Adds the first missing piece from #2391's migration-gaps list: a
read-only btrfs snapshot priv op so hivectl migrate can freeze a
consistent point-in-time copy of an agent's state subvolume for
btrfs send, without stopping the live agent.
- PrivRequest::SnapshotAgentSubvolume / DeleteAgentSnapshot (hive-sh4re)
- hive-priv handlers: btrfs subvolume snapshot -r / delete, sibling
dot-prefixed path (<AGENT_STATE_ROOT>/.<agent>.snapshot.<label>)
- hive-c0re::priv_client wrappers
- hivectl subvol snapshot / delete-snapshot verbs (no agent stop needed
— btrfs snapshots are atomic against a live subvolume)
Does not yet wire actual btrfs send/receive or the hivectl migrate
verb — those stay tracked on #2391 as separate follow-up pieces.
Per mara's feedback on PR #2407 ("better: you can also provide url in
dashboard, same as with matrix, no host config"), drops
services.hyperhive.extraForges and the admin-API mint/revoke flow
entirely. The operator now creates a token on the external forge
themselves and pastes a label + base URL + access token into the
dashboard's FORGES tab, the same shape as the GitHub PAT flow plus the
base-URL field from the matrix extra-account flow. hive-c0re only ever
writes/deletes two local files per account (forge-<label>-token,
forge-<label>.json sidecar for the URL) via hive-priv — no remote
account creation, no admin token, no revoke-on-the-remote-side, no nix
config to enumerate.
- nix/host-modules/hive-forge/default.nix: removed the extraForges
option, its label-format assertion, and the HYPERHIVE_EXTRA_FORGES
env forwarding.
- hive-c0re/src/forge/extra.rs: deleted (REST admin-API provisioning,
no longer needed).
- hive-c0re/src/dashboard/extra_forges.rs: GET /api/extra-forges?
agent= lists an agent's stored forges by scanning its state dir
(mirrors matrix_accounts.rs's filename-scan listing), POST
/api/extra-forge-account (agent/label/base_url/token/
action=add|remove) stores or removes an account.
- hive-sh4re/priv_proto.rs + hive-priv/main.rs: new
WriteAgentExtraForgeAccount/DeleteAgentExtraForgeAccount priv
requests (adds base_url, writes/deletes a JSON sidecar alongside the
token).
- hive-c0re/src/priv_client.rs: matching wrapper functions.
- frontend/packages/dashboard/src/credentials.{html,js}: FORGES tab is
a per-agent list + add-account paste form (label/base_url/token), no
grant/revoke-from-catalog UI.
- docs/web-ui/dashboard.md: FORGES tab section rewritten.
Supersedes the design in PR #2407 (already approved+green on the old
admin-API model) — opening as a fresh PR against the same issues
rather than force-pushing over the approved one.
All agent containers now receive their bridge IP dynamically via DHCP
from the dnsmasq pool instead of a hash-derived static address:
- nix/templates/harness-base.nix: networking.useDHCP = true
- nix/modules/hive-gateway.nix: expand DHCP pool to full usable range
(.2 to .254 on /24) — was last-14-IPs-only
- hive-sh4re/src/priv_proto.rs: remove agent_ip from NetworkIsolation
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/mod.rs: drop agent_network_ip + DHCP_POOL_SIZE
- hive-c0re/src/lifecycle/host_config.rs: remove agent_network_ip call
- hive-priv/src/main.rs: LOCAL_ADDRESS= empty (DHCP assigns IP);
HOST_ADDRESS still set so nixos-container installs default route
before the DHCP lease arrives
- nix/dhcp-pool-size: deleted (no longer needed)
The nix/dhcp-pool-size single-source-of-truth file and all associated
Rust/Nix dual-constant plumbing are gone — there is no static map.
bridge_gateway_ip() is retained (still needed for HOST_ADDRESS).
Closes#2363
- Add `priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` to hive-sh4re as the shared
single source for the per-agent runtime root path. hive-priv now
imports it instead of carrying a local const with a stale comment
that still pointed at `coordinator::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` (removed in
#2285/#2367 — moved to `paths::agent_runtime_root()`).
- Add 'must stay in sync' cross-ref comments on both sides of the
privsep boundary:
· priv_proto::META_DIR ↔ paths::meta_root()
· priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT ↔ paths::AGENTS_ROOT
· priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ paths::RUNTIME_ROOT + agent_runtime_root()
· paths::AGENTS_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT
· paths::RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT
The dep graph prevents a shared import (hive-sh4re is a leaf; both
hive-c0re and hive-priv depend on it but not each other), so the
lockstep comments are the enforced contract.
The knowledge repo is cloned with credentials embedded in .git/config;
those credentials survive on disk and the entire LOCAL_DIR (including
.git/) is bind-mounted read-only into every agent container. Any
agent (or prompt-injected PR build) can read the site-admin token via
cat /knowledge/.git/config.
Defense-in-depth layer: in write_nspawn_flags, append
--tmpfs=/knowledge/.git after the --bind-ro=.../knowledge flag whenever
the /knowledge bind mount is present. systemd-nspawn processes the tmpfs
after the bind, overlaying an empty in-memory directory over .git/ inside
the container. Agents see the working-tree documents but not the repo
metadata or stored credentials.
This is independent of the complementary fix in workers/knowledge.rs
(stop embedding credentials in .git/config in the first place). Both
layers together provide defense-in-depth: even if a future credential
accidentally reaches .git/config, it stays off the container floor.
Closes part of issue 2308 (bind-mount isolation layer).
Add a [Unit] section to hyperhive-limits.conf (the drop-in written by
write_resource_limits) with:
ConditionPathIsDirectory=/run/hyperhive/agents/<name>
When this condition is not met, systemd skips the unit with result
"condition" — NOT a failure, so the start-limit counter is not
incremented. Belt-and-braces on top of the tmpfiles.d fix (subtask 2):
if a dir is somehow absent at start time, the container idles instead of
restart-looping into start-limit-hit.
Also promote AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT to a module-level const (was duplicated
inside two functions) and remove the duplicates.
systemd-tmpfiles d entries adjust mode+owner on existing dirs. Using
0755 root root would stomp live agents' socket dirs (owned by agent
uid:gid) on every sync_tmpfiles call, breaking the harness's ability
to bind new sockets until host_config rechowns them.
Fix: 0777 root root — matches the chmod_socket_dir(0o777) fallback
already used by host_config when the agent uid is unavailable. World-
writable dirs let the non-root harness bind sockets regardless of who
owns the dir. host_config's chown_socket_dir tightens ownership when
the agent uid is resolved.
Also add missing # Errors doc to priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles.
Root cause of the boot outage: container@h-* units try to start before
hive-c0re reaches ensure_runtime, so bind-mount source dirs are missing.
Fix: hive-c0re (via hive-priv, which runs as root) writes
/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf whenever the agent set changes.
systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service (sysinit.target) reads it at every boot
BEFORE any container units start, pre-creating:
/run/hyperhive/agents/<name> — MCP socket dir (bind -> /run/hive)
/run/hive-agent/<name> — web socket dir (bind -> /run/hive-agent)
This alone removes the outage class: even if hive-c0re is slow to start,
the bind-mount sources exist and container units can activate.
Added:
- PrivRequest::SyncAgentTmpfiles { agents } in hive-sh4re
- sync_agent_tmpfiles() in hive-priv: generates content, writes atomically,
calls systemd-tmpfiles --create to apply immediately
- priv_client::sync_agent_tmpfiles() wrapper
- lifecycle::sync_tmpfiles() best-effort helper (list + priv call)
- Call sites: hive-c0re startup, handle_spawn success, destroy success
systemd will refuse to start a unit that has hit start-limit. nixos-
container start does not clear the counter first. Add a best-effort
systemctl reset-failed container@h-<name>.service
before each StartContainer so an earlier lockout cannot block a now-
correct start. Ignoring the reset exit code is intentional: the unit
may not exist yet on first-time create, and reset-failed on a clean
unit is a harmless no-op.
nixos-container has no kill verb. The KillContainer priv request was
calling nixos-container kill which always fails. Replace with:
machinectl kill <name> --signal=SIGKILL
which sends SIGKILL to all processes in the container — the correct
semantics for a forced shutdown (called after graceful stop has been
attempted). Add a machinectl_run helper alongside container_run so
callers stay consistent.
Two non-blocking points from the subvol-upgrade review:
- The start request was `?`-propagated before the migration result was
surfaced, so a restart-side failure (incl. the IPC call itself
erroring) could shadow whether the migration succeeded or failed.
Capture the start result instead and surface the migration outcome
first; the restart-failure messages now point at `hivectl start
--agent <name>` for manual recovery.
- The crash-window case (host dies between the two swap renames, leaving
the agent root missing but the original data under `.<name>.old`) now
detects the leftover and tells the operator to `mv` it back, instead
of a bare "no state dir to upgrade — nothing to do".
Replace the stringly-typed infra-control path with an InfraContainer enum
(Ci/Forge/Gateway/Matrix). The variants are the allowlist: serde rejects any
unknown or unsafe name (hive-c0re has no variant) at the wire boundary, so
hive-priv no longer needs a root-side SIBLING_CONTAINERS.contains() check on
ControlInfraContainer — the type enforces it, and 'the daemon can't stop
itself' is a compile-time guarantee.
- priv_proto: InfraContainer enum; manual Serialize/Deserialize + FromStr +
unit_name() all key off one mapping, so the wire form ('hive-ci', …) is
unchanged and there's no drift. ControlInfraContainer.container: String ->
InfraContainer.
- hive-priv / priv_client / server.rs: thread the enum; scoped_infra returns
Vec<InfraContainer>; the control handler uses unit_name().
- agent_server: the infra_admin restart gate parses the name via FromStr
instead of a slice .contains().
- SIBLING_CONTAINERS stays (validate_container_name/_system_name still use it
for journals / general container validation); a test keeps the enum and the
slice in lockstep.
New agents get a btrfs subvolume state root automatically when the host
FS is btrfs, but agents that predate that migration are left on plain
dirs and miss the subvolume feature set (snapshots, per-subvol
usage/quota, send/receive migration). Add an opt-in operator verb to
convert an existing plain-dir agent in place.
btrfs cannot promote a directory to a subvolume in place, so the new
privileged op stages a sibling subvolume mirroring the dir (create +
`cp -a --reflink=auto` preserving ownership/permissions/xattrs + match
the root's owner and mode), then atomically renames the original aside
and the subvolume into place, then removes the original. Any failure
before the swap leaves the original untouched; idempotent (no-op if
already a subvolume) and btrfs-gated.
The `hivectl subvol upgrade <agent> --yes` verb composes it client-side
like `restart`: stop the agent so its state bind-mount is released, run
the migration via hive-priv, then restart it — the restart is attempted
regardless of the migration outcome so a failed migration never leaves
the agent down.
- hive-sh4re: UpgradeAgentSubvolume priv request variant.
- hive-priv: the migration handler plus stage/cleanup helpers.
- hive-c0re: priv_client wrapper and the hivectl verb; regen CLI docs.
Select the level-0 (`0/<subvolid>`) leaf qgroup row explicitly instead
of taking the last data line, so usage parsing is unambiguous even if an
operator has assigned the subvolume to a higher-level aggregate qgroup.
`btrfs qgroup show -f <path>` already scopes the listing to qgroups
impacting the given path (excluding ancestral qgroups, per
btrfs-qgroup-show(8)); selecting the `0/` leaf among them pins it to the
subvolume's own automatic usage qgroup.
Also: case-insensitive match on the stable "quota not enabled" error
fragment (wording varies across btrfs-progs versions), `# Errors` doc
sections on the three public priv_client quota functions, and precise
doc comments on the `-f` flag semantics.
Follow-up to the btrfs-subvolume migration. Operator-opt-in disk
accounting + quotas on agent state subvolumes via btrfs qgroups:
- three privileged ops (qgroup ops need root): EnsureBtrfsQuota
(btrfs quota enable on the agent-state filesystem — statfs-gated,
idempotent, no-op off btrfs), ReadSubvolumeUsage (btrfs qgroup show
-f --raw for one agent), SetSubvolumeQuota (btrfs qgroup limit, or
clear). Reuses the is_on_btrfs helper from the subvolume work.
- priv_client wrappers, incl parse_qgroup_usage -> (referenced,
exclusive) bytes.
- hivectl 'quota' subcommand: enable / show [agent] / limit <agent>
<size|none>, with a K/M/G/T size parser + human-readable output.
Quota is deliberately NOT auto-enabled: btrfs quota enable triggers a
full rescan that is I/O-heavy on a large filesystem, and the operator
should choose when to pay that. 'quota show' on a plain-dir agent (no
subvolume) reports no qgroup data rather than erroring.
- Replace the #-number tracker references in code comments with prose
(tracker-tag lint; hive convention is prose in source).
- ensure_agent_subvolume now treats a chown failure on the freshly
created subvolume as fatal: it rolls the subvolume back (deletes it)
and returns an error, instead of warning and leaving a root-owned
subvol that hive-c0re can't write into (which would also make the
c0re-side exists-check skip the retry, wedging the agent).
Progressive enhancement: a brand-new agent's state root under
/var/lib/hyperhive/agents is created as a btrfs subvolume when the host
filesystem is btrfs, otherwise it falls back to a plain directory. No
existing agent is auto-migrated — the new path only fires when the root
does not yet exist, so plain-dir agents are left untouched until an
explicit opt-in upgrade.
Two new privileged ops (subvolume create/delete are root-only):
EnsureAgentSubvolume statfs-gates on btrfs, creates the subvolume, and
chowns it to the hive-core user so the normal state/claude/harness
mkdirs succeed inside it; DeleteAgentSubvolume btrfs-subvolume-deletes
the root iff it is actually a subvolume. hive-c0re calls Ensure before
the per-agent dirs are created (spawn/rebuild/InitConfig) and Delete on
the purge path only — destroy keeps the subvolume for revival, matching
plain-dir semantics. btrfs-progs added to the hive-priv unit PATH.
Per-subvolume usage accounting + optional quota is a separate
follow-up.
Per review: RESTARTABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS and the new CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS
were near-identical subsets of SIBLING_CONTAINERS. Drop both and validate infra
lifecycle ops against SIBLING_CONTAINERS directly (all four infra containers;
hive-c0re is never in it, so it can't stop itself). This also makes hive-matrix
restartable, including via an infra_admin agent's restart tool.
Collapse the two priv ops too: RestartInfraContainer is gone; ControlInfraContainer
{ action } is the single op (restart = action: Restart). priv_client's
restart_infra_container is now a thin wrapper over control_infra_container.
`hivectl stop` brings the whole hive down in one operator action — all
sub-agents plus the ci/forge/gateway/matrix infra containers — and
`hivectl start` brings it back up. Scope flags (--agents, --agent <name>,
--ci, --forge, --gateway, --matrix) narrow the set; a bare invocation
targets everything. hive-c0re never stops itself.
- hive-sh4re: HostRequest::{Stop,Start} + LifecycleScope wire type;
priv_proto InfraAction + ControlInfraContainer + the
CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS allowlist (adds hive-matrix, excludes
hive-c0re).
- hive-priv: control_infra_container handler (systemctl <verb>
container@<name>, allowlist-validated root-side).
- hive-c0re: handle_stop / handle_start fan out agents via lifecycle and
infra via hive-priv; per-target failures are aggregated. Infra
systemctl routes through hive-priv (the privsep boundary).
- The --graceful flag is threaded through Stop now; the per-agent quiesce
itself lands with the graceful-agent-stop work.
When isolateContainers=true, claude (and all egress) broke in every
container: agents came up with an IP but no way off the bridge subnet.
Two container-side gaps, both confirmed against nixpkgs
nixos-containers.nix:
1. No default route. hive-priv wrote HOST_ADDRESS= empty in the nspawn
conf. nixos-container's container-side setup only installs
`ip route add default via $HOST_ADDRESS` when HOST_ADDRESS is
non-empty, so the container had an address but no gateway -> nothing
off-subnet (incl. api.anthropic.com) was reachable. Fix: write
HOST_ADDRESS=<bridge-ip>. In bridge mode the host-side address/route
setup is skipped, so this only affects the container's default route.
2. No usable resolver. nixos-container copies the host's /etc/resolv.conf
into the container at every start; the host resolver (e.g. 127.0.0.53)
is unreachable from a private netns and isn't authoritative for the
hive's own zones. Fix: hive-priv drops a marker carrying the gateway
IP only when isolated, and a new harness-base oneshot
(hyperhive-isolated-dns) rewrites resolv.conf to point at the bridge
dnsmasq. Inert in shared-netns mode (no marker), so the shared
container toplevel does the right thing in both modes.
The gateway IP is the address part of HIVE_NETWORK_SUBNET (the bridge IP
verbatim, honouring a non-.1 operator override), via a new validated
bridge_gateway_ip() helper with unit tests.
Unblocks defaulting isolation on.
The nixpkgs bump to clippy 0.1.95 / cargo 1.95.0 added + strengthened a
large batch of lints. CI denied ALL warnings (`-D warnings`) against the
`pedantic = warn` workspace lint, so the bump hard-failed `nix flake
check` workspace-wide with zero code changes — and would recur on every
future clippy bump.
Posture fix (the durable part): CI now runs
`-D warnings -A clippy::pedantic`, so the default/correctness/style lints
stay a hard gate while the "extra, opinionated" pedantic group is
advisory only (still `warn` for local `cargo clippy` via the workspace
lints table, just non-blocking in CI). `-A` rather than `-W` so the
group drop doesn't re-enable the specific pedantic lints the workspace
allows (e.g. `must_use_candidate`).
Also fixes the genuine DEFAULT/STYLE lints the bump surfaced across the
workspace (doc_lazy_continuation, collapsible_if, ptr_arg,
match_like_matches_macro, …) via `cargo clippy --fix` + manual stragglers
(`too_many_arguments` #[allow] on the host-config constructors), and
three tests that had rotted while the CI runner was offline (#1221):
- topology::top_level_agents_in_multi_root — hardcoded unsorted expected
- rebuild_queue::depends_on_evicted_dep_counts_as_resolved — needs
MAX_HISTORY_PER_KIND newer terminals to evict, not one
- coordinator::agent_paths doctest — illustrative pseudo-code, now `ignore`
Validated: clippy + formatting + cargo-test checks all pass.
Addresses mara's review: each credential type gets its own PrivRequest
variant, making the exact priv surface visible in the wire protocol.
No runtime filename dispatch — the operation name is the gate.
- WriteAgentForgeToken { agent_name, token } → state/forge-token
- WriteAgentMatrixToken { agent_name, token } → state/matrix-token
- priv_client: two typed fns (write_agent_forge_token, write_agent_matrix_token)
- forge.rs: split mint_and_persist_token into mint_and_persist_agent_token
(priv) + mint_and_persist_core_token (direct write); drop dead token_path fn
- matrix.rs: call write_agent_matrix_token directly
Addresses mara's security review: replace validate_state_filename (which
accepted any non-traversal filename) with a tight allowlist containing
only the two known credential filenames: forge-token and matrix-token.
Also addresses argus review feedback:
- drop issue tag from priv_proto.rs doc comment
- add comment explaining the path-detection heuristic in forge.rs
- add note about create_dir_all uid=0 edge case in write_agent_state_file
hive-c0re runs as the unprivileged hive-core user (privsep from #702)
and cannot write to agent-owned state directories. forge-token and
matrix-token writes were failing with EACCES on every startup sweep.
Add WriteAgentStateFile to PrivRequest: hive-priv (root) writes the
file 0600 and chowns it to the agent user so the agent can read it.
- hive-sh4re: add AGENT_STATE_ROOT constant + WriteAgentStateFile variant
- hive-priv: validate agent name + filename (no traversal), write via root
- priv_client: add write_agent_state_file helper
- forge: mint_and_persist_token routes agent paths through priv
- matrix: ensure_user_for routes matrix-token through priv
Closes#1257
Per argus review on PR #1247: move the ~50-line inline match arm into
its own async fn sync_gateway_nginx() -> Result<(String, String)>.
Match arm becomes a one-liner.
Also add a tracing::warn when the ActiveState query exits non-zero
(gateway container down) so the cause is visible in the log.
systemctl --machine=hive-gateway requires root (machine-bus transport
enters the container namespace). hive-c0re is unprivileged, so every
call to nginx_active_state() and gateway_systemctl() silently failed
with exit 1, causing a continuous 30s retry loop without ever
syncing nginx.
Fix:
- Move state-aware nginx logic into hive-priv ReloadGatewayNginx:
check ActiveState, then reload/reset-start/start accordingly.
hive-priv already runs as root and has machine-bus rights.
- Remove nginx_active_state() and gateway_systemctl() from
gateway_nginx.rs (they were always running unprivileged, always
failing silently).
- Make write(), reload_if_pending(), reload_gateway_nginx() async so
they can call the async priv_client without a blocking bridge.
- Update callers in agent_sockets::spawn_poll and meta::sync_agents
to await the now-async functions.
The priv_client::reload_gateway_nginx() call and PrivRequest::ReloadGatewayNginx
wire type already existed — the gateway_nginx module was just not using them.
forge_admin() spawned nixos-container run hive-forge directly from the
hive-core process. nixos-container run uses nsenter to enter the container
namespaces, which requires root. hive-core is unprivileged, so every call
failed with: nsenter: stat of /proc/<pid>/ns/user failed: Permission denied
Fix: add RunForgeAdmin { args } to PrivRequest. hive-priv (root) handles
it by spawning nixos-container run hive-forge -- runuser -u forgejo --
forgejo --work-path /var/lib/forgejo admin <args>. forge_admin() now calls
priv_client::run_forge_admin().
matrix: ensure_user_for hit M_USER_IN_USE then failed when the stored
password file was missing (state dirs wiped but homeserver kept accounts).
Previously required manual hivectl matrix reset-password <name>.
Fix: add auto_reset_password() — calls the admin API (PUT
/_synapse/admin/v2/users/@<name>:<server> with the hive admin token) to
set a new random password, then proceeds with login. Falls back to the
existing manual-recovery error if the admin token is unavailable.
Closes#1234
