hivectl, docs: choom is not root-only, and set-limits takes no agent name
Two unrelated changes landed correctly and left their prose behind, both
on operator-facing surfaces.
`hivectl agent <name> choom` gained a `hive-admin` path when hive-c0re
started shipping a polkit rule for `machinectl shell`. `choom.rs`
implements exactly that — `euid != 0 && !in_hive_admin_group()` — but
the `Choom` variant's clap doc comment still said "Requires root and a
running container", eight weeks on. That string is what
`choom --help` prints and what renders into the generated CLI
reference, so it is the sentence an operator actually reads, and it
tells a `hive-admin` member the command is not available to them.
`docs/turn-loop/mcp.md` carried the same staleness inside a
trust-boundary argument ("an operator (root) action"), where naming a
narrower reachable set than the real one is the wrong way to be wrong.
Dating it rather than asserting it: the acceptance landed 2026-09-07,
the doc string 2026-07-16.
Separately, `docs/tools/hivectl.md` states the agent-name hoist itself
("the name is hoisted onto the parent command, so none of the verbs
below repeat it") and its own example block obeys it, then twice writes
`set-limits sock --memory-max 8G` — the pre-hoist order. The generated
reference is unambiguous: `hivectl agent <NAME> <COMMAND>` versus
`hivectl agent set-limits [OPTIONS]`, with `quota set <SIZE>` nearby
showing that positionals do render when they exist. The costly one is a
complete command in backticks inside the paragraph explaining the
footgun it illustrates.
`docs/tools/hivectl-cli.md` is regenerated rather than hand-edited; the
diff against the committed copy is exactly one line.
Closes #4236.
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4 changed files with 11 additions and 11 deletions
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@ -226,8 +226,8 @@ operator-driven `hivectl agent <name> choom` session — which passes neither `-
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nor `--allowedTools` — gets claude's built-in synchronous `Bash` tool
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(inline, human-approved). That sidesteps the async `mcp__bash__run`
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completion wake landing in the wrong session (the harness inbox) for a
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choom-started task; `choom` is an operator (root) action, so
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built-in shell there stays within the existing trust boundary. The bash MCP server
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choom-started task; `choom` is an operator action (root or `hive-admin`),
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so built-in shell there stays within the existing trust boundary. The bash MCP server
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(`run` / `status` / `kill`) uses `allowedTools = ["*"]` so all
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`mcp__bash__*` tools are always available regardless of tool groups.
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