META_LOCK past 60s logs a warning naming the waiter and the holder.
priv_client::list_containers now waits at most 30s (LIST_WAIT) for
hive-priv's `nixos-container list`, via the existing `within` helper. Its
periodic callers (crash_watch, agent_sockets, swarm_agent_status, wanted,
mcp_sockets, swarm_status via container_view) already treat an Err as a
skipped cycle, so a hung listing no longer stops their loops for good.
lifecycle::is_running / unit_state run `systemctl is-active` with
kill_on_drop and a 10s timeout (IS_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT); a timeout warns and
reads as not-running / UnitState::Other, the same as a systemctl that
could not be spawned. The new lifecycle::running_state returns None for
that case, and crash_watch keeps the agent's previous observation on None
so a hung systemctl is neither reported as a crash nor as a recovery.
`call` itself and every mutating op (start/stop/destroy/send-snapshot/
daemon-reload) stay unbounded.
Closes#5061
prebuild_toplevel awaited nix build with a bare child.wait().await, so
a wedged nix-daemon (unreachable remote builder, stuck build slot)
hung the rebuild job forever with no way for the job queue to recover
short of restarting hive-c0re.
Mirrors #4741's hive-priv fix: the child now leads its own process
group, and after PREBUILD_TIMEOUT (1h, four times CI's observed
cold-cache flake check) the whole group is SIGKILLed and the call
fails with a named timeout error instead of hanging.
Refs #4723, #4741
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf was a boot-time backstop (#2290)
that pre-created every agent's bind sources. The start preamble already
creates them for every c0re-driven start, and on this host only hive-c0re
starts agent containers. The file was also the reason the socket dir's
owner had to be declared there, which is how it spent its life at
`0777 root root` whenever the uid could not be resolved (#4742).
- hive-priv gains `EnsureAgentSocketDir { name }`, called from
`set_nspawn_flags` in every start path. It creates
`/run/hive-agent/<name>` `0751 root:root` with mkdirat relative to an
O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW fd for the parent. An existing entry has to be a
directory (fstatat AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); anything else is refused, and a
directory is left alone. hive-c0re's own create_dir_all went: its /run
is read-only under ProtectSystem=strict.
- The container's `hive-agent-user-migrate` activation chowns that dir to
the agent user and sets 0751, the same way it already handles state/ and
harness/. It refuses a symlink or non-directory there, since `test -d`
and chmod follow links. No host-side passwd parse, and no window where
the dir is world-writable.
- `/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>` stays created by hive-c0re itself
(`ensure_agent_runtime_dir`). It holds the `mcp.sock` that hive-c0re
binds as hive-core, so it must not become root- or agent-owned.
- The `/run/hive-agent` parent is declared in hive-priv.nix, `0755
root:root`, instead of hive-gateway's hive-core rule. hive-priv is its
only writer now, and hive-priv's ReadWritePaths needs it to exist.
- The manager start in `ensure_root_agent` now goes through
`converge_start_preamble` + `start_with_fallback`. It was a bare start,
so after a reboot the manager's bind sources existed only because of the
tmpfiles file, and its limits drop-in did not exist at all.
- Removed: `sync_tmpfiles`, `agent_uid_gid` / `parse_passwd_uid_gid`,
`priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles`, `AgentTmpfilesEntry`, the tmpfiles
body builder and their tests, plus the three call sites.
- Legacy: hive-priv unlinks the file at every start, ignoring ENOENT.
`SyncAgentTmpfiles` stays one release as a payload-ignoring variant that
does the same unlink and returns Ok, for an older hive-c0re.
Salvaged from #4752: the boundary.md correction that nginx only dials,
because ProtectSystem=strict makes its /run read-only.
Behaviour change: a manual `nixos-container start h-<name>` right after a
reboot, before hive-c0re has started that agent, now fails on a missing
bind source instead of starting.
Closes#4742
An agent name that is not a valid Ident made `Coordinator::agent_paths`
panic. Job payloads carry names as plain strings (the swarm's published
wanted state is one source), and a panic inside a job-queue node never
reaches `complete_growing`, so the node's resources (the deploy
window included) were held until hive-c0re restarted. `agent_paths` now
returns an error; the job-queue nodes, the admin-socket spawn and
set-limits paths, the root-agent spawn and the dashboard set-limits
handler propagate it.
`lifecycle::list().await.unwrap_or_default()` turned a failed container
list into "no agents":
- meta-update cascade: the lock bump committed and zero rebuilds fanned
out, reported as success. The cascade is now resolved before the lock
bump and a list failure fails the node.
- dashboard update-all: queued nothing and returned 200 "ok". Now 500
with the error.
- container rescan: every row was emitted as removed and the cache
emptied. Now the last snapshot stands; `hivectl status` gets an error.
- dashboard journal: answered 404 "no managed container". Now 500.
- spawn/rebuild port-collision check: silently skipped. Now fails.
- startup migration: the per-agent phases ran over nothing, and phase 3
handed an empty agent list to `meta::sync_agents`, which renders the
meta flake with exactly the agents it is given. Both now log the list
failure and skip.
The hive-jobq scheduler still leaks a node's resources on any executor
panic; that root is not addressed here.
Refs #4723
lifecycle::destroy logged a failed `nixos-container destroy` and returned
Ok, so the DestroyContainer node went green, the agent was unregistered,
and with purge the after_ok PurgeState deleted its state while the
container config and root still existed.
Propagate the error unless the container list, read after the failure,
no longer names the container. An unreadable list fails too.
`agent_uid_gid` returns `None` for all 13 agents on every sync, and the
tmpfiles caller answers that `None` by writing `d /run/hive-agent/<name>
0777 root root` instead of `0751 <uid> <gid>` — a world-writable socket
dir, which docs/trust-boundary/boundary.md spells out as letting anything
that can reach the path unlink an agent's socket and bind its own.
Which failure fires could not be determined, because the read used
`.ok()?` and collapsed every io::Error into the same `None` a missing
user produces. None of the three causes the doc comment enumerated (not
built yet, unparseable, missing user) fits 13 long-lived containers whose
agent user demonstrably exists — from inside one:
srw-rw-rw- atlas atlas /run/hive-agent/atlas/agent.sock
So the live cause was outside the documented set and unidentifiable. Both
`None` arms now log, with the path and the error.
Splitting the pure parser out to make it testable surfaced a second,
narrower bug. The old scan used `?` on the field reads, and those are
only reached once the name matches — so an unusable row *for the wanted
user* returned `None` from the whole function instead of skipping, hiding
a usable entry below it. (Rows for other users were always skipped fine:
`split(':')` always yields at least one item, so the first `?` could not
fire.) It now skips unusable rows and keeps looking.
Does not pre-empt #3047, which removes the lookup entirely and stays
blocked on #3998; this only makes the lookup honest about failing while
it exists.
Closes#4197.
The swarm writes agent-configs/<agent> when it creates an agent, before
any hive is told to deploy it. setup_proposed authored a second copy of
those same bytes locally, so an agent's initial config had two sources
of truth, each unaware of the other and free to disagree. It now clones
that repo and falls back to the template only when there is nothing
there to take.
Preferred-source rather than a new-path-only variant because
provision_container is the Provision node for the swarm deploy and the
approval flow both, and cannot tell them apart. The approval flow
creates agent-configs/<agent> only after the first spawn
(forge_after_first_spawn), so it finds nothing and lands on the
template: the fallback becomes unreachable when hive-level create is
removed, rather than becoming something someone has to find and delete.
clone, not the neighbouring init+fetch. A failed fetch leaves an empty
.git behind, and that .git is exactly the byte setup_proposed reads to
decide whether seeding is still needed, so the fallback would have seen
a seeded repo. git removes a directory it created when a clone fails.
--branch main also makes an empty repo fail cleanly instead of cloning
to an unborn HEAD that would look seeded.
Per mara on #3725: the on/off toggle is removed, and required env vars
unset lead to a crash. HIVE_NETWORK_ISOLATION is gone from
hive-network.nix -- it was the toggle.
Validation happens once at daemon startup rather than per container.
The variables are process-global, so a bad value breaks every container
rather than one: failing at boot gives a single diagnostic naming the
bad value, and cannot reach a state where some containers were
configured before it was noticed.
Option<NetworkIsolation> collapses to NetworkIsolation through the wire
type, client and helper, which deletes the branch instead of leaving it
unreachable. serde(default) is dropped on that field deliberately: a
request omitting isolation is now rejected rather than defaulting to a
container sharing the host's network namespace.
What this replaces was a silent security downgrade. Of the four ways
into the old fallback, two logged nothing at all -- a container came up
without isolation and the journal agreed it was fine.
Doc comments that still described the removed branch are updated
(argus's note on #3723 scoped that to this issue). The hive-priv one is
a minimal edit inside the block #3723 rewrites; de-splicing is that
PR's job.
is_running collapsed every non-active state into false, so a container that
exhausted its bounded restarts read as plain "down" -- indistinguishable
from one an operator stopped deliberately. Bounding the restarts made that
gap sharper: a slow-failing agent used to grind on visibly, now it can stop
quietly.
Adds UnitState + unit_state() beside is_running rather than widening it.
is_running has ~8 call sites and nearly all are reconcile/power logic asking
"is it up? if not, start it" -- a question with two answers. Only the view
builder needs more, and it gets both facts from one systemctl call, since
is-active prints the state when not passed --quiet.
Surfaces as a flat failed flag on ContainerView and AgentStatusRow, matching
the shape those types already document: independent, orthogonally-observed
facts rather than a state machine. serde(default) keeps it order-independent
with the frontend half.
No behaviour change: nothing acts on the flag, per the ruling.
A config deploy could silently discard committed agent config. sock's
icon commit carried a full proposal/approved/building/deployed tag set
yet was not an ancestor of `main` — genuinely deployed, then dropped.
Two gaps compounded.
`prepare_applied_target` is documented as "fast-forward applied/main to
target", but `git_update_ref` is `git update-ref <ref> <target>` with no
old-value guard: an unconditional force move. Anything reachable from the
old `main` but not from `target` leaves the branch without a word.
And nothing checked that it *was* a fast-forward. `run_deploy_merge_verify`
asserts exactly one thing about history — that the live PR head still
equals the reviewed sha. That is a drift gate on the *head*; it says
nothing about the *base*. A PR opened from a stale base passes it
unchanged and then rewinds `main` when it lands.
Adds, in the order they run:
- an ancestry gate as step 3 of MergeVerify — the reviewed head must
descend from `applied/main`, else bail before the irreversible merge.
It sits after the fetch (the commit has to be local to check
reachability) and before the eval, so it stays inside the region where
nothing is mutated and the node is still safely retryable.
- `git_update_ref_cas`, used for the `applied/main` move.
`git update-ref <ref> <new> <old>` refuses, and leaves the ref alone,
when the current value is not `old`. The ancestry gate only proves the
target is safe against the `main` observed *then*; the CAS is what
keeps that proof true *now*. `run_deploy_apply` already reads
`prev_main` to park the rollback ref, so that value is threaded in —
re-reading it inside the callee would reintroduce the race.
`git_is_ancestor` returns `Ok(false)` for exit 1 rather than treating
"not an ancestor" as a failure. Its doc comment notes this is not the
"did this branch land upstream" question: a squash-merge rewrites the
commit, so `--is-ancestor` correctly answers false for a branch whose
contents were merged. Different question, same command.
Tests cover both directions of the ancestry check, and that a stale CAS
both errors *and* leaves the ref where it was — a guard that fails while
still moving the ref would be worse than none.
Not covered here, deliberately: the non-PR apply path also writes `main`
and wants the same treatment. Kept separate to stay reviewable.
All agent containers now receive their bridge IP dynamically via DHCP
from the dnsmasq pool instead of a hash-derived static address:
- nix/templates/harness-base.nix: networking.useDHCP = true
- nix/modules/hive-gateway.nix: expand DHCP pool to full usable range
(.2 to .254 on /24) — was last-14-IPs-only
- hive-sh4re/src/priv_proto.rs: remove agent_ip from NetworkIsolation
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/mod.rs: drop agent_network_ip + DHCP_POOL_SIZE
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/host_config.rs: remove agent_network_ip call
- hive-priv/src/main.rs: LOCAL_ADDRESS= empty (DHCP assigns IP);
HOST_ADDRESS still set so nixos-container installs default route
before the DHCP lease arrives
- nix/dhcp-pool-size: deleted (no longer needed)
The nix/dhcp-pool-size single-source-of-truth file and all associated
Rust/Nix dual-constant plumbing are gone — there is no static map.
bridge_gateway_ip() is retained (still needed for HOST_ADDRESS).
Closes#2363
No need to preserve agent IPs across this deploy — nothing outside a
container depends on a specific agent IP. Simpler approach: subtract
DHCP_POOL_SIZE from the usable count before hashing so agents only ever
land in [2, usable - DHCP_POOL_SIZE + 1], never in the DHCP pool.
Removes the secondary-hash remap block (~10 lines). Returns None for
subnets too small to hold both agent slots and the pool (edge case;
practical subnets are /24).
Add a DHCP pool to the gateway's dnsmasq so bridge-attached service
containers (hive-ci and future equivalents) get their addresses from
a proper DHCP server instead of a brittle static derivation.
gateway (hive-gateway.nix):
- Add IPv4 arithmetic helpers (ipToInt, intToIp, pow2) to compute the
DHCP pool range at nix eval time from bridgeIp + bridgePrefixLength.
- Reserve the last dhcpPoolSize (14) usable host addresses as the DHCP
pool (e.g. .241-.254 on a /24 with 10.42.0.0 network).
- Add dhcp-range and dhcp-leasefile to the dnsmasq settings block.
The pool is active whenever services.hyperhive.network.enable is true.
hive-ci (hive-ci.nix):
- Remove the ciBridgeIp / ciBridgeOctets static derivation and the
brittle top-of-/24 comment block.
- Switch networking.interfaces.eth0 to useDHCP = true so hive-ci gets
its address from the gateway DHCP pool.
lifecycle (mod.rs, tests.rs):
- Add DHCP_POOL_SIZE = 14 constant (must stay in sync with
dhcpPoolSize in hive-gateway.nix).
- Remap agents whose FNV-1a hash falls in the DHCP pool into the
agent-only window [2, dhcp_start - 1]. Only the rare agent whose
name hashes into the pool is affected; all others keep their IPs.
- Update and extend tests: agent range is now .2-.240 on /24;
add agent_network_ip_never_in_dhcp_pool covering 18 agent names.
