squid: base allow list for every authed user, and no start limit on the list reload
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parent
10fdf06334
commit
e78a529ec2
5 changed files with 82 additions and 12 deletions
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@ -289,6 +289,18 @@ host. It never decrypts TLS, so it holds no signing key. It caches nothing.
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restricted. Agents must not start sending credentials until every hive runs
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the `hive-c0re` that writes it, or a legacy agent loses general internet.
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- **Base list.** `services.hyperhive.squid.baseAllowedDomains` is open to every
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authenticated user, whatever its flag: what the agent harness needs off the
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swarm. The default is the hosts Claude Code requires
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(<https://code.claude.com/docs/en/network-config>): `api.anthropic.com` for
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the model API and the usage probe (`hive-agent/src/claude_usage_watch.rs`),
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`claude.ai` for the account login, and `platform.claude.com` for the OAuth
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token exchange and refresh. An agent whose `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` or ACP
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provider points elsewhere needs that host added to the option: the value
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sits in the agent's own environment file, which the host doesn't read. The
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list omits the plugin marketplace clone from `github.com`, since a failed add
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isn't fatal. The rules below still refuse an entry that resolves to a
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private address.
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- **Allow-list.** `services.hyperhive.squid.allowedDomains` defaults to empty,
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plus the self-check canary (`services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.canary`), so
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the canary widens the restricted list by that one name. The swarm's own
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@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ that value. Read it with
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`swarm_queue_client::agent_permissions::unrestricted`. The hive reads it for
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the agent's squid policy: [the egress proxy](../networking/network.md#egress-proxy-squid)
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lets an unrestricted agent's credential reach any destination, and holds the
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others to the allow-list. An agent sends its credential once it has fetched it, from its next start.
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others to the base list and the allow-list. An agent sends its credential once it has fetched it, from its next start.
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**How a change applies** —
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- The agent's harness reads its own key every 10 seconds and builds every
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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ let
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denyCanary = "deny-canary.invalid";
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allowed = lib.unique (cfg.allowedDomains ++ [ cfg.selfcheck.canary ]);
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base = lib.unique cfg.baseAllowedDomains;
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# The squid user the self-check logs in as: `swarm_secret_client::proxy::SELFCHECK_USER`.
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selfcheckUser = "selfcheck.squid";
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@ -63,9 +64,9 @@ let
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# The IP-literal
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# denies come first because `dstdomain` on an IP literal does a reverse
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# lookup. The credential check sits right before the first allow, so only a
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# request that would otherwise be let through gets the 407 challenge. An
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# unrestricted user is then let through to any other destination on a safe
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# port, and every other user to the listed names. The `dst` denies cost an
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# request that would otherwise be let through gets the 407 challenge. Every
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# user is then let through to the base names, an unrestricted user to any other
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# destination on a safe port, and every other user to the listed names. The `dst` denies cost an
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# unlisted name a lookup on the host's resolver before it is refused.
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squidConf = ''
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http_port ${listen}
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@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ let
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# an agent controls could match an allowed name.
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acl ip_v4_host url_regex ^([a-z]+://)?[0-9.]+(:[0-9]+)?(/|$)
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acl ip_v6_host url_regex ^([a-z]+://)?\[[0-9a-fA-F:.]+\](:[0-9]+)?(/|$)
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${lib.optionalString (base != [ ]) "acl base_dst dstdomain ${lib.concatStringsSep " " base}"}
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${lib.optionalString (
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allowed != [ ]
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) "acl allowed_dst dstdomain ${lib.concatStringsSep " " allowed}"}
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@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ let
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http_access deny to_bridge
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http_access deny to_private
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http_access deny !authed
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${lib.optionalString (base != [ ]) "http_access allow base_dst"}
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http_access allow unrestricted
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${lib.optionalString (allowed != [ ]) "http_access deny !allowed_dst"}
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${lib.optionalString (allowed != [ ]) "http_access allow allowed_dst"}
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@ -225,13 +228,43 @@ in
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listed: they resolve to the bridge or a private address, which the
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destination rules refuse, and agents reach them directly. The
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self-check canary is allowed on top of this list, so it widens the
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restricted allow list by that one name. A name must resolve, on this host's resolver, to a public
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address: one in a loopback, link-local, private, shared (100.64.0.0/10),
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multicast or reserved range (or is `::`), or in the bridge subnet, gets a 403 for
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restricted allow list by that one name. A name must
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resolve, on this host's resolver, to a public address: one in a
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loopback, link-local, private, shared (100.64.0.0/10), multicast or
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reserved range (or is `::`), or in the bridge subnet, gets a 403 for
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every user.
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'';
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};
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baseAllowedDomains = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
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default = [
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"api.anthropic.com"
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"claude.ai"
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"platform.claude.com"
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];
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example = [
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"api.anthropic.com"
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"claude.ai"
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"platform.claude.com"
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"openrouter.ai"
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];
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description = ''
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Hostnames every authenticated user may reach, whether or not its agent
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holds the `unrestricted_internet` flag: what the agent harness needs
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off the swarm to work at all. The defaults are the hosts Claude Code
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requires. `api.anthropic.com` serves the model API and the usage
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probe, `claude.ai` the account login, and `platform.claude.com` the
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OAuth token exchange and refresh. An agent whose `claude` or ACP provider
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points elsewhere (`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, an `opencode` provider) needs
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that host listed here: the value lives in the agent's own backend
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environment, which this host does not read. Swarm-internal names are
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not listed, since agents reach them directly. The destination denies
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still apply to every entry, and the list is separate from
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`allowedDomains`.
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'';
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};
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usersFile = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.path;
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default = "/var/lib/hive-squid/users";
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@ -340,6 +373,9 @@ in
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systemd.services.squid-unrestricted-reload = {
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description = "Reload squid to read its unrestricted-users list";
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# Several list writes in a few seconds must not trip the start limit: a
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# tripped limit also fails the path unit, and later writes then reload nothing.
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startLimitIntervalSec = 0;
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serviceConfig = {
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Type = "oneshot";
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ExecStart = "${config.systemd.package}/bin/systemctl try-reload-or-restart squid.service";
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@ -348,10 +384,10 @@ in
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assertions = [
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{
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assertion = !(builtins.elem cfg.selfcheck.unrestrictedCanary allowed);
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assertion = !(builtins.elem cfg.selfcheck.unrestrictedCanary (allowed ++ base));
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message = ''
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services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.unrestrictedCanary must be a name outside
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allowedDomains, or the self-check cannot tell an unrestricted user from a
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allowedDomains and baseAllowedDomains, or the self-check cannot tell an unrestricted user from a
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restricted one.
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'';
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}
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@ -497,11 +497,13 @@ let
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lines = lib.splitString "\n" hiveOtel.services.squid.configText;
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at = l: lib.lists.findFirstIndex (x: x == l) null lines;
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allow = at "http_access allow allowed_dst";
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base = at "http_access allow base_dst";
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unrestricted = at "http_access allow unrestricted";
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authed = at "http_access deny !authed";
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firstAllow = if unrestricted < allow then unrestricted else allow;
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firstAllow = lib.min base (lib.min unrestricted allow);
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in
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allow != null
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&& base != null
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&& unrestricted != null
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&& authed != null
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&& at "http_access deny to_localhost" != null
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@ -529,13 +531,15 @@ let
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{
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# Control: the allow ACL line is found and holds the canary, so the
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# absence of the swarm's service names is not a lookup of nothing.
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name = "squid's default allow-list is the self-check canary alone, with no swarm service name";
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name = "squid's default allow-list is the self-check canary alone and its base list is the Claude Code hosts, with no swarm service name";
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ok =
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let
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lines = lib.splitString "\n" hiveOtel.services.squid.configText;
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acl = lib.findFirst (l: lib.hasPrefix "acl allowed_dst dstdomain " l) "" (map lib.trim lines);
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baseAcl = lib.findFirst (l: lib.hasPrefix "acl base_dst dstdomain " l) "" (map lib.trim lines);
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in
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acl == "acl allowed_dst dstdomain ${hiveOtel.services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.canary}"
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&& baseAcl == "acl base_dst dstdomain api.anthropic.com claude.ai platform.claude.com"
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&& hiveOtel.services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.canary == "cache.nixos.org"
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&& !(builtins.elem hiveOtel.services.hyperhive.swarm.forge.domain (lib.splitString " " acl));
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}
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@ -580,6 +584,8 @@ let
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in
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at "http_access allow unrestricted" != null
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&& at "http_access deny !allowed_dst" != null
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&& at "http_access deny !authed" < at "http_access allow base_dst"
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&& at "http_access allow base_dst" < at "http_access allow unrestricted"
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&& at "http_access allow unrestricted" < at "http_access deny !allowed_dst"
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&& at "http_access deny !allowed_dst" < at "http_access allow allowed_dst"
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&& builtins.elem ''acl unrestricted proxy_auth "${list}"'' lines
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@ -597,6 +603,7 @@ let
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svc = hiveOtel.systemd.services.squid-unrestricted-reload.serviceConfig;
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in
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path.pathConfig.PathChanged == list
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&& hiveOtel.systemd.services.squid-unrestricted-reload.startLimitIntervalSec == 0
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&& builtins.elem "paths.target" path.wantedBy
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&& lib.hasSuffix "systemctl try-reload-or-restart squid.service" svc.ExecStart
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&& builtins.elem "f ${list} 0640 hive-core squid - -" rules
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@ -150,11 +150,15 @@ pkgs.testers.runNixOSTest {
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"203.0.113.2" = [
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"forge.t.local"
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"cache.t.local"
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"api.t.local"
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"other.t.local"
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"deny-canary.invalid"
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];
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"127.0.0.1" = [ "loop.t.local" ];
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${bridgeIp} = [ "bridge.t.local" ];
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${bridgeIp} = [
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"bridge.t.local"
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"basebridge.t.local"
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];
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"169.254.169.254" = [ "meta.t.local" ];
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"fd00:99::2" = [ "ula.t.local" ];
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"::" = [ "any6.t.local" ];
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@ -171,6 +175,10 @@ pkgs.testers.runNixOSTest {
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environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.mkpasswd ];
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services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.unrestrictedCanary = "other.t.local";
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services.hyperhive.squid.selfcheck.canary = "cache.t.local";
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services.hyperhive.squid.baseAllowedDomains = [
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"api.t.local"
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"basebridge.t.local"
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];
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services.hyperhive.squid.allowedDomains = [
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"forge.t.local"
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"loop.t.local"
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@ -324,6 +332,13 @@ pkgs.testers.runNixOSTest {
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# DES would accept the first eight characters; the hash must not.
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assert connect("forge.t.local", "atlas:" + PW["atlas"][:8]) == "407", "a prefix of the password"
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with subtest("a base-list name is open to a restricted user, with a credential, and nothing else is"):
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assert connect("api.t.local", ATLAS) == "200", "restricted user, base name"
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assert connect("api.t.local") == "407", "no credential"
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assert connect("api.t.local", "atlas:" + secrets.token_urlsafe(24)) == "407", "wrong password"
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assert connect("other.t.local", ATLAS) == "403", "control: an unlisted name is still refused"
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assert connect("basebridge.t.local", ATLAS) == "403", "a base name that resolves to the bridge"
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with subtest("with an empty list every user is restricted"):
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assert connect("other.t.local", UMA) == "403", "uma, not listed yet"
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assert connect("other.t.local", ATLAS) == "403"
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