nix: split module-eval into per-subsystem checks
The single module-eval derivation forced ~62 full nixosSystem fixtures live at once to compute its cases list: 10.6GB peak RSS / 5m25s to evaluate, by far the dominant cost in nix flake check. Splits it into 21 independent checks.module-eval-* derivations (1-7 fixtures each) sharing builders/helpers via module-eval/lib.nix, so no single derivation needs more than a handful of fixtures live at once. A few cases spanning two clusters carry a small duplicated fixture rather than threading shared state through lib.nix.
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24 changed files with 3760 additions and 2997 deletions
222
nix/module-eval/grafana.nix
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nix/module-eval/grafana.nix
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# `checks.module-eval-grafana` — see ./lib.nix for the shared
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# rationale (why this suite exists, naming convention, "evaluates
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# not executes").
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{
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pkgs,
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lib,
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self,
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nixosSystem,
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}:
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let
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inherit
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(import ./lib.nix {
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inherit
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pkgs
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lib
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self
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nixosSystem
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;
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})
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hive
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runGroup
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;
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grafanaOldPath = hive {
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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swarm.grafana.socketDir = "/run/test-grafana-sock";
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swarm.grafana.datasourceUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:19999";
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swarm.grafana.logsDatasourceUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:19998";
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swarm.grafana.plugins = [ ];
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swarm.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory;
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};
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# The metrics UI beside the IdP. It reads its secret out of the store like
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# every other Grafana host, so it needs a store identity like every other
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# Grafana host — the cert pair here is not scenery, it is the arm that would
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# have caught the deleted co-located copy unit coming back.
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grafanaWithAuthelia = hive {
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ];
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deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory;
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deploy.authelia.enable = true;
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deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem";
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deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem";
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};
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# The same UI with the IdP on ANOTHER host and a store leaf placed by hand.
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# Knowing an IdP is not running one: `swarm.authelia.url` is what says this
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# swarm has SSO, and nothing about this host does. Identical to the fixture
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# above in everything the delivery path reads, which is the point.
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grafanaRemoteAuthelia = hive {
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ];
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deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory;
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swarm.authelia.url = "https://auth.example.invalid";
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deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem";
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deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem";
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};
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# A Grafana host holding no store identity. This used to be the shape the
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# module went QUIET on — no OIDC block, a warning, and a container whose
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# login form is off regardless, so no way in and nothing failed. It is kept
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# rather than deleted because the shape is still reachable by an operator;
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# what changed is the deliverable, from a warning nothing reads back to a
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# refusal naming the two options to set. Only the identity is missing, so an
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# arm below can name which refusal fired.
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grafanaNoIdentity = hive {
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ];
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deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory;
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swarm.authelia.url = "https://auth.example.invalid";
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};
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# The mirror image: the identity is placed, and the swarm names no IdP. The
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# other half of "SSO must always be configured", and isolated the same way —
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# exactly one thing wrong, so the arm reads one refusal.
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grafanaNoSso = hive {
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deploy.grafana.enable = true;
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deploy.grafana.plugins = [ ];
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deploy.grafana.package = pkgs.emptyDirectory;
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deploy.bao.clientCertFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client.pem";
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deploy.bao.clientKeyFile = "/etc/pki/bao-client-key.pem";
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};
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# Did ./host-modules/swarm-grafana.nix refuse this host, and for which of its
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# two reasons. An assertion is a config VALUE until something forces it —
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# `.config` never throws — so a fixture in a state the module refuses is
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# evaluable and the refusal is readable as data. That is what lets a case
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# check that a misconfiguration is REPORTED, rather than only that it is not
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# silently accepted.
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#
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# Matched on the option name the message names, not on its prose, so the
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# wording stays rewordable: the option name is the part an operator has to
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# act on, and a message that stopped naming it would be the actual defect.
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grafanaRefusedFor =
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m: option:
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lib.any (
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a:
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!a.assertion
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&& lib.hasInfix "services.hyperhive.deploy.grafana.enable requires" a.message
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&& lib.hasInfix option a.message
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) m.assertions;
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cases = [
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{
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# This fixture enables grafana and NOT authelia, which is the shape the
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# login form used to stay enabled in: the toggle read "both services are
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# on this host" rather than "grafana requires SSO". Grafana ships an
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# `admin`/`admin` account and its vhost is on the public gateway, so a
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# password box there is a way in whatever the topology.
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name = "grafana disables its local login form even where authelia is not on this host";
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ok =
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grafanaOldPath.containers.swarm-grafana.config.services.grafana.settings.auth.disable_login_form;
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}
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{
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# The absence class this whole file is for, and the reported defect in one
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# arm: the OIDC block hung off "authelia is on this host", so the split
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# deployment got a Grafana with no SSO settings and no login form — no way
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# in at all. The block is emitted in every deployment now, so the negative
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# arm is not "no block elsewhere" but "the two do not name the same IdP":
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# each host's block has to point at the URL the SWARM names, and a block
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# built from `deploy.authelia` rather than `swarm.authelia.url` would pass
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# a presence check on both fixtures while sending one of them nowhere.
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name = "grafana's OIDC block names the swarm's IdP, wherever that IdP runs";
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ok =
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let
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oauth = m: m.containers.swarm-grafana.config.services.grafana.settings."auth.generic_oauth";
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remote = oauth grafanaRemoteAuthelia;
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local = oauth grafanaWithAuthelia;
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in
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remote.enabled
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&& lib.hasInfix "https://auth.example.invalid/api/oidc/token" remote.token_url
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&& local.enabled
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&& lib.hasInfix "https://auth.t.local/api/oidc/token" local.token_url
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&& !(lib.hasInfix "auth.example.invalid" local.token_url);
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}
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{
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# 🩸 The arm that guards the ruling this slice landed under. There is ONE
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# delivery route: the store reader, on every host that runs Grafana. The
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# negative names the deleted unit rather than a generic absence, because
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# the way this regresses is someone re-adding the co-located copy as an
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# optimisation — a second writer of one path, and a second shape of "the
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# secret is wrong" to debug.
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name = "grafana's OIDC secret has exactly one delivery unit, the store reader, in both topologies";
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ok =
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let
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local = grafanaWithAuthelia.systemd.services;
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remote = grafanaRemoteAuthelia.systemd.services;
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in
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local ? swarm-bao-grafana-oidc
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&& remote ? swarm-bao-grafana-oidc
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&& !(local ? swarm-grafana-oidc-secret)
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&& !(remote ? swarm-grafana-oidc-secret);
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}
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{
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# What the deleted warning became. The shape is unchanged — a Grafana host
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# holding no store leaf — but silence there is a container nobody can log
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# into for a reason no log names, and a warning is read back by nothing.
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# The second arm is what makes this a refusal about the IDENTITY: this
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# fixture names an IdP, so a message about `swarm.authelia.url` here would
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# mean the two assertions had been collapsed into one conjunction.
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name = "a grafana host with no store identity is refused, naming the options to set";
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ok =
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grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "deploy.bao.clientCertFile"
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&& grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "deploy.bao.clientKeyFile"
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&& !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoIdentity "swarm.authelia.url");
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}
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{
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# "SSO must always be configured", as an eval-time refusal rather than a
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# gate. A null URL used to drop the OIDC block silently, and
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# `disable_login_form` is unconditional a hundred lines below it, so that
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# combination produced a Grafana with no SSO and no password box — an
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# outage whose cause is a boolean that evaluated to false at build time
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# and left no trace. Same isolation as the arm above, mirrored.
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name = "a grafana host in a swarm with no IdP is refused, naming swarm.authelia.url";
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ok =
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grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoSso "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url"
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&& !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaNoSso "deploy.bao.clientCertFile");
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}
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{
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# Without this the two arms above prove nothing: a refusal that fires on
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# every host is not a check, and both of these are hosts a swarm is
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# expected to have. Read through the same helper, so a message that
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# stopped naming its option would fail the arms above rather than pass
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# this one by accident.
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name = "neither grafana refusal fires on a correctly configured host, co-located or not";
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ok =
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!(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaWithAuthelia "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url")
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&& !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaWithAuthelia "deploy.bao.clientCertFile")
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&& !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaRemoteAuthelia "services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.url")
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&& !(grafanaRefusedFor grafanaRemoteAuthelia "deploy.bao.clientCertFile");
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}
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{
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# Same 403-not-a-miss reason as the matrix and queue arms below: the
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# reader's grant covers the `services` prefix, so a path outside it is
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# refused rather than empty, however correct it reads. The negative arm is
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# the rename this is exposed to — a secret filed under the hive that runs
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# the service instead of under the service itself.
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name = "grafana's OIDC secret is read from the prefix the publisher writes";
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ok =
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let
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s = grafanaRemoteAuthelia.systemd.services.swarm-bao-grafana-oidc.script;
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in
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lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/services/swarm-grafana/oidc/client" s
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&& !(lib.hasInfix "secret/swarm/hives/" s);
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}
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{
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# Both halves of the co-location assumption, which was one host's
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# `deploy.*` answering a question about the whole swarm: the identities
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# were minted only where the queue happened to run, and the token
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# endpoint was known only where the IdP happened to run.
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name = "hive identities and the token endpoint do not depend on which host runs what";
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ok =
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let
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autheliaNoQueue = hive { deploy.authelia.enable = true; };
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in
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lib.elem "hive-h1" (map (c: c.id) autheliaNoQueue.services.hyperhive.swarm.authelia.oidc.clients)
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&&
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grafanaRemoteAuthelia.services.hyperhive.swarm.statusPublish.tokenEndpoint
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== "https://auth.example.invalid/api/oidc/token";
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}
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];
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in
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runGroup "grafana" cases
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