swarm-ci-runner: run the forge CI runner as a swarm service
The CI runner was a hive deploy module: hive-ci.nix ran it beside the forge, and hive-c0re registered it through the forge's admin API with the `core` token, writing the registration token through hive-priv. It could only run on the forge's host, and it kept an admin-scoped forge token on a hive. Now the runner is a swarm service: - swarm-ci-runner.nix runs it in a `swarm-ci-runner` container on the host that sets deploy.ci-runner.enable, reaching the forge by name. It needs neither the forge nor a hive there. - swarm-controller reads the forge's runner registration token with its own admin token and writes it to swarm/services/ci-runner/ registration-token whenever it differs from what it last wrote. Its grant on that path is create/update only. - The runner's own leaf (CN swarm-ci-runner, role and policy of the same name) reads that one path. swarm-bao-ci-runner.service fetches it into the runner's EnvironmentFile and restarts the runner on a change. - A pre-start step removes .runner when the daemon's journal since its last start holds Forgejo's "unregistered runner" refusal (the daemon exits 1 when its startup Declare gets it), or when .runner names another forge address; upstream's pre-start step then registers again. Removed from the hive side: hive-ci.nix and deploy.forgejo.ci.*, forge/ci_runner.rs, PrivRequest::RegisterCiRunner and its handler and ReadWritePaths entry, InfraContainer::Ci with hivectl's --ci and the dashboard's hive-ci journal entry, HYPERHIVE_FORGE_CI_ENABLED, and read:admin,write:admin from CORE_TOKEN_SCOPES: nothing else in hive-c0re calls /api/v1/admin/*. The old ci options, under both swarm.forge.ci and deploy.forgejo.ci, now fail evaluation naming deploy.ci-runner. The forge's half of the old ci.enable, the actions/checkout mirror and DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = self, is deploy.forgejo.actionsFromSelf. Closes #4954
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@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ Concretely, the core daemon's dashboard `/api` carries **no
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application-layer authentication** — the core daemon serves operator-authority
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routes unauthenticated at the HTTP layer. Their protection is entirely (a) the
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gateway, which fronts all operator traffic and is where operator auth lives,
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and (b) network isolation, which keeps agents — and `hive-ci`'s untrusted PR
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builds — off host-loopback so nothing can reach `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`
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and (b) network isolation, which keeps agents — and the CI runner's untrusted
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PR builds — off host-loopback so nothing can reach `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`
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directly. This is deliberate given the load-bearing role of network isolation
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above, but it's a standing invariant: the `/api` must never bind to a
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non-loopback address or get exposed outside the gateway, and every new
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operator-authority route inherits that assumption. hyperhive treats `hive-ci`
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like an agent for this purpose — it runs untrusted PR code and is
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operator-authority route inherits that assumption. hyperhive treats
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`swarm-ci-runner` like an agent for this purpose — it runs untrusted PR code and is
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netns-isolated for the same reason.
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The boundary rests on three layers:
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@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ Unsandboxed nix builds run as `nixbld` users (non-root, typically UIDs 30001-300
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Without sandbox isolation, a build derivation's builder script has read access to
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any file in the container that the nixbld user can read.
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The blast radius also has a **network** dimension. hive-ci runs its unsandboxed
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builds of untrusted PR code in its own private netns behind the hive bridge: a
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build reaches the forge only through the gateway and can't reach host-loopback
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The blast radius also has a **network** dimension. `swarm-ci-runner` runs its
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unsandboxed builds of untrusted PR code in its own private netns behind the
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bridge: a build reaches the forge by name and can't reach host-loopback
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services — including the core dashboard at `127.0.0.1:<dashboard_port>`, which
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has no application-layer auth of its own (see [`docs/scheduler/ci.md`](../scheduler/ci.md)). The `0600`
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token policy bounds file reads; network isolation bounds network reach.
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@ -286,7 +286,6 @@ known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through:
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| `ControlInfraContainer` | `systemctl <action> container@<container>.service` — the `InfraContainer` enum is the allowlist, and serde rejects unknown names at the wire boundary (`hive-c0re` has no variant, so no request can name it) |
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| `SyncAgentTmpfiles` | unlink `/etc/tmpfiles.d/hyperhive-agents.conf` and return `Ok` |
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| `SetAgentPaused` | create / remove the `<state>/<name>/harness/paused` marker that parks an agent's turn loop |
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| `RegisterCiRunner` | write `/run/hive-ci/runner-token` (host path, root-owned) then `systemctl --machine=hive-ci restart gitea-runner-hive.service`. Only the registration token crosses; the forge admin token never enters the container |
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| `EnsureAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume create <state>/<name>` for a new agent — no-op when the path exists or the filesystem isn't btrfs |
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| `UpgradeAgentSubvolume` | migrate an existing plain state dir into a subvolume: create, `cp -a --reflink=auto`, atomic swap. Operator opt-in, and the caller stops the agent first |
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| `DeleteAgentSubvolume` | `btrfs subvolume delete <state>/<name>` — purge path only, never a plain destroy |
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@ -301,7 +300,7 @@ known operations; there is no arbitrary command pass-through:
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**Container allowlist** — `hive-priv` validates every request against
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an allowlist before any operation: the allowlist accepts only names
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matching the agent-name convention (char-validated) or the known
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sibling service containers (`hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`, `hive-ci`),
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sibling service containers (`hive-forge`, `hive-matrix`),
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and rejects arbitrary container names. `hive-gateway` is a host unit,
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not a container, so it's not in this list — see `ReloadGatewayNginx`
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above for how the hard-coded unit name scopes its access instead.
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