swarm: give agent containers their own queue principal
Agents have authelia *users*; they had no machine identity at all, so an agent could not authenticate to the swarm queue as anything. This mints one `agent-<hive>` OIDC client per hive beside the existing `hive-<hive>` one, teaches the auth-callout responder an agent arm, and opens the queue's client port on the bridge so a container can reach it. One client per HIVE, not per agent: agents are created at runtime, and a per-agent client would make creating one a config change plus an authelia reload. The cost is that agents on a hive are indistinguishable to the broker, which is deliberate and tracked separately. The agent grant is deny-by-default twice over. An agent id matches no hive rule, so it gets a hive's status-key grant from neither; and with no agent subject configured the responder returns no grant at all rather than an empty publish list, which would be a denial wearing a grant's shape. What an agent may publish is a deployment's decision, taken through `--agent-publish-subject` the same way `--hive-publish-subject` already works. `Policy::new` now refuses two prefixes where one contains the other. The arms are tried in order, so that overlap does not error at match time - it silently hands one principal the other's grant. Not shipped here, and neither is reachable without it: no subject is configured for agents anywhere in nix, and nothing yet delivers `agent-<hive>.secret` into an agent container. Both belong to the stream that will be the first consumer.
This commit is contained in:
parent
d7ca8d922b
commit
fe9417ae52
5 changed files with 301 additions and 13 deletions
|
|
@ -143,6 +143,33 @@ let
|
|||
accessTokenSignedResponseAlg = "RS256";
|
||||
}) hyperhiveCfg.swarm.hives;
|
||||
|
||||
# The identity an agent container presents to the swarm's queue. One per
|
||||
# HIVE, not per agent, and that is the load-bearing choice rather than a
|
||||
# shortcut: agents are created at **runtime**, so anything minted per agent
|
||||
# would make creating one a config change plus an authelia reload. Keyed on
|
||||
# the hive, this list's length tracks the roster above it — deploy-time, like
|
||||
# every other entry here.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ⚠️ The cost, stated rather than discovered later: every agent on a hive
|
||||
# presents the SAME client id, so the broker can tell *hives* apart and not
|
||||
# *agents*. Deliberate and deferred — closing it requires the client list to
|
||||
# stop being static, which is the same problem the users-database writer
|
||||
# already solves for identities.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Mirrors `hiveClients` field for field so the two stay comparable. The
|
||||
# signing algorithm is not load-bearing here — this client's only consumer is
|
||||
# the queue's auth-callout responder, which *introspects* rather than
|
||||
# verifying offline — but it matches its sibling rather than inventing a
|
||||
# second answer to a question nobody asked.
|
||||
agentClients = lib.mapAttrsToList (name: _: {
|
||||
id = "${cfg.agentClientPrefix}${name}";
|
||||
description = "HyperHive agents on hive ${name}";
|
||||
kind = "machine";
|
||||
redirectUris = [ ];
|
||||
audience = [ "${cfg.agentClientPrefix}${name}" ];
|
||||
accessTokenSignedResponseAlg = "RS256";
|
||||
}) hyperhiveCfg.swarm.hives;
|
||||
|
||||
# `swarm-authelia-bridge`'s own identity — distinct from
|
||||
# `swarm-controller`'s (`swarm-controller.nix`'s `queueClientId`). A
|
||||
# resource server introspecting a token proves its OWN identity to the
|
||||
|
|
@ -416,9 +443,21 @@ in
|
|||
default = deployCfg.nats.enable;
|
||||
defaultText = lib.literalExpression "services.hyperhive.deploy.nats.enable";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
Mint one machine client per hive in
|
||||
Mint machine clients per hive in
|
||||
{option}`services.hyperhive.swarm.hives`, so each hive can
|
||||
authenticate to swarm services as itself.
|
||||
authenticate to swarm services as itself: `hive-<name>` for the
|
||||
hive's own daemons, and `agent-<name>` for the agent containers
|
||||
running on it.
|
||||
|
||||
Two clients rather than one because they are not the same
|
||||
principal — a hive's daemons run on the host and an agent runs
|
||||
in a container the host hands a credential to, so a swarm
|
||||
service has to be able to grant them different things. It is
|
||||
one client per *hive* on the agent side, not per agent: agents
|
||||
are created at runtime, and a per-agent client would make
|
||||
creating one a config change plus an authelia reload. The cost
|
||||
is that agents on a hive are indistinguishable from each other,
|
||||
tracked as a follow-up rather than papered over.
|
||||
|
||||
Defaults to whether the swarm message queue is enabled, because
|
||||
that is the first service that needs a hive to prove who it is.
|
||||
|
|
@ -667,6 +706,27 @@ in
|
|||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
agentClientPrefix = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
readOnly = true;
|
||||
default = "agent-";
|
||||
description = ''
|
||||
Prefix of the OAuth2 client id minted for the *agents* of each hive
|
||||
in `services.hyperhive.swarm.hives` — agents on hive `alpha` all
|
||||
present
|
||||
`${config.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.agentClientPrefix}alpha`.
|
||||
Read-only for the same reason as `hiveClientPrefix`, and read by the
|
||||
same consumer with the same failure mode: a split spelling denies
|
||||
every agent as a timeout.
|
||||
|
||||
One id per hive rather than per agent, because agents are created at
|
||||
runtime and a per-agent client would make creating one a config
|
||||
change plus a reload. The consequence is that this identity says
|
||||
*which hive* an agent belongs to and never *which agent* — the
|
||||
broker cannot tell two agents on one hive apart.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
machine = lib.mkOption {
|
||||
type = lib.types.str;
|
||||
readOnly = true;
|
||||
|
|
@ -828,7 +888,7 @@ in
|
|||
# wherever this module is, so `oidc.clients` is never actually empty
|
||||
# — see `oidcEnabled`'s comment above.
|
||||
services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.oidc.clients =
|
||||
lib.optionals cfg.oidc.hiveIdentities hiveClients
|
||||
lib.optionals cfg.oidc.hiveIdentities (hiveClients ++ agentClients)
|
||||
++ [ bridgeClient ];
|
||||
|
||||
# A redirect URI on a machine client is not harmless-but-unused: it
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -233,6 +233,17 @@ in
|
|||
TCP port the queue listens on. 4222 is upstream's default and
|
||||
sits outside hyperhive's claimed ranges (dashboard 7000, forge
|
||||
3000, matrix 8008, every agent in 8100..8999 via FNV-1a hash).
|
||||
|
||||
Contributed to
|
||||
`services.hyperhive.network.exposeHostPorts`, which opens it on
|
||||
the bridge interface only — so it is reachable from agent
|
||||
containers and not from the outside world. An agent connects to
|
||||
`nats://<bridgeIp>:<port>`; loopback inside a container is the
|
||||
agent itself, not this host.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike {option}`monitorPort` and {option}`metricsPort`, the
|
||||
address is not what bounds who may use this port: the queue's
|
||||
`auth_callout` refuses every client it cannot identify.
|
||||
'';
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -564,6 +575,26 @@ in
|
|||
nats = "127.0.0.1:${toString cfg.metricsPort}";
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
# Open the client port on the bridge, so agent containers can reach
|
||||
# the queue. `privateNetwork = false` below means the server binds in
|
||||
# the host netns, which is the precondition this option names — but
|
||||
# sharing a netns is not reachability: the bridge interface is
|
||||
# default-deny, so without this an agent's connect attempt is dropped
|
||||
# by the firewall and looks exactly like every other NATS failure,
|
||||
# a timeout.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ⚠️ Bridge interface only — never the world. What makes it safe to
|
||||
# open at all is that the queue is fail-closed: `auth_callout` admits
|
||||
# nobody until the responder above answers for them, so an agent that
|
||||
# reaches this port still has to present a token authelia vouches for.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# An agent connects to `nats://<bridgeIp>:<port>`, NOT to
|
||||
# `nats://127.0.0.1:<port>` — inside a container loopback is the
|
||||
# *agent*. Every url in this repo today is the loopback one and each
|
||||
# is correct for its reader, because those readers share the host
|
||||
# netns; an agent does not.
|
||||
services.hyperhive.network.exposeHostPorts = [ cfg.port ];
|
||||
|
||||
containers.swarm-nats = {
|
||||
autoStart = true;
|
||||
ephemeral = false;
|
||||
|
|
@ -730,14 +761,15 @@ in
|
|||
# be the same string — which is why both come from one let.
|
||||
"--account ${lib.escapeShellArg clientAccount}"
|
||||
"--introspection-url ${lib.escapeShellArg introspectionUrl}"
|
||||
# Both of these name a principal some OTHER module mints,
|
||||
# so both are read out of that module rather than spelled
|
||||
# Each of these names a principal some OTHER module mints,
|
||||
# so each is read out of that module rather than spelled
|
||||
# again here — same argument as `--account` above, one
|
||||
# level wider. The responder denies a client id it does
|
||||
# not recognise, and a NATS denial arrives as a timeout,
|
||||
# so a drift here is silent at the point of change and
|
||||
# misattributed at the point of failure.
|
||||
"--hive-client-prefix ${lib.escapeShellArg autheliaCfg.hiveClientPrefix}"
|
||||
"--agent-client-prefix ${lib.escapeShellArg autheliaCfg.agentClientPrefix}"
|
||||
"--reader-client ${lib.escapeShellArg controllerCfg.queueClientId}"
|
||||
];
|
||||
# Every credential arrives by `LoadCredential` and is named
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue