refactor(#2455): split hive-agent-mcp into its own bin crate

This commit is contained in:
damocles 2026-07-14 23:45:33 +02:00
commit e7f8254788
15 changed files with 334 additions and 100 deletions

View file

@ -2,10 +2,9 @@
//! set into the `--allowedTools` / `--tools` argument strings and renders the
//! `--mcp-config` blob claude reads at spawn (built-in hyperhive server +
//! any `hyperhive.extraMcpServers`). Pure config-string generation consumed by
//! [`crate::turn`] when it builds the claude command — it never touches the
//! running MCP server ([`crate::mcp`]). The `send` allow-list check
//! ([`check_send_allowed`]) lives here too since it's driven by the same
//! `/etc/hyperhive/*.json` operator config.
//! [`crate::turn`] when it builds the claude command. It never touches the
//! running MCP server (a separate binary) — the `send` allow-list check that
//! server enforces lives alongside it in the `hive-agent-mcp` crate.
/// Name of the hyperhive MCP server inside claude's view. Claude prefixes
/// tools as `mcp__<this>__<tool>` (e.g. `mcp__hyperhive__send`).
@ -251,59 +250,6 @@ pub fn builtin_tools_arg() -> String {
/// `mcp__<key>__<tool>` pattern in `--allowedTools`.
const EXTRA_MCP_PATH: &str = "/etc/hyperhive/extra-mcp.json";
/// Where the NixOS module writes the per-agent send allow-list (see
/// `nix/templates/harness/`). Empty list = unrestricted (the
/// default). Non-empty list constrains `mcp__hyperhive__send`'s `to`
/// field; the manager is always implicitly permitted regardless of
/// the list contents.
const SEND_ALLOW_PATH: &str = "/etc/hyperhive/send-allow.json";
/// Enforce the per-agent send allow-list. Returns `Ok` when the
/// recipient is permitted (no list configured, `<parent>` sentinel
/// always allowed, or `to` is in the list); returns `Err(refusal)`
/// with a claude-readable string when blocked <20><><EFBFBD> the harness surfaces
/// the refusal as the tool result so claude knows the message didn't
/// land and can react (e.g. route via `<parent>` instead).
pub fn check_send_allowed(to: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
if to == hive_sh4re::PARENT_RECIPIENT {
// Always allow `<parent>` — the allow-list constrains peer
// chatter, not the structural reporting line; the operator
// can rewire who the parent IS via `set_parent` without
// having to remember to update the per-agent allow-list.
// The broker resolves the sentinel to the real parent label
// on the host side per topology.json (falls back to `operator`
// for root agents).
return Ok(());
}
let Ok(raw) = std::fs::read_to_string(SEND_ALLOW_PATH) else {
return Ok(()); // file missing → no policy configured → unrestricted
};
let allow: Vec<String> = match serde_json::from_str(&raw) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
path = SEND_ALLOW_PATH,
error = ?e,
"send allow-list parse failed; falling back to unrestricted",
);
return Ok(());
}
};
if allow.is_empty() {
return Ok(()); // empty list = unrestricted (back-compat)
}
if allow.iter().any(|n| n == to) {
return Ok(());
}
Err(format!(
"send refused: recipient '{to}' not in hyperhive.allowedRecipients \
(configured in agent.nix). Allowed: {allow:?}. Your structural \
parent is always reachable route through `send(to: \"{}\", …)` \
if you need to reach someone outside the allow-list.",
hive_sh4re::PARENT_RECIPIENT
))
}
#[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
struct ExtraMcpServer {
command: String,