`agents.conf` and `gateway.htpasswd` move from /var/lib/hyperhive/gateway
to /var/lib/hive-gateway/conf, alongside the `tls/` the gateway already
kept there.
nginx reads both as an unprivileged user. Under c0re's state dir it could
only reach them by traversing a directory systemd re-declares `0750
hive-core` on every c0re start — so nginx was given `SupplementaryGroups
= [ "hive-core" ]`, which also handed it read access to everything else
group-readable in that tree. The tokens are individually 0600, but the
broker sqlite carries no explicit mode: every message between every agent
was readable by the process whose job is parsing untrusted network input.
Moving the files removes the need and the exposure together. The group is
gone, and its absence is now commented as load-bearing so it doesn't come
back as a fix for a symptom it would recreate.
Also drops this module's `/var/lib/hyperhive` tmpfiles rule. It declared
`0755 root root` and could never win against `StateDirectoryMode`, and a
losing declaration still reads as a guarantee — that is what sent the
first diagnosis of the outage looking for who had changed the mode.
Ordering is unchanged and still the thing that makes a fresh boot work:
tmpfiles runs before services and seeds both files empty-but-valid, nginx
names them (an `include` of a missing file is fatal, not empty), and
content arrives when c0re writes and reloads — which it does on every
topology change, so a boot against the empty seed resolves itself.
Folds in the mode fix: `write` now sets 0644 on the tmp file before the
rename, because a rename carries the source's mode and discards the
destination's, and the tmpfiles rule that declares 0644 is
create-if-absent so it never re-applies.
Per review: docs represent current state. Every "used to" / "no longer"
clause this branch introduced is gone — including the History section in
network.md, which was a whole subsection about a sync mechanism that
doesn't exist.
Where the removed clause was carrying a real constraint, the constraint
stays and is stated in the present tense instead of as a delta: nothing
narrows what the gateway's nginx can reach except the directory
permissions in front of a socket, and nothing bounds `ReloadGatewayNginx`
except the hard-coded unit name. Those read as rules now rather than as
the story of how they came to be rules.
The gateway's nginx + dnsmasq no longer run in their own nspawn container.
`nix/host-modules/hive-gateway/default.nix` loses the
`containers.hive-gateway` wrapper and everything that existed only to punch
holes in it: `privateNetwork = false`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, five bind mounts,
its own `stateVersion`, `networking.firewall.enable = false`,
`networking.resolvconf.enable = false`, and the `hive-gateway-resolv`
path+service pair. 465 -> 303 lines.
The container never bought isolation here. It shared the host netns by
necessity — nginx binds the host's :80/:443, dnsmasq answers on the bridge —
so each of those settings was undoing a boundary the gateway could not
afford in the first place.
Four things made it more than a deletion, none of them visible in the nix
diff:
- The self-signed cert service also imports the hive CA leaf, so removing it
with the container would have left nginx naming a missing cert file, which
it refuses to load at all.
- The nginx reload is a hive-priv verb. It still needs root, but no longer
for the reason its doc gave, and `--machine=` was both transport and
scope — so the unit name is now hard-coded in the helper as the
containment.
- The lifecycle verb named a container that stops existing.
- `journalctl -M hive-gateway` had no machine to enter.
Per the operator's ruling, the operator verb keeps working and agents lose
it. `InfraContainer` answered three questions that used to share an answer;
it now splits into `name()` (identity), `target()` (Container vs HostUnit),
`service_unit()` (the systemd unit), and `agent_restartable()`, which the
MCP restart path checks before the capability so the refusal cannot read as
"ask for infra_admin". `SIBLING_CONTAINERS` drops the gateway — it gates the
requests that name a container as a string — while `FromStr` still accepts
it, because that answers what a name is, not who may act on it. The
dashboard's gateway journal reads host journald filtered to `nginx.service`.
Prose was corrected where it only named a location, and re-argued where the
container was doing security work: a `0666` per-agent socket was safe
because only the gateway container had the directory bind-mounted. There is
no mount now, so the directory permissions are the whole of the access
control — the constraint holds, its mechanism doesn't.
Gate: nix fmt / clippy --all-targets -D warnings / cargo test all clean (710
tests); hivectl-cli.md regenerated from the clap tree. The nix eval was run
in both TLS shapes at this commit: every delta in the rendered
virtualHosts is one of the three intended path moves, dnsmasq settings are
byte-identical, and the absence probe flips true -> false with bindMounts
emptied.
Phase 4 (repoint every container onto `meta#<n>`) and phase 5 (rename
the `root` container to `h-root`) were marker-guarded one-shots for
layouts no live hive still has: containers are rendered onto `meta#<n>`
at creation, and the `h-` prefix has been the naming for far longer than
any deployment predates. A one-shot nobody can still trigger is dead
weight, so both are gone along with `repoint_container`,
`rename_manager_container`, `CONTAINER_TIMEOUT` and the two marker paths.
Phase 6 was not obsolete, only misplaced. Ruth's tool groups are now
seeded by `ensure_root_agent` on the one path that creates her, rather
than re-asserted on every hive-c0re boot. The skip-if-already-set guard
survives the move: a destroy+recreate under the same name must not reset
an operator's chosen group set back to MANAGER_DEFAULT.
That also settles a latent bug. Phase 4's marker check was a `return`,
not a skip, so on any hive carrying the marker phases 5 and 6 never ran
at all — the tool-group backfill, whose whole job was preventing a silent
privilege downgrade, has not executed here in a long time. Moving it to
create-time removes the question rather than answering it.
What stays is convergence: three unguarded, idempotent phases that re-run
each boot and no-op once their state is right. The module doc now names
the three categories so the next person can tell which kind they're
adding.
Split the priv-socket wire types (PrivRequest/PrivResponse/PrivEvent and
friends) out of hive-sh4re into their own hive-priv-sock crate, mirroring
the existing hive-host-sock split. hive-priv — the root-privileged
helper — now depends on just this narrow protocol crate instead of the
much larger daemon-shared crate, shrinking its dependency surface and
making the privsep boundary easier to audit. No server/client
implementation lives here, only the wire contract; hive-c0re still
depends on hive-sh4re directly for everything else.
Both webhook registrations (knowledge push + config-PR pull_request) now
use the public hive domain instead of loopback:
https://<HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN>/webhook/{knowledge,config-pr}
This routes deliveries through the gateway, bypassing the Forgejo SSRF
guard that blocked loopback delivery and silently broke the config-PR
merge flow since launch.
Changes:
- webhook_secret: new module — auto-generate + persist a 32-byte HMAC
secret to STATE_ROOT/webhook-secret on first startup; verify
X-Hub-Signature-256 on every incoming webhook POST (HMAC-SHA256).
- forge/mod.rs: ensure_config_pr_webhook now takes hive_domain +
webhook_secret; sets secret in Forgejo hook config.
- workers/knowledge.rs: ensure_webhook same update.
- dashboard/webhook.rs: both handlers read raw Bytes first, verify HMAC,
then parse JSON. Returns 401 on signature mismatch.
- dashboard/mod.rs: AppState carries webhook_secret; serve() takes it.
- main.rs: load/generate secret at startup; pass to registration tasks
+ dashboard; add 5-minute config-PR polling fallback task.
- forge/config_pr_poll.rs: new — scan agent-configs/* for open PRs with
no pending MergeConfigPr approval; queue them. Idempotent.
- stores/approvals.rs: has_pending_merge_config_pr() for poll dedup.
- nix/modules/hive-gateway.nix: remove dashboardAuth from /webhook/
location (HMAC replaces basic auth for webhook endpoints; Forgejo
cannot send HTTP Basic credentials with webhook deliveries).
- Add `priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` to hive-sh4re as the shared
single source for the per-agent runtime root path. hive-priv now
imports it instead of carrying a local const with a stale comment
that still pointed at `coordinator::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT` (removed in
#2285/#2367 — moved to `paths::agent_runtime_root()`).
- Add 'must stay in sync' cross-ref comments on both sides of the
privsep boundary:
· priv_proto::META_DIR ↔ paths::meta_root()
· priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT ↔ paths::AGENTS_ROOT
· priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ paths::RUNTIME_ROOT + agent_runtime_root()
· paths::AGENTS_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_STATE_ROOT
· paths::RUNTIME_ROOT ↔ priv_proto::AGENT_RUNTIME_ROOT
The dep graph prevents a shared import (hive-sh4re is a leaf; both
hive-c0re and hive-priv depend on it but not each other), so the
lockstep comments are the enforced contract.
Replace the #-number tracker references in code comments with prose
(tracker-tag lint; hive convention is prose in source). No behaviour
change. Branch-protection / collaborator / team / repo API field names
were verified against the live Forgejo swagger.
Agents must no longer create repos with their own forge token (a
write-scoped token otherwise creates + owns repos and can self-merge,
bypassing operator-only-merge). Instead:
- Set max_repo_creation=0 on every agent forge user (marker-guarded
PATCH in sync_agent; covers agents provisioned before this). Blocks
new direct creation; push/PR/clone and existing repos are untouched.
- Provision a c0re-owned 'agents' org (the namespace agent repos land
in) plus an empty 'operators' team inside it. The org owns the repos
so perms stay c0re-managed; the operator joins the team out-of-band.
- create_agent_repo() is the sanctioned path: creates the repo in the
agents org, adds the requesting agent as a *write* collaborator (not
owner), and applies branch protection that whitelists merge + required
approval to the operators team — so the author can't merge its own PR.
- is_hive_managed_namespace() guards 'internal'/'agent-configs'/'core'
against a future create surface passing an explicit owner.
No existing repos are modified. The agent/hivectl surface that invokes
create_agent_repo is a follow-up commit.
The hive Space was created empty — joining it surfaced no rooms because
Matrix doesn't auto-join a Space's children. Provision a default
"hive-chat" room on the matrix sweep, wire it bidirectionally to the
Space (m.space.child on the Space, m.space.parent on the room), and
invite @hive + every agent. The room uses a restricted join rule
allowing any Space member to join, so the operator (a Space member) can
join it from the Space hierarchy without an explicit invite.
Idempotent, mirroring ensure_hive_space: persisted chat-room-id wins,
else rediscover a non-space room named hive-chat, else createRoom. The
space-child link is re-applied each sweep (idempotent PUT) so a
recovered room reconverges its hierarchy link. Room id persisted to
matrix/chat-room-id (0600, survives destroy --purge).
