The internal forge is the canonical store for the meta flake, every
agent's config repo, and the internal/* repos, so it can no longer be
optional. Remove the services.hyperhive.forge.enable toggle:
- hive-forge.nix: drop the `enable` option; the forge config now
deploys gated on `services.hyperhive.enable` (it ships with hyperhive).
- hive-c0re.nix: HIVE_FORGE_URL env unconditional; forge-public-URL gate
drops the enable check (keeps behindGateway).
- hive-gateway.nix: local /etc/hosts forge entry keyed on behindGateway.
- hive-ci.nix: drop the now-moot `forge.ci.enable requires forge.enable`
assertion (forge is always present); reword the option doc.
- nix/docs/default.nix: drop the `forge.enable = mkForce false` stub
(option gone); the options-doc eval stays light via hyperhive.enable.
- hive-c0re forge.rs / hivectl.rs: reword 'forge.enable = true' error
text to 'wait for hive-c0re to start the container' (the runtime
token-absent path is unchanged — it's a bootstrap-timing check, not
the opt-out).
- docs/approvals.md, docs/ci.md: drop stale forge.enable references.
Migration: configs that set `services.hyperhive.forge.enable = false`
must drop the line — the forge is now mandatory.
Prereq/companion to #1838 (PR-based config flow, which assumes the forge
is always present).
Per argus review: std::env::var(..).ok() yields Some("") for an empty
env value, so require_hive_domain would 'succeed' with an empty domain
and emit invalid nix (swarm.peers."" = …). Filter empty so it resolves
to None → the CLI's clear 'domain unset' error fires instead.
Per operator review (#1899): the hive's own domain should never be
typed by hand. Remove the --domain flag from peer-config and wg init
entirely; both now resolve it from the daemon (HostRequest::HiveDomain).
peer-config errors with a clear hint if the daemon can't answer; wg init
prints the peer block best-effort (skips it, still enables the mesh, if
unresolved). Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Per operator review: hivectl shouldn't make the operator retype this
hive's own domain. Add a HostRequest::HiveDomain admin-socket query
(c0re answers from HYPERHIVE_HIVE_DOMAIN, already in its service env) and
a domain field on HostResponse.
hivectl peer-config now resolves the domain as: --domain override (kept
for offline/scripted use), else the daemon query; errors with a clear
hint when neither resolves. wg init resolves it best-effort too, so it
prints the hand-over peer-config block without --domain (skipped, not
failed, when the daemon is unreachable).
Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Add `hivectl peer-config --domain <this-hive-domain>`: prints the
`services.hyperhive.swarm.peers."<domain>"` nix block a peer operator
pastes to federate with this hive. Emits `caCert = ./<hive>-ca.pem` plus
a `cp /var/lib/hive-tls/ca.pem ./<hive>-ca.pem` line when this hive
serves a self-signed CA (the cert file exists); omits caCert for
ACME/public-CA hives (trusted by the default bundle). Includes the
WireGuard public key when the mesh key exists, and the
wireguardAddress/Endpoint passed via flags.
`wg init` gains an optional --domain; when set it calls peer-config at
the end, so a fresh mesh setup prints the hand-over block in one command.
Pure output — reads local state (TLS CA cert presence, wg key), never
mutates. Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Closes#1897.
Add swarm.peers.<domain>.caCert (path to a peer hive's root CA PEM),
trusted everywhere the hive's own internal CA is — so a self-signed
peer hive can federate (matrix) and any in-hive consumer validates its
certs.
Mechanism (reuses the existing hive-CA embedding): the meta-flake
renderer embeds a LIST of CA files next to each agent's flake —
hive-ca.pem (the hive's own self-signed CA, when active) plus each peer
caCert as peer-ca-<N>.pem — and emits them all in
security.pki.certificateFiles, so every agent trusts them at build
time. The matrix container trusts the same peer CAs for federation TLS.
Nothing is installed in the host trust store; the certs live in the nix
store (no mutable host file).
- meta.rs: embedded_ca_files() = hive CA + peer CAs (from new
HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS env); ca_embed_state() tracks the list (content +
add/remove); sync_agents materialises + stages the list; render emits
the multi-entry certificateFiles. Tests cover hive-only / hive+peers
/ peers-only / none.
- hive-c0re.nix: HIVE_PEER_CA_PATHS service env (colon-joined caCerts);
caCert / certFingerprint option docs updated to the hive-wide scope.
- hive-matrix.nix + docs/swarm.md: scope + comment updates.
certFingerprint stays the c0re-only leaf-pin path.
Per operator direction (no privileged mode; everything is perms /
capabilities), remove the socket-derived `privileged: bool` from the
unified dispatch and gate every verb on the caller's identity instead:
- serve/dispatch/dispatch_shared/dispatch_orchestration + all lifecycle
handlers drop the `privileged` param.
- lifecycle (start/kill/restart/update/init_config/apply_commit) + get_logs
gate on `topology::is_descendant_of` (a parent owns its whole subtree; the
root covers every agent as a consequence, no positional privilege). The
restart infra-branch stays InfraAdmin-gated (orthogonal).
- agent-state queries (loose-ends / reminder count + rollup): own subtree is
free, other agents + the hive-wide `"*"` sweep require QueryAgentState.
require_new_child + resolve_agent_state_target widened direct-child -> subtree.
- hive-wide orchestration verbs gate on the grantable tool-group via
tool_groups::groups_for: schedules -> `scheduling`, meta-inputs +
cancel-approval -> `approvals`. update_meta_inputs now attributes the
approval to the caller, not a hardcoded MANAGER_AGENT.
- #1834 cancel-guard unwind: handle_cancel_loose_end drops `privileged`
(agent path is never privileged); question/reminder cancels are
ownership-only, approval cancel checks the `approvals` tool-group.
The manager socket stays as pure transport (serves agent=ruth, no authority
of its own); collapsing it into ruth's per-agent socket is the #1825
follow-up. No is_root here — root-identity primitives are #1825's.
The per-agent and manager sockets ran two parallel dispatchers with
duplicated lifecycle handlers (agent-side topology-gated, manager-side
ungated) plus a manager-only handler set. Collapse to one parameterized
server in socket_server.rs:
- one serve() + dispatch(req, agent, privileged, coord); start() binds
the per-agent sockets (privileged=false), start_manager() binds the
manager socket (privileged=true).
- each lifecycle/config handler (start/restart/kill/update/init_config/
apply_commit) merges its dual: the topology guard (require_child /
require_new_child) runs only on the !privileged path; init_config
records the requester as parent only when !privileged. restart keeps
the orthogonal, capability-gated + audited infra-container branch.
- the agent-state queries (loose-ends / reminder count + rollup) branch
on privileged: privileged keeps any-target + the "*" hive-wide sweep
(query_agent_state-gated), non-privileged keeps the topology/cap gate.
- the privileged-only verbs (schedules / meta-inputs / get_logs) plus
the submit/schedule/watchdog helpers move into socket_server; they are
reached via dispatch_privileged_only(), which rejects the whole group
on a non-privileged socket.
- delete manager_server.rs; repoint refs; merge the test modules.
No behavior change: the topology guard still applies on every
non-privileged lifecycle call, the privileged socket still acts on any
agent, and privileged-only verbs are still rejected on agent sockets.
Pure rename ahead of the agent+manager server consolidation: the
per-agent socket dispatcher already hosts the shared dispatch and all
lifecycle handlers, and will absorb the manager-only handlers next, so
`agent_server` becomes a misnomer. No logic change — git mv plus a
mechanical `agent_server` -> `socket_server` rename across refs.
The cancel-loose-end guards (cancel approval / question / reminder)
inferred manager-level privilege by string-matching the canceller
against the hardcoded `hive_sh4re::MANAGER_AGENT` ("ruth"). That laundered
privilege through a name: a request arrives on the privileged manager
socket, gets stamped with the bootstrap agent's name, and the guards
re-derive privilege from that name. Renaming or replacing the bootstrap
agent would then silently move privilege.
Privilege is a property of the SOCKET the request arrived on (the manager
socket is the trust boundary), so thread an explicit `privileged: bool`
through `dispatch_shared` → `handle_cancel_loose_end` → the three guards:
- `Broker::cancel_reminder_as` and `OperatorQuestions::cancel`: the
`== MANAGER_AGENT` leg becomes `privileged` (owner/asker + operator name
legs unchanged).
- `check_approval_canceller_is_manager(canceller)` →
`check_can_cancel_approval(privileged)` (manager-socket-only); unit tests
updated to assert on the flag.
The manager socket passes `privileged = true`; the agent socket passes
`false`. `MANAGER_AGENT` is still passed as the actor NAME for legitimate
attribution/routing (notifications, schedule ownership, bootstrap
destroy-protection) — those are not privilege checks and are left intact.
Scope is the privilege guards only.
nginx proxied `<hive>/` straight to hive-c0re:7000, and hive-c0re served the
dashboard dist itself via `tower_http::ServeDir` (from `HIVE_STATIC_DIR` baked
into its service env). So a frontend-only change rebuilt the hive-c0re unit and
restarted the core daemon — every operator session dropped its SSE stream for a
pure CSS/JS change.
The gateway nginx now static-serves the dashboard dist directly; hive-c0re's
dashboard router is API-only. The split uses the Accept-header SPA fallback (the
same `map $http_accept` pattern the matrix/agent vhosts already use), so no
backend prefix has to be enumerated: a browser navigation (Accept: text/html)
whose path is not an on-disk asset gets the SPA index.html; everything else
(every /api route, the bare action/mutation routes, the two SSE streams, the
knowledge webhook — all Accept != text/html) falls through `try_files` to the
`@c0re` named location and is reverse-proxied to hive-c0re. A new c0re route
needs no gateway change.
- hive-c0re.nix: expose the themed dist as a new internal read-only option
`services.hyperhive.c0re.servedFrontend`; drop `HIVE_STATIC_DIR` from the
service env (the router no longer serves files).
- hive-gateway.nix: read that option in host-module scope (dashboardDist),
static-serve `dashboard/` with the Accept-header `try_files ... @c0re` split;
`@c0re` carries `proxy_buffering off` + a 1d read timeout for the SSE streams
and a duplicated auth_basic block (named locations do not inherit it). The
dashboard map is unconditional; the matrix map stays gated on the matrix GUI.
- dashboard.rs: drop the ServeDir fallback + the HIVE_STATIC_DIR resolution; the
router 404s unmatched paths (the gateway only proxies non-static requests).
- hive-c0re/Cargo.toml: drop the now-unused tower-http dependency.
- docs/gateway.md: document the dashboard static split + the `@c0re` fall-through.
The store path is reachable inside the gateway nspawn container (shared
/nix/store), mirroring how HIVE_AGENT_FRONTEND_DIR already exposes the per-agent
UIs. The gateway and c0re changes must land together (atomic cutover) or the
dashboard 404s — this needs a watched gateway + c0re rebuild.
Replace the #-number tracker references in code comments with prose
(tracker-tag lint; hive convention is prose in source). No behaviour
change. Branch-protection / collaborator / team / repo API field names
were verified against the live Forgejo swagger.
Closes the #1787 loop — the sanctioned create path now that agents
can't create repos directly. Adds:
- wire: Request::CreateRepo{repo} + Response::RepoCreated{full_name,
clone_url} (hive-sh4re).
- agent_server: dispatch_shared arm + handle_create_repo — validates the
repo name, then forge::create_agent_repo (org-owned repo, agent=write
collaborator, operator-team branch protection). Returns the full name
+ clone url so the agent can git clone immediately.
- MCP: create_repo tool + CreateRepoArgs in the harness.
- a new opt-in ToolGroup::Forge (=[create_repo]) so the operator
controls which agents can spin up repos (least privilege).
Workspace clippy -D warnings, cargo test, nix fmt all green.
Agents must no longer create repos with their own forge token (a
write-scoped token otherwise creates + owns repos and can self-merge,
bypassing operator-only-merge). Instead:
- Set max_repo_creation=0 on every agent forge user (marker-guarded
PATCH in sync_agent; covers agents provisioned before this). Blocks
new direct creation; push/PR/clone and existing repos are untouched.
- Provision a c0re-owned 'agents' org (the namespace agent repos land
in) plus an empty 'operators' team inside it. The org owns the repos
so perms stay c0re-managed; the operator joins the team out-of-band.
- create_agent_repo() is the sanctioned path: creates the repo in the
agents org, adds the requesting agent as a *write* collaborator (not
owner), and applies branch protection that whitelists merge + required
approval to the operators team — so the author can't merge its own PR.
- is_hive_managed_namespace() guards 'internal'/'agent-configs'/'core'
against a future create surface passing an explicit owner.
No existing repos are modified. The agent/hivectl surface that invokes
create_agent_repo is a follow-up commit.
Two non-blocking points from the subvol-upgrade review:
- The start request was `?`-propagated before the migration result was
surfaced, so a restart-side failure (incl. the IPC call itself
erroring) could shadow whether the migration succeeded or failed.
Capture the start result instead and surface the migration outcome
first; the restart-failure messages now point at `hivectl start
--agent <name>` for manual recovery.
- The crash-window case (host dies between the two swap renames, leaving
the agent root missing but the original data under `.<name>.old`) now
detects the leftover and tells the operator to `mv` it back, instead
of a bare "no state dir to upgrade — nothing to do".
Replace the stringly-typed infra-control path with an InfraContainer enum
(Ci/Forge/Gateway/Matrix). The variants are the allowlist: serde rejects any
unknown or unsafe name (hive-c0re has no variant) at the wire boundary, so
hive-priv no longer needs a root-side SIBLING_CONTAINERS.contains() check on
ControlInfraContainer — the type enforces it, and 'the daemon can't stop
itself' is a compile-time guarantee.
- priv_proto: InfraContainer enum; manual Serialize/Deserialize + FromStr +
unit_name() all key off one mapping, so the wire form ('hive-ci', …) is
unchanged and there's no drift. ControlInfraContainer.container: String ->
InfraContainer.
- hive-priv / priv_client / server.rs: thread the enum; scoped_infra returns
Vec<InfraContainer>; the control handler uses unit_name().
- agent_server: the infra_admin restart gate parses the name via FromStr
instead of a slice .contains().
- SIBLING_CONTAINERS stays (validate_container_name/_system_name still use it
for journals / general container validation); a test keeps the enum and the
slice in lockstep.
New agents get a btrfs subvolume state root automatically when the host
FS is btrfs, but agents that predate that migration are left on plain
dirs and miss the subvolume feature set (snapshots, per-subvol
usage/quota, send/receive migration). Add an opt-in operator verb to
convert an existing plain-dir agent in place.
btrfs cannot promote a directory to a subvolume in place, so the new
privileged op stages a sibling subvolume mirroring the dir (create +
`cp -a --reflink=auto` preserving ownership/permissions/xattrs + match
the root's owner and mode), then atomically renames the original aside
and the subvolume into place, then removes the original. Any failure
before the swap leaves the original untouched; idempotent (no-op if
already a subvolume) and btrfs-gated.
The `hivectl subvol upgrade <agent> --yes` verb composes it client-side
like `restart`: stop the agent so its state bind-mount is released, run
the migration via hive-priv, then restart it — the restart is attempted
regardless of the migration outcome so a failed migration never leaves
the agent down.
- hive-sh4re: UpgradeAgentSubvolume priv request variant.
- hive-priv: the migration handler plus stage/cleanup helpers.
- hive-c0re: priv_client wrapper and the hivectl verb; regen CLI docs.
Select the level-0 (`0/<subvolid>`) leaf qgroup row explicitly instead
of taking the last data line, so usage parsing is unambiguous even if an
operator has assigned the subvolume to a higher-level aggregate qgroup.
`btrfs qgroup show -f <path>` already scopes the listing to qgroups
impacting the given path (excluding ancestral qgroups, per
btrfs-qgroup-show(8)); selecting the `0/` leaf among them pins it to the
subvolume's own automatic usage qgroup.
Also: case-insensitive match on the stable "quota not enabled" error
fragment (wording varies across btrfs-progs versions), `# Errors` doc
sections on the three public priv_client quota functions, and precise
doc comments on the `-f` flag semantics.
Follow-up to the btrfs-subvolume migration. Operator-opt-in disk
accounting + quotas on agent state subvolumes via btrfs qgroups:
- three privileged ops (qgroup ops need root): EnsureBtrfsQuota
(btrfs quota enable on the agent-state filesystem — statfs-gated,
idempotent, no-op off btrfs), ReadSubvolumeUsage (btrfs qgroup show
-f --raw for one agent), SetSubvolumeQuota (btrfs qgroup limit, or
clear). Reuses the is_on_btrfs helper from the subvolume work.
- priv_client wrappers, incl parse_qgroup_usage -> (referenced,
exclusive) bytes.
- hivectl 'quota' subcommand: enable / show [agent] / limit <agent>
<size|none>, with a K/M/G/T size parser + human-readable output.
Quota is deliberately NOT auto-enabled: btrfs quota enable triggers a
full rescan that is I/O-heavy on a large filesystem, and the operator
should choose when to pay that. 'quota show' on a plain-dir agent (no
subvolume) reports no qgroup data rather than erroring.
One-time-setup convenience for the inter-hive WireGuard mesh
(services.hyperhive.swarm) so nobody has to remember the wg dance:
- hivectl wg init [--address X] — generate (if absent) the hive's
private key at /etc/wireguard/hive.key (0400, never clobbered),
derive + print the public key, and print the swarm.wireguard nix
snippet to enable the mesh.
- hivectl wg peer <domain> --pubkey --address [--endpoint] — print the
swarm.peers.<domain> nix snippet to add a remote hive.
- hivectl wg status — wrap wg show wg-hive.
Hybrid model per the design: the verb owns the imperative state (the
key file), the operator pastes the printed nix into host config (kept
in git) — nothing mutates declarative config behind their back.
hivectl-only (root host ops, like the gateway htpasswd verbs); no
priv/wire/c0re changes.
flake: wrap hivectl with wireguard-tools on PATH so wg resolves even
before the mesh config (which would otherwise pull it in) exists —
wg init is the first setup step. Add clippy.toml doc-valid-idents for
the WireGuard proper noun. Regenerate hivectl-cli.md.
Add a 'hivectl completions <shell>' subcommand (clap_complete) that
prints a completion script for bash/zsh/fish/elvish/powershell, generated
from hivectl's own clap command tree so it never drifts from the real
verbs/flags. The package build installs the bash/zsh/fish scripts via
installShellFiles, so an operator gets working completion automatically
once hivectl is on their profile with shell completion enabled.
Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md for the new verb.
- Replace the #-number tracker references in code comments with prose
(tracker-tag lint; hive convention is prose in source).
- ensure_agent_subvolume now treats a chown failure on the freshly
created subvolume as fatal: it rolls the subvolume back (deletes it)
and returns an error, instead of warning and leaving a root-owned
subvol that hive-c0re can't write into (which would also make the
c0re-side exists-check skip the retry, wedging the agent).
Progressive enhancement: a brand-new agent's state root under
/var/lib/hyperhive/agents is created as a btrfs subvolume when the host
filesystem is btrfs, otherwise it falls back to a plain directory. No
existing agent is auto-migrated — the new path only fires when the root
does not yet exist, so plain-dir agents are left untouched until an
explicit opt-in upgrade.
Two new privileged ops (subvolume create/delete are root-only):
EnsureAgentSubvolume statfs-gates on btrfs, creates the subvolume, and
chowns it to the hive-core user so the normal state/claude/harness
mkdirs succeed inside it; DeleteAgentSubvolume btrfs-subvolume-deletes
the root iff it is actually a subvolume. hive-c0re calls Ensure before
the per-agent dirs are created (spawn/rebuild/InitConfig) and Delete on
the purge path only — destroy keeps the subvolume for revival, matching
plain-dir semantics. btrfs-progs added to the hive-priv unit PATH.
Per-subvolume usage accounting + optional quota is a separate
follow-up.
Drop the enumeration of what the flag does not apply to, per operator
review on the sibling graceful-stop change. Regenerate the CLI doc so
the markdown-docs self-diff check stays in sync.
`hivectl restart [scope]` cycles the scoped containers — composes the
existing stop + start daemon ops client-side (reusing the merged Stop/Start
wire ops + global --socket), so no new wire/c0re surface. Same scope model
as stop/start (--agents/--agent/--ci/--forge/--gateway/--matrix), and
--graceful on the stop half. If the stop phase reports a failure the start
phase is skipped so a half-stopped hive isn't blindly started over.
Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
The host admin socket path was duplicated on every daemon-assisted verb
(agents restart/restart-all, stop, start). Hoist it to a single global arg
on the top-level Cli (`--socket`, default DEFAULT_HOST_SOCKET, accepted
before or after the subcommand) and thread cli.socket through dispatch.
Verbs that don't talk to the daemon ignore it. Pure CLI-ergonomics change;
no wire/behaviour change. Regenerated docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md.
Per review: RESTARTABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS and the new CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS
were near-identical subsets of SIBLING_CONTAINERS. Drop both and validate infra
lifecycle ops against SIBLING_CONTAINERS directly (all four infra containers;
hive-c0re is never in it, so it can't stop itself). This also makes hive-matrix
restartable, including via an infra_admin agent's restart tool.
Collapse the two priv ops too: RestartInfraContainer is gone; ControlInfraContainer
{ action } is the single op (restart = action: Restart). priv_client's
restart_infra_container is now a thin wrapper over control_infra_container.
Per review: c0re expands the LifecycleScope to explicit container-name
lists (scoped_agents / scoped_infra) in the dispatch arm, then hands those
lists to handle_stop / handle_start. The 'all agents' flag no longer flows
past the resolution boundary, so downstream consumers (incl. the future
graceful-stop queue) always operate on concrete names. CLI --agents flag
unchanged.
Until the per-agent quiesce lands, --graceful falls through to a hard
stop. Help-text the limitation so an operator passing the flag isn't
misled into thinking the agent quiesced.
`hivectl stop` brings the whole hive down in one operator action — all
sub-agents plus the ci/forge/gateway/matrix infra containers — and
`hivectl start` brings it back up. Scope flags (--agents, --agent <name>,
--ci, --forge, --gateway, --matrix) narrow the set; a bare invocation
targets everything. hive-c0re never stops itself.
- hive-sh4re: HostRequest::{Stop,Start} + LifecycleScope wire type;
priv_proto InfraAction + ControlInfraContainer + the
CONTROLLABLE_INFRA_CONTAINERS allowlist (adds hive-matrix, excludes
hive-c0re).
- hive-priv: control_infra_container handler (systemctl <verb>
container@<name>, allowlist-validated root-side).
- hive-c0re: handle_stop / handle_start fan out agents via lifecycle and
infra via hive-priv; per-target failures are aggregated. Infra
systemctl routes through hive-priv (the privsep boundary).
- The --graceful flag is threaded through Stop now; the per-agent quiesce
itself lands with the graceful-agent-stop work.
