Watch
0
0
Fork
You've already forked hyperhive
0

swarm-ci-runner: run the forge CI runner as a swarm service

The CI runner was a hive deploy module: hive-ci.nix ran it beside the
forge, and hive-c0re registered it through the forge's admin API with
the `core` token, writing the registration token through hive-priv. It
could only run on the forge's host, and it kept an admin-scoped forge
token on a hive.

Now the runner is a swarm service:

- swarm-ci-runner.nix runs it in a `swarm-ci-runner` container on the
  host that sets deploy.ci-runner.enable, reaching the forge by name.
  It needs neither the forge nor a hive there.
- swarm-controller reads the forge's runner registration token with its
  own admin token and writes it to swarm/services/ci-runner/
  registration-token whenever it differs from what it last wrote. Its
  grant on that path is create/update only.
- The runner's own leaf (CN swarm-ci-runner, role and policy of the same
  name) reads that one path. swarm-bao-ci-runner.service fetches it into
  the runner's EnvironmentFile and restarts the runner on a change.
- A pre-start step removes .runner when the daemon's journal since its
  last start holds Forgejo's "unregistered runner" refusal (the daemon
  exits 1 when its startup Declare gets it), or when .runner names
  another forge address; upstream's pre-start step then registers again.

Removed from the hive side: hive-ci.nix and deploy.forgejo.ci.*,
forge/ci_runner.rs, PrivRequest::RegisterCiRunner and its handler and
ReadWritePaths entry, InfraContainer::Ci with hivectl's --ci and the
dashboard's hive-ci journal entry, HYPERHIVE_FORGE_CI_ENABLED, and
read:admin,write:admin from CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES: nothing else in hive-c0re
calls /api/v1/admin/*. The old ci options, under both swarm.forge.ci and
deploy.forgejo.ci, now fail evaluation naming deploy.ci-runner.

The forge's half of the old ci.enable, the actions/checkout mirror and
DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = self, is deploy.forgejo.actionsFromSelf.

Closes #4954
This commit is contained in:
atlas 2026-10-05 02:25:05 +02:00 • committed by mara
commit e2da5509ae
60 changed files with 1088 additions and 1201 deletions

View file

@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ Unsandboxed nix builds run as `nixbld` users (non-root, typically UIDs 30001-300
Without sandbox isolation, a build derivation's builder script has read access to
any file in the container that the nixbld user can read.
The blast radius also has a **network** dimension. hive-ci runs its unsandboxed
builds of untrusted PR code in its own private netns behind the hive bridge: a
build reaches the forge only through the gateway and can't reach host-loopback
The blast radius also has a **network** dimension. `swarm-ci-runner` runs its
unsandboxed builds of untrusted PR code in its own private netns behind the
bridge: a build reaches the forge by name and can't reach host-loopback
services — including the core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`, which
has no application-layer auth of its own (see [`docs/scheduler/ci.md`](../scheduler/ci.md)). The `0600`
token policy bounds file reads; network isolation bounds network reach.
@ -286,7 +286,6 @@ known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through:
| `ControlInfraContainer` | `systemctl <action> container@<container>.service` — the `InfraContainer` enum is the allowlist, and serde rejects unknown names at the wire boundary (`hive-c0re` has no variant, so no request can name it) |
| `SyncAgentTmpfiles` | unlink `/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf` and return `Ok` |
| `SetAgentPaused` | create / remove the `<state>/<name>/harness/paused` marker that parks an agent's turn loop |
| `RegisterCiRunner` | write `/run/hive-ci/runner-token` (host path, root-owned) then `systemctl --machine=hive-ci restart gitea-runner-hive.service`. Only the registration token crosses; the forge admin token never enters the container |
| `EnsureAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume create <state>/<name>` for a new agent — no-op when the path exists or the filesystem isn't btrfs |
| `UpgradeAgentSubvolume` | migrate an existing plain state dir into a subvolume: create, `cp -a --reflink=auto`, atomic swap. Operator opt-in, and the caller stops the agent first |
| `DeleteAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume delete <state>/<name>` — purge path only, never a plain destroy |
@ -301,7 +300,7 @@ known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through:
**Container allowlist** — `hive-priv` validates every request against
an allowlist before any operation: the allowlist accepts only names
matching the agent-name convention (char-validated) or the known
sibling service containers (`hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`, `hive-ci`),
sibling service containers (`hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`),
and rejects arbitrary container names. `hive-gateway` is a host unit,
not a container, so it's not in this list — see `ReloadGatewayNginx`
above for how the hard-coded unit name scopes its access instead.