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Commit graph hyperhive/swarm-secret-client/Cargo.toml
Author SHA1 Message Date
atlas
741fe388f9 move startup_read from swarm-queue-client to swarm-secret-client
read_with_startup_retry retries the first read of a client secret through a store that is restarting. Nothing in swarm-queue-client calls it; its only callers are the four binaries that read the secret (swarm-builder, swarm-claude-login, swarm-controller, swarm-review-classifier), and they already depend on swarm-secret-client. It sits beside stored_secret, which moved there in #5538. swarm-queue-client drops its backon dependency and the tokio test-util dev-dependency that only these tests used.
2026-10-18 16:11:55 +02:00
atlas
f4f459f0b2 move stored_secret from swarm-queue-client to swarm-secret-client
The module is a rename (97% similar); everything else in the diff follows
from the move:

- stored_secret.rs: private `chain()` helper, the 8-line copy of the queue
  crate's `chain` the module called as `crate::chain`; the queue crate's
  public `chain` stays.
- stored_secret.rs: `Duration::from_mins(5)` in `MAX_REREAD_DELAY` is
  unchanged moved code, not a new use.
- swarm-secret-client Cargo.toml: gains futures-util, tokio and tracing as
  dependencies and tokio `test-util` plus tracing-subscriber as dev
  dependencies; the module and its tests use them.
- swarm-queue-client Cargo.toml: drops futures-util and the tracing-subscriber
  dev dependency, which only the moved module used; its tokio dev comment is
  reworded to the tests that remain.
- Cargo.lock: the same dependency moves, nothing else.
- swarm-queue-client lib.rs: imports `swarm_secret_client::stored_secret`,
  and its tests use a small local `Store` in place of the moved module's
  test-only `Fake`, which is no longer reachable.
- callers (hive-c0re, swarm-builder, swarm-ci-metrics, swarm-claude-login,
  swarm-controller, swarm-nats-auth, swarm-review-classifier): import path
  only; no re-export is left behind.
2026-10-18 09:00:08 +02:00
atlas
44984e0d36 move install_crypto_provider to swarm-secret-client
The rustls provider install is process setup every swarm binary runs, and
swarm-secret-client depends on no other swarm crate, so a binary that only
needs the provider and the store no longer links the queue client.

- swarm-secret-client/src/lib.rs, Cargo.toml: the function, its test, a
  `//!` line on why it lives there, and the rustls dependency; rustls
  `ring` as a dev-dependency feature, so the test builds both providers as
  the binaries do and fails if the install is dropped.
- swarm-queue-client/src/lib.rs, Cargo.toml: function and test removed;
  `connect()` calls the secret client's; rustls dropped (no other use),
  swarm-secret-client added.
- swarm-metrics-auth/Cargo.toml: drop swarm-queue-client, whose only use
  was the provider; the binary no longer links async-nats.
- swarm-logs-auth, swarm-logs, swarm-metrics, swarm-ci-metrics Cargo.toml:
  the dep comment no longer names the provider (they keep the dep for
  agent_token / the OIDC mint).
- Cargo.toml: the rustls comment names the provider's new home.
- 14 call sites (hive-agent, hive-c0re, hive-subagent-mcp x2,
  swarm-builder, swarm-ci-metrics, swarm-claude-login, swarm-controller,
  swarm-logs-auth, swarm-logs, swarm-metrics-auth, swarm-metrics,
  swarm-nats-auth, swarm-review-classifier): one-line path change.
- Cargo.lock: the dependency edges above.
2026-10-18 03:18:43 +02:00
atlas
d5de1e4943 swarm UI: log an agent into claude from its card; the credentials go to bao and the agent picks them up
A new swarm service, `swarm-claude-login`, in its own container on the host
that sets `deploy.claude-login.enable` (defaulted on by `allSwarmServices`
where the host has the minter's store leaf, like the review classifier).

- swarm-ui: an agent card showing "login needed" gets a "log in" button.
  Its dialog starts the login, shows the URL claude printed, and takes the
  pasted code.
- swarm-controller: `POST/DELETE /api/agents/{name}/claude-login` and
  `POST /api/agents/{name}/claude-login/code`, behind the swarm UI's
  authelia-gated `/api/`, relay the steps to the minter as requests on
  `$SWARM.claude-login.request`.
- swarm-claude-login: runs `claude auth login` over piped stdio with HOME
  and CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR in a per-login scratch dir, scrapes the first
  https URL, writes the code to stdin, and stores the `.credentials.json`
  at `swarm/agents/<agent>/claude-credentials` with a KV v2 write, a new
  version over any earlier one. The scratch dir goes on every exit path; a
  login waits 15 minutes for its code.
- hive-agent: while parked in `wait_for_login`, reads that leaf every 30 s
  under the agent's own cert and installs it only when its KV version is
  newer than the one recorded in `<harness>/claude-credentials-version`.
  An equal or older version is never put back, because claude rotates the
  refresh token and the stored copy is stale after the first refresh.
- swarm-secret-client: `claude_login` paths and `SecretStore::read_versioned`.
- Credentials: a `claude-login` store leaf minted by glue-bao-tls, a
  `swarm-claude-login` policy (create/update on
  `swarm/agents/+/claude-credentials`, read on its own queue client
  secret), an authelia machine client, and a `--claude-login-client`
  grant in the queue's auth-callout responder. The unit runs as a static
  system user.

The hive's own web-UI login is unchanged.

Refs #5268
2026-10-15 13:26:29 +02:00
damocles
0d6c003fa8 swarm-secret-client: derive Kind's segment strings via strum instead of a hand-written match 2026-09-12 00:06:31 +02:00
atlas
560f727797 swarm-secret-client: write hive policies to the modern ACL path
`write_policy` called `vaultrs::sys::policy::set`, which targets
`sys/policy/<name>` — the deprecated alias the store gates as a path of
its own. Every grant in this tree names `sys/policies/acl/hive-*`, so a
correctly-scoped controller was refused with a 403 and no hive read
policy has ever been written, on any deployment. The doc comment three
lines above the call already named the modern path; the code is what
moves to meet it.

vaultrs has no endpoint for that path (`grep policies/acl` over 0.8.0:
zero hits, against 8 for `sys/policy`), so this defines one over its own
endpoint machinery — which keeps the client's token header and `/v1`
prefix middleware rather than re-deriving them.

The alternative was to widen the grant to cover the legacy path. This
way needs no policy change at all: the deployed grant already permits
the write, so no store is re-bootstrapped and nothing is entrenched on
an alias upstream has deprecated.

Two tests pin the path and the body shape. The reason this survived
deployment is that nothing in the tree ever asserted either one.

Closes #4177.
2026-09-11 01:34:31 +02:00
atlas
4384a1fffa swarm-secret-client: the agreements both ends of the store must share
mara ruled (a) on #3726: a thin workspace crate over `vaultrs` rather than
keeping bao access in nix and having each end trigger units. The HTTP is the
SDK's job; what this crate owns is the things the controller and a hive must
say *identically*, and which have no other home because neither end is senior
to the other.

Three such agreements:

`path::matrix_account` builds where a credential lives. It is fallible rather
than a `format!`, because both names reach it from elsewhere -- the agent name
from the topology, the account name from an agent's own config -- and a `/` or
`..` in either does not produce a malformed path, it produces a valid path to
a *different agent's* secret. The charset mirrors the KV bucket-name rule.

`Credential`'s `value` field is not a free choice: glue-matrix-bao-token.nix
reads the store with `bao kv get -field=value`, so the name is load-bearing
for a consumer no Rust test can reach. A test pins the serialised shape.

`client::Settings` reads BAO_ADDR / BAO_CLIENT_CERT / BAO_CLIENT_KEY /
BAO_CACERT explicitly instead of letting vaultrs fall through to its own
defaults, which look for VAULT_ADDR / VAULT_CLIENT_CERT / VAULT_CLIENT_KEY.
Every unit in this tree sets the BAO_ spellings, so the defaults would yield a
client with no identity at all -- surfacing as a TLS handshake failure, which
names neither the missing variable nor the reason.

The env read is split from the connect so every misconfiguration arm is
testable without a reachable store and without touching process-global env.

Dependency impact, measured against the lock at forge/main rather than assumed:
native-tls 0 -> 0, openssl-sys 0 -> 0, one reqwest (0.13.4) which vaultrs
shares, and 10 new crates that are all derive/proc-macro helpers.

Refs #3726
2026-09-03 00:29:52 +02:00