Mara wanted the underlying plumbing gone too, not just the dashboard
display. Traced every consumer before cutting:
- certFingerprint (services.hyperhive.swarm.hives.<name>.certFingerprint):
removed the nix option entirely. Its only consumer was the dashboard
code removed in the previous commits.
- HYPERHIVE_PEERS: removed entirely — the env var itself, the whole
block that built it in hive-c0re/environment.nix, and its entry in
meta.rs's FORWARDED_VARS (which forwarded it into every agent
container). Turned out to have zero real consumers, not just one:
the docs claimed hive-agent::identity::peers() read it for qualified
agent labels, but no such function exists — identity.rs only
qualifies THIS agent's own label with HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN, nothing
peer-list-related. Grepped the whole hive-agent crate to confirm
before removing.
services.hyperhive.swarm.peerHives (the nix option HYPERHIVE_PEERS was
built from) is untouched — swarm-wireguard.nix reads it directly for
the wg-hive mesh, a real and unrelated consumer.
Verified: cargo build/clippy/test -p hive-c0re -p swarm-controller all
clean (needed nix develop -c per the usual -lsqlite3 gap), all touched
nix files pass nix-instantiate --parse, and a throwaway nixosSystem
eval confirms the wireguard mesh still configures a peer's
wireguardAddress into wg-hive correctly with certFingerprint gone.
`agents.conf` and `gateway.htpasswd` move from /var/lib/hyperhive/gateway
to /var/lib/hive-gateway/conf, alongside the `tls/` the gateway already
kept there.
nginx reads both as an unprivileged user. Under c0re's state dir it could
only reach them by traversing a directory systemd re-declares `0750
hive-core` on every c0re start — so nginx was given `SupplementaryGroups
= [ "hive-core" ]`, which also handed it read access to everything else
group-readable in that tree. The tokens are individually 0600, but the
broker sqlite carries no explicit mode: every message between every agent
was readable by the process whose job is parsing untrusted network input.
Moving the files removes the need and the exposure together. The group is
gone, and its absence is now commented as load-bearing so it doesn't come
back as a fix for a symptom it would recreate.
Also drops this module's `/var/lib/hyperhive` tmpfiles rule. It declared
`0755 root root` and could never win against `StateDirectoryMode`, and a
losing declaration still reads as a guarantee — that is what sent the
first diagnosis of the outage looking for who had changed the mode.
Ordering is unchanged and still the thing that makes a fresh boot work:
tmpfiles runs before services and seeds both files empty-but-valid, nginx
names them (an `include` of a missing file is fatal, not empty), and
content arrives when c0re writes and reloads — which it does on every
topology change, so a boot against the empty seed resolves itself.
Folds in the mode fix: `write` now sets 0644 on the tmp file before the
rename, because a rename carries the source's mode and discards the
destination's, and the tmpfiles rule that declares 0644 is
create-if-absent so it never re-applies.
The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container.
`nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the
`containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch
holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts,
its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`,
`networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv`
path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines.
The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by
necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge —
so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not
afford in the first place.
Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix
diff:
- The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it
with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which
it refuses to load at all.
- The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer
for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and
scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the
containment.
- The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing.
- `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter.
Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose
it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer;
it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit),
`service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the
MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as
"ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the
requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts
it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The
dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`.
Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the
container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe
because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is
no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access
control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't.
Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710
tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run
in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered
virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are
byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts
emptied.
One attrset describing every hive in the swarm including this one,
identical on every host, with hiveName selecting which entry is us.
"My peers" is derived (swarm.peerHives) rather than declared.
Every field in the old per-host peer list was intrinsic to the hive it
described, never to the pair -- so the list was a directory each host
kept its own copy of. Beyond the deduplication it removes a bug class:
two hosts could hold different endpoints for the same third hive with
nothing to detect the disagreement.
Drops the per-hive caCert. Trust inside a swarm derives from the swarm
root, which every hive chains to. What that genuinely removes is
trusting a hive whose root this swarm does not own -- a cross-swarm
problem that wants a mechanism of its own, not a field that happened to
work.
The matrix container's certificateFiles block goes with it and could
NOT be migrated: that list is read at build time and the swarm root is
a runtime file (its key must never enter the store), so there is no
build-time name to put there. caCert being a nix path was precisely
what made it the build-time distribution channel. Agents are unaffected
-- hive-tls folds the root into the hive trust bundle and the meta
renderer embeds that one file. Tracked separately.
Migration is an assertion plus warnings, not a rename: hives is peers
union {self}, and the set gains a member no existing config has written
down. A rename migrates a name and a default can re-root a meaning;
neither can conjure a new member. The warning explains, the self-entry
assertion stops the build.
Cross-hive trust was O(n²) hand-pinning: every hive had to name every
peer's CA. A swarm root makes it O(1) — trust the root once and every
present and future peer validates.
The root is generated by a new `swarm-ca` unit on a single-host swarm
and operator-provided otherwise; `swarm.ca.autoConfigure` picks between
them and derives its default from `swarm.peers` being empty, so "all on
one host" is read off the deployment rather than remembered. Both modes
produce the same artifacts in the same places, so splitting hosts later
is moving the service dirs, not switching code paths. The root key never
enters the nix store, and the root is never regenerated automatically —
replacing it invalidates every peer at once.
Each hive CA carries `nameConstraints` pinned to that hive's domain, so
a leaked hive CA can only mint names inside its own subdomain, enforced
by verifiers rather than by convention.
`ca.pem` was serving as both the issuer and the anchor consumers trust;
those are the same file only while it is self-signed. openssl will not
terminate a chain at a trusted cert that isn't self-signed (rustls and
Go will), so the promotion would have broken some consumers and not
others. `hive-tls-ca` now also writes `trust-bundle.pem` — the hive CA
plus whatever it is rooted at — and every anchor consumer reads that:
agents, the CI and forge containers, and the peer-config recipe. On a
hive with no swarm root the bundle is just that CA, so nothing consuming
it needs a mode to branch on.
`nix_logged` wrote its `build_logs` row with `node_id = None`, so a deploy's
eval/relock log was reachable from the agent+kind+time listing but not from
the queue node that ran it.
The comment justifying the `None` said both callers are "reached from outside
the queue as well as from inside it". That is no longer true: `verify_commit`
and `prepare_deploy` have exactly one caller each, and both sit under the
`MergeVerify` / `DeployApply` arms of `exec.rs`'s node dispatch, where the
`NodeId` is already in scope.
Threads `Option<u64>` from the dispatch down, mirroring `prebuild_toplevel`'s
existing `Some(id.get())` at exec.rs:241. Kept as `Option` rather than a bare
`u64` because `meta::prepare_deploy` / `meta::verify_commit` are public API and
a future non-queue caller has no node to name; the comment now says that
instead of the stale claim.
No behaviour change beyond the log row gaining its node link.
`QueueInner` was `{ sched, node_rt }`, where `node_rt` held exactly one
datum per node: the `build_logs` row id. It existed because a `hive_jobq`
node payload is immutable after insert while the log row is created when
the build starts — so the link could not ride the node.
Invert it: the log row names its node (`build_logs.node_id`, one migration
in the existing `schema_versions` framework). Same single-home property,
in the direction the type system allows.
`QueueInner` is now just the scheduler. That is the point: the queue holds
no per-node side map, so nothing has to be locked alongside the graph.
Deleted as a consequence, each surfaced by dead-code analysis after the
edit above rather than predicted:
- `NodeRuntime`, `node_rt`, `set_build_log_id`, and `build_log_id_of`
(which linear-scanned the map to match a wire `u64` against opaque
`NodeId`s). The lookup is an indexed query now.
- `struct Ctx`, entirely. It carried `coord` + `dag_id` + `node_id` into
the executors so the build-log callback could reach the queue; without
the callback, `coord`/`dag_id` were never read and `node_id` was already
on the `Claim` both executors receive.
- `QueueInner::node_running`, which existed only for `set_build_log_id`'s
"only while running" guard.
- The `Fn(i64)` callbacks on `prebuild_toplevel` / `swap_update` /
`priv_run_inner`, replaced by a `node_id: Option<u64>` passed down. The
id travels one way now instead of being registered back.
`meta.rs`'s `nix_logged` passes `None` deliberately: its callers reach it
from outside the queue as well as inside, and nothing reads the link for
them yet.
`id_for_node` takes `MAX(id)` rather than assuming uniqueness — a retried
node opens a second row and the panel wants the current attempt. The test
moved to where the behaviour lives and covers that, plus survival across
completion and non-collision with node-less rows.
Resources were derived from the node's kind: `templates::node` called
`NodeKind::resource_deps()`, which fanned out to `needs_build_slot` /
`needs_lease` / `needs_meta_window`. That made the requirement a property
of the *kind*, so a kind that happened to run under an ancestor already
holding the resource could get away with declaring nothing.
Three did. `Start`, `Stop` and `PostSwap` appear in none of the three
predicates, and that was only safe because one construction site fans
them out from inside a lease-holding `Reconcile` — a fact about today's
DAG shape, not about the nodes.
Each of the 41 construction sites now says what it holds. `Start` /
`Stop` / `PostSwap` declare the agent lease; per the contract that is a
re-entrant borrow, which a new test pins rather than argues.
`running_transients` reads the node's declared deps instead of
re-deriving from the kind. That closes the blank-pill gap: the pill went
blank during container start, stop and the post-swap tail because the
declaration was missing, not because the filter was wrong.
The deleted predicates carried the only written record of three design
decisions; each moved to the `Resource` variant it constrains rather than
dying with its function.
The OTEL resource attributes are baked into every agent's
managed-settings.json at evaluation time, but claude-settings.nix read
the names from the container's environment.variables - where they are
never set. meta.rs forwards them as runtime env only, so the reader hit
its "unknown" fallback and every agent shipped
service.name=hyperhive-agent,agent=<a>,hive=unknown,swarm=unknown
on every metric, while the same process's env held pr1ma/constellation.
Measured in this container's /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json.
The map from forwarded env var to agent option already existed for the
service URLs, with a doc comment naming this exact hazard: "setting only
one leaves the other on its default". The names were simply never added
to it. They are now, and the constant is renamed FORWARDED_VAR_OPTIONS
since it no longer holds only URLs.
hyperhive.hiveName / hyperhive.swarmName follow the forge.url shape:
nullOr str defaulting to null, where null means the hive did not name
itself and "unknown" is an honest label rather than a guess baked at
eval time.
Also fixes, unasked: CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL_SESSION_NAME_PREFIX reads the
same value, so remote-control sessions were named "unknown-<agent>".
Gated with nix, not just cargo - the blast radius here is module eval,
which fmt/clippy/test cannot see:
agent-base assertions -> [] (no failures)
extendModules with both options -> hive=pr1ma,swarm=constellation
Note the value is baked, so every agent needs a rebuild before the new
label appears on its metrics.
With the agent option nullable, a missing `HIVE_FORGE_URL` would no
longer fail anything — it would deploy a whole fleet of agents that
silently never log into the forge. The forge is not optional on a
running hive, so the hive asserts that itself rather than leaning on a
module that legitimately allows "no forge" when evaluated standalone.
`sync_agents` checks it before writing anything. That is the moment the
hive commits to a flake, and it keeps `render_flake` a pure string
operation: the renderer is exercised directly by a dozen tests, so
making *it* env-dependent would force each of them to either set a
process-wide var — the parallel-test race this module already avoids —
or fail for reasons unrelated to what they assert.
`require_service_urls` is pure over the already-collected pairs, so its
two tests need no process env at all.
Refs #2860
Step 1 of removing the localhost fallbacks: make the renderer emit the
value it already knows, so the option stops being a second, disagreeing
source of truth.
These options existed but nothing ever set them, so every agent fell
back to their localhost:<port> defaults while the real value reached
the container only as an env var. The two are consumed at different
times — the option is baked into scripts at build time (tea-login's
FORGE_URL), the env var is read at runtime — so which answer a given
code path gets depends on which one it happens to read.
Emitting them here follows the shape the otel block already uses: host
state becomes build-time agent module config. It is the precondition
for deleting the defaults, which is the actual fix: a loopback address
is only correct when the callee shares the caller's netns, and the
forge and homeserver are moving to swarm level, possibly onto other
hosts.
An absent var emits nothing rather than a guess. Once the defaults are
gone that surfaces as an eval failure, which is the point — better a
build that stops than an agent quietly talking to a port on the wrong
machine.
The emit is a pure helper rather than an inline loop so it can be
tested without process env. The first version of the test set env vars
and rendered the whole flake; it failed because the parallel runner
raced it against the existing env-mutating test, not because of any
defect. Testing the pure function has no such hazard, and the
render-level variant is kept #[ignore]d with that reason recorded.
mara on PR #2769: "make the default null instead of special casing """.
`claude_code_path` was a `String` whose empty value meant "no host-level
pin". That is a sentinel doing an `Option`'s job — the same shape argus
and mara already rejected on #2755's weights, and the same
empty-field cruft mara called out on #2756.
So it is `Option<String>` end to end:
- host module: `claudeCodePath` evaluates to `null` when
`claudeCodePackage` is unset, so `serve.json` carries JSON `null`
rather than `""`.
- `Coordinator` + `HiveEnv`: `Option<String>`, defaulting to `None`.
- `render_flake`/`render_flake_with_lookup`: `Option<&str>`, and the
emission is an `if let Some(path)` instead of an `is_empty()` guard.
- agent module: `hyperhive.claudeCodePath` is `nullOr str`, default
`null`.
Behaviour is unchanged in both directions; only the way "unset" is
spelled moves. The `builtins.hasContext` assertion still guards the
pinned case (short-circuited by the null check, so an unpinned hive
never evaluates it).
16/16 `meta::` tests, clippy clean, `nix fmt` no-op, `nix build .#docs`
green.
Agents run whatever `claude-code` the meta flake's `nixpkgs` resolves
to, and that is normally a release channel. This one package moves fast
enough that stable trails unstable by weeks — 26.05 is on 2.1.187 while
unstable carries 2.1.220 — and an agent cannot fix it for itself: it
only ever sees the single nixpkgs hive-c0re injects, so an `agent.nix`
has no other tree to reach for.
New host option `services.hyperhive.c0re.claudeCodePackage` takes the
package directly and rides the existing `hyperhiveDocs` threading path —
serveConfigJson -> HiveEnv -> render_flake — to reach each agent as
`hyperhive.claudeCodePath`. Null (the default) is today's behaviour.
What travels is the store *path*, as a plain string literal, not a flake
input: containers share the host's `/nix/store`, so the build is already
reachable inside them with its whole closure and has nothing to travel.
An input would be worse than useless — a `path:/nix/store/<pkg>` input
is re-copied as a reference-less `-source`, which strips exactly the
closure the binary needs.
The catch is that a path written into a generated flake is text, so
nothing in the container's closure keeps the binary alive. The host does
that instead, and gets it for free: the package is interpolated into
`/etc/hyperhive/serve.json`, `builtins.toJSON` preserves string context,
so the /etc entry references it and the system closure gc-roots it for
as long as that generation is the one the agents were rendered from. An
assertion pins that property, because losing the context is invisible at
eval and at deploy — it would surface only as every agent failing to
spawn `claude` whenever the next gc ran.
Container side wraps the path in a symlink farm rather than putting it
on PATH directly: `systemd.services.<name>.path` and
`environment.systemPackages` both coerce a store-path *string* through
`lib.toDerivation`, i.e. `builtins.storePath`, which pure evaluation
rejects. Interpolating the path into a builder is just text and
evaluates anywhere. `claude-code` drops out of systemPackages when a
pin is set, so there is exactly one claude in the container.
Refs #2693
The hive applies one `agentCpuQuota` / `agentMemoryMax` to every
container. That's the right default and the wrong ceiling: a build-heavy
agent needs headroom the other twelve don't, and raising the hive-wide
value to suit it hands that headroom to everyone.
Adds a per-agent override, persisted host-side and resolved per-field
against the hive defaults.
Follows the existing `meta/*.json` pattern (`capabilities.json`,
`tool-groups.json`): a host-side map read by `hive-c0re`, staged and
committed in the meta repo so every change lands in the audit trail.
```json
{ "sock": { "cpu_quota": "400%", "memory_max": "8G" } }
```
Fallback is **per field**, not per agent: an entry with only
`memory_max` leaves that agent on the hive-wide CPU quota. Absent file,
absent agent and absent field all resolve to the hive default, so the
feature is inert until someone opts an agent in.
Unlike the other meta files this one is **not** injected into the
container — a limit is something done *to* an agent, not something it
reads about itself.
```
hivectl agents set-limits sock --cpu-quota 400% --memory-max 8G
hivectl agents set-limits sock --reset
```
Values are validated before they're persisted: they go into a systemd
drop-in verbatim, and a typo there makes the unit fail to *start* —
turning a fat-fingered quota into a container that won't come back.
The command is declarative: each call replaces the agent's whole entry.
That makes a forgotten flag a silent revert, so a bare `set-limits
<name>` is rejected at the clap layer and clearing needs an explicit
`--reset`.
`ContainerView` gains `cpu_quota` / `memory_max`, both always populated:
there's no "unset" state to render, only "same as everyone else". They
reflect what the drop-in *says* — what the next start will enforce — not
a live cgroup reading.
The write goes through `meta::commit_resource_limits` rather than the
bare setter, so it's staged and committed under `META_LOCK`. Writing
without committing would leave the meta working tree dirty for the next
`prepare_deploy` to trip over.
Docs: `persistence.md` (the new meta file, and why it isn't injected),
`tools/hivectl.md` (the prose guide), `tools/hivectl-cli.md`
(regenerated clap dump).
Closes: internal/requests issue 25
The two-phase approval deploy keeps a bumped `flake.lock` staged
uncommitted for the whole container build, so no other meta mutation may
land inside that span — until now enforced by a process-global
`meta::exclusive()` mutex held inside each executor fn.
A `MutexGuard` cannot outlive the fn that takes it, which is what blocks
decomposing the opaque `ApprovalDeploy` node into scheduler-visible
sub-nodes: the window has to span them. Replace the mutex with
`Resource::MetaWindow`, a global capacity-1 queue resource declared by
every meta-mutating node kind (`NodeKind::needs_meta_window`). Resources
are held by a subtree root across its whole subtree, so a later increment
can hang the deploy's phases under one window-holding parent.
Same global serialisation as before, and the scheduler now blocks a node
from being claimed rather than parking a worker on a mutex.
Split the rebuild's meta preamble out of `Prebuild` into a new `MetaSync`
node. `Prebuild` must NOT hold the window: the old mutex was deliberately
scoped to drop before the multi-minute toplevel build, which only reads
the store, and a cap-1 global held across it would serialise every
agent's rebuild behind every other's. `MetaSync` is a sibling root that
`Prebuild` deps `AfterOk` on — not its parent, since a parent's resource
covers its whole subtree and would reintroduce exactly that problem.
Queue tests: shape assertions gain the extra node, which is the point of
the change (phases become nodes). The concurrency invariants are intact
but observed one step later — the `MetaSync` heads take turns on the
window, exactly as the runtime mutex made them, so those tests now
complete the heads before asserting that the prebuilds overlap.
Per operator review (#2547): remove the never-reached branch. render_flake
read HIVE_FORGE_URL inline with an unwrap_or_else(localhost:3000) fallback
that can't be hit — the daemon always sets HIVE_FORGE_URL (environment.nix)
— and the localhost URL wouldn't match the domain-scoped credential helper
anyway. Thread forge_base as an explicit param instead: the caller
sync_agents passes forge::forge_http_base(), tests pass it explicitly. This
removes the dead branch AND the hidden env-read, and drops the racy env
set_var from the forge-url test. render_flake is pure/param-driven again.
The persistent agent-<n> input url in the meta flake is now the forge
config repo, but the deploy + manual-rebuild re-lock must not follow it:
prepare_deploy and lock_update_for_rebuild override the input back to the
local applied mirror (git+file://<applied_dir>, main head) via
--override-input, which writes the applied rev into flake.lock.
This keeps the forge as the declared, reviewable source while:
- surviving forge unreachability (rebuilds fire on crash-restart and meta
bumps too, not just config PRs -- coupling every rebuild to forge would
be a regression),
- deploying exactly the reviewed head applied/<n>/main was fast-forwarded
to (no TOCTOU on a newer forge head merging mid-deploy),
- reusing verify_commit's local-override pattern so verify and deploy eval
the same source.
New applied_override_url helper + unit test.
- deploy-window gate (meta::exclusive) + path-limited meta commits:
a perm/lock/topology commit can no longer sweep an ApprovalDeploy's
staged flake.lock and neuter abort_deploy (regression test included)
- cancel surfaces now buffer terminal roll-ups the scheduler drains,
so a queued approval DAG cancelled by the operator resolves its
approval instead of dangling, and cancelled power ops revert their
wanted flip to the observed state
- hivectl restart / restart-all ride the queue (lease serialization,
transient guard) and restart sets wanted=Up like the old kill+start
- exactly one Rebuilt event per rebuild DAG, emitted at terminal
- StopForUpdate pre-seeds a missing agent_power row from the pre-stop
observation so a rebuild can't strand an unknown agent offline
- history trim keeps terminal fan-out parents with live children
- audit_log back on db::open; swarm.js badge for reconcile DAGs
CLAUDE_CODE_OTEL_DIAG_STDERR was always set when OTEL is enabled, making
OTEL SDK errors (e.g. 404 from a misconfigured collector endpoint) appear
in every agent's stderr unconditionally. Move it behind a new opt-in flag.
Changes:
- nix/modules/hive-c0re.nix: add services.hyperhive.otel.debug (bool,
default false); wire to HYPERHIVE_OTEL_DEBUG env on hive-c0re unit.
- hive-c0re/src/meta.rs: add debug field to OtelConfig; read
HYPERHIVE_OTEL_DEBUG; emit hyperhive.otel.debug = true when set.
- nix/templates/harness-base.nix: add hyperhive.otel.debug internal
option; move CLAUDE_CODE_OTEL_DIAG_STDERR out of otelSettingsEnv into
a debug-gated lib.optionalAttrs block.
Default behaviour: OTEL exports silently (no stderr noise). Operators
troubleshooting collector connectivity set services.hyperhive.otel.debug
= true to re-enable the diagnostic output.
Add swarm.peers.<domain>.caCert (path to a peer hive's root CA PEM),
trusted everywhere the hive's own internal CA is — so a self-signed
peer hive can federate (matrix) and any in-hive consumer validates its
certs.
Mechanism (reuses the existing hive-CA embedding): the meta-flake
renderer embeds a LIST of CA files next to each agent's flake —
hive-ca.pem (the hive's own self-signed CA, when active) plus each peer
caCert as peer-ca-<N>.pem — and emits them all in
security.pki.certificateFiles, so every agent trusts them at build
time. The matrix container trusts the same peer CAs for federation TLS.
Nothing is installed in the host trust store; the certs live in the nix
store (no mutable host file).
- meta.rs: embedded_ca_files() = hive CA + peer CAs (from new
HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS env); ca_embed_state() tracks the list (content +
add/remove); sync_agents materialises + stages the list; render emits
the multi-entry certificateFiles. Tests cover hive-only / hive+peers
/ peers-only / none.
- hive-c0re.nix: HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS service env (colon-joined caCerts);
caCert / certFingerprint option docs updated to the hive-wide scope.
- hive-matrix.nix + docs/swarm.md: scope + comment updates.
certFingerprint stays the c0re-only leaf-pin path.
Wire agents to trust the gateway's self-signed leaf at build time. When
the gateway runs self-signed TLS, hive-tls sets HIVE_TLS_CA_PATH in
hive-c0re's service env pointing at the host hive CA cert. The meta flake
renderer reads it and, when present, writes the public CA cert next to
flake.nix as hive-ca.pem and emits security.pki.certificateFiles so every
agent's system trust store includes the hive CA.
Build-time embedding (rather than a runtime bind-mount + bundle service)
keeps trust robust: the CA travels with the flake source, lands in the
standard NixOS trust store, and needs no per-process SSL_CERT_FILE
plumbing. Only the public CA certificate is embedded; the CA private key
never leaves the host. The cert is re-embedded and re-committed on CA
rotation even when the flake is otherwise byte-identical; when self-signed
TLS is off the embedded cert is dropped so the flake stays buildable.
Covers OpenSSL-based tools (git, curl) directly. A follow-up switches the
hive-forge reqwest client to native roots so it picks up the same store.
The forwarded host env vars (HIVE_FORGE_URL, HIVE_FORGE_PUBLIC_URL,
HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN, ...) were emitted only into the harness
service's own unit environment. Under network isolation that left the
bash-task runner, the matrix daemon, tea-login and interactive shells
without HIVE_FORGE_URL, so `hive-forge` and friends fell back to the
loopback default (localhost:3000) — unreachable from a private netns,
where the in-cluster gateway URL (forge.<domain>) is the only path.
Emit the forwarded set into systemd.globalEnvironment too, which every
unit + shell in the container inherits, so all in-container surfaces
see the same forge/matrix endpoints. The existing harness-service
forward is kept (harmless redundancy). Shared netns is unaffected (the
localhost default still works there).
Adds a regression test asserting the forwarded vars land inside the
globalEnvironment block, and the generated flake parses.
The nixpkgs bump to clippy 0.1.95 / cargo 1.95.0 added + strengthened a
large batch of lints. CI denied ALL warnings (`-D warnings`) against the
`pedantic = warn` workspace lint, so the bump hard-failed `nix flake
check` workspace-wide with zero code changes — and would recur on every
future clippy bump.
Posture fix (the durable part): CI now runs
`-D warnings -A clippy::pedantic`, so the default/correctness/style lints
stay a hard gate while the "extra, opinionated" pedantic group is
advisory only (still `warn` for local `cargo clippy` via the workspace
lints table, just non-blocking in CI). `-A` rather than `-W` so the
group drop doesn't re-enable the specific pedantic lints the workspace
allows (e.g. `must_use_candidate`).
Also fixes the genuine DEFAULT/STYLE lints the bump surfaced across the
workspace (doc_lazy_continuation, collapsible_if, ptr_arg,
match_like_matches_macro, …) via `cargo clippy --fix` + manual stragglers
(`too_many_arguments` #[allow] on the host-config constructors), and
three tests that had rotted while the CI runner was offline (#1221):
- topology::top_level_agents_in_multi_root — hardcoded unsorted expected
- rebuild_queue::depends_on_evicted_dep_counts_as_resolved — needs
MAX_HISTORY_PER_KIND newer terminals to evict, not one
- coordinator::agent_paths doctest — illustrative pseudo-code, now `ignore`
Validated: clippy + formatting + cargo-test checks all pass.
