The user JWT the callout issues carried no exp, so nats-server armed no
expiry timer and a connection kept its grant until the client dropped it:
a deleted or re-minted agent queue secret, a removed OIDC client or an
expired access token never reached a live connection.
Every issued user JWT now expires at the presented OIDC token's exp
(read from the introspection answer) or an hour after issue, whichever
is sooner; the agent queue-secret path has no exp of its own and gets
the hour. Every queue client reconnects through an auth callback that
re-reads or re-mints its credential, so the forced reconnect presents a
current one.
Fixes#5432
The operator-boundary sentence about config PRs moves into the config:repo
block, the extra MCP servers bullet no longer names agent.nix, and agent
creation is described without a config repo. config_bind_source's doc
covers the empty mount of an archetype agent. The archetype doc says to
deploy swarm-nats-auth before the hives.
Refs #5386
The hive reads the agent-archetype key when it provisions and rebuilds an
agent and keeps it in swarm-agent-archetypes.json. For an archetype agent
the meta flake has no agent-<name> input and mkAgent imports
hyperhive.hyperhiveArchetypes.<name>.module; provisioning, rebuilds, the
meta-input cascade, a deploy's rev and the startup migration skip the
config repos. The harness gets HIVE_ARCHETYPE and the system prompt says
the agent has no config repo. The create form sends the picked archetype.
Adds the android-dev built-in.
Refs #5386
These three are per-host choices that hive-c0re reads and renders into
its agents, so they belong under the hive controller's deploy namespace
rather than swarm-wide:
- c0re.dashboardPort -> deploy.hive-controller.dashboardPort
- c0re.claudeCodePackage -> deploy.hive-controller.claudeCodePackage
(the claude-login and review-classifier containers on the same host
keep following it)
- otel.extraResourceAttributes -> deploy.hive-controller.otel.extraResourceAttributes
The old paths stay as mkRenamedOptionModule aliases, now in deploy.nix
with the namespace's other renames. github.enable and the collector port
stay swarm-wide.
Five host options whose values hive-c0re renders into every agent's
build move under services.hyperhive.swarm, so the swarm states each of
them once instead of every hive carrying its own copy:
c0re.dashboardPort -> swarm.dashboardPort
c0re.claudeCodePackage -> swarm.claudeCodePackage
github.enable -> swarm.github.enable
otel.collector.port -> swarm.hiveOtel.collectorPort
otel.extraResourceAttributes -> swarm.hiveOtel.extraResourceAttributes
Every old path is a mkRenamedOptionModule alias, so a host that sets one
keeps its value and gets an eval warning naming the new path. Types and
defaults are unchanged, so the rendered meta flake, serve.json and
hive-c0re's environment are the same as before on a host that sets
none of them.
The readers move with them: serve.json and its gc-root assertion, the
hive-c0re environment, the hive collector's listen address and bridge
port, the swarm collector's port-collision assertion, and the
claude-login and review-classifier containers' claude pin. The
swarm-services-switch fixture sets the swarm path and now also checks
that serve.json carries the pinned claude.
Part of #4857 (slice 2).
The builder's hyperhive input is the docs-stripped flake source, so an
agent config with docs.enable = true failed to evaluate: docs.source
defaults to reference-docs, built from the missing docs/. Pass the host's
c0re.hyperhiveDocs as a hyperhive-docs input and set docs.source from it,
as the hive's meta flake does.
Fixes#5411
The reviewer now has messaging, inbox and execution. execution is what
gives an agent the bash server, without which it cannot run hive-forge
or git to read a PR and post a review. meta is dropped: get_agent_meta
is not part of reviewing a PR.
Refs #5386
A flake declares agent archetypes in its `hyperhiveArchetypes` output,
`<name> = { module; meta; }`. The hyperhive flake ships `reviewer`
(default permissions without `execution`).
swarm-builder answers `$SWARM.builder.archetypes` with the `meta` of
every archetype its own hyperhive source declares. swarm-controller asks
once the queue connects and every 10 minutes, checks each archetype as
`POST /api/agents` checks its settings, and stores the result in the
`agent-archetypes` KV bucket when it changed. `GET /api/archetypes`
serves it, and the create form's archetype select prefills permissions,
resource caps and inference from it.
The agent created is an ordinary agent with its own config repo; the
archetype's module is not applied yet.
Refs #5386
A review request for a head whose newest recorded review approved or
requested changes now runs nothing: the classifier account posts that
verdict and table again, opening "Already reviewed <sha>, verdict
unchanged". A head whose newest review had no clean verdict, a failed
post, or no record gets a fresh run, as before.
An accepted request now keeps its key until its record is written, so a
request right after a run finishes reads that run's verdict instead of
starting a second run.
Part of #5387; the restart-loss half waits on #5219.
swarm-metrics reads the swarm's VictoriaMetrics from inside an agent
container: query, query-range, series, labels and label-values, each one
GET against the store's Prometheus read API through the gateway, printing
the store's JSON. It authenticates the way swarm-logs does, with the
agent's own queue secret read from bao under the agent's leaf, sent as
a swarm-agent bearer.
On the metrics store's host the read API's auth map gains an agent arm
ahead of the Grafana one. It routes to swarm-metrics-agent-auth, a
swarm-logs-auth instance logged in under the existing swarm-metrics-auth
leaf, whose bao grant now includes swarm/agents/+/queue read. The check is
rate-limited per address like the log store's
(deploy.victoriametrics.agentAuth{Rate,Burst,VerdictTtl}).
nix/agent-modules/metrics.nix installs the wrapped binary when the hive
forwards HIVE_AGENT_METRICS_URL (from swarm.victoriametrics.domain) and a
store address, the same gate as swarm-logs. Adds the base:swarm-metrics
skill and the CLI reference with its freshness check.
Fixes#5395
nix_build::run read nix's stdout and stderr with read_to_end, so a long
--print-build-logs run held its whole log in memory until nix exited,
though the reply uses only the last 30 lines (4000 bytes) of stderr and
the last non-empty line of stdout. Both streams now go through a Tail
that holds at most 128 KiB and keeps the last 64 KiB. Output under 64 KiB
reaches tail() whole, so those replies are unchanged.
hh-swarm-queue-connect-failed matched "swarm queue connect failed; this
agent publishes nothing upward", which nothing has logged since the
harness started retrying its first connect and exiting (235bc481b). The
rule now matches the error the harness logs when every attempt has
failed, CONNECT_EXHAUSTED in swarm_queue.rs, and its comment and summary
describe the retry-then-exit behaviour.
A failed MintAgentIdentity node logged nothing: the error reached only
the job graph. mint_identity now warns with the agent and the error, and
hh-agent-identity-mint-failed fires on that line.
Refs #4651
swarm-secret-publish and its path unit now run inside authelia's container,
beside the mint, and read each client secret at the path authelia writes it.
The host unit and host path unit, which read the secrets through the
container's root on the host, are gone, and so is
deploy.authelia.hostClientSecretDir, which only they read. The publisher keeps
its store identity, the secret-publisher leaf. The host hands the leaf and the
store's CA into the container as nspawn system credentials, and the unit loads
them; where this host mints the leaf, the container waits for swarm-bao-pki.
Authelia does not wait for the publisher, which retries every 30 seconds while
the store is down.
The container also runs the journal forwarder the other service containers
run, pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm collector (serviceProducers
swarm-authelia) as a new machine OIDC client (swarm.authelia.otel.clientId)
that authelia registers for itself and the publisher carries to the store. The
fetch unit reads it back under the publisher's leaf, also handed to it as a
system credential, so the swarm-secret-publisher policy gains read on that one
leaf; its stanza keeps create and update, which the exact path would otherwise
take from the services/* prefix. Without the leaf the forwarder is off.
The container drops --link-journal=host, and the host collector stops reading
it. The services' "nothing at <path>" errors name the publisher in authelia's
container.
A swarm-ci-metrics host unit on a 5-minute timer lists every forge
repo's Actions runs as the new read-only ci-metrics account and pushes
each finished run's duration and queue wait over OTLP, stamped at the
run's stop time. The first pass backfills from run 1. swarm-controller
mints the account's token into bao and keeps a ci-metrics team with
read on the Actions unit in every organisation.
Closes#5376
The dashboard filtered by hive and agent only, so the review classifier's
API-key spend could not be told apart from the agents' subscription usage.
Add a service variable (agents or the review classifier) and apply it to
every panel and to the agent variable's own query.
A pki start refused by its start limit failed every reader that
Requires= it with `dependency`. That leaves a unit inactive, not
failed, so Restart=on-failure never fired and readers without a
refresh timer never ran again (#5381: grafana 502 for ~43 min).
Readers and granting units now Wants= + After= pki; one whose leaf is
still missing fails its login with exit 1 into its existing retry.
pki gets StartLimitIntervalSec=0: it is deliberately not
RemainAfterExit, so each reader's start re-runs it.
`forgejo-swarm-controller-account`, in the forge's container, now puts
the swarm-controller's forge token into the swarm secret store itself,
under the forge publisher's leaf. The container already receives that
leaf as nspawn system credentials for its journal forwarder; the mint
loads the same three. The token reaches bao on stdin (`value=-`) and
the forge's API through a header file, never as an argument, and never
touches disk.
The mint's guard is a marker holding the published token's name, at
/var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token-name, written last: after the
put, and after every other `swarm-controller-boot-*` token of the
account is revoked through forgejo's admin API, authenticated as the
new token. So a put that failed, or a marker lost while the store kept
an older token, leaves no live token behind once a mint completes. The
mint logs in to the store and checks that the account is a site admin
before it mints, so a store that is down or an account the admin API
would refuse mints nothing on each retry. Failures retry under
store-retry; forgejo does not wait for the mint. No bao read and no
grant change: the forge publisher keeps create/update on the token.
Removed: the host's `swarm-bao-forge-publisher` service and path unit,
which read the token file through the container's root, and their
entries in the store and policy ordering glue. The forge publisher's
policy unit stays; `swarm-bao-forge-oidc` still uses the leaf.
On deploy, an existing forge host has no marker, so the mint runs once:
it mints a new token, publishes it, revokes the old one, and deletes
the old /var/lib/forgejo/swarm-controller-token. The controller's next
forge call gets a 401, re-reads the store and carries on.
An answer that fails to validate is asked for a second time, for that
classification only, with a reminder to reply with the JSON object alone.
The second ask comes out of the classification's CLASSIFICATION_DEADLINE:
it gets what the first ask left, and is skipped when less than 20 seconds
remain, so RUN_DEADLINE's bound still holds. A failed ask (runtime error,
timeout) is not repeated. If the second answer does not validate either,
the row has no answer, as before.
Model::ask takes the deadline for the ask; the ACP runtime no longer holds
its own.
The parser also takes the first fenced block of a reply that has prose
around the fence; prose around a bare object is still rejected.
The metrics store's container now runs the journal forwarder the other
service containers run, pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm
collector (serviceProducers swarm-victoriametrics) as a new machine OIDC
client (swarm.victoriametrics.otel.clientId), registered by a glue file
wherever authelia runs and published to the store by the secret publisher.
The container keeps its loopback-only netns. The collector cannot dial a
unix socket, so swarm-victoriametrics-egress-relay, a socket-activated
systemd-socket-proxyd inside the container, takes its connections on
127.0.0.1:4380 and passes them to /run/swarm-victoriametrics-egress/egress.sock.
The host's nginx listens there and sends /swarm-victoriametrics/ to the swarm
collector and /api/oidc/token to authelia, both by name and verified, and
refuses every other path. nginx gets ReadWritePaths on that directory and
removes a stale socket before it starts.
The container cannot reach the store, so the client secret is fetched on the
host by swarm-victoriametrics-forwarder-oidc under swarm-metrics-auth's leaf,
the shape swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc has, and bound into the container
read-only. The forwarder module gains hostSecretFile for that: set, it renders
no fetch unit. swarm-metrics-auth's policy gains one read stanza on the
forwarder's client path.
The container drops --link-journal=host, and the host collector stops reading
it.
Also lists the forge publisher's and matrix-ctl's leaves in the forwarder
secrets row of docs/swarm/secrets.md, which the hive-forge/hive-matrix change
missed.
Each container now runs the journal forwarder the CI runner's, Grafana's and
the log store's containers run, pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm
collector (serviceProducers hive-forge and hive-matrix). Each authenticates as
a new machine OIDC client of its own (swarm.forge.otel.clientId,
swarm.matrix.otel.clientId), registered by a glue file wherever authelia runs,
minted by authelia and published to the store by the secret publisher. The
forge's and the homeserver's browser login clients are unchanged. The client
ids are swarm-forge-collector and swarm-matrix-collector, not
hive-<x>-collector, which is the client id a hive named <x>-collector gets.
The fetch unit inside each container reads the client secret with the store
identity the host already holds for that service. The forge publisher's leaf
is handed into the forge container as an nspawn system credential, as the
grafana and log store containers do. matrix-ctl's leaf is already bound into
the homeserver's container, so its forwarder reads it at those paths, as
swarm-matrix-appservice-publish does; with no matrix-ctl identity the
homeserver's forwarder is off. Each of the two policies gains one read stanza
on its forwarder's client path. The host units that use those identities are
unchanged.
The two containers drop --link-journal=host, and the host collector stops
reading them.
Each container now runs the journal forwarder the queue's and the builder's
containers run, pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm collector. Each
authenticates as a new machine OIDC client of its own
(swarm.<service>.otel.clientId), registered by a glue file wherever authelia
runs, minted by authelia and published to the store by the secret publisher.
Grafana's browser login client is unchanged.
The fetch unit inside each container reads the client secret with the store
identity the host already holds for that service (the runner's, Grafana's,
and the log store responder's), now also handed into the container as an
nspawn system credential. Each of those three policies gains one read stanza
on its forwarder's client path. The host units that use those identities are
unchanged.
The three containers drop --link-journal=host, and the host collector stops
reading them.
The gateway nginx serves stub_status on a loopback server of its own,
127.0.0.1:8085 (services.hyperhive.gateway.statusPort). The hive-tier
collector reads it with the contrib nginx receiver, which the pinned
otelcol-contrib 0.151.0 ships, so no exporter daemon is added. The
receiver dials http:// only (a unix: or http+unix: endpoint fails with
"unsupported protocol scheme"), so the listener is loopback TCP with
allow 127.0.0.1 / deny all rather than a unix socket.
The new gateway dashboard plots nginx.requests, nginx.connections_current
by state, and nginx.connections_accepted against handled, per hive.
Part of #5342.
Each container now runs the journal forwarder the queue's container runs,
pushing to a receiver of its own on the swarm collector as the service's
existing OIDC client, with the client's secret read inside the container
by the fetch unit. Their store identities are system credentials, so the
fetch unit loads them too. The three containers drop --link-journal=host,
which hid their journals from the forwarder, and the host collector stops
reading them.
The swarm-nats container now runs its own otel collector, which reads the
container's journal and pushes it to the swarm collector at
https://<swarm.otel.domain>/swarm-nats, authenticated as the queue's
existing OIDC client (swarm.nats.clientId). Records carry
service.name=nats and no hive label.
The collector lives in a reusable container module,
nix/container-modules/swarm-journal-forwarder.nix, which follows
swarm-bao's forwarder: a journald receiver over /var/log/journal with
merge and a file_storage cursor, an otlphttp exporter with an
oauth2client authenticator that requests its own client id as audience,
self-metrics on a loopback telemetry port, and the client secret handed
in through LoadCredential. Unlike swarm-bao, the secret is fetched inside
the container by swarm-journal-forwarder-oidc.service, under the
container's own store identity (the swarm-nats-auth leaf, which already
holds a read grant on secret/swarm/services/swarm-nats/oidc/client).
The fetch retries until the store answers, and the collector restarts
until the file exists. A 10-minute timer re-reads the secret and restarts
the collector when it changed.
The swarm collector's authenticated producer route was hard-wired to
swarm-bao. It is now rendered from swarm.otel.serviceProducers
(internal), one receiver, oidc authenticator, gateway location and
pipeline entry per service: swarm-bao (port 4391, unchanged names) and
swarm-nats (port 4392). The reserved-fragment and port-collision
assertions cover every entry.
The queue's OIDC client registration gains its own id as audience and
RS256-signed access tokens, which the receiver verifies offline.
swarm-nats drops --link-journal=host, so its journal stays in the guest
where the forwarder reads it, as swarm-bao did in 44009dc51. The new
swarm.nats.otel.telemetryPort (8891) keeps the forwarder off the
collectors' 8888-8890 in the shared host netns, with an assertion.
module-eval-nats-authelia gains four cases: the container's forwarder
and fetch unit on the store host and on a queue-only host, the
responder role's read grant, the swarm collector's swarm-nats receiver
on a host without the queue, and the client registration.
Part of #4499
Part of #5342
credentials.md, services.md and secrets.md each started with text that
belongs elsewhere, ahead of the heading: a cell fragment glued onto the
heading line, and two table rows. Put each back in its table or cell.
secrets.md was already broken on main (the swarm-builder row of the
per-unit table sat above the heading); the other two came in with this
branch.
Grafana's VictoriaLogs datasource now targets https://logs.<swarm> and sends
the same static bearer as the metrics datasource. The log store's vhost routes
a 64-hex Authorization bearer to a second swarm-metrics-auth instance
(swarm-logs-grafana-auth, cert role swarm-logs-auth, which gains a read on the
bearer's store path). swarm-agent. tokens and everything else keep their routes.
Part of #3742 (DoD 3, logs).
The three delivery units made /run/swarm-grafana-secrets only after
`bao login` and `bao kv get`, so with the store sealed or unreachable the
bind source was never created by them and a switch could restart the
container without it. Each script now starts with the install, from one
shared `ensureSecretDir`, and the tmpfiles comment says what is true.
The module-eval case asserts the install precedes `bao login` in all three
scripts. docs/swarm/sso.md states that after a reboot Grafana stays down
until the secret store answers.
Part of #4998 (slice 2b: grafana).
The three delivery units still read from bao under Grafana's own leaf, but
now write to /run/swarm-grafana-secrets on the host (tmpfs), which the
container bind-mounts read-only at the same path. Before, they wrote to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/swarm-grafana/var/lib/{grafana-oidc,grafana-admin,
grafana-metrics}/ on persistent disk, where a superseded value stayed after
rotation and went into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now
removes the three old files.
Rotation is unchanged: refresh_consumer restarts Grafana (or starts it if it
failed) when a file changes, since Grafana reads each $__file{} once as it
starts. After a reboot the files are fetched again; until the store answers
Grafana stays down, where before it came up on the last copy from disk.
Part of #4998 (slice 2b).
The swarm UI has no switch of its own since it runs wherever the
controller runs; its package option follows it under
deploy.swarm-controller.ui. deploy.swarm-ui.package and
swarm.ui.package stay as renames and warn at evaluation. The flake's
default, the vhost root and the module-eval stub use the new path.
swarm-bao-matrix-oidc still reads the secret from bao under matrix-ctl's
leaf, but now writes it to /run/hive-matrix-oidc on the host (tmpfs), which
the container bind-mounts read-only for tuwunel's LoadCredential. Before, it
wrote it to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-matrix/var/lib/tuwunel-oidc/<id>.secret on
persistent disk, where a superseded secret stayed after rotation and went
into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now removes that old file.
clientSecretFile must now lie under /run/hive-matrix-oidc/, the one directory
the container shares; any other value fails at evaluation.
Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the value
differs and refresh_consumer restarts tuwunel. After a reboot the secret is
fetched again; until the store answers, tuwunel does not start.
Part of #4998 (slice 4: tuwunel).
swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc still reads the secret from bao under the
forwarder's own leaf, but now writes it to /run/swarm-bao-forwarder-oidc on
the host (tmpfs), which the swarm-bao container bind-mounts read-only for the
collector's LoadCredential. Before, it wrote it to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/swarm-bao/var/lib/swarm-bao-otel-oidc/<id>.secret on
persistent disk, where a superseded secret stayed after rotation and went
into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now removes that old file.
Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the value
differs and refresh_consumer restarts the forwarder. After a reboot the
secret is fetched again; the file is not pre-created, so until the store
answers the forwarder stays down (LoadCredential refuses a missing source) and
resumes from its journal cursor afterwards. The container now starts after
systemd-tmpfiles-resetup, since the new bind source is made there.
Part of #4998 (slice 3: forwarder).
swarm-bao-otel-oidc still reads the secret from bao under the collector's
own leaf, but now writes it to /run/swarm-otel-oidc on the host (tmpfs),
which the container bind-mounts read-only for the collector's
LoadCredential. Before, it wrote it to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/swarm-otel/var/lib/swarm-otel-oidc/<id>.secret on
persistent disk, where a superseded secret stayed after rotation and went
into backups of the container root. Host tmpfiles now removes that old file.
Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the value
differs and refresh_consumer restarts the collector. After a reboot the
secret is fetched again; until the store answers the collector starts on an
empty file and the stores refuse its pushes and scrapes.
Part of #4998 (slice 2a).
swarm-bao-ci-runner still reads the token from bao under the runner's own
ci-runner leaf, but now writes it to /run/swarm-ci-runner on the host
(tmpfs), which the container bind-mounts read-only for the register
unit's LoadCredential. Before, it wrote the token to
/var/lib/nixos-containers/swarm-ci-runner/var/lib/swarm-ci-runner/registration-token
on persistent disk, where a superseded token stayed after rotation and
went into backups of the container root. The container's tmpfiles now
remove that old file.
Rotation is unchanged: the ten-minute timer rewrites the file when the
value differs and refresh_consumer restarts the runner. After a reboot
the token is fetched again; until the store answers, a runner that is
already registered keeps running and only a new registration waits.
Part of #4998 (slice 1).
The dashboard, its API, the swagger UI and the agent routes move to their
own vhost, `swarm.dashboardDomain` = `<hive>.hives.<swarm.domain>`, under
the swarm domain so authelia's session cookie reaches it. `/`, `/api/` and
`/api/docs/` ask authelia through `auth_request`, and authelia's
`operatorsOnly` rule for each hive's dashboard name lets only the admins
group in. The hive domain keeps matrix discovery and redirects every other
path to the new name.
The name rides as a SAN on the hive's own gateway leaf: the per-hive bao
role allows it, and hive-tls asks for it and checks coverage.
HTTP Basic auth is gone: the htpasswd writer and its test, the
`hivectl gateway` verbs and host-socket requests, the `gateway.auth`
options (now a removed-option error), the unauthorized page and the bcrypt
dependency. tmpfiles deletes a leftover gateway.htpasswd, which held
bcrypt hashes at 0644.
c0re hands out dashboard and agent URLs on the new name
(HYPERHIVE_DASHBOARD_DOMAIN), and the swarm controller's hive roster
carries each hive's dashboard name for the swarm UI's hive list.
Closes#3469
swarm-bao-forge-oidc fetched the forge's OIDC client secret from bao and wrote
it to /var/lib/nixos-containers/hive-forge/var/lib/forgejo-oidc/<id>.secret,
on the container's persistent root, where it outlived a bao rotation and was
in every backup of that tree.
Now the fetch writes it to /run/hive-forge-oidc/<id>.secret on the host
(tmpfs, root 0400). The directory is bound read-only into the container at
the same path, and forgejo-sso-source loads it through LoadCredential. A
tmpfiles rule creates the directory at boot, so the bind source always
exists, and removes the old persistent copy.
After a reboot the file is absent until the fetch succeeds, and
forgejo-sso-source fails to start until then; the fetch starts it again once
it writes the file. Logins keep working meanwhile: forgejo holds the secret
in its login-source row.
deploy.forgejo.sso.clientSecretFile (and its old swarm.forge.sso name) is
removed: it only chose where in the container the fetched file landed. The
fetch no longer needs the container's forgejo uid, so it no longer fails on a
fresh host before the container has created its state dir.
Part of #4998.
mara on #5170: "dont split caps and perms. its all perms. / dont include
the now empty tool groups / nothing set -> default / also add perms to
agent creation screen".
- hive-sh4re: one `Permission` enum (messaging, meta, inbox, execution,
web_tools, manage_root_agent) replaces `ToolGroup` and `Capability`;
`lifecycle`/`forge` are gone. `Permission::default_for` is the default
for an agent the swarm sets nothing for.
- The record is `{ "permissions": [...] }`. Missing key, unset field or
no successful read yet = default; `[]` = none; a failed read after a
good one keeps the last value.
- hive-agent reads its own key every 10s and builds each turn's --tools,
--allowedTools and MCP config (rewritten before every turn) from it;
the subagent daemon reads it on each start/continue. Agents get a
read-only grant on their own key.
- hive-c0re restarts an agent only when its manage_root_agent changes.
The import now merges meta/capabilities.json and meta/tool-groups.json
into one list per agent and deletes both; the "import pending, don't
read" decision is `ImportOutcome::read_allowed`, table-tested.
- swarm-controller: `GET /api/permissions` (names + default) and an
optional `permissions` on `POST /api/agents`, stored before the job is
queued. swarm-ui's create-agent form gets a permissions field.
- Deleted: HIVE_TOOL_GROUPS and its forward to the subagent daemon,
tool_groups.rs, ruth's tool-group seed, the permissions rebuild job
(PermPayload/WritePermFile/perm_change), the dashboard permissions tab
and its stale-entries panel.
Part of #5170.
swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token logs in to the store with Grafana's
leaf, like its three Grafana siblings, and glue-bao-readers-store-order.nix
already orders it after the store's container and PKI unit. The
services-switch case that pins that ordering did not list it, so dropping
it from the glue would have passed. It is now in the roster, and the count
of readers rendered off the store's host goes from 7 to 8: the unit exists
wherever Grafana does.
credentials.md gets the row for its store path, beside the controller's
forge token.
swarm-bao-grafana-controller-token, on the host that runs Grafana, logs in
to Grafana's API over its socket as the built-in admin (the password
swarm-bao-grafana-admin minted, #5138) and keeps a `swarm-controller`
service account that is an enabled Viewer. It mints a token for that
account and writes it to bao at
swarm/controller/swarm-controller/grafana/token under Grafana's leaf. A
ten-minute timer runs it again. The unit keeps a stored token Grafana
accepts. If Grafana refuses the stored token with 401, or bao holds
none, the unit deletes every token of the account and mints a new one.
Grafana's grant gains create/read/update on that leaf, and the
controller's gains read.
swarm-controller serves GET /api/alerts from Grafana's
/api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/alerts. It reads the token from bao,
keeps it in memory, and re-reads bao once on a 401. The HTTP client has
5s connect and 15s request timeouts. Any failure is a 503 that names its
cause. swarm-ui gets an /alerts page listing them, built the same way as
the hives page.
This is option (c) on #5129, the operator's choice.
create_agent puts back the caps and inference settings it replaced if a
later store or the job insert fails, so a refused creation leaves nothing
behind for the name. The shared field components take an id prefix so the
create dialog and an open editor never share a DOM id. The queue check now
follows the hive roster check, the 422 is documented, and the copy says
empty rather than closed and that destroy keeps stored settings.
