network.md listed matrix among the shared-netns containers and the
private-netns list named only agents and the CI runner; it now says
every privateNetwork container keeps its own firewall. The authelia
module no longer calls the matrix container shared, and the hive-c0re
comment on having no homeserver fallback no longer names port 8008.
Part of #4815.
The hive no longer sets an agent's CPU or memory cap: caps come from the swarm, else the hive-wide defaults. The container load tab was the only hive UI that set them, and its figures are already exported as OTEL metrics, so with the tab gone nothing wrote meta/resource-limits.json.
Removed: the file's reader and writer, the `hivectl agent set-limits` verb with its host-socket request, the `GET /api/container-resources` and `POST /api/resource-limits/{name}` dashboard endpoints, and the `cpu_quota`/`memory_max` fields of the container view that only the tab read. A leftover resource-limits.json is ignored.
hive-c0re (`hive-<name>`), swarm-controller and swarm-review-classifier
read their queue client secret from the store once and held it as
`ClientSecret::Value` for the life of the process. After authelia
re-minted a secret and swarm-secret-publish stored the new one, every
later token mint presented the old value and was refused until the
daemon restarted.
`ClientSecret::Stored` replaces `Value`: a `StoredSecret` holds the
secret in memory with a caller-supplied read callback, so the crate
takes no store dependency. When the token endpoint answers 400 or 401,
`mint_token` (and its blocking sibling, used by the controller's OTLP
exporters) re-reads it and, if the store holds a different secret,
mints once more with it. One re-read runs at a time and is spawned so
it outlives a caller that gives up. A re-read that fails or finds the
refused value delays the next one, 5 s doubling to 5 min, so a secret
that stays wrong costs one store read per delay. Logs name the client
id and never the secret.
swarm-nats-auth's `oidc_secret` was the template; its re-read machinery
now sits on `StoredSecret`, so the tree has one copy. The responder
gains the same re-read backoff.
The controller keeps its `IDENTITY` OnceLock: it now holds a
`QueueConfig` whose secret is re-read, and the lazily built vcs-metrics
exporter reads the identity from it.
agent_renewal.rs's module doc said a re-minted agent queue secret only
reaches the agent at its next start; hive-agent reads the store on every
connection attempt after its first, so the doc now says that.
Part of #5017 (slice Q).
Scheduled prompts live at swarm level (swarm-controller's
/api/schedules, `swarmctl schedule`, the swarm UI's /schedules page).
The hive dashboard's SCH3DUL3S tab only listed the rows left in
hive-c0re's `scheduled_prompts` table so operators could copy them
over; the operator confirmed everything is migrated.
Removed:
- the SCH3DUL3S tab, its pane, schedules.js, its CSS (including the
`.rqe-source*` rules, whose only emitter was schedules.js) and the
hub tile's "schedules" entry
- hive-c0re's GET /api/schedules and the `scheduled_prompts` store
(with its v1 column migration and test)
- hive-sh4re's `schedule` wire types, which only that route used
- docs describing the tab, the route and the two tables
The rebuild-queue cancel route that shared the module moves to
dashboard/rebuild_queue.rs under an OpenAPI tag of its own.
The two sqlite tables are not dropped: nothing opens them any more,
and persistence.md says they can be dropped by hand.
Closes#4916
Every 30 seconds `workers::swarm_limits` reads the `agent-limits` key of
each agent this hive has and stores the result in
swarm-resource-limits.json, where the drop-in, the heap ceiling and the
dashboard read it. A cap therefore follows its agent to whichever hive
runs it.
Each value goes through the hive's own validate_cpu_quota /
validate_memory_max before it is stored, since hive-priv renders it
verbatim into the container's drop-in, and one bad value refuses the whole
set (argus on #4268, carried over from the wanted-state consumer this
replaces). A failed read, or a bucket that does not answer, leaves the
stored caps as they are; three failures in a row raise a banner.
swarm-nats-auth grants every hive `$JS.API.DIRECT.GET.KV_agent-limits.>`:
read-only, and every agent's key, not just the hive's own. Scoping it to
the hive's agents would need a roster in the auth responder, which
policy.rs argues against. mara chose this on #4268 (c95293); narrowing it
is a possible low-priority follow-up, not planned. A test pins that the
grant reads every key, writes none, and reaches no other bucket.
Contributes to #3865.
mara's ruling: "swarm level overrides replace the hive ui limits. otherwise
dont change the logic."
swarm value present -> it is the value; nothing hive-side is consulted
swarm value absent -> exactly today's chain: per-agent field, else hive
Per field, so a swarm memory ceiling leaves CPU on the hive's chain.
The fallback chain itself is not touched: effective_from_with_swarm calls
effective_from as it was and lets the swarm replace its result, and
effective_with_swarm delegates to effective, so there stays one place the
chain lives. `an_empty_swarm_map_leaves_the_existing_chain_bit_for_bit`
asserts the wrapper is a no-op across every shape the chain distinguishes.
The swarm's caps live in their own swarm-resource-limits.json, not in the
operator's resource-limits.json: different writers, different lifetimes,
and a swarm write into the operator's file would make "reset to hive
defaults" destroy something the operator never set. It is read and written
through the same read_map / write_map, so an unreadable file is an error,
and write_dropins resolves both files through limits_to_apply, whose
keep-the-last-applied-drop-in policy covers the swarm file too.
stage_limits hands limits_to_apply the swarm caps file too, so the
agent's memory-max-bytes copy, which it sizes its heap and subagents
against, is the MemoryMax= systemd enforces: the swarm cap when there is
one.
Nothing writes swarm-resource-limits.json yet; the reader comes with the
swarm's agent-limits bucket later in this series.
`parse_bytes` knew only K/M/G/T, in either case. A size with the bare
`B` unit (`1048576B`), which `validate_memory_max` stores and systemd
enforces, became `infinity` in the agent's cap file: the cgroup was
capped while the agent was told there was no cap. It now takes exactly
the single-term forms systemd's `parse_size` does: no suffix, `B`, or
K/M/G/T/P/E, case-sensitive. Lowercase units and `4GB`, which systemd
refuses and so leaves the unit uncapped, read as `infinity` too.
A test runs every suffix form the validator accepts through it and
checks the stored value parses to the right byte count.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
The cap file was removed for a cap of `infinity` or a RAM percentage,
so the boot check warned on every start of such an agent, for a
legitimate config. The file is now written on every start:
- a size: its byte count, as before;
- `infinity`: the literal `infinity`. The generators set no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=, and the boot check is quiet;
- a percentage: resolved on the host the way systemd resolves
MemoryMax=N% for the container@ unit. That is permyriad (at most two
decimals, at most 100%) of sysconf(_SC_PHYS_PAGES) *
sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE), rounded down to a page;
- a value systemd ignores (zero, over 100%, more than two decimals,
unparseable) leaves the unit uncapped, so it is `infinity`.
The file is missing only when hive-c0re can't tell the cap: the
limits file and the kept drop-in are both unreadable, or a percentage
meets an unknown host memory size. The boot check now warns only for
a missing file or a first line that is neither a byte count nor
`infinity`.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
When hive-c0re can't read resource-limits.json and a limits drop-in
already exists, it keeps the drop-in, but it wrote no memory cap file. A
container whose runtime dir had no file yet (hive-c0re upgraded, /run
not cleared) then started with no heap ceiling and no subagent
MemoryHigh=, silently. `stage_limits` now writes the file on every
call: from the new limits, or from the last `MemoryMax=` in the kept
drop-in (`infinity` when it has none or can't be read).
A missing or malformed cap file at boot is no longer silent. The
generators run before the container's journal and an nspawn container
has no /dev/kmsg, so a oneshot `hyperhive-memory-cap-check.service`
logs a warning naming the path. The agent then runs with no JSC heap
ceiling and no subagent MemoryHigh=; the container's MemoryMax= still
applies.
module-eval-agent-memory gains a case pinning how the ceiling reaches
claude: `hive-agent` and `hive-subagent-daemon` neither set nor unset
BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize, both generators and the check unit are installed.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
An agent's memory cap was rendered into its flake (`memoryMaxBytes` →
`services.hyperhive.agent.claudeMemoryMaxBytes`), so the closure depended
on it and a changed cap reached the JSC heap ceiling and the subagent
`MemoryHigh=` only after a rebuild.
hive-c0re now writes the effective `MemoryMax=` in bytes to the agent's
runtime dir (`/run/hive/memory-max-bytes` inside) in `write_dropins`,
from the same value the drop-in gets. The file is removed for
`infinity` or a RAM percentage, and left alone when the drop-in is kept.
Inside the container, `nix/agent-modules/memory-cap.nix` reads it at
boot: an environment generator sets `BUN_JSC_forceRAMSize` (75%) for
every unit and `machinectl shell`, `/etc/set-environment` exports it in
login shells, and a unit generator writes `MemoryHigh=` (2/3) as a
drop-in for `hive-subagent-daemon`.
The render drops `memoryMaxBytes`, the agent option is removed (both
spellings fail eval with a removal message), and
`effective_memory_bytes_from` goes with its only caller.
Part of #5081 (slice S0-2).
Part of #5081 (slice S0-1a). An agent's closure no longer depends on the
name or domain of the hive that renders it.
- hive-priv writes /etc/hyperhive-hive-facts (HYPERHIVE_HIVE_NAME,
HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN) into the container from the same WriteNspawnFlags
call that writes /etc/hyperhive-bridge-dns. hive-c0re passes the values
from its own unit env. hive-priv refuses a value outside [A-Za-z0-9._-].
- A systemd environment generator in the agent (hive-facts.nix) loads the
file into the container manager's environment, so every unit sees it,
as with the systemd.globalEnvironment entries the render used to emit.
It also builds CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL_SESSION_NAME_PREFIX
(<hive>-<agent>), which left claude's managed settings.
- meta.rs stops forwarding HYPERHIVE_HIVE_{NAME,DOMAIN} and stops setting
services.hyperhive.agent.hiveName. The option is removed (both
spellings now fail with a removal message).
- otel.nix drops the agent's hive= resource label. The swarm collector
upserts hive per authenticated receiver (swarm-otel.nix resource/<h>,
on both the metrics and logs pipelines), so stored series keep it.
The otel first hop, otel enable and the dashboard port are still baked;
they are S0-1b.
An agent with no matrix account has no `mcp__matrix__*` tools, so a
refusal that only says "use the matrix MCP tools" points it at something
it cannot call. `OPERATOR_SEND_REFUSAL` now names matrix for an agent
that has it, and tells one without it that there is no direct channel:
the operator reads its `set_status` line, its turn output on the
dashboard, and its logs. The allow-list refusal, the `send` tool
description, the MCP server instructions and the system prompt say
"over matrix if you have it" to match, and the helper-event bullets go
back to "ask the operator" without naming a channel.
Agents reach the operator over matrix now (#5115). A `send` to
`operator` is refused, by the broker and by the MCP allow-list check,
with an error that names the matrix MCP tools. The dashboard's Y3R C4LL
tab goes with it: the operator inbox, `GET /api/operator-inbox`,
`Broker::unread_for_recipient`, and the browser notifications that only
ever fired on operator-bound messages.
The harness no longer posts turn failures and plugin-install failures
to the operator inbox. Both are already logged at warn; a new Grafana
rule, `hh-agent-turn-failed`, fires per agent on the harness's
`turn failed` line.
Dashboard-to-agent messaging (op-send, the agent web UI's message box,
mark-all-read for agent inboxes) is unchanged.
Decisions per mara on #5115: q1 a, q2 a plus a grafana alert, q3 keep
dashboard-to-agent messaging and leave swarm-level code alone.
Logs live at swarm level now (VictoriaLogs, read through Grafana
Explore). The hive dashboard's own journal viewer goes, with
everything that existed only to serve it:
- frontend: /logs.html, logs.js, logs.css, the H0M3 "Logs" tile and
the per-agent menu's "journal logs ->" link. The build-log list
rules BU1LDS used from logs.css move into builds.css.
- hive-c0re: GET /api/journal/{name} and GET /api/journal-host, and
priv_client::read_container_journal.
- hive-priv / hive-priv-sock: the ReadContainerJournal request, its
JournalQuery/JournalOutput wire types and the journalctl -M executor.
- nix: hive-c0re's systemd-journal supplementary group, whose only
reader was the journal-host handler.
- docs: the L0GS section, the API entry and the security table row.
Closes#5113Closes#3819
The tokio socket stays non-blocking after into_std, and the flag is
shared with hive-priv through SCM_RIGHTS, so btrfs send wrote into a
non-blocking socket.
A build_logs row is opened with finished_at NULL and closed only by the
process that runs the build. If hive-c0re stopped in between, the row stayed
open for good: the dashboard listed it with no status, its log stream never
sent `done`, and the retention sweep, which skips open rows, never deleted it.
Coordinator::open now closes every open row as `fail` and appends a line
saying hive-c0re stopped. It runs before this process starts any build, and
only there: BuildLogs::open itself leaves rows alone so a second opener can't
close another process's live rows.
The per-agent web UI no longer sets the model: the `/model` slash
command, the model picker, `POST /api/model`, `Bus::set_model` and the
`hyperhive-model` writer are gone. The model chip is display-only and
shows where the model comes from (`model_source` in `/api/state`). The
model is set on the swarm (swarm UI agents page, `swarmctl agent
inference set`).
The read side is unchanged: with no swarm value an agent runs its
agent.nix model, else an existing `hyperhive-model` file, else haiku.
Existing files are not touched.
With the picker gone, its model list goes too: `available_models` in
`/api/state`, the ACP model-list filter, and the harness's global
`HIVE_AVAILABLE_MODELS`. The subagent daemon keeps its own
`HIVE_AVAILABLE_MODELS` from mcp.nix, and the `availableModels`
assertion stays.
`/effort` (command, picker, route, file) is unchanged.
Refs #5034
config-changes.md § Meta flake, hive-c0re nix comments and the meta.rs/exec.rs
doc comments still described the declared agent-<n> input as a forge-hosted
git+http repo; meta.rs renders git+file://<applied>.
run_meta_lock relocked each cascade agent's `agent-<name>` input and only
then fast-forwarded `applied/<name>/main` to the forge config main. The
declared input has been the applied mirror (`git+file://<applied>`) since
b9cef950, so the relock pinned the mirror's old head; the cascade's
rebuilds run with `relock = false` and build that lock. An agent whose
mirror was behind forge main was redeployed on its old config, and the
mirror was then moved to the new head, claiming the agent current.
Fast-forward first, then relock. The fast-forward stays best-effort per
agent: a failed one logs a warn and that agent is relocked against
whatever its mirror has. The two steps move into catch_up_cascade_agents,
which takes them as injected effects (the advance_applied_main pattern in
actions.rs) so the order is unit-tested without nix or a forge.
The stale comment claiming the relock ran against "the forge URL" is
replaced by the actual constraint on the helper's doc.
Closes#5090
hive-c0re publishes this hive's status to the swarm queue as the OIDC
client `hive-<name>`. Its secret came from
`deploy.hive-controller.statusPublish.clientSecretFile`, which defaulted
to authelia's minted file only on a host running both authelia and the
queue. Every other hive had no secret and never published, so the
controller showed it `never_reported`.
Now `swarm-secret-publish`, beside authelia, also copies each hive's
`hive-<name>` secret to `swarm/hives/<hive>/oidc/client`. Its policy
already allows `swarm/hives/*`. hive-c0re reads that path under the
hive's own store leaf, which the existing `swarm/hives/<hive>/*` grant
covers, and holds the value in memory.
The shared queue client no longer remembers a failed first connect for
the life of the process. A failed attempt is retried with a backoff
from 5s, doubling to a cap of 5 minutes; the dashboard banner stays up
until an attempt succeeds. The two status publishers wait for the
client instead of giving up on the first `None`, so a secret published
after boot is picked up without a restart.
Removed: the `statusPublish.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings,
now removed options with a message), its same-host default, its
LoadCredential, the assertion tying it to the other two coordinates,
and `swarm_queue_client::QueueConfig::from_env`, whose only caller was
this read. Publishing is now on wherever the queue URL and token
endpoint are set and the hive holds a store leaf.
Refs #5015
advance_applied_main refused every rev that does not descend from
applied/main, including an ancestor of it. Ancestors arrive in normal
operation: swarm-controller queues each merge's TriggerDeploy as an
independent node with no resource or edge between them and spawns each
runnable node on its own task, so two merges of one agent can publish in
either order; the meta-update cascade fast-forwards applied/main to the
forge's main on its own; and the webhook handler does not dedup a
redelivered merge event. Since a refusal now logs at ERROR and fires the
`hh-config-rev-refused` alert, each of those would page as a refusal.
An ancestor is now RevAdvance::Superseded, logged at info, nothing queued.
Only a rev that has diverged (neither descendant nor ancestor) is refused.
Refs #4851
A deploy request whose rev hive-c0re refuses (fetch failed, or the rev
does not descend from applied/main) no longer tries to comment on the PR
that merged it. Off the forge host that attempt always failed with "forge
core token absent". The refusal now logs at ERROR, message unchanged, and
the new `hh-config-rev-refused` Grafana rule fires on it.
Deleted with the posting: actions::post_rev_deploy_failure_to_pr, the
whole forge/pr_comment.rs (config_repo, merged_pr_for_commit,
post_pr_comment), and ReaderToken::value, whose only caller was
merged_pr_for_commit.
Refs #4851
The htpasswd test now seeds the temp path at 0600, so only the explicit
chmod on the temp yields 0644. The wg test blocks the temp path with a
directory and asserts the write fails with the existing key untouched,
which an in-place write cannot satisfy.
Each of these wrote its file in place (or set the mode after the
write), so a write cut short by a kill or a full disk left a partial
file behind, and some secrets existed for a moment at umask mode:
- swarm-authelia/swarm-grafana/hive-forge/swarm-bao generators: a
partial file passed the `-s`/`-e` guard and was kept forever. They now
capture the value first and land it with `atomic_write_secret`.
- swarm-controller webhook secret: a truncated file failed the 64-hex
check and the secret was regenerated, out of step with the forge
hooks. It is now written 0600 to a sibling temp, fsynced, renamed.
- hive-c0re htpasswd: the temp is now fsynced and set 0644 before the
rename, like the sibling agents.conf writer, instead of relying on
c0re's umask.
- hivectl wg init: the private key is created 0400 in a temp and
renamed, instead of written at umask mode and chmod'ed after.
Closes#5068
wait_until_ready only checked READY_TIMEOUT between polls, so a half-open forge
hung the first get_version forever. The probe now goes through forge::bounded; a
timeout counts as not-ready and falls into the existing retry/deadline path.
forgejo-api 0.11.1 takes no caller-built client, so a request to a forge that
accepts the connection and never answers waited forever. Every forge::api()
call site now goes through forge::bounded, a 10s timeout that errors naming the
operation. The PR-comment calls run inline in swarm_status::drain_swarm_events,
the one task serving both swarm subscriptions, so a stalled forge stopped both.
Refs #5066
Bounding is_running turned a hung systemctl into "not running" for
callers that record or act on the answer: the broad-stop restore set
dropped the agent, start_many could rebuild-and-restart a running
agent, reconcile could seed Offline. is_running is back to the
unbounded call it was.
The periodic workers read through the bounded running_state instead:
crash_watch (unchanged), and the swarm_agent_status publisher via the
new container_view::read_agent_status_bounded, which skips the agent
for that sweep when the unit state is unreadable. The GetAgentMeta
socket handler keeps the unbounded read_agent_status_live.
priv_client::list_containers now waits at most 30s (LIST_WAIT) for
hive-priv's `nixos-container list`, via the existing `within` helper. Its
periodic callers (crash_watch, agent_sockets, swarm_agent_status, wanted,
mcp_sockets, swarm_status via container_view) already treat an Err as a
skipped cycle, so a hung listing no longer stops their loops for good.
lifecycle::is_running / unit_state run `systemctl is-active` with
kill_on_drop and a 10s timeout (IS_ACTIVE_TIMEOUT); a timeout warns and
reads as not-running / UnitState::Other, the same as a systemctl that
could not be spawned. The new lifecycle::running_state returns None for
that case, and crash_watch keeps the agent's previous observation on None
so a hung systemctl is neither reported as a crash nor as a recovery.
`call` itself and every mutating op (start/stop/destroy/send-snapshot/
daemon-reload) stay unbounded.
Closes#5061
- swarm-controller webhook: regenerate the secret only when the file is
absent. Any other read error is returned with the path; the caller
already logs "webhook secret unavailable" and the endpoint answers 503.
Overwriting meant every registered hook kept the old secret and every
delivery failed HMAC, with nothing re-registering them.
- swarm-queue-client wanted: open_read_only/watch return Result; only
STREAM_NOT_FOUND on the bucket maps to None. hive-c0re's wanted pull
fails the DAG node with the cause instead of logging "nothing has been
declared"; the watch warns with the error chain.
- swarm-nats-auth: warn when the OIDC secret re-read task dies.
- swarm-controller forge: listing a repo's config PRs failing is warn,
not debug.
Closes#5056
HIVE_FORGE_URL (set + parseable) and HIVE_ASSETS_DIR are checked once in
main before workers start. Short revs in container_view and pr_status
take 12 chars instead of byte-slicing.
No behaviour change. Casts replaced by try_from / Duration math; schedules.rs
reuses agent_renewal::unix_now; the five swarm-queue-client KV open-or-create
copies share one private kv::open_or_create.
Add secret_file::write_secret_0600: create the parent dir, write a
sibling temp file opened create_new + mode 0600, sync_all, rename over
the target. Use it for the matrix sender token, the space/chat room-id
files and the forge core token, which previously wrote at the process
umask, then chmod-ed with the error discarded, and dropped the
create_dir_all error. agent_identity::write_identity uses it too
instead of its own open-0600 loop; that loop opened with create +
truncate, so a pre-existing file kept its old mode.
Also log instead of discarding:
- the manager's applied-rev marker write in auto_update
- the knowledge `git remote set-url` scrub (spawn error and non-zero
exit; the exit status only, since stderr may echo the old URL)
- the parent create_dir_all in paths::move_if_legacy
Closes#5037
Agent creation gains a GrantDocsRead node (after CreateForgeUser) that adds
the agent as a read collaborator on internal/docs, and forge::docs_grant
runs a pass over the store's hive-agent-* roster at start and every five
minutes that queues the same job for any agent that is not one. The pass only
adds; an unreadable roster or forge read changes nothing.
hive-c0re drops shared_docs_access, its call in sync_agent, and the
SHARED_ORG / SHARED_DOCS_REPO constants only it used.
swarm-controller now gives every hive in its directory a forge account,
`hive-<hive>`, in a new `hives` team of `agent-configs` (read on
`repo.code` + `repo.pulls`, every repo including later ones), and mints
one `read:repository` token named `swarm-hive` into the store at
`swarm/hives/<hive>/forge/token`. A five-minute pass queues a
`MintHiveForgeToken` node for a hive whose token is missing or no longer
matches the forge, whose account is missing, or whose team membership or
team settings drifted. A hive whose store or forge read failed is never
queued, so an outage cannot rotate every hive's token. The token decision
reuses `agent_token`'s classifier and replace step, now parameterised by
name and scopes.
An agent may be called `hive-<x>`. The hive account is created with
`hive-<hive>@hives.hyperhive.local` and the job refuses an account by that
name with any other email before it locks it down, adds it to the team or
mints for it; agent creation already refuses the hive's account by the
same email check.
The controller's bao policy gains the `swarm/hives/+/forge/token` leaf
(create/read/update), pinned by the bao-grants module-eval assertion. The
hive's own policy already reads `swarm/hives/<hive>/*`.
hive-c0re reads that token through `forge::reader_token()`, falling back
to the core token file when the store holds none, and uses it for:
fetching a merged config rev (swarm deploy, `hivectl forge
reconcile-config`), reseeding a purged `applied`, the meta-update
cascade's fast-forward, seeding `proposed` on first deploy, and finding
the PR that merged a refused rev. Those reads no longer require a local
`hive-forge` container. The `/knowledge` clone moves from the forge
host's boot sweep into the knowledge pull, so every hive clones it.
Posting the deploy-failure comment on that PR stays on the core token.
Refs #4851
The reseed bail text, the `ensure_all` doc, the forge module doc and a
rebuild comment still described hive-c0re mirroring the applied config to
`agent-configs/<name>`. State what the code does now; scope the
config-changes doc to swarm-created agents and say what a legacy agent
whose repo has no `main` gets.
Refs #4851
Per the operator's ruling on #4851 (option (a)): the hive holds no
write identity on the forge, so the `push_config` mirror of an applied
repo's tags and `main` to `agent-configs/<name>` is removed, along with
its `run_config_push` helper and its call in `sync_agent`.
Docs and comments that described the mirror now say that forge `main`
advances only by an operator's merge.
Refs #4851
The docs, option descriptions and comments that named the swarm root, the
swarm CA or the hive CA as an existing trust anchor now name the secret
store's pki root or the trust bundle that holds it:
- docs/swarm/README.md, secrets.md, bao.md
- deploy.bao.clientCaFile's and gateway.verifiedProxyTo's descriptions
- comments in hive-c0re/src/meta.rs, hive-agent/src/swarm_queue.rs,
swarm-logs/src/auth.rs, swarm-controller/src/vcs_metrics.rs,
hive-forge, swarm-authelia, swarm-ci-runner, glue-bao-tls, swarm-bao,
swarm-grafana, swarm-otel, otel, hive-c0re, lib/hive-ca-trust.nix,
hive-forge/Cargo.toml and the flake-update workflow
Nothing behaves differently: every edit is a nix, Rust or TOML comment, an
option description, or a test assertion message. The Rust edits change the
workspace source, which this PR already rebuilds for hivectl.
Refs #4588
hive-c0re waited on hive-priv's answer with no timeout, so a hung
hive-priv would stall the disk sampler indefinitely. The wait is now
hive-priv's own 10 min bound plus a minute (the bound is shared as
MEASURE_AGENT_DISK_TIMEOUT); a timeout is an error, so the agent shows
unknown.
An agent with none of state/, work/ or the rootfs has no measurable
size. hive-priv now answers with an error for it instead of a total of
0, which read as a real measurement.
