New docs/swarm/ui.md (split-page shape, per the docs rule), linked from
the swarm README and added to the gateway's vhost map.
Leads with the step that separates 'protected' from 'locked out':
swarmctl user add <you> --group operators. auth_request asks whether
there is a session; the access_control rule is what makes it mean
operator, and an account created before the rule existed has no groups.
Also records the four wiring sites a swarm service name needs, with the
certificate one called out - serviceDomains is both the sub-CA's
nameConstraints set and the leaf's SANs, and the apex is a sibling of
the other three rather than a parent, so nothing issues for it
implicitly.
`agents.conf` and `gateway.htpasswd` move from /var/lib/hyperhive/gateway
to /var/lib/hive-gateway/conf, alongside the `tls/` the gateway already
kept there.
nginx reads both as an unprivileged user. Under c0re's state dir it could
only reach them by traversing a directory systemd re-declares `0750
hive-core` on every c0re start — so nginx was given `SupplementaryGroups
= [ "hive-core" ]`, which also handed it read access to everything else
group-readable in that tree. The tokens are individually 0600, but the
broker sqlite carries no explicit mode: every message between every agent
was readable by the process whose job is parsing untrusted network input.
Moving the files removes the need and the exposure together. The group is
gone, and its absence is now commented as load-bearing so it doesn't come
back as a fix for a symptom it would recreate.
Also drops this module's `/var/lib/hyperhive` tmpfiles rule. It declared
`0755 root root` and could never win against `StateDirectoryMode`, and a
losing declaration still reads as a guarantee — that is what sent the
first diagnosis of the outage looking for who had changed the mode.
Ordering is unchanged and still the thing that makes a fresh boot work:
tmpfiles runs before services and seeds both files empty-but-valid, nginx
names them (an `include` of a missing file is fatal, not empty), and
content arrives when c0re writes and reloads — which it does on every
topology change, so a boot against the empty seed resolves itself.
Folds in the mode fix: `write` now sets 0644 on the tmp file before the
rename, because a rename carries the source's mode and discards the
destination's, and the tmpfiles rule that declares 0644 is
create-if-absent so it never re-applies.
Two claims this branch falsified and left standing, both caught in
review:
`vhosts.nix`'s `errorPages` param comment enumerated the set
(`{ notFound, unreachable, unauthorized }`) and adding a fourth member
made the enumeration wrong at the point a reader consults it.
`gateway.md` said extending custom error pages beyond the per-agent
routes was "a separate follow-up" — while this branch is that follow-up,
so the doc contradicted the code sitting next to it.
Rewrites the scope rule as the criterion rather than a list, since a
list is what went stale: a route earns a page when the default status
would point at the wrong component. That covers the per-agent routes and
the sso vhost, and explains why forge/matrix/fluffychat still don't
qualify — their upstreams being down means what the code says.
`swarm/sso.md` described the empty user store as a resting state — a
provider that is reachable but has nobody in it yet. It isn't. Authelia
validates the store at startup and treats zero users as fatal:
error reading the authentication database: could not validate the
schema: users: non zero value required
so it exits 1, systemd restarts it, and an enabled-but-unbootstrapped
swarm presents as a crash-looping container behind a vhost that is
working correctly. The observed symptom is `502 Bad Gateway`, which
reads as a proxy fault and is not one.
Says so, gives the error text to grep for, and marks the `swarmctl user
add` step as required to finish the install rather than as a first-login
convenience. `gateway.md` gains the same warning next to the vhost,
because that is where someone lands when the 502 is what they can see.
The reason the store ships empty is unchanged and still right: seeding
an account means a credential in a config file. What was wrong was
calling the resulting state harmless.
`DNS:forge.<domain>` and `DNS:matrix.<domain>` sat beside
`DNS:*.<domain>`, which already covers them — a wildcard covers exactly
one label and those are one label. Naming them read as policy, and that
is why they outlived the thing they described: a configured service name
no longer has to be under this hive's domain, and when it isn't, this is
the one list it cannot join.
Proved by execution rather than eval, because the SAN list is a printf
argument filled in at runtime and eval can only show the template — the
lesson from the gateway outage. openssl-verified against a CA carrying
the real name constraint: old and new leaves agree on every name the hive
serves, the wildcard genuinely stops at one label, and a sibling name
added to this leaf fails.
That last case came back stronger than expected: a nameConstraints
violation invalidates the certificate, not the offending SAN, so one
foreign name here would break the leaf for the dashboard and every other
vhost sharing it. The comment says so now, and gateway.md's cert-shape
paragraph no longer describes SANs that are gone.
The vhost half of this change is only useful with an account behind it,
and the provider is generated with an empty user set on purpose. Document
the `swarmctl user add` step rather than automating it: bootstrapping an
IdP non-interactively means a secret arriving from a file, an env var or a
nix expression, all worse than one command typed once.
The gateway and network pages gain the rows they would otherwise be
missing — vhost map, local-dev hosts entry, and the resolver's
authoritative-name list.
Per review: docs represent current state. Every "used to" / "no longer"
clause this branch introduced is gone — including the History section in
network.md, which was a whole subsection about a sync mechanism that
doesn't exist.
Where the removed clause was carrying a real constraint, the constraint
stays and is stated in the present tense instead of as a delta: nothing
narrows what the gateway's nginx can reach except the directory
permissions in front of a socket, and nothing bounds `ReloadGatewayNginx`
except the hard-coded unit name. Those read as rules now rather than as
the story of how they came to be rules.
The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container.
`nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the
`containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch
holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts,
its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`,
`networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv`
path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines.
The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by
necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge —
so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not
afford in the first place.
Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix
diff:
- The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it
with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which
it refuses to load at all.
- The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer
for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and
scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the
containment.
- The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing.
- `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter.
Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose
it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer;
it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit),
`service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the
MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as
"ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the
requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts
it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The
dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`.
Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the
container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe
because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is
no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access
control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't.
Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710
tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run
in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered
virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are
byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts
emptied.
The three moves above falsify prose in five files, and none of it is
caught by a gate: clippy, cargo test and nix flake check read exactly
zero markdown.
Corrected where a doc stated a DEFAULT or enumerated the vhosts --
gateway (ACME requirements + the header table + the two Forgejo
reachability lines), matrix (gatewayHost, firewall rationale, agent
reachability), network (container table + the HTTP resolution bullet),
turn-loop config, dashboard.
Two mentions are deliberately left alone. `docs/tools/hivectl.md` says
the URL is read from the daemon "instead of assuming forge.<domain>" --
that sentence is about not assuming a shape and stays true. And
matrix.md's breaking-change note describes what `serverName` USED to
default to; it is history, correctly labelled, and rewriting it would
erase the record of an earlier migration.
The ACME line gained a requirement rather than a rename: with the
service names under the swarm domain, every one of those names has to
resolve to this host, not just the hive's own.
One attrset describing every hive in the swarm including this one,
identical on every host, with hiveName selecting which entry is us.
"My peers" is derived (swarm.peerHives) rather than declared.
Every field in the old per-host peer list was intrinsic to the hive it
described, never to the pair -- so the list was a directory each host
kept its own copy of. Beyond the deduplication it removes a bug class:
two hosts could hold different endpoints for the same third hive with
nothing to detect the disagreement.
Drops the per-hive caCert. Trust inside a swarm derives from the swarm
root, which every hive chains to. What that genuinely removes is
trusting a hive whose root this swarm does not own -- a cross-swarm
problem that wants a mechanism of its own, not a field that happened to
work.
The matrix container's certificateFiles block goes with it and could
NOT be migrated: that list is read at build time and the swarm root is
a runtime file (its key must never enter the store), so there is no
build-time name to put there. caCert being a nix path was precisely
what made it the build-time distribution channel. Agents are unaffected
-- hive-tls folds the root into the hive trust bundle and the meta
renderer embeds that one file. Tracked separately.
Migration is an assertion plus warnings, not a rename: hives is peers
union {self}, and the set gains a member no existing config has written
down. A rename migrates a name and a default can re-root a meaning;
neither can conjure a new member. The warning explains, the self-entry
assertion stops the build.
Second split under docs/swarm/, following the shape docs/turn-loop/ and
docs/web-ui/ already use.
The README keeps the `## Swarm CA` heading rather than deleting it: an
existing cross-reference targets that anchor, and a heading is the
cheapest thing to preserve. It now carries the one-paragraph summary and
a pointer, so a reader who lands on the anchor still arrives somewhere
that answers the question.
The CA page also absorbs three things that were true but undocumented —
why the trust bundle rather than the bare intermediate (openssl will not
terminate a chain at a non-self-signed anchor without -partial_chain),
that autoConfigure derives from enableAllLocalDefaults, and that the
name constraint excludes both IP families because a permitted-DNS-only
constraint says nothing about IP SANs.
`docs/swarm.md` becomes `docs/swarm/README.md` and the shared-services
material moves to `docs/swarm/services.md`, following the shape
`docs/turn-loop/` and `docs/web-ui/` already use. The README keeps a
pointer so the reading path is unbroken.
Every referrer moved with it — five docs pages, two option descriptions
in swarm.nix, and CLAUDE.md's reading path. A pointer to a file that
moved is worse than one to a file that was deleted: the content still
exists, so the reader concludes the note is wrong rather than the path.
Cross-hive trust was O(n²) hand-pinning: every hive had to name every
peer's CA. A swarm root makes it O(1) — trust the root once and every
present and future peer validates.
The root is generated by a new `swarm-ca` unit on a single-host swarm
and operator-provided otherwise; `swarm.ca.autoConfigure` picks between
them and derives its default from `swarm.peers` being empty, so "all on
one host" is read off the deployment rather than remembered. Both modes
produce the same artifacts in the same places, so splitting hosts later
is moving the service dirs, not switching code paths. The root key never
enters the nix store, and the root is never regenerated automatically —
replacing it invalidates every peer at once.
Each hive CA carries `nameConstraints` pinned to that hive's domain, so
a leaked hive CA can only mint names inside its own subdomain, enforced
by verifiers rather than by convention.
`ca.pem` was serving as both the issuer and the anchor consumers trust;
those are the same file only while it is self-signed. openssl will not
terminate a chain at a trusted cert that isn't self-signed (rustls and
Go will), so the promotion would have broken some consumers and not
others. `hive-tls-ca` now also writes `trust-bundle.pem` — the hive CA
plus whatever it is rooted at — and every anchor consumer reads that:
agents, the CI and forge containers, and the peer-config recipe. On a
hive with no swarm root the bundle is just that CA, so nothing consuming
it needs a mode to branch on.
It was written into gateway.md, which only owns half the story: that
doc describes the web.sock path, and before this branch it never
mentioned agent.sock at all. Putting a rule shared by hive-c0re, the
harness and nginx inside the gateway walkthrough means someone asking
"why can't c0re dial agent.sock" has no reason to look there.
boundary.md already covers who may touch what across the trust boundary
-- including the sibling case of hive-priv's socket getting its mode
from the unit rather than the process -- so the rule lives there now,
with the three principals as a table. gateway.md keeps a two-line note
about the one fact it needs (nginx traverses via o=--x) and links out.
Both the gateway doc and the tmpfiles comment said "a directory without
the sticky bit lets any user unlink files in it". True of the old 0777,
but it names the wrong lever: write permission on a directory is what
confers the right to unlink its entries, and the sticky bit is only a
restraint on that -- it was never set here, so it is not what 0751
changes. Dropping o=w removes the permission outright.
The fix is unchanged; this is so a future reader doesn't go looking for
a sticky bit that was never there. Caught in review by argus.
/run/hive-agent/<name> was 0777 root root in steady state, not just during
first spawn. A directory without the sticky bit lets any user unlink files
in it, and the gateway container has all of /run/hive-agent bind-mounted
in, so anything that could reach the path could delete an agent's
agent.sock, bind its own, and receive that agent's todos from hive-c0re.
Two mechanisms were writing the dir and undoing each other: the tmpfiles.d
entry wrote 0777 root root, then hive-c0re round-tripped through hive-priv's
ChownSocketDir to narrow it. `d` re-asserts mode and owner on every apply
and the file is regenerated on any agent's spawn or destroy, so every such
event reset every agent's dir back to world-writable.
SyncAgentTmpfiles now carries each agent's container uid/gid and the entry
declares the answer: 0751 <uid> <gid>. Three principals need the dir and no
two share a group -- the harness binds its sockets (owner rwx), hive-c0re
dials agent.sock and the gateway's nginx dials web.sock (both only need
traverse, and both sockets are already 0666).
Deletes ChownSocketDir and ChmodSocketDir, both priv_client wrappers, the
either/or in host_config with its two swallowed warn!s, and the now-dead
socket_dir_path -- two verbs off the privileged helper's surface and one
round-trip off every agent spawn.
Also makes the two tmpfiles rules for /run/hive-agent itself agree: the
gateway module said hive-core, the generated file said root, and which won
depended on the order systemd read them in.
The TCP fallback was removed from gateway_nginx.rs in the previous
commit. Update docs/gateway.md to match:
- Step 4: remove 'TCP loopback for agents not yet rebuilt' — always UDS now
- Remove the 'TCP loopback fallback' subsection entirely
- Drop the redundant 'including the root/bootstrap container' /
'sub-agents + root' enumerations in the port-range + state-dir
uniformity statements — 'every agent' / 'all agents' is enough (and
calling out '+ root' reintroduces the special-case framing).
- Stop describing the root agent's privileged (manager-flavour) socket
as a current thing (it's being removed): drop the conventions.md
capability clause, the network.md per-agent-privileged-socket list
entry, and the persistence.md /run/hyperhive/manager/mcp.sock
runtime-dir bullet.
Port-range, network-isolation, state-dir, web-UI-port, priv allowlist,
and rebuild-source mentions now refer to the root/bootstrap container
rather than 'the manager' — no structural manager exists (root-ness is
topological). Real artifact names (the manager.nix template toplevel,
/run/hyperhive/manager/mcp.sock) are left as-is.
The dashboard vhost split static-vs-backend on the request Accept
header (map $http_accept $dashboard_spa_target), so the same URL
behaved differently by content-type — e.g. /api/state fetched with
Accept: text/html wrongly returned index.html.
Now that all hive-c0re routes live under /api/ plus the single
/webhook/knowledge endpoint, route by path instead: /api/ and
/webhook/ proxy to c0re (SSE settings on /api/), everything else
serves the dist with try_files $uri /index.html. Drops the
dashboard Accept-header map and the @c0re named location.
Updates docs/gateway.md accordingly.
nginx proxied `<hive>/` straight to hive-c0re:7000, and hive-c0re served the
dashboard dist itself via `tower_http::ServeDir` (from `HIVE_STATIC_DIR` baked
into its service env). So a frontend-only change rebuilt the hive-c0re unit and
restarted the core daemon — every operator session dropped its SSE stream for a
pure CSS/JS change.
The gateway nginx now static-serves the dashboard dist directly; hive-c0re's
dashboard router is API-only. The split uses the Accept-header SPA fallback (the
same `map $http_accept` pattern the matrix/agent vhosts already use), so no
backend prefix has to be enumerated: a browser navigation (Accept: text/html)
whose path is not an on-disk asset gets the SPA index.html; everything else
(every /api route, the bare action/mutation routes, the two SSE streams, the
knowledge webhook — all Accept != text/html) falls through `try_files` to the
`@c0re` named location and is reverse-proxied to hive-c0re. A new c0re route
needs no gateway change.
- hive-c0re.nix: expose the themed dist as a new internal read-only option
`services.hyperhive.c0re.servedFrontend`; drop `HIVE_STATIC_DIR` from the
service env (the router no longer serves files).
- hive-gateway.nix: read that option in host-module scope (dashboardDist),
static-serve `dashboard/` with the Accept-header `try_files ... @c0re` split;
`@c0re` carries `proxy_buffering off` + a 1d read timeout for the SSE streams
and a duplicated auth_basic block (named locations do not inherit it). The
dashboard map is unconditional; the matrix map stays gated on the matrix GUI.
- dashboard.rs: drop the ServeDir fallback + the HIVE_STATIC_DIR resolution; the
router 404s unmatched paths (the gateway only proxies non-static requests).
- hive-c0re/Cargo.toml: drop the now-unused tower-http dependency.
- docs/gateway.md: document the dashboard static split + the `@c0re` fall-through.
The store path is reachable inside the gateway nspawn container (shared
/nix/store), mirroring how HIVE_AGENT_FRONTEND_DIR already exposes the per-agent
UIs. The gateway and c0re changes must land together (atomic cutover) or the
dashboard 404s — this needs a watched gateway + c0re rebuild.
Make self-signed TLS the gateway's default whenever no external TLS source
is configured, and deprecate the explicit selfSignedTls toggle. Self-signed
is now derived as `tls.certDir == null && !tls.acme.enable`, so an operator
selects a TLS mode by setting tls.certDir or tls.acme — or neither, for the
self-signed default. There is no http-only mode: matrix discovery hardcodes
https, so the gateway always terminates TLS.
The selfSignedTls option is kept as a deprecated no-op (warns when set to
false) so existing configs still eval. The two selfSignedTls mutual-
exclusion assertions and the HSTS-requires-TLS assertion are dropped — they
are impossible or vacuous now that self-signed is the floor. The hive-tls
module and the forge ROOT_URL scheme consume the derived value: the gateway
always terminates TLS, so behind the gateway the forge is always advertised
over https.
Updates docs/gateway.md (TLS-modes table, self-signed section, the removed
http-only section, firewall + discovery notes). Eval-proven: default →
self-signed (hive CA active, https ROOT_URL); tls.certDir → CA inactive;
selfSignedTls=false → deprecation warning fires.
Replace the gateway's bare in-container self-signed leaf with a leaf
signed by a host-held hive CA. A bare self-signed leaf is its own trust
anchor, so every regeneration is a fresh anchor every consumer would have
to re-trust, and a runtime-generated in-container leaf cannot be wired
into an agent's build-time trust store at all. A stable CA fixes both: a
single anchor that agents and federation peers trust once, surviving leaf
rotation.
New hive-tls module: a host oneshot generates a long-lived CA (default
~20y) under services.hyperhive.tls.stateDir and signs a gateway leaf
(default ~10y, SAN covering the bare domain, forge., matrix. and the
wildcard). It is ordered before the gateway container so the leaf exists
when nginx starts. Active only when the gateway uses self-signed TLS
(default) and a domain is set; inert under operator-cert or ACME modes.
Gateway: bind-mount the host CA dir read-only at /run/hive-ca; the
existing in-container cert unit now imports the host leaf into nginx's
state dir (copy as root, key left root:nginx 0640 for the pre-start
config test) instead of generating one. Cert/key paths nginx serves are
unchanged.
Foundational step toward agent + federation trust of self-signed hives;
no behaviour change for agents yet (they still reach the forge over plain
http on port 80). Eval-proven across self-signed, certDir and the inert
default paths.
The "hive-forge container shape" section described the container
isolation model but omitted the port and firewall knobs that operators
need when exposing forge externally or overriding the Forgejo ROOT_URL.
Add two subsections:
"Network and port configuration" — covers httpPort (default 3000),
sshPort (default 2222), and openFirewall (default false, was previously
true — breaking change note included). Explains the shared-netns
rationale for why openFirewall is safe to leave off for agent use but
must be set for browser/external-git-client access. Clarifies that
forge.behindGateway obviates forge.openFirewall for HTTP reach.
"rootUrl override" — documents forge.rootUrl (default null) with the
auto-derivation table (behindGateway ? http://domain/ : http://domain:port/)
and explains when to override (TLS, https:// clone URLs, bespoke shapes).
Notes the auto-derivation always produces http://, so TLS operators must
set rootUrl explicitly.
Reflect the fix from the companion Rust change: the nginx reload/start
is now routed through hive-priv (root) instead of calling
systemd-run --machine= directly from unprivileged hive-c0re.
Document the state-aware dispatch (active→reload, failed→reset+start,
other→start).
security.acme defaults key to 0640 root:acme — nginx in the container
can't read it. operator must set group = "nginx" on the ACME cert.
addresses argus yellow note on PR #1153.
add services.hyperhive.gateway.tls.certDir option: operators with a
CA-signed cert (Let's Encrypt, corporate CA) point at the ACME output
dir instead of using the auto-generated self-signed cert.
- tls.certDir: host path bind-mounted r/o at /run/hive-tls/ in gateway
- tls.certName / tls.keyName: filenames within certDir (default: cert.pem / key.pem, matches nixpkgs security.acme layout)
- hasTls = selfSignedTls || certDir != null: publicScheme=https in both cases
- assertion: selfSignedTls=true + certDir set together is an error
- openFirewall: httpsPort opened in both TLS modes
- docs/gateway.md: TLS modes table + operator-cert section
- docs updated in swarm.md peer config reference in the cert TLS section
when using operator cert, swarm peers can omit certFingerprint —
standard CA bundle handles trust automatically.
when isolateContainers=true, isolated agents have dnsmasq as their
resolver — forge.<domain> resolves to bridgeIp. route HIVE_FORGE_URL
through nginx on port 80 instead of exposing the raw forge port.
- HIVE_FORGE_URL: http://<forge.domain> when isolated (nginx proxies)
- bridge firewall: open 80+443 for agents to reach nginx (gateway)
- remove forge-specific httpPort rule (no longer needed)
- update docs/gateway.md + docs/network.md
per mara's review comment on PR #1150.
When containers run in private netns (isolateContainers=true), host
loopback is unreachable so HIVE_FORGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000 breaks.
- nix/modules/hive-network.nix: when isolateContainers is on + forge
is enabled, open forge.httpPort on the bridge interface so agents
can reach forgejo at bridgeIp:httpPort (forgejo binds 0.0.0.0)
- nix/modules/hive-c0re.nix: HIVE_FORGE_URL switches to bridge IP
when network.enable && isolateContainers; loopback path retained
when isolateContainers=false
- docs/network.md: add Forge access + Forge URL rows to effects table
- docs/gateway.md: rewrite HIVE_FORGE_URL section for both modes
Remove stale htpasswdFile option from nix example (option no longer
exists). Update hivectl command examples to drop --file flag (now
optional with standard default). Add description of the fixed path
and how it's exposed inside the container.
Add `hivectl gateway {create-user,delete-user,list-users}` subcommands for
managing htpasswd files used by gateway Basic auth. Pure Rust bcrypt
(cost 12, $2y$ prefix nginx accepts). No external htpasswd binary required.
Also fix the NixOS module assertion: `cfg.auth ? htpasswdFile` is always
true in the module system (declared options always exist as keys); switch
to `nullOr path; default = null` + `!= null` check so the assertion
actually fires with a useful error when enable=true but no file is set.
Guard bind-mount and nginx config against null to prevent eval errors.
Update docs/gateway.md to show hivectl commands instead of raw htpasswd.
Replaces the earlier PAM+binary approach with nginx's built-in
`auth_basic` module. No new binary, no new systemd service, no PAM.
New option `services.hyperhive.gateway.auth`:
- `enable` — off by default
- `htpasswdFile` — host path to an htpasswd file (required when enable)
- `realm` — WWW-Authenticate realm string (default "hyperhive");
restricted to `strMatching "[^\"$]*"` to prevent nginx config injection
When enabled:
- the parent directory of `htpasswdFile` is bind-mounted read-only
into the gateway container at `/run/gateway-auth/`
- the `"/"` proxy location gets `auth_basic` + `auth_basic_user_file`
Create credentials: `htpasswd -Bc /path/to/file alice` (BCrypt).
See `docs/gateway.md` ("HTTP Basic auth") for the full setup guide.
The #872 path-unit approach was silently broken: IN_MOVED_TO from an
atomic rename on the host does not propagate across the nspawn
mount-namespace boundary into the container, so the watcher inside
the gateway container never fired.
Fix: after each agents.conf write, c0re calls
`systemd-run --machine=hive-gateway -- nginx -s reload` from the host.
The reload is best-effort (logged on failure, not fatal).
Remove the now-unused `hive-gateway-agents-conf.path` +
`hive-gateway-nginx-reload.service` from the gateway container config.
Update docs/gateway.md + comments to reflect the host-side approach.
docs/web-ui.md (1315 lines) split into three sub-files:
- docs/web-ui/shape.md — shared SPA skeleton, SSE multiplexing,
Worker-death self-heal, terminal pane, listener bind, relative
paths, atomic repaint, side panel
- docs/web-ui/dashboard.md — SW4RM/Y3R/SYST3M/SCH3DUL3S/S3TT1NGS
tabs, container row, topology tree, selection bar, approval card,
dashboard endpoints + event channel
- docs/web-ui/agent.md — header, terminal, composer, inbox, live
view, slash commands, per-agent endpoints, stats page
docs/web-ui.md replaced with a thin index linking all three.
Section anchors in docs (gateway.md, gotchas.md), Rust doc comments
(hive-ag3nt/src/web_ui.rs), and nix/templates/weston-vnc.nix updated
to point at the correct sub-file. README and CLAUDE.md file-map
updated with sub-file links. Inline // comments in frontend source
left unchanged (they reference the index which redirects to the right
sub-file).
