swarm-controller: read the queue client secret from the store, drop the file
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The controller's OIDC client secret (client `swarm-controller`, used for the queue connection, the auth-bridge bearer and the OTLP push) came from an operator-placed file, `deploy.swarm-controller.queue.clientSecretFile`, handed in by `LoadCredential=`. Now `swarm-secret-publish`, which already copies authelia's minted OIDC secrets into the store, also publishes this one, to `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client`. That path sits under `controller/`, which no hive's policy reads. The controller reads it once at start with its existing store certificate and holds it in memory, as `swarm_queue_client::ClientSecret::Value`. If the store is down, it retries for about a minute and then fails the start, so `Restart=` tries again. Policy delta: the controller gets `read` on that leaf, and the publisher gets `create`/`update` on that leaf. Removed: the `queue.clientSecretFile` option (both spellings, now removed options with a message), its singleHostSwarm default, the credential and placeholder, and the path watcher plus its restart oneshot. A controller without a store identity is now an eval error, because it has no other way to get the secret.
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22 changed files with 595 additions and 247 deletions
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@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ strategy for every credential, including the mTLS leaf.
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/main` | `swarm-controller`, with the swarm's appservice token, at agent creation and in a five-minute pass | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | the pass re-mints when the stored token is missing, unknown to the homeserver, or someone else's |
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/matrix/<account>` | `swarm-controller` | the agent container itself, under the certificate its hive passed in | must be stated |
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| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/matrix/appservice-token` | `swarm-matrix-ctl`, inside the `hive-matrix` container, once | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate | none: the container keeps its copy and republishes it when the store's differs |
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| `swarm/controller/swarm-controller/oidc/client` | authelia, at its first boot, where the controller registers its client; `swarm-secret-publish` copies it in | `swarm-controller`, under its own certificate, once at start | none: authelia mints it once. A re-mint is republished by `swarm-secret-publish`'s path unit, and the controller holds the old value until it restarts |
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/bao-mtls` | the store's agent PKI mount (`deploy.bao.agentPkiMountPath`), which generates the key, at `swarm-controller`'s request at agent creation | `hive-c0re`, under the hive's own certificate, when it writes the agent's container config | must be stated |
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/queue` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation | the agent container itself, under its own certificate — the identity it presents to the swarm queue, naming that one agent rather than its hive | none: the secret is fixed for the life of the agent and is revoked by deleting the path. A rotation mechanism is tracked as separate work, because rotating this credential needs a reconnect path — a queue client holding a revoked secret doesn't find out until it reconnects |
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| `swarm/agents/<agent>/forge-token` | `swarm-controller`, at agent creation and in a pass every 5 minutes over every agent with a store identity | the agent container itself, under its own certificate, fetched to `/run/hive-agent-forge-token/token` | the controller re-mints when the stored token is missing or no longer matches the forge (last eight characters and scopes); the agent re-fetches on a 10-minute timer |
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